




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# ***JPRS Report***



# **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPBS-UPA-89-062

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1 DECEMBER 1989

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**Gorbachev Replacement of Solov'yev  
'Undemocratic'**

*18001671A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 25 Aug 89 pp 2-3*

[Article by E. I. Litonov: "Perestroyka: Program of Action by Leningrad Communists"]

[Excerpt] Much has been said today to the effect that the processes of democratization in the Party are significantly lagging behind the democratization processes in society, and that the organs receive no feedback. I would like to illustrate this theoretical tenet by evoking a commonly known and most recent event, namely, the election of a new secretary of the Party Oblast committee.

To tell the truth, I felt shame for the Leningrad Oblast Party organization, for all of us, for many of those present here, because what happened looked very unseemly. What do I mean? These proposals were discussed haphazardly at the united plenum, though attempts were made to veil them, right after the elections, when it became clear that Yuriy Filippovich failed to receive the required number of votes. It was clear that the issue was up in the air. It was not disclosed however, and it was raised only when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev arrived all of a sudden. I think in general that it was up to us to decide who is should be our first secretary, it was our task.

Well, Yuriy Filippovich submitted his request and the plenum relieved him (of this position). I could not grasp at all why such haste, why all the candidates that emerged during the discussion should not have been put to a vote the same day, why they were not given an opportunity to gather their thoughts, think things over, and present their platform on TV and in the press. Then all these candidates could have been discussed by the shop party organizations, by party groups, so that all Obkom members could make up their mind on the basis of this discussion and then hold the Obkom plenum a week or two later. And the issue would have been resolved. I am absolutely certain that Boris Veniaminovich would have been elected. But in this way we shut off rank-and-file Communists from the political life completely. We did exactly what we have been bitterly complaining here. We did it ourselves, nobody else. Therefore, let's evaluate this fact in our resolution and do everything so that this never happens again in the Leningrad organization. So that our vital problems are resolved not by a stranger, but by ourselves. Comrades, this is the first issue I wanted to take up. This haste results in a situation when I have only three minutes to try to convey a lot of information. You should realize that this is insignificant.

I would like to address another issue. What worries me and what worries many party organizations at major enterprises is the social insecurity of the labor collective and the ordinary working person. A labor collective is defenseless vis-a-vis the ministry. Much has been said about this here. Comrades, cooperatives operate in excellent conditions - they may or may not make products, can set virtually any price, can do anything they want. But an industrial enterprise has to cover a long distance to be able to start the

production of consumer goods. I think that the rights should be equalized as a first step. This issue was raised today as well. Anyone entering the market should enjoy only one right - the right to stamp its trademark for which it is held responsible. The rest concerns a producer alone and his relations with a customer on the market. I'm confident that then our co-op operators will be outsold by our industrial enterprises, and then jackets will cost 30 rubles instead of 130. I'm sure that "Volodarka" will sew them. Just do not meddle with them. But in the present situation, such meddling is taking place.

Labor collectives are defenseless with regard to the Soviets and their executive committees.

I understand that today we should help the militia which is in a predicament. Yesterday our labor collective set aside 40,000 rubles that it can pass over. But one wonders immediately as to what has happened to one million rubles that we transferred to the executive committee to compensate for 75 limitchiks (non-Leningrad residents who get jobs and residence permit) whom we employed this year, one million, Comrades? What has happened to the million that we paid for cooperative apartments, which we allegedly could give to our workers ahead of the people on the waiting list, the apartments for which they are going to pay as well? This equals two million.

I'm not mentioning that soon we shall have to set aside money to pay for polluted water. Then either of two things should be done - make regular payments to the social security fund and solve this problem, or do not charge plants and let them settle those problems themselves. Otherwise, they are getting money left and right. This should not be the case. This influences the position taken by our Soviet organs to a large extent. This a very important matter and I think that labor collectives will remain defenseless with regard to the Soviets, especially after the next elections.

We all got familiar with the draft document dealing with elections to the local Soviets. We should think, however, whether all of us find the suggested system acceptable, although the proposed law has many good elements. One detail has been overlooked. Travkin, for example, a deputy held in respect by all of us, suggested that local power should have two chambers, one chamber should include people working in the given territory, the other, by those who live there.

**Party Participation in Perestroyka Examined**  
*90UN0043A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in  
Russian No 40, 7-13 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by V. Fedin, deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Research Institute of Public Opinion Analysis: "More Words than Action"]

[Text] In our country, there are more than 440,000 grassroot party organizations which form the foundation of the CPSU. How are they working today, in the conditions of perestroyka? Are all communists active fighters?

To study these issues, researchers of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences polled delegates of oblast party conferences in Brest, Grodno and Vitebsk Oblasts and in other regions of the country.

In all regions where the poll was conducted, a low opinion on the activity of labor collectives' party organizations was noted. In Latvia, for instance, only 9.8 percent of respondents saw them as "active fighters for perestroyka", on the Baykal-Amur Railroad 20 percent and in Grodno Oblast 16.9 percent. About one half of respondents thought that the authority of party organizations is upheld only by a part of party members.

This view was supported by party members' assessment of themselves. Based on the poll's results, one out of five communists, and in some areas one out of three, may be called skeptical. There were even some who rejected the party's course to perestroyka.

Rather frequently, communists expressed dissimilar political views. A large proportion of "outside observers" and "skeptics" declared that it would be a mistake to expect the mass of communists to accept unanimously the decisions of supreme and central party organs and to join the struggle for renewal promptly.

It is alarming that after four years of perestroyka party committees have progressed little in instilling in young communists the desire to be more active and to assume the responsibility for perestroyka at the workplace. Assessing the level of participation by communists in perestroyka, the following descriptions prevailed: "average" and "more words than action".

Despite resolutions passed by many CPSU Central Committee plenums, the system of interaction between party committees and grassroot party organizations remains essentially unchanged since the period of stagnation, resulting in the basic party unit lacking a consistent program to implement perestroyka in labor collectives. More than two thirds of respondents noted that no such program existed in principle. And even where there were such programs, they did not meet the needs of the labor collectives' development.

The result of all this taken together is that party organizations have failed to awaken collectives or to inspire people to work in a new way, i.e., effectively. In the opinion of 40 percent of respondents, the surfeit of words which do not become reality is the reason why people no longer trust decisions which have been passed.

To implement plans for social development, we need economic reforms. But party members are ambivalent about those reforms. Many disapprove of the party's decision to allow different forms of property, viewing such pluralism as something that does not completely dovetail with socialism. The extreme view is that if various forms of property become deeper, we will see the return of capitalist forms of industrial relations.

It is well-known that the rise of communists' authority depends on their ability to provide an in-depth analysis of social processes and to assess critically their own activities. Unfortunately, few possess such an ability. Almost one third of respondents believe that the party organization can not prevent crises in the collective. In many primary organizations, work for the organization itself—i.e., inner party, bureaucratic and apparatus-oriented work—prevails.

The decline of the authority of party organizations stems in a large measure from the fact that many communists have a double standard and enjoy many undeserved privileges due to their party membership.

The analysis of the sociological poll and the study of documents of primary party organizations forces us to conclude that the political "brake" has been moving from the top down, becoming powerful and difficult to eliminate. This situation is increasingly understood by the masses of non-party members, especially by young people. As a result, real interest in joining the party has declined.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that party members and non-members know very little about the activities of superior party organizations. They get this information mainly from the press. A poll among young people in six oblasts showed that young people were poorly informed about the activities of their local party organizations. Few communists, or only 14.7 percent, claimed that the party organization was in close contact with young people and exerted a positive influence on them.

#### Statistics on CPSU Composition, Growth

90UN0048A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 14, Sep 89 pp 23-24

[Unattributed report: "The CPSU in Figures"]

[Text]

#### Composition of CPSU and Growth of Party Ranks.

In the 3 years following the 27th CPSU Congress, party membership increased by more than 483,000. Between 1986 and 1988, the average annual growth of party ranks was 0.8 percent compared to the period between the 26th and 27th party congresses.

Table 1. Membership of the CPSU (as of 1 January of corresponding year)

	1986	1987	1988	1989
CPSU Members	18,288,786	18,566,787	18,827,271	18,975,725
CPSU Candidate Members	715,592	700,928	641,515	512,097
Total Communists	19,004,378	19,267,715	19,468,786	19,487,822

The growth of membership of republic party organizations of the CPSU is characterized by the following data. The Communist Party of the Ukraine numbered more than 3,188,000 in 1986 and more than 3,231,000 in 1987; the Communist Party of Belorussia—667,000 and 679,000; the Communist Party of Uzbekistan—642,000 and 652,000; the Communist Party of Kazakhstan—810,000 and 824,000; the Communist Party of Georgia—383,000 and 389,000; the Communist Party of

Azerbaijan—376,000 and 384,000; the Communist Party of Lithuania—197,000 and 202,000; the Communist Party of Moldavia—189,000 and 193,000; the Communist Party of Latvia—177,000 and 180,000; the Communist Party of Kirghizia—144,000 and 147,000; the Communist Party of Tajikistan—122,000 and 124,000; the Communist Party of Armenia—186,000 and 191,000; the Communist Party of Turkmenistan—110,000 and 111,000; and the Communist Party of Estonia—109,000 and 111,000, respectively.

Table 2. Composition of CPSU by Social Status

As of 1 January	Workers		Peasants (Kolkhoz Farmers)		Office Workers and Others	
	in absolute figures	in percent	in absolute figures	in percent	in absolute figures	in percent
1986	8,551,779	45.0	2,248,166	11.8	8,204,433	43.2
1987	8,722,639	45.3	2,247,432	11.6	8,297,644	43.1
1989	8,843,686	45.4	2,227,722	11.4	8,416,414	43.2

The percentage of Communists with a higher, partial higher, and complete secondary education is increasing. As of 1 January 1986 it was 78.4 percent; in 1987 it was 79.4 percent; and in 1989 it was 81.3 percent. In 1986,

more than 239,500 Communists had an academic degree of candidate and about 31,000 had a doctor of sciences degree; in 1989, the figures were more than 258,000 and 35,000, respectively.

Table 3. Composition of CPSU Members by Length of Membership

Party membership as of 1 January of corresponding year	1986		1987		1989	
	thousand	percent	thousand	percent	thousand	percent
under 5 years	3,057	16.7	3,076	16.6	2,945	15.5
6-10 years	2,792	15.3	2,843	15.3	2,920	15.4
11-20 years	4,677	25.6	4,588	24.7	4,666	24.6
21-30 years	4,300	23.5	4,556	24.5	4,753	25.0
31-50 years	3,307	18.1	3,365	18.1	3,564	18.8
over 50 years	156	0.8	138	0.8	128	0.7

The distribution of Communists by sectors of the national economy is characterized by the following data (as of 1 January of the corresponding year): 47.1 percent of the Communists worked in industry, construction, transportation, and communications in 1986 and 46.3 percent in 1989; in agriculture—19.9 and 19.7 percent; in trade, public catering, material and technical supply, and other sectors of material production—6.1 and 6.1 percent; in science—4.2 and 4.3 percent; in education,

VUZes, health, culture, and art—11.5 and 12.2 percent; in bodies of state and economic management and in the apparatus of party and public organizations—9.1 and 9.2 percent; in housing, municipal facilities and services, and consumer services—2.1 and 2.2 percent, respectively.

The nationality composition of the CPSU is characterized by the data in Table 4.

Table 4. Nationality Composition of CPSU

Nationality	1986		1987		1989	
	in absolute figures	in percent	in absolute figures	in percent	in absolute figures	in percent
Russian	11,241,958	59.1	11,370,434	59.0	11,428,479	58.64
Ukrainian	3,041,736	16.0	3,082,731	16.0	3,132,391	16.07
Belorussian	726,108	3.8	738,793	3.8	753,048	3.86
Uzbek	465,443	2.4	475,981	2.5	491,338	2.52
Kazakh	387,837	2.0	397,037	2.1	408,737	2.10
Georgian	321,922	1.7	327,592	1.7	337,245	1.73
Azerbaijani	337,904	1.8	347,301	1.8	366,559	1.88
Lithuanian	147,068	0.8	151,144	0.8	156,442	0.80
Moldavian	110,715	0.6	114,537	0.6	120,346	0.62
Latvian	78,193	0.4	79,440	0.4	80,524	0.41
Kirghiz	78,064	0.4	80,494	0.4	84,243	0.43
Tajik	87,759	0.5	89,604	0.5	92,438	0.47
Armenian	291,081	1.5	296,953	1.5	292,845	1.50
Turkmen	76,786	0.4	78,731	0.4	81,246	0.42
Estonian	61,277	0.3	62,280	0.3	61,801	0.32
Others	1,550,527	8.2	1,574,726	8.2	1,600,140	8.23

Table 5. Admission into CPSU

Year	Admitted as CPSU Candidate Members	Admitted as CPSU Members
1985	654,233	609,927
1986	663,070	640,719
1987	585,294	607,201
1988	438,886	522,884

Workers comprised 59.4 percent of the total number of candidate members admitted during the period between the 26th and 27th CPSU Congresses and 56.4 percent during the period 1986-1988; kolkhoz farmers—9.9 and 10.4 percent; engineering and technical personnel, agronomists, scientific workers, teachers, physicians, and other specialists of the national economy—26.1 and 28.5 percent; administrative and management workers—3.2 and 3.3 percent; and students—1.4 and 1.4 percent, respectively.

**Primary Party Organizations.** During the last 3 years, the total number of primary party organizations increased by 1,586 and as of 1 January 1989 was 441,949. The number of large primary party organizations is also increasing. At the beginning of 1986 there were 36,670 CPSU organizations having more than 100 Communists (7.2 percent), and at the beginning of 1989 there were 32,963 (7.5 percent). For data characterizing the network of primary party organizations during the period 1981-1989, see: POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE, No 9, 1989, p 107.

**Reports and Elections.** During the course of the reports and elections campaign conducted in 1988 in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray organizations of the party, a

significant replacement of the elective aktiv took place. Almost 60 percent of the staffs of party raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, and kraykoms were replaced. There were 66 new kraykom and obkom secretaries elected, including 3 first secretaries, and 1,433 party okruzhkom, gorkom, and raykom secretaries, including 250 first secretaries. More than one-third of the secretaries of primary and shop party organizations were replaced. Of two or more candidates, 8 party obkom and kraykom secretaries and 1,117 gorkom and raykom secretaries, including 269 first secretaries, were elected to a new term.

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#### Academics Debate Multiparty Issue

90UN0022A Moscow POISK in Russian No 18, Sep 89  
pp 4, 5

[Discussion by Doctor of Juridical Sciences B. Kurashvili, Doctor of Historical Sciences B. Morozov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences G. Alekseyeva: "Many Parties or One? Three Viewpoints on a Controversial Problem"]

[Text] Today this question often arises during discussions, and is touched upon also in the letters received from POISK readers. Here are just a few opinions.

"I would like to call upon the respected scientists (writes N. F. Trofimenko from Tiraspol, a CPSU member since 1941) to perform a courageous deed—to admit that under the single-party system the Soviets will never attain true power. Testimony to this fact is our 70-year

history". Doctor of Chemical Sciences S. Kara-Murza believes: "Today the multiparty system would be an artificial superimposition of a type of dualism which is foreign to us over all the conscious and subconscious structures by which we have been raised and in which we see the world and society. Unlike other cultures, where the dualism of the world signifies a struggle (not to the death!) of the primordially related and worthy oppositions, in our country one principle is always incomparably stronger and brighter than its opposites. Therefore, we have so literally and easily perceived Marx's metaphor of the proletariat as the gravedigger of the bourgeoisie."

Ye. Plotnikova from Moscow spoke more categorically: "Before speaking about the multiparty system in our country, let us admit honestly that in the past decades we have done much to undermine the authority of the party. That is the cause of our trouble, and not the one-party system."

[Kurashvili] Actually, if we recall the pre-electoral meetings, almost every candidate was asked how he felt about the idea of a multiparty system. A few even risked speaking out categorically against it. Most often they said that the idea should be theoretically studied. Yet even after the elections, interest in this question did not wane. Some time in April, after the downfall of the Leningrad party functionaries in the elections, I was invited to come to the Leningrad Higher Party School to present a lecture on the political system, with emphasis on the prospects of a multiparty system.

As for myself, I agree with your veteran reader: The time has long been right for the multiparty system. You will note—whether we want it or not, it is already emerging. Today—in the form of the "popular fronts". It has taken on a mass character (unfortunately, primarily on a national footing). In the Baltic, specifically, there are already in fact two parties existing in the republics. They are trying to cooperate with each other. This is possible, by the way, only because the communists and the party committees have not taken the position of decisive and unconditional repudiation of the "popular fronts". And in fact they already perform the two main functions of a second party. The first function is the criticism of the existing apparatus and its actions. The second is participation in elections and the nomination of its candidates to representative organs. I might add that they are doing this quite successfully. It is even possible that we have in some measure begun to move toward a multiparty system, so to speak, in a vertical cross-section.

[Alekseyeva] However, there are many communists among the members of the "popular fronts"...

[Kurashvili] At a recent Soviet-American politological symposium Fedor Burlatskiy said, "You Americans have considerably fewer differences between your two parties than we have between the currents within our one party".

And in reality, this is so. Today, ideas such as that of creating a democratic fraction within the CPSU are emerging. Yet I propose that we stop and think: If within

the party there are different currents, significantly distinguished from each other, does this not mean that membership in this party to some degree takes on a formal character?

[Alekseyeva] Excuse me, Boris Pavlovich. I would like to clarify the fact that the problem we are discussing is not a new one. It did not emerge today. In 1957 the so-called Krasnopolytsy group was "discovered" (I was in the same class with these fellows, and also during graduate study at Moscow University). So, they received various terms of jail sentences merely for meeting at the apartment of Krasnopolytsev and discussing a topic about which you and I today speak so openly. All of Moscow University was in turmoil. There were over 240 persons involved in the case! Very many were expelled from the party. Among them was one of the best professors at Moscow University, Irina Moskalenko. Natan Edelman, a well-known Pushkin specialist today, was expelled from the Komsomol. I was expelled from graduate school, and was out of work for a year—with my dissertation completed. The history faculty was dismissed for the mere idea of a multiparty system.

And do you know what? The KGB, which conducted this case, literally begged Moscow University to take the fellows on bail. Unfortunately, the administration was not agreeable to this: They are enemies of the people, and we reject them. And this was after the 20th Party Congress! Thus, the discussion is not arising for the first time, and perhaps those events from 30 years ago have had some influence today on the wait-and-see attitude of scientists.

Yet in society the discussions are going on. This is because our party is not dealing with many problems and realities. Each time people begin to think up a version which is the closest: Let us assume, those same flourishing countries which have 2, 3, or 4 parties. Let us do as they have, they say, and then everything here will be fine. There will be soap, and so on, and so on, and so on.

Yet I am an opponent of the multiparty system, a very convinced opponent. Why? Why, because we have done absolutely nothing to correct the situation in our party. Has its potential really been exhausted? All of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms should have begun with a reform of the party. We must begin cleaning house.

Moreover, the main thing is not to follow the path of slogans, as we have done in the past years. Let us recall the headlines in the newspapers: "For cleanliness and light in the party house", "For an honest and clean face of the party member" ... Yet this was far from real steps. It is also a mistake to believe that we are reforming the party if we move around departments and commissions within the Central Committee, if we place some in retirement and promote others to good positions at institutions.

The growth in the crime rate, the increase in negative tendencies in the economy, the de-stratification of society. On whom are all these phenomena blamed? On the party. And why? Cultural and intellectual degradation—that is a terrible trait in our society. It affects all strata, absolutely all groups of the population, including, in my opinion, also the party apparatus.

We need Congress decisions on the moral conditions within the party. We cannot have communists who are bribe-takers, leaders such as Rashidov and Shchelokov. All this must be punished, and in such a way that the people can see. For a long time this went unpunished. And the surprising thing is that it is all there in the Charter. Yet if the Charter is not put into force, that means we need a decision which carries the authority of the party congress. I am deeply convinced that the people will understand us. And when they print reports in the newspapers that so-and-so (who was known to have been caught stealing or disgraced himself in some other way) was placed in retirement—how does this sound? Medunov was given a huge pension. Well, what will the attitude of the people be toward such a party? Excuse me, but whose pension was he given? They gave him my mother's pension, who all her life had received 50 rubles. Or that of the old woman who gets by in the village on 23 rubles, living on bread and water. I personally believe that in order to hold a party position one must have the recommendation of a primary organization, as well as pass a professional examination, as is done in the USA.

Here is the next direction of reform. We absolutely refuse to make use of past experience. We have already forgotten that there were such leaders as Lenin and Bogdanov, who made a great contribution to the development of the party. We may argue about the role of Bogdanov, about how Stalin used him, but we have a great intellectual potential. Let us take PRAVDA, for example. But just look at what our party is engaged in. Everything except theoretical work.

With our low level of political culture, how can we speak of a second, third, or fourth party, Boris Pavlovich? They would be exactly the same. And then, what does the "popular front" mean. Is it some new variant, so to speak, of a political party? A political party must be in power. That means that now they will begin to struggle for power and will forget about the country altogether, and about the interests of the people.

[Kurashvili] A political party must aspire to the role of the ruling party. Sometimes it may succeed in this, and sometimes it may fail. That depends on the support which it receives from the people at the elections, and nothing else.

[Alekseyeva] Yes. They will strive toward this. But how will this look in our situation of general ruin, of wild political lack of culture? That is a political tragedy for the country.

It seems that in an epoch of crisis we must rely on the best forces within the party. Up until practically the most recent time this was not the case (and in many organizations still is not). Go to any raykom, any one. You will be lucky to meet such a person as our first secretary—Doctor of Economic Sciences B. Chaplin. These are singular individuals. And they even wanted to get rid of him, so where did they send him? To Vietnam, I believe,

as an advisor. Yet he was very much needed here. So we are making one mistake after another instead of developing a program on how to set about cleaning house in our party, how to democratize it, and how to bring the Charter up to date, which has existed for us since pre-revolutionary times. At the 27th Congress we adopted a Program which absolutely does not correspond to the needs of the present day.

[Kurashvili] All this is the consequence of the one-party system. Yet you hope that we will adopt a resolution, and everything will change. Those are illusions!

[Alekseyeva] No, we must take measures, and not adopt resolutions. I am saying: Let us hold a discussion on the condition of the party. Let us instill iron discipline on one hand, and on the other—let us affirm democracy. Excuse me, but there is no democracy in the party. Yet at the same time we have many levers for changing our party and bringing about order. In each primary [party organization], etc.

[Kurashvili] I do not refute that. It is always possible to improve and revitalize something. But this, first of all, is not reliable and not long lasting.

[Alekseyeva] And a second party—is that reliable?

Let us try to take a look at the problem from another side. After all, after the October Revolution we had a situation of political pluralism. For how long? In historians' circles there are still differences of opinion as to when and how the one-party system arose in the country. Some say it was in 1918, some in the 20's, and some in the 30's...

[Morozov] Now, now. Contrary to what some people say, the practice of the Bolsheviks after taking power was not sectist. The historical cross-section prior to July of 1918 remains blurred, as if it had never occurred. But in reality? On 12 December 1917, at Lenin's insistence 7 leftist socialist-revolutionaries entered the ranks of the government. Five of them headed up the people's commissariats. The leftist socialist-revolutionaries reflected the interests of the peasant masses, and in his speeches during this period Lenin always spoke about a union with the peasantry. This union existed until the leftist socialist-revolutionaries themselves left the Soviets. There was also a party of communist-populists. They too later (one in September of 1918, the other in 1920) entered the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]. What does this tell us? Specifically, that neither single-party nor the multiparty leadership is new to us.

[Alekseyeva] The make-up of the government at that time included not only the leftist socialist-revolutionaries. It included also the socialist-revolutionary anarchists, as well as the socialist-revolutionary internationalists—that was the left wing, and the menshevik internationalists, who had split off from them. It is absolute nonsense when in the West they try to make it out as though Lenin did everything to see that

the dictate of one party was established. The leftist socialist-revolutionaries offered several times to unite with the party of bolsheviks, but Lenin was against it. Only when all these parties made the decision on self-liquidation were they accepted into the make-up of the RKP(b) in their full complement, as they had wanted. Why? Because it was these parties, and not the bolsheviks, who came to the conclusion that there was no reason for the existence of several parties if their common goal was the same—socialism. Their last documents speak of this.

[Morozov] We should take another look at this experience of multiparty leadership in our country, the experience of the Leninist stage. That is the first thing. Secondly, I agree: There is no need now for creating a new party. Rather, we must apply all our efforts to increase the authority of the CPSU, to re-interpret its role as the political avant-garde. We still see it being replaced by the Soviets, the trade unions, the youth, and other mass organizations.

However, I would also like to disagree with you, Galina Dmitriyevna. You have stated with extreme sharpness that, supposedly, absolutely nothing has been done for self-purification. No, the 19th Party Conference, at least in its decisions, has written down many strong statements. And some things are already being done. Well, take for example, the elimination of sectoral departments and the reduction of the apparatus by 40 percent. Is this a fact? It is! It may be proceeding slowly, but we cannot do everything all at once... Elections with alternative choices are being held. It is true, not many. Here Comrade Onikov reports: One percent of the obkom secretaries were elected on an alternative basis. Gorkom and raykom secretaries—6 percent. It is a start.

The party has the strength to overcome the administrative-command style. Although I cannot help but agree that this is proceeding with great difficulty. There were 300 editors of republic and oblast newspapers from throughout the country studying here in the Academy of Social Sciences. We gave them a questionnaire survey. To the question of style of party management of the press, 67 percent responded that it is the administrative-command style. The secretary of the party committee explains: I must take charge of the situation. As before, he wants to hold everything in his fist.

[Kurashvili] And yet I am convinced that a monopoly of political power is allowable and may work effectively only in certain extraordinary conditions. And then only at the cost of strictest measures for maintaining intra-party discipline and political discipline in general, those measures which, as a rule, slip into unsubstantiated repressions, with which we are well acquainted. Today the conditions are principally different. And to orient ourselves today on those organizational forms which arose under extraordinary conditions—that is our main political mistake today. At the same time, all the measures we have taken already in recent years, including those on reforming the system of power, are merely

half-measures... Theory is replaced by an argument of common sense. We are implementing partial measures in the hope that later somehow something acceptable will come out of all this. That is the sum total of our present theory. It is not such a simple question.

Galina Dmitriyevna mentioned the communists in the "popular fronts". What does this mean in essence? That the party is losing its most active members, who are going over to the "fronts" and really working there. After all, the "first-timers" are generally holding the same meetings as we always held.

Please note. Our Charter states that if the Central Committee finds itself in a difficult situation and needs to seek the advice of the party, it holds an all-party discussion. Could it be that it did not have such difficulties or did not need to consult with the party during the years of perestroika? Yet the all-party discussion with voting in each primary party organization on alternative programs of action could have provided a generally complete picture of social currents in the party. Yet only now has the thought of such a discussion arisen.

I might add, about the fear of the word "schism". When Lenin saw that he had to look over his shoulder at the conservatives, to drag along these weights which hindered him from moving ahead, he opted for a schism. And now, if there are real innovators in our party, let them organize themselves. Or, perhaps, someone is condemned as being a conservative. I, by the way, am not a proponent of behind-the-back criticism of this wing, because in general, healthy conservatives (I would prefer to call them fundamentalists) also have their reasons, their motives. In some things they are, without a doubt, correct.

I would even go so far as to say that if we do not opt for the multi party system now, we are placing our social order in danger. This is because a multiparty system which is built not on the basis of the Communist Party, but by semi-elemental means, will be less socialistic.

Two or three parties oriented toward socialism could push extremist, extreme, neosocialist currents to the side of political life.

The multiparty system and the parliamentary system also ensure a separation of powers, as well as protection of the rights of the citizen, and sensitivity of the entire political system to the demands of changing life. This is not our discovery.

Party affiliation must be reborn and head up socialist construction only in a new form—in the form of two or three (according to the possible models of socialism) parties, competing for the trust of the people, replacing each other in power, and controlling (and not destroying) each other. This will be the framework of democratic socialism.

[Morozov] I would not pin my hopes on politics alone. We know that our economy has entered a channel of very

sharp crisis. One of the reasons, as I understand it, is that we have too long rejected multi-structure in types of ownership.

[Alekseyeva] I believe that it is not ownership which has brought us to this crisis, but the fact that for 50 years the country has been ruled by semi-literate, and often amoral persons. Why, any capitalist system would have fallen apart long ago! This speaks of the fact that our system is very strong and that someday all of mankind (my deep conviction!) will come around to public forms of ownership.

[Morozov] Renewal is in progress. Yet let us not be in a hurry: today, right now! At the same time it is clear—we have no social conditions for the emergence of other parties. There are programs of individual groups. I have read them. You know, sometimes they evoke a smile, or paragraphs are copied from our party Program.

And, in speaking of the Program. To a certain degree I join in the opinion expressed by Galina Dmitriyevna. This most important document is still not completed. It contains nothing about the development of intra-party democracy and the involvement of communists in work on social principles. As you can see, the hand of some party bureaucrat (and here we can direct our wrath!) crossed out this important point.

[Alekseyeva] I would like to add that we do not know the society in which we live. How can we manage it? Who must organize this? The party.

Today many are insisting on convening an extraordinary congress in connection with the difficult situation. However, if we do not know the situation, an extraordinary congress will not give us anything. Therefore, I repeat—we need an all-party discussion. After that—a radical reform of the party through a congress.

Until the party understands that it will not move ahead without involving scientists and specialists, and I might add, specialists with different opinions, it will itself not be capable (i.e., I am referring to its leadership part) of understanding that the proposed solutions may have such-and-such consequences (and you yourselves understand how difficult this is for our leadership). Until that time, our society will always slip into the direction of crisis.

[Morozov] The difficulty also consists of the fact that the transitional period is ongoing also in the party, which at the same time is concerned with ideology. Even yesterday, corresponding members as well as academicians tried to prove that we have developed socialism, and received awards for this. Yet today these same people must do something else. Can they theoretically interpret this period?

[Alekseyeva] But why orient ourselves toward them? We have a large mass of educated youth on whom we can depend. Two months ago we held an international conference on Bogdanov. I was amazed at how deeply our

young fellows—economists, political scientists and philosophers—were capable of interpreting the most complex political material. That means, let us bring up these people. Why are we neglecting them? Why are they living as assistants on 115-120 rubles a month?

Yet I repeat: We must begin with a discussion—what is the party, and what kind of a party do we need. With different points of view, not being afraid to hurt anyone's feelings. After all, at the congress we told the Secretary General the truth to his face! Yet in general we had no leaders to whom we could tell the truth.

Furthermore, we must examine in detail, and the party historians and specialists in party construction must give us factual material on what the party represents today, at the present time, down to its professional membership.

I believe the topic is worthy enough to devote the 28th Party Congress to it. Then it will become perfectly clear whether our party can move ahead, or whether it is time to create new parties.

#### CPSU CC Member on Plenum, Language Laws

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[Interview with CPSU Central Committee member N. Gellert by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent N. Garifullina: "We Are Building a Family of Peoples"]

[Text] Farm machinery operator Natalya Vladimirovna Gellert from Kazakhstan usually manages to squeeze her autobiography into half a small page from a school notebook. She was born in 1953. Graduated from trade school, began to work as a tractor operator at the sovkhoz imeni Amangelda in Tselinograd Oblast, where she has now been working for twenty years. In 1973 she became a Party member, in 1986 she was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, and in 1989 a Central Committee member. Behind these sparse lines there is a life which, while still not long, is rich in events, sufficiently rich that films have been made and books written about her. The fact is that Natasha—and this is the only thing she is called in Kazakhstan—is a spiritually rich individual, an unusual, talented person. And, finally, she is simply a beautiful, charming woman.

We met with her half an hour after the CPSU Central Committee plenum concluded its work. Natasha had spoken on this day and still had not calmed down from her excitement.

[Correspondent] Natalya Vladimirovna, what are your impressions about the work of the Plenum? What seems to be most important, the main thing, among the questions discussed?

[Gellert] First of all, the plenum passed a resolution on convening the next, 27th Congress of the CPSU, and is

now already, literally starting today, beginning to prepare for it. I need not speak about the fact that the pre-Congress period represents a serious test for every Communist, for the entire Party. This is understood. We must demonstrate by our actions our right to be the political vanguard of society. The party now finds itself under a crossfire from critics; cases of Communists giving up their Party cards have become more frequent. It is bitter to acknowledge that people's faith in the Party has been shaken. It is necessary not merely to restore but also to strengthen its authority. And for this, it seems to me, it is necessary to intensify the process of democratization within the Party itself, to ensure that people sense, already in the very near future, real changes for the better.

The most serious and pressing question of the day, the nationalities question, was at the center of attention at the Plenum. The main discussion developed around this. I will not recount how many complicated problems, ones difficult to solve, have accumulated over the decades. To a certain degree this is natural. I will use an example to explain. When, a high power Kirovets tractor comes off the assembly line at the Korovskiy Zavod association in Leningrad—and I work on tractors of precisely this make—nobody will guarantee that it will work forever. But it is assumed that preventive and capital repair, good technical maintenance, and the replacement of parts and units, when necessary, will prolong its life. We, who in 1922 created a unique Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the only one in the world, have grown complacent and have forgotten that the living organism of our Union also requires solicitous maintenance.

And here is what has deeply and humanly touched and gladdened me: At the Plenum, we talked loudly and clearly about what this Soviet Union of ours is, about what it has brought to all the republics, to each of us. I am confident that, listening to the report, millions of our fellow countrymen can not but experience a feeling of pride and satisfaction. There is no reason to hide the fact that, in recent times, we have indeed forgotten how to be proud. Moreover, we are constantly being told from right and left that there is nothing to be proud of: We have been building and building but it is not clear what we have built, whether it is some kind of ramshackle structure or something else. More and more frequently, in Lithuania and Estonia, in Georgia and Moldavia, calls are being heard for secession, for leaving the USSR. To go along with these will mean the break-up of our country. Is such a thing permissible? The very idea seems blasphemous. And what is even more offensive, the "separatists" are referring to Lenin's thesis concerning the right of nations to self-determination. This is a very one-sided, intentionally narrow understanding of Lenin's thoughts. Creative discussion at the Plenum led to a deeper understanding of the principle of self-determination, which has now been thoroughly outlined in the Party's platform. And if we return to the interpretation of Vladimir Ilich himself, we will recall his words: "Secession is certainly not our plan. We are certainly not

teaching secession. In general, we are against secession." The "separatists" of today even ignore the fact processes of integration are actively at work throughout the entire world; they are stubbornly holding a course toward isolation; they are playing into the hands of others.

[Correspondent] We will ask pointed question: Whom does this profit?

[Gellert] It would be good if such questions were posed and thought about more often by those who lightly preach foreign ideas to the people and by those who gullibly listen to them. Perhaps a sober analysis of the economic balance of regional consumption would cool down certain hot heads. Data presented in the Plenum documents make you think. For example, while, in 1987, the share of imported industrial production within republic-wide consumption came to 18 percent in the RSFSR and to 33 percent in Kazakhstan, then for in the Baltic republics it came to from 39 to 42 percent, in Central Asia from 37 to 47, in Moldavia to 44 percent, etc. Everyone should think about these figures...

[Correspondent] Perhaps it is necessary to remind everyone a little more often that these are the realities, so that the people who live in any republic will know the economy of our country—the most complex of organisms, one which involves thousands and thousands of intertwined threads which connect the republics, the cities, the oblasts and the individual enterprises to one another. If even one thread is broken, the response is work stoppages, losses resulting from underdeliveries, and our deficits.

[Gellert] You know what I can't get used to? Every time that I come to the capital, I am amazed: People are carrying on endless discussions. Where do they get the time? For us, there is no time for meetings. The land demands our hands... I remember that, at our sovkhoz, it affected us strongly when strikes were going on in Kuzbas, in Vorkuta, in the Baltic countries, in Moldavia. Of course, the miners' demands were just, but this winter we will come to feel what their strikes mean for the country. And think of the gigantic material losses that result from the strikes and other conflicts in Azerbaijan, in Armenia. No, strikes are not the answer. I can imagine if they were to go on strike in the virgin lands—the wheat would shed its grain and we would be left without bread. No, it is necessary to seek other ways...

[Correspondent] And so, a platform has been approved, the basic principles of a new Party nationalities policy have been formulated. Which of them do you consider to be most important?

[Gellert] First of all, I would note its precise orientation toward the individual. Look here, the report emphasizes that our nationalities policy is called upon to ensure broad possibilities for satisfaction of the particular interests of each people. And it is also stipulated here: "...and at the same time, a strengthening of guarantees of the rights of citizens, no matter what nationality they belong to." And later the same thing is emphasized: "It is

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necessary everywhere to strengthen protection of the rights of citizens of the USSR." Why does this seem to me to be of prime importance? Because it is easier to proclaim equality for all, for the entire people, than it is to ensure equality in real life for each person. The events of the past two or three years have clearly shown this. How many instances of discrimination have there been already. It is sufficient to recall the notorious "residential qualification" or the language laws passed in a number of republics, which infringe the rights of a rather significant part of the population. No, we cannot speak about the equal rights of peoples if people feel themselves infringed upon!

Listening to the report, I turned my attention to one important point: "In the history of the Soviet state, there should not remain a single 'blank spot'. Society should have full and exhaustive information about all its episodes, no matter how bitter they were." And this is what I am thinking about in these days. In recent years, the press, radio, and television have literally overflowed with materials resurrecting our 70-year history. Interest in it is great, and this is logical: We all want to know our past, to understand it, to evaluate, to draw lessons from the mistakes. But I am struck and alarmed by the sometimes one-sided approach which denies all that has been positive in our history. In the final analysis, there also have not only been mistakes and distortions in our nationalities policy. A true brotherhood of peoples has also developed, a feeling of being a single family, of friendship and internationalism, which helped us to survive in times of great trial and which are also helping now. Why do they want to deprive us of this legitimate pride, painting the past in a single, black color?

[Correspondent] Scholars and public affairs writers have diagnosed this sickness as social daltonism, which is characteristic, unfortunately, of many of those whose palettes contain only dark shades. It is true that a few years ago their main color was rosy-blue... But one is just as bad as the other. We must view history, like life as well, as a dialectical unity. Light and dark, good and evil, justice and, alas, illegality, like nobility and perfidy, are neighbors in life...

[Gellert] I am in total and complete agreement with this. And there have been amazing pages in our short history, which we can be proud of. October, the victory over fascism, the triumph of Gagarin, the virgin lands full of heroism... Yes, yes, even the assimilation of the virgin lands, which became a true school of internationalism, about which, it is true, people are simply silent today. It seems to me that this is unjust, first of all vis-a-vis those who froze in tents, who plowed the first furrows, who built the roads and the agricultural cities on the steppes.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that you have now touched upon a very important, I would even say, the most important problem that is disturbing people. This is the question about the special, if you wish, the historical responsibility of those who educate, form, and guide public thought, society itself... Indeed, before the

eyes of a single generation, history has already been rewritten several times—for opportunistic considerations, for the benefit of one or another figure, and this has caused enormous damage to the public consciousness.

[Gellert] Unfortunately, this process is also continuing and, in our day, has taken on an impermissible scale. I am not an historian, only a rank and file citizen of the Soviet Union. But precisely because I am a citizen, I wish to know true and objective history that is neither embellished nor blackened. The truth has nothing in common with pluralism of opinions. Truth is not many-sided, it has only one, a single side. What I want to say is that historical fact can not be interpreted in any old way—depending upon the whim of the "interpreter" and the wishes of the "customer." Therefore, the report's words that history cannot be rewritten to please subjective notions and political calculations brought joy to my heart.

Let me return to the virgin lands. Dethroning L.I. Brezhnev who, as we now know, did not write the book "Virgin Lands," we have also denigrated the virgin lands. I cannot reconcile myself to this. I was brought up by people who developed the virgin lands. If there had been no Mikhail Dobzhik, whose tent is on display at the Museum of the Revolution, if there had been no Vladimir Diktyuka, no Nurgabul Malgazhdarov, no Leonid Mikhaylovich Kartauzov—these are legendary people for us—I would not have been shaped as an individual, this is certain. This year, the virgin lands are 35 years old, but this passed without notice. And, at my own risk, I congratulated the first virgin lands pioneers on this holiday in my address at the March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The virgin lands gave the country rich spiritual capital; it is no more fitting to dissipate this than it is to forget that their development was the international duty of all peoples.

[Correspondent] At the Plenum, you raised the question of restoring the autonomy of Soviet Germans. As you know, about a million Germans deported during the war years are now living in Kazakhstan and there are several hundred thousand of them living in the RSFSR. The pain with which you spoke about the misfortunes of your people is understandable. What can you add to what you said in your address at the Plenum?

[Gellert] Only one thing: Justice must prevail for all peoples subjected to repressions during the years of Stalinism. And may the injustices that were permitted become a lesson for our country for all time. The past must not be repeated.

[Correspondent] Natasha, I know that you speak three languages at home with your family—your native German, the language of your husband, Gazidulla Bekehev, that is Kazakh, and Russian. Does it turn out that, even in such a small social unit as the family, with the

two languages natural for a mixed marriage, you also were unable to get along without a language for international communication?...

[Gellert] When my oldest daughter Zhanargul was born, Gazidulla and I began to think about what language to teach her. I said at once: We will start with Russian. Well, why? Children cannot go out into the wild world without the Russian language. So, our daughter and son, Arman—who incidentally, had his 8th birthday today.

[Correspondent] Congratulations.

[Gellert] Thanks. So our daughter and son, like my husband and I, know three languages, and this is fine.

[Correspondent] The draft platform, as you recall, came out unambiguously for giving the status of a state language to the language of the core nationality, the one that has given its name to a republic. And Russian was assigned only the role of a means of international intercourse. Most of the readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA who have participated in discussion of the platform have come out in favor of assigning the Russian language the status of a nationwide language.

[Gellert] This correct. Having read the draft, I said at once: We how will we get along without the Russian language? So we'll all come together in Moscow, the representatives of 15 republics, and is each of us to bring an interpreter?... And in the army, are you also going to give the order to issue orders through interpreters? It's absurd. I was indescribably glad when I heard in Mikhail Sergeyevich's address that representatives of the various nationalities consider it expedient to assign the Russian language the status of a nationwide language for the USSR as a whole. I am convinced that this answers the desires of the Soviet people. And then it is necessary to consider not only the realities that have developed in our country, but also world practice. In the United States which, as you know, is also a multi-national country, English is the state language. In Canada—English and French, in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual India—English. Well and why can the USSR also not have a statewide language? Today when, in many regions, the language problem has become a basis for establishing divisions along ethnic lines, such an approach would reduce tensions there.

[Correspondent] Speaking at the 27th Party Congress, you talked about "spiritual bread," about the fact that multi-ethnic Soviet culture exercises a powerful influential force over people's minds and hearts and you advised that the good tradition of the first virgin land years has begun to be forgotten. Back then, creative unions of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other republics watched over the virgin lands, but later on this tradition began to die out. Has anything changed during the three years that have passed since the congress?

[Gellert] In the beginning, pilgrimages by literary and cultural figures began, then the wave died down, and now everything has returned to the way it was. True, it is

reassuring that an agreement—on the level of ministries of culture—on creative collaboration was concluded between the RSFSR and Kazakhstan not so long ago. We are placing great hopes in it, all the more so because the two republics and peoples have already been closely tied to one another for more than 250 years, and our brotherhood has passed the test of time. It is to be hoped that all-round relationships will multiply and become stronger not only between Russia and Kazakhstan, but also between all peoples of our country, so that our Union will remain inviolable for hundreds of years. You know, we in Kazakhstan have a saying: "A burden taken up together is light." If we remain together, we will overcome all difficulties.

#### Kapto on Restructuring Political Education

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[Article by A. Kapto, head of the CPSU Central Committee's Ideological Department: "Deepen the Restructuring of Political Education"; based on a report given at the All-Union Conference of the Directors of Political-Enlightenment Houses]

[Text] The life of the party and country is characterized by major events and a rapidly changing situation. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies has been held, opening a new period in the development of socialism's social system. The first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet has ended. The CPSU Central Committee's plenum on nationalities policy under present-day conditions is drawing near. The CPSU Central Committee's conference on the party's activities and tasks in a situation of revolutionary restructuring has been held. At it there was discussion, and very heated discussion at that, of the issues that particularly concern communists and all Soviet people today.

The key questions of ideological activity were examined in organic connection with the revolutionary transformations in the country, and against the background of the new, contradictory situation. The party's new role, the freeing of it from inappropriate functions, and the formation of its present-day character urgently require that ideological activity be made an extremely important area. For only an advanced ideology that most fully reflects the interests and aspirations of the working people can unify society's vanguard today into a strong and capable party. This is the source of the demands on ideological activity, in terms of content, style, forms and methods.

At present, the formation of a new concept of ideological work is assuming particular importance. As was emphasized at the recent conference in the CPSU Central Committee, this question is no less complex and difficult than that of the turnaround in the economy and the social sphere, and it may even be more difficult, since it has to do with people's attitudes.

The need for a new vision of the party's ideological work is attributable to the acuteness and contradictory nature of the processes of the renewal of societal life, the complexity of the restructuring processes, and the dynamic nature of public consciousness itself, which lately has turned in the direction of a sharply critical attitude toward the pace of renewal and the forms and methods of work, especially that of party organizations and communists.

The new social conditions require that party ideological activity be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the day. Ideological work merely as a means of "supporting" decisions that have been made, as a means of facilitating the passing of commands "from the top down," should become a thing of the past.

In the present political situation in the country, under the conditions of the reform that has begun of bodies of authority and management, and of the party's shift to primarily political methods of guidance, **ideological work is moving to the forefront.**

In our view, the idea of the unity of upbringing and people's creative, publicly constructive activities should become central in the updated concept of ideological work. As is known, for a long time the emphasis in ideological practice was placed on shaping and "imparting" knowledge, that is, on education, training, informing, etc. The active side of ideology was undervalued. The party's complex system of ideological work operated by itself, as it were, and there was no practical mechanism for linking it to social practice. "Its revolutionary and critical essence was removed from it," it was stressed at the conference in the CPSU Central Committee, "the function of renewing and persuading was depreciated, and it was to a significant degree divorced from the masses and driven into the laboratories and study circles."

All this did not help to develop in people independence, creativity, firmness of ideological conviction, and the ability to work in a new way. Recurrences of these and other deformations are visibly manifesting themselves today in restructuring actions. On the whole, dogmatized ideological work has not withstood the tests of restructuring.

The connecting of ideological upbringing work with life and with the requirements of a fundamental renewal of all spheres of societal life are the main way to enhance its effectiveness. This is precisely the way, as V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out, that makes it possible to arouse a "thirst for building and creativity" in the masses, to awaken them to a "new life and arouse them to socialist creativity," the result of which is "living" and "creative" socialism (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 35, pp 57, 269; Vol 36, p 104). We believe that the practical mechanism of that unity will be the chief component of the concept of the party's ideological work under present-day conditions.

A characteristic feature of ideological work of the new quality is its democratic nature, which, in our profound conviction, should distinguish all levels, means, forms and methods of it. Unfortunately, the liabilities of the past administrative-command period still continue to be firmly entrenched in the system of ideological work. Many party organizations resort rather frequently to the old strategy of forbidding and regulation, show an antipathy for democracy and pluralism of opinions, and ignore the need to give real consideration to people's social and national differences and the interests of all strata and groups of the population.

Behind these issues one can see an inability and unwillingness to organize work independently, and a desire to receive instructions from above and avoid responsibility for one's activity. In short, we need to free ourselves of these habits and improve democratic principles in both the content and the organization of ideological work.

It seems to us that the practice of ideological upbringing should be oriented first and foremost toward the human being, and be based on his interests and requirements. The chief feature of the party's ideological work is humanistic. It is assuming new significance in the sense of the fullness of the expression of people's feelings, views and experiences. We must make a serious turn toward people, intensify our connection with the masses, and initiate a living dialogue with all categories of the population and on all the most acute issues of restructuring.

Ideological work should increasingly be based on the full richness of universal human values. Even today Lenin's thesis concerning the need to enrich the communist with the knowledge of all the riches that humanity has produced has not lost its significance. That is a manifestation of the real dialectic of the class-specific and the universally human under today's concrete conditions.

It seems that, under the conditions of a contradictory and dynamic societal life, when it is necessary to react rapidly to what is taking place—to both positive and negative trends—ideological work is called on to be dynamic in both content and form. It should be anticipatory in nature, foreseeing the potential development of events. Today no serious step whatsoever can be taken without assessing public attitudes and without an in-depth comprehension of the tactics and strategy of ideological work.

I cannot help saying that we have made a good many errors here. Today we are already having to go back on certain decisions that were taken without taking public opinion into account. The inability to rapidly adjust our ideological actions manifested itself, in part, during the election campaign, when the aktiv found itself fettered to a significant degree, and in a number of cases even paralyzed. Cases in which ideologists are caught "bringing up the rear" have frequently been noted in acute political situations in a number of regions of the country. And in order not to be caught bringing up the rear of

events, we must organize the timely scholarly study and interpretation of the processes of a seething societal life. Every forward movement we make should proceed not gropingly, but in thoroughly measured and faultless steps, with deep reliance on the masses.

The further intensification of people's political active ness will give rise not only to new forms and methods of ideological work, but also to new problems, whose solution will require totally different approaches that have no analogues in past experience. What will be needed is in-depth scholarly analysis and nonstandard decisions that change established rules and develop original actions in a timely fashion. Our task is to teach ideological personnel to rapidly and correctly react to specific and complex life situations and collisions.

We see the further deepening of guidance of the upbringing sphere as taking the path of developing democratic, creative and independent principles in the activities of party organizations, ideological institutions and all personnel. Ideological practice cannot be successful when new tasks are accomplished by employing old methods and models. It is necessary to raise the level of the analytical and forecasting functions of ideological work, and of its results. The slightest trace of useless activity, helplessness and uncertainty in actions should be eliminated from practice once and for all.

Fundamentally new approaches are needed to carry out the analysis of the ideological situation in the country as a whole and in individual regions. In our view, a system for the study of public opinion needs to be established. We intend to make fuller use for this purpose of the potential of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences and other party research institutions, as well as all-union centers for the study of public opinion and the USSR Academy of Sciences' institutes. If the desire is there, a great deal can also be done at the local level, as we are persuaded by the accumulated experience of the party organizations of Moscow, Minsk, Leningrad and Dnepropetrovsk. Who, if not ideological departments, is to pool the efforts of the sociological services of higher schools and industrial enterprises, statistics agencies, and other institutions? A firm reliance on sociology will make it possible to enhance analytical principles in the party committees' managerial actions, and strengthen the committees' ties with the masses.

We believe that the new concept will require a fundamental change in the style and organization of ideological work. I should say that we are losing a great deal today because of the fact that a window-dressing, "remote-control" manner of managing political upbringing work still persists. Old precepts are already unacceptable in ideological activities, and new ones have not yet been created.

Today many aspects and problems of ideological upbringing work require in-depth theoretical and practical interpretation. It seems to us that the most urgent of them are: the specific features of the development of

mass consciousness in the restructuring process; defining the degree of maturity of its various forms; the nature of changes in the social-class and demographic structures of the population, and taking them into account in ideological upbringing work; the interaction of various generations of Soviet people in the upbringing process, their unity and contradictions; the historical legacy and socialist spiritual values; the dialectics of the universally human and the class-specific, the national and the international in ideology, politics and culture; the sociopsychological mechanisms of overcoming dogmatic and metaphysical thinking, and the inculcation of a dialectical-materialist world view; socialist pluralism of opinions and ideological practice.

Among the **fundamental questions**: how will the new ownership relations and the economic interests of various classes, groups and strata be reflected in ideology and in the whole structure of public attitudes? How will the consequences of the people's alienation from the property of the people as a whole and from economic and political power be overcome? How will people's attitudes toward the market, the spirit of enterprise, and the appearance of Soviet millionaires change? How will the "revival" of private-ownership ideology and mentality that has begun be "experienced" in the minds of the people? These are extremely difficult questions, but we must give answers to them right away, because they have been raised by practice and are needed for practice.

Figuratively speaking, today a strong alliance of theoreticians, ideologists and politicians is needed as it has never before. Theory is called on to fertilize practice, and practice is called on to act as a social client and be receptive to science, its conclusions and recommendations. We can count on success only when all ideological workers recognize the need for scientific approaches to work and are themselves engaged in a continuous creative search and are arousing others to do the same. Without this, there will be no new upbringing practice and no new concept of ideological activity.

In short, today we need a fundamentally new sort of ideological work—open, accessible, creative, addressed to the human being, and existing for his sake. The monologue that was familiar in the past should be replaced by a broad dialogue and socialist pluralism of opinions. Political blather and the separation of words and deeds should be replaced by truthful propaganda and agitation closely linked with the practice of socialist development and the interests of people.

In this connection we must in many respects reexamine the **conceptual questions of political education and its specific tasks in our stormy, dynamic time**.

The restructuring of the education system must be approached from broad party positions, as a constituent part of the ideology of renewal and an important element of society's current, seething political life. This is how the question was posed at the 27th Party Congress, which put forward the task of a radical restructuring of the

education system. In contrast to the times of stagnation, this work was developed from the very beginning on a broad collective basis. The CPSU Central Committee's 15 September 1987 resolution and the "Basic Guidelines for the Restructuring of the System of the Political and Economic Education of the Working People" are in many respects based on the proposals of party committees and communists.

The period that has passed since the congress has shown that the basic guidelines for the restructuring of the system of political education were defined correctly. But there have been serious shortcomings in their implementation, in which there have been inconsistencies, delays, misfires, and long-outmoded approaches. Moreover, new problems have arisen that require their own answers and solutions. The restructuring of political education has brought to light serious shortcomings that have proved to be much more complex and acute than previously supposed. Around us passions are seething, rallies are raging, and former notions are crumbling, yet in the field of political enlightenment there is quiet and complacency. And in some places it is half-asleep.

At present criticism of political education is intensifying. It is often even said that it is in a state of crisis. I do not doubt that political education is necessary, and that it should work for restructuring. And if there is a question of crisis, it is a crisis of old approaches, forms and methods of education, and of the attitude toward it.

In continuing work to implement the CPSU Central Committee's 15 September 1987 resolution, it is necessary, first and foremost, to take the actual situation more fully into account, and to implement additional measures for overcoming additional shortcomings and eliminating the braking factors.

In this connection, the accepted concept of political education should not be regarded as something inviolable, and its individual propositions should not be canonized. Taking into account the rapidly changing conditions of sociopolitical life in the country, each party organization not only may but is obliged to make its own contribution to the accomplishment of this task. The success of searches will be determined not by the uniformity but by the diversity of actions, solutions and discoveries.

Previously it was believed, and some people still believe, that creating a concept of political education was a job for the center. Everyone else's role was to sit and wait, and then blindly "duplicate" these precepts. Such times have passed. Today all party organizations should engage in the development and establishment of a new system of Marxist-Leninist education, and in the search for new approaches.

**The radical updating of the content of education is a fundamental question.** This is the main direction in which it must be restructured.

In the first place, I have in mind the in-depth assimilation of a new system of theoretical views of the development of socialism and of the world as a whole, and of the concept of the revolutionary restructuring of various spheres of Soviet society's life—views and a concept which have been developed by the party since April 1985 are reflected in party documents. Second, this means a new reading of the ideological and theoretical legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism through the prism of present-day tasks. Third, it means a study of the achievements of the social sciences as a reflection of the new realities of our time and of the experience of the masses' social creativity. Fourth and last, it means the continuous, prompt interpretation of scholarly, sociopolitical and other information concerning events and processes taking place in the country and the world.

The first attempt to implement these approaches to updating the content of education was made in the development and recommendation of two-year education courses. Many of them found students, and the study of their curriculums is producing benefits. But canonization and the declaration that they are the only acceptable way to study Marxist-Leninist theory and the party's policies have done serious damage. Nor can we fail to take into account the rapid pace of life and the changes that are taking place in society. It is noteworthy that the process of updating the content of education has been taking place with the active and concerned participation of party committees and of their political-enlightenment houses and laboratories. Thus, more than 60 education courses were developed taking into account local requirements. They include: "Through Revolutionary Restructuring to the Leninist Character of Socialism" (Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Tomsk and Tyumen oblasts), "Man, Society, Development" (Ukraine SSR), "New Political Thinking and Propaganda for the Values of Socialism" (Kamchatka Oblast), and others.

However, so far only the first, initial steps have been taken in updating the content of education and, especially, in mastering that content. Of course, there are a great many difficulties here. Scholarship nourishes propaganda with ideas. But there are many questions that it has not adequately treated; moreover, its achievements have been extremely slow to be put into practice in propaganda.

It seems to us that lately the social sciences have managed to undertake certain very important generalizations and conclusions concerning the development of the contemporary world, and an interpretation of preceding stages in the history of Soviet society. One can say that a kind of breakthrough has begun in the sphere of theory and ideology. Granted, figuratively speaking, it has not yet turned into a full-scale offensive across the entire front. Our entire society feels the lag in this area. It shows up, among other places, in the effectiveness of propaganda and, in particular, in political education.

We all now keenly feel the need for a thorough methodological restructuring of the theory of social science. What is being done to this end?

In connection with qualitatively new demands on the development of Marxist-Leninist theory and on social scientists, the activities of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism and of its branches will be restructured on the basis of an integral concept that is being developed of scholarly activity under today's conditions.

With the most active participation of scholars, workers in public education and higher schools, and the Komsomol aktiv, draft "Basic Guidelines for the Restructuring of the Teaching of the Social Sciences and the Enhancement of Their Role in the Communist Upbringing of Student Young People" have been drawn up. It is proposed that they be submitted for broad public discussion after they are examined in the CPSU Central Committee. These and other documents will unquestionably produce serious impetuses for the development of the social sciences.

An important place in the development of historical awareness is being assigned to the "20th-Century Political History" course, which discloses an objective picture of the development of Soviet society and of the contradictory and interconnected contemporary world.

Restructuring urgently requires an authentically scientific interpretation of the theory and practice of socialism in close connection with the cognition of new phenomena and the dialectics of social processes. A radically reshaped theory of socialism and communism will become the nucleus of the content of sociopolitical knowledge.

Economic science and the determination of the correct correlation between its practical and ideological functions require fundamental restructuring. In the analysis of capitalism, the study of its present-day forms merits special attention. Political economy should make its contribution to the formation of a new model of the socialist economy and the development of a contemporary type of economic thinking.

As experience shows, we must create and creatively assimilate a new democratic mechanism of the interaction of science, politics and ideology. Formerly and at the present, party committees have utilized social scientists primarily as propagandists. Some of them have lost the sense of the new and have assumed the role of protectors of the "purity" of Marxist-Leninist theory. The dogmatism and conservatism of some propagandists have resulted in a situation in which some of the best-prepared students have been drawn to individual leaders of informal associations, people's fronts, and even extremist groups. Therefore, the active involvement of social scientists in scholarly life and in the development of policies—general and regional—will help enrich propaganda and the practice of ideological work.

All this is also very important for the restructuring of political education, which should be receptive to the achievements of the social sciences and the party's theoretical thought. The concept of restructuring as the theoretical and practical expression of the objective requirements of the present stage in society's development, an expression aimed at the productive renewal of socialism at all its levels, has been put forward and placed at the center of the entire content of that education.

Lately conjectures concerning the "historical guilt of Marxism," the notion that "Leninism is already Lysenkoism," and so forth have been persistently spread around. Attempts to feed parasitically off this are being made by political speculators and irresponsible elements, who pretend to "scientific" opinions concerning "the socialism that was never achieved," and who claim that socialism is practically to be equated with the deformations that have occurred in the past, and that the future lies with some sort of supposedly "democratic capitalism." There has been criticism of the Leninist concept of socialism "from the right," from conservative positions, and attacks on it "from the left." One hears statements concerning the repudiation of our strategic goals. Some people are trying to cast doubt on the party's leading role and to reject socialist values and the legacy of October and Lenin.

This is why the development of a contemporary concept of socialism on the basis of Leninist methodology is assuming special importance today. In general terms, certain basic initial positions have been defined in the characterization of the qualitatively new state of society. This is very important not only for science, but for all the practical work of our ideological personnel.

It seems that no matter how acute the problems, how urgent our affairs, we cannot for a minute lose our general theoretical guidelines or permit any sort of disregard for theory, methodology and the achievements of social thought. Without them it is difficult to imagine the intellectual and spiritual elevation of members of the CPSU, which is what determines their influence and prestige today.

Of course, this does not mean a return to the theoretical scholasticism that reigned for decades in the sphere of political education. We must act in such a way as to place at the center of discussions the issues that concern people and that are discussed at rallies and meetings and in the family. Education cannot stand apart from seething life.

Obviously, we need to skillfully combine the study of theory and politics with an analysis of new events, phenomena and processes. Full and up-to-date information makes it possible to make broad and objective generalizations, and serves as a source of accurate theoretical and political assessments. And, conversely, a scientific approach makes it possible to correctly orient oneself in the sea of current information.

The question is often asked: do we need curriculums and textbooks? And does the chief problem of delays in the restructuring of education lie in them? I shall note that various sorts of classes have been held on the basis of these curriculums: both mediocre ones and good ones. Success here depends in large part on the propagandists and on the students' attitude toward education. Our country is immense, and its conditions are diverse. Students themselves differ according to their level of general educational and political preparation. We must take into account the size and complexity of any given subject. Therefore, communists and all students should have freedom of choice.

In general, from our viewpoint, the curriculums for the courses and problems being studied can be the most diverse: two-year, one-year, or more flexible ones geared to the next two to three months. No single type of program should be turned into an absolute. Everything depends on the specific situation and the students' needs. And of course, the curriculums should not be regarded as something mandatory in their entirety, but should be merely a basis, a kind of guideline for the preparation of a propagandist's plan for working with a specific group of students. Within the framework of a curriculum, substitutions of certain subjects in connection with communists' wishes and new situations are possible and even essential.

Of course, up-to-date study aids, brochures and publications in the periodical press on important current problems are needed to go with these curriculums. Incidentally, this not only in no way deprives anyone of the possibility of turning to any other source, but, to the contrary, presupposes it. It is especially important to look to primary sources—the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and party documents, as well as to reference literature and monographs, magazines, newspapers, and radio and television broadcasts.

Such a democratic approach to the updating of content makes it possible to take the diversity of students' interests and needs into account. Without interest, education will be dead and will inevitably turn into a pro forma action.

At present it is important to show more persistence in creating a new generation of textbooks and other study aids that incorporate the achievements of social thought and contemporary pedagogy, psychology and methods. As we know, a whole series of study aids has already been created, some of which are successful. However, there have been a good many serious complaints, sharp criticism and expressions of candid dissatisfaction on the part of propagandists and students with the level of the literature that has been published. A great deal of work needs to be done in this area.

The restructuring of education depends in large part on the assimilation and application of up-to-date study methods that activate people's creative thinking activity. Dialogue, the lively and candid exchange of views,

discussions, debates, business games, the analysis of concrete situations, etc. are being introduced into the practice of propaganda work. In Kirov Oblast more than 100 political discussion clubs have been established, and reading rooms and consultation stations have been set up. The number of political discussion clubs has increased nearly fivefold in Rostov Oblast's Komsomol political enlightenment system.

However, it should be noted that an immense amount of work remains to be done. Pedantry and primitivism continue to reign in many classes. People justifiably complain about the boredom and uselessness of classes. At the Dneprodzerzhinsk Coking Chemical Plant imini Sergo Ordzhonikidze, nearly 70 percent of the students are dissatisfied with the quality of education. Approximately one-third of them noted that it yields no practical benefits. Classes are conducted according to the old methods, and lectures predominate. And debates, discussions, the analysis of specific situations, and other contemporary methods are used extremely rarely.

We must think about how to achieve a shift to new active methods of holding classes everywhere. Can it be that we should continue the search for other forms of education that are in keeping with the spirit of the times? Evidently, we should listen to the proposals that are made by workers at political-enlightenment houses and laboratories, scholars and sociologists. For example, scholars at the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences propose that a competition be held in party organizations for the development of contemporary forms of education. Life itself suggests some of them: a social and political discussion forum, an alternative ideas club, a debating club, and others.

In short, the sort of forms are needed that make it possible to drive out the conservative spirit of study-circle isolation and enclosure within the framework of political schools and seminars, otherwise we have stagnation. A party of 20 million members cannot be treated as though all of them were alike. As experience shows, round-table discussions and meetings with scholars, cultural figures, and party, soviet and economic-management officials justify themselves. These forms make it possible to expand the propaganda sphere and intensify influence on the masses.

I particularly want to stress: the main lever of restructuring that the party committees hold consists of the democratic principles of political education set forth in the CPSU Central Committee's resolution. In a number of party organizations, restructuring along these lines has probably been most noticeable. Thus, throughout the country as a whole, party organizations have established, in addition to those recommended, 28,000 new educational formations—political discussion clubs, public political reading rooms, internationalist-upbringing schools, multipurpose schools, and others. Thus, for the first time, party organizations are actually exercising the right to determine the structure of education independently.

They are also independently determining the length of study of various courses. Democratization is also manifesting itself in the selection of propagandists by students, which raises the prestige and accountability of the former. It also changes the psychology of the students and their attitude toward education.

At the same time, we should strongly and exactingly assess existing shortcomings and omissions in the work of party organizations. They have not yet freed themselves from the psychology of expecting instructions from above, or from command-administrative methods.

A key question in the restructuring of political education is the formation of a highly qualified corps of propagandists. As is known, it was once recommended that seminars and schools be set up only when there were qualified propagandists available. It would seem that under conditions in which there is a shortage of them, this should lead to a reduction in the number of schools and seminars. However, during the last academic year the propagandist corps grew by 153,000 and reached 1,140,000. At the same time, the number of propagandists with a higher education declined by 2.3 percent, and the number of those who had graduated from universities of Marxism-Leninism dropped by 6.8 percent. At the admission of the heads of schools and seminars themselves, 27 percent of them have a poor knowledge of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, and of party documents. A survey has shown that only with half of the propagandists was a desire to carry out this public assignment taken into consideration.

It is no accident that many propagandists have proved unprepared for the rapid politicization of society, the existence of contradictory opinions, judgments and views, and the pressure of shouters and demagogues. Some of them lose control over the atmosphere of classes, evade the discussion of pressing problems, and prefer to limit themselves to the spectrum of traditional, purely theoretical questions. There are also those who, afraid to appear to be conservatives, play up to philistine attitudes of students and engage in the public castigation of scholastic values.

We must think about how to conduct an inspection of propagandist forces and rid ourselves of those who are incapable of working in the new way. It is axiomatic that the country's best intellectual forces—people who are capable of thinking analytically and in a nonstandard fashion, and of cogently defending socialist ideals and values, people who are personally convinced of the correctness of the policy of restructuring and renewal—need to be enlisted in political education. In this connection we have an important untapped reserve in USSR people's deputies, prominent scholars, social scientists and cultural figures, not to mention party and soviet officials.

In work on the selection of propaganda personnel, we should not follow the principle of first establishing a school and then finding the propagandist to staff it.

Right now the selection of brilliant individuals, talented people, and real political fighters for the role of leaders should be placed at the center of work to form political schools and seminars. And we must not be afraid of a reduction in the number of students; the reproduction of political ignorance and ersatz knowledge is more frightening.

A new academic year in the system of Marxist-Leninist education lies ahead. By its whole essence, internal organization and structure, it should be incorporated into the fabric of today's transformations. Its content and ideological orientation will unquestionably be immensely influenced by the results of the first and second Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the materials of the upcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on nationality relations.

The new academic year will take place under the conditions of active preparation for the next, 28th CPSU Congress and broad intraparty discussion of the questions of restructuring the party itself. The report and election campaign will start in August. A great deal of work remains in connection with elections to local soviets, which will complete the formation of the new political structure and will mark the transition to sovereignty of the soviets from top to bottom.

The country is coming to the concluding year of the 12th Five-Year plan. The economic reform is entering a new stage, and a new concept of the plan for the 13th Five-Year Plan is being developed. All this determines important tasks for party committees and political enlightenment houses and laboratories in the area of the Marxist-Leninist education of the masses.

There are a number of questions that must be discussed. In particular, on which problems, taking into account the specific features of the new year, should communists' study be focused?

It would be a good idea to complete the study of courses previously begun and, on the basis of requests by communists and party nonmembers, to organize work according to independent programs on the basic guidelines of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy as formulated in documents of the first Congress of People's Deputies, and on the party's fundamentally new nationalities policy as elaborated in CPSU documents. In the countryside, study of the problems of the new agrarian policy elaborated by the CPSU Central Committee's March (1989) Plenum has become extremely important. Of course, the party committees, taking the ideological and political situation in the regions into account, will themselves also prepare new courses on important problems of present-day societal life.

We have had a tradition of starting the academic year on a single currently important topic with the active participation of party, soviet, economic-management, trade-union and Komsomol executive officers. Perhaps this year such a topic could be "The restructuring of the party's work is an extremely important, key task of the

day" [Materials to aid propagandists on this topic will be published in Issue No 14 of our magazine.—Editors]. Although even here there should be no canons.

In the current very complex and acute situation, the role of the Marxist-Leninist education of communists and all working people is increasing as never before. On the eve of the new academic year it is essential for party organizations and committees to discuss the whole complex of questions in an exacting manner, and to collectively work out proposals concerning ways to deepen the restructuring of political education and enhance its effectiveness. By clarifying and elaborating more specifically the methodological, ideological and theoretical foundations of the restructuring of education, we contribute to the creation of a new concept of the party's ideological work at the present stage.

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**Independence Prerequisite For Stable Union**  
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[Article by Mikhail Gefter: "Are We Really On the Brink of an Abyss?"]

[Text] It's a question asked by more people than born pessimists. These people range from the housewife facing bare shelves to those affected by the growing numbers of disasters and bloodshed. It is being asked by those not in power and those in power. Their tone is naturally different but do they mean the same thing? On closer examination, we see, they imply different things.

More than that. The division is blurred. The anxiety over tomorrow prompts some people to move into unknown territory, while in other it strengthens confidence that the process named "perestroika" has gone too far, is making a mess of daily life, and brings a new discord closer. Are there grounds to believe we're approaching the last judgement?

There are, and they are conspicuous. These grounds are not only events; they're related to people. Different people. Different even when they say almost the same words, even if what they say does not concern more than their immediate needs. Worries arising from desperation can be different. But besides worries and desperation there are also intentions to cash in on worries and desperation, and there are people motivated by this intention. Again, they are different people, quite dissimilar at first sight. In fact, you can't fail to distinguish between a guardian of defunct internationalism and an ardent fighter against masonic dominance, but both believe it is their right (and duty) to make decisions for other people, to control their lives.

The apocalyptic surrogates and their manufacturers are trying to hobble us precisely now that, individually and all together, we have started to discover a way out of

Stalinist uniformity, that omnipresent power over souls and bodies, which is now in its death throes. This way out is also a way into an independent life. Into being masters of our own lives. Being masters of our own destinies precludes the existence of a uniform way of life, the uniform, power structure, and uniform consciousness all over the country.

A mere year ago, all claims for independence seemed to be local, peripheral phenomena. Experts sounded warnings about "flash points" which remained unheeded. Today well-nigh the whole of the Soviet Union is a "flash point" and this was supposed to make those responsible for what's going on wise up to the fact that the main culprit (if that's an appropriate word) is their own insensitivity to the awakened feelings and instincts of human communities which have existed for hundreds and even for thousands of years. Does not the last year's experience make it obvious that "local" problems can't be resolved if dealt with separately? On the agenda is the formidable problem of finding a way for the peoples and civilizations that make up the USSR to live together. This is the problem behind all the economic, social, cultural, general, and personal ones. They can only be resolved if dealt with as being mutually determining.

The problem has not been raised by the Baltics. The Baltics (by virtue of special historical circumstances) have made it urgent and revealed the crux of the problem. Self-reliance, from now on, can be effective only if it reaches the level of independence. And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will only achieve natural and easy integrity, responding to the call of the 21st century, when the starting point of a new integration is nothing less than independence, of all its composite parts, big and small alike.

We have come back to the road we started imperceptibly abandoning right after December 31, 1922. The paralysis of relations based on agreement culminated in the harassment of "smaller" nations, which disgraced us. Is it so hard to see that the Baltics are just a name on the map, while the real issue is the past and future of three countries whose destinies were decided (jointly!) by Stalin and Hitler, and that looking back, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians insist that their homelands again be recognized as countries? That if we want Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia—industrious, able, cultured nations—to remain part of the USSR, we should recognize their right to join the Union on new terms, and that this can't be done without setting up an entirely new Union?

What was the reply of the "strong centre" to this topical issue? First it was indifference, then limited and belated concessions, and now gloomy forecasts and threatening warnings. The appeal issued by the Secretariat of the Writers Union of the Russian Federation (not by the Union or even its Board but merely its Secretariat) voices accusations against Estonia and its legislature, and complains about the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which, while "correctly assessing" the Estonian local election law unfortunately failed to reveal

the "political roots of what is going on in Estonia, and failed to give a political assessment of the actions of the Republic's leaders although the issue was raised by members of the Presidium". That makes culprits of both Estonia and the USSR's legislature. Who are the judges? Secretaries of the Writers Union write: "Developments in Estonia have been long and closely watched in Russia. And we address our main queries to the Party's Central Committee and the Politbureau" (the call has been heard, as we know, and we have proof in the form of the Statement of the CPSU Central Committee on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics).

The obsolete rhetoric, the bogie of "anti-Sovietism" that seemed to have been consigned to the archives, the notorious "arm of the West", which amounts to an exercise in recitation, instead of an analysis with conclusions that could lead to a compromise not in words but in deeds... Is this only a zigzag or the start of back-pedalling?

A difficult time of seething passions and a shortage of political wisdom. A difficult time but not desperately so. We aren't on the brink of an abyss. We are at the crossroads. As regards the abyss we are being goaded into it by false prophets who seem to want to be our rescuers after we fall into it. Today they are trying to rid the Russian-language minority of "extremists", tomorrow they may be ridding everyone of everyone.

The latter happened under Stalin. Enough. We can't let this happen again. We must firmly state we need no such redeemers. Because we are masters in our own home and responsible to it before the living and the dead.

Responsible all together and individually.

#### Swiss Model of Federation Considered

18120003B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 39, 1 Oct 89

[Article by Vladimir Mekhontsev: "Nationalities Issue From a Swiss Angle"]

[Text]

#### Three State Languages

It is Switzerland's situation in the centre of Europe at the crossroads of major international routes and in the neighbourhood of powerful and at times extremely war-like nations that has shaped its modern image and made it an area of peaceful coexistence of three languages: German, French and Italian. There is a fourth national language in Switzerland which has no official state status. It is the Romansh language of the ancient Etruscans who settled in the Alps in the fifth century B.C. and to this day preserve their culture and customs. To be precise, Romansh consists of several highly distinct dialects which can for all practical purposes be regarded as separate languages. In the Grisons Canton school textbooks are published in seven languages: German,

Italian, Surselvan, Sutselvan, Surmiran, Puter and Val-lader—the languages of the canton's native population which is about 40,000.

According to Alain Pichard, a Swiss academic and writer, it was exactly this Grisons polyphony that prevented the Romansh language from becoming another state language. In that case all official documents, Acts of Parliament and parliamentary debates would have to be translated into a minimum of another five languages, not just one: an impossible predicament for office work at the federal level.

However, such linguistic variety coexisting within Switzerland's borders makes for a coexistence and variety of national cultures. There are 26 cantons and half-cantons in Switzerland, whose total area is no larger than that of the Moscow Region. In 19 cantons the predominant language is German, in six—French, and in one the majority speak Italian. As totally independent administrative units, the cantons differ from one another in socio-economic, cultural and linguistic characteristics.

Every Swiss citizen regards him or her first and foremost as a member of their community, next—their canton, and only then as part of the Swiss Confederation. Outside Switzerland, however, everyone is Swiss, a son or daughter of that diverse and yet so dear country. This patriotism is not ostentatious, it is imbibed with one's mother's milk, fostered at the first school lessons.

#### 26 Systems of School Education

One of the most striking characteristics of the Swiss school system is its distinctive federalism. All educational matters are controlled by the cantons. No central body like a Ministry of Education exists or is necessary. There are almost as many school systems as there are cantons. The same subject is taught differently in different cantons, but is always directly relevant to the specific situation in the canton and the confederation. Cantons have the right to fix the beginning of the school year and publish textbooks on many subjects. Such independence allows them to successfully resolve the language problem. In most schools optional courses in one of Switzerland's three state languages are taught in addition to the local language. There is no coercion. The general assumption is that respect for a native language cannot be fostered by forcing it on children. The democratic nature of the Swiss school system promotes love and respect not only for the child's native canton, but also for others.

Polyglot Switzerland is very rational to its attitude to languages. Each person is free to speak any of four national languages, but in the areas where a Swiss requires other languages in addition to his or her mother tongue, an effective network of language courses is available for a fee to full-time and part-time students. Often the employer pays for the young employee to master the language he or she needs professionally.

No language restrictions or obligations for citizens can be found in the country's legislation. The only reservation is contained in Article 107 of the Federal Constitution, which stresses that the Federal Court must have all three official languages (German, French and Italian) represented.

#### Crossroads of Power

Playing so vital a role, the principles of federalism influence not only the educational system, but virtually every sphere of the country's life. From the time they came together 700 years ago, this motley conglomeration of cantons speaking different languages has scrupulously protected itself from every risk of strong one-man or one-canton domination.

Swiss cantons are not just administrative units. They are real miniature states forming the Swiss Confederation.

Each canton has its government, its parliament and its judicial authorities. According to the Swiss scholar Oswald Sigg, the country's stability relies on a finely balanced system of distribution of legislative and executive functions between the federation and the cantons. It includes four main levels of authority.

The first covers the issues fully controlled (both in matters of legislation and government) by the federal bodies. These are the armed forces, customs, state finances, the post, telegraph and telephone, railways and shipping.

The second refers to the cantons' sphere of control: the maintenance of public order, including the police, and social issues, with the emphasis on aid to low-income groups.

The third level covers the issues whose main principles and scope are defined by the federal law, while their specific forms of realization, as well as methods of control, remain the prerogative of the canton authorities, e.g., the labour code, civil and criminal law, transport, and social insurance.

Finally, the most interesting fourth group of issues is the area where theoretically and practically the legislative and executive functions of both federal and canton authorities overlap—taxation, road construction, public education—while the state-supported development of such public institutions as radio and TV provides a reliable basis for multilingual communications. In all linguistic regions, that is in German-, French- and Italian-speaking Switzerland, there are autonomous radio and TV stations.

Swiss federalism is essentially democratic. This does not mean, however, that the Swiss have no problems of nationalism or separatism.

#### About Swiss Separatists

Back in 1815 the Vienna Congress handed over the French-speaking Jura Region to the Bern Canton in

compensation for separating from it the Vaud Canton. Such an authoritarian decision enraged Jura's population. Soon after the Vienna Congress the first outbursts of separatism occurred in the area. It took decades of fierce struggle to establish, in 1978, an independent Jura Canton within the Swiss Confederation.

The echoes of this struggle can to this day be heard in the local press and addresses of some of the canton's officials, to say nothing of such trifles as announcements in French instead of all three state languages on the trains there.

From time to time separatism and nationalism flare up. Three years ago, a group of young "autonomists" broke one of Bern's famous little fountains dating back to the 15th-16th century. This act of vandalism outraged everyone in Switzerland, including the people of Jura. The press commentaries and indignant letters to newspaper editors emphasized one and the same idea: while defending one's national feelings, one must not show disrespect for the feelings of other nationalities, as this may lead to violence.

There are other problems in Switzerland, too, which are pressing enough for such a small country. As a rule, however, they all proved solvable. The search for solutions is simplified by the general desire for compromise, by patience and thoughtfulness, and above all by the Swiss rational attitude to every problem. This attitude is based on the ideal of a single identity coupled with respect for the cantons' independence. Nor can one disregard the tolerance with which the federal and canton authorities treat the activities of various groups and movements in defence of their native language, dialect or culture, which operate in many cantons. Some of these groups get special subsidies amounting, in the case of the Romansh League, to 632,000 Swiss francs a year.

The activities of "autonomists" from various movements have never been banned either. For example, the movement "Free Geneva" advocates the secession of this canton from the Swiss Confederation. With the help of the mass media, the local authorities lead an on-going debate with this movement's spokesmen, shaping public opinion against it, but not banning it.

#### The Unity of Many Faces

It is religion that plays the role of the bonding agent in the sphere of national relations between various language groups. One of the largest cantons, Valais, is divided language-wise into Upper Valais which is German-speaking, and the French-speaking Lower Valais. Yet no case of ethnic strife has ever been noticed there. Moreover, it is one of the few cantons whose population is remarkably unanimous in their assessment of any decision of the federal government. Many experts explain this phenomenon by stressing that 90 per cent of the Valais population are Roman Catholics.

Solutions vary as much as problems do. They range from the mere expression of sympathy to the introduction of amendments to the Federal Constitution. For instance, there is a widespread opinion that in order to develop national languages, the Constitution should be amended so as to increase the responsibility of the Federation and the cantons for the preservation and development of all four languages in the areas where they are spoken, and for the creation of conditions for better understanding among Swiss citizens speaking different languages.

Consider Switzerland's main law, the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. It contains provisions that are universal and address the many problems arising in the life of that multilingual and multinational country.

Article 3, for example, stipulates that "cantons are sovereign inasmuch as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution". Further on it says that every canton "exercises all the rights that have not been delegated to the federal authorities". In turn, the confederation guarantees the inviolability of the canton's boundaries and their sovereignty within the limits stipulated by Article 3, as well as the constitutional liberties and rights of individual citizens.

The above provisions of the Federal Constitution have allowed Switzerland for decades to avoid sharp collisions having to do with its structure as a confederation. United in its diversity, Switzerland sets a good example to its near and distant neighbours in the European home.

**Unsanctioned Actions By Yeltsin Supporters,  
Democratic Union**

*90UN0107 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by G. Drugoveyko: "From 1000 till 1300 and after 1500"]

[Text] Yesterday at the editorial office the telephones were ringing: "What happened in Moscow on Saturday?" "Is it true that demonstrators formed a chain from Zelenograd to the center of the capital?"

So here it was, Saturday at 1000 at the Gorky metro station.... A group of people was finishing preparations for the spectacle. Rolled-up placards, banners, metal flagstaffs—the equipment for demonstrations and gatherings is improving. The participants entered easily into conversation:

—We want to demonstrate our support for Yel'tsin, Gdlyan and Ivanov. We support the struggle against corruption and the mafia. Our present legal system is such that there can be no talk of fighting the mafia or defeating corrupt clans without violating legal rules.

—Very often people who are honest in their personal lives can be dishonest towards society. They themselves do not steal or take bribes or gifts, but their passive stance towards these illegal acts amounts to complicity.

...At a few minutes before 1100 large numbers of people gather on the sidewalks. "Preventive" clashes with the police erupt.

The police explain:

"No demonstrations of any kind are allowed. No one is allowed to enter the thoroughfare. It's dangerous."

Nevertheless, small groups ran out into the middle of the thoroughfare in various places on Gorky Street. They stood holding hands, their placards, posters and banners unfurled.

The slogans varied, according to those present, but they all supported perestroika.

Quite a number of sharp words were aimed at the media. There were personal accusations without concern for whether or not these public declarations were well-founded. Clearly such free expression of views is tied to the conviction that one will not be held accountable for any "excesses."

At one point a man unexpectedly ran out in front of an oncoming line of cars in an attempt to stop traffic. It is to a police officer's credit that the trouble was over in a matter of minutes. Afterwards the officer said:

"Today's duty will cost all of us a few years of our lives. It would be nice if no one ended up under the wheels of a car."

Although there were small and large breaks in the human chain where it crossed streets and sidewalks, it extended almost half-way through Moscow.

We all know when the demonstration ended. At 1300 the chain collapsed. The participants dispersed. Each of them returned to his usual Saturday thoughts, concerns and affairs.

...And at 1500 the Democratic Union began its "work" at the Pushkin Monument.

If you took everything being said there on faith you would be astounded. Here indeed are people who know everything and who give decisive evaluations to everything without the least doubt about the truths they are espousing!

But let's not take everything on faith. Let's look and listen in on their discussion.

...Two people are arguing. A score or so of curiosity seekers are looking on. The argument is over a multi-party system and the leadership role of the CPSU.

—The Party bureaucracy has demonstrated its inability to govern the country. Therefore the CPSU should refuse a leading role.

—The Party bureaucracy is not the same as the CPSU. I myself am a communist. I have always worked honestly and lived from my own labor.

—Let's not talk about you personally. Not a single reform proposed by your party works. If you held an election right now for Prime Minister, no one would vote for the communist Ryzhkov. A candidate from another party would win.

—Wait a minute! Who told you no one would vote for Ryzhkov? No one! And you're treating it like a foregone conclusion.... I would vote for Ryzhkov!

Many people support him: "I would vote for Ryzhkov too..." "So would I!"

A group nearby is smaller. But here too, fierce discussions are going on.

—We have to create a democratic society.

—The CPSU has already made a declaration about that at a congress; this happened before any movements had appeared, including your "Democratic Union."

—But there's still no democracy. We've only had eight months of democracy in all: from February to October, 1917.

—And the Provisional Government's court martials? What were they, democratic?

—I don't know about them.

—If you don't know about them, then you shouldn't call that period democratic.

There are several hotbeds of discussion at the Pushkin Monument. But all of the arguments have something in common—a certain characteristic technique which, incidentally, is true of all of the "Democratic Union's" activities.

The DS [Democratic Union] members use to their advantage a position which some members of the organization formulate in the following way: oppose everything the government does. Indeed, it is both advantageous and easy to criticize, the more so because one will not be held responsible.

Here's the method: freely invent some historical event which never took place. For example, "If the Regular Session had taken place, then..." What follows is a historical fantasy on whichever subject the DS chooses.

Two Saturday events. What is the chief lesson we can extract from them?

Popularity these days has a price. And if a person is able to consolidate a popular following, he becomes a protector who is immune to arguments, proofs, and even the facts. We are still more drawn to faith than to analysis. We tend to believe words we hear more easily than we do actions which are yet to be seen, understood, and evaluated.

And those who are not popular seek and fight for popularity. They are willing to pay any price for it.

**Gidaspov Remarks to Leningrad Aktiv Meeting**  
18001672A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 26 Aug 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Meeting of the Leningrad Party Organization Aktiv; Perestroyka: A Program of Actions for Leningrad's Communists; B. V. Gidaspov's Concluding Remarks"]

[Text] As the course of the discussion has shown, Leningrad's communists firmly adhere to perestroyka's positions. We have made our choice. And it makes it incumbent upon us to infuse the activities of the Leningrad party organization with new and specific content and to concentrate our efforts on solving the practical matters of political, intellectual, social and economic affairs.

What, in this connection, based on the results of the discussion which has taken place, needs to be emphasized in particular?

It is important that all of Leningrad watched us. And not just Leningrad. Even more important is the fact that everyone who followed the work of our meeting did not see a single indifferent person, who did not have either convictions or a point of view about the events occurring in our country today.

Our initial position is a firm belief in the fact that the CPSU can not yield to anyone, no matter whom, its own

role as the political leader and vanguard of society. Under the new conditions, it is necessary to have a profound understanding of the role of the party and that of the party organizations as integrating forces, without which there can be neither a successful completion of the cause of socialism nor a solution for any specific problem confronting the labor collectives, the rayon, Leningrad and the oblast.

The party organizations and communists are obligated, in fact, to display the ability to master the situation and to evaluate objectively the processes occurring in society.

It is important to expand the open dialogue with the various strata of the populace and to use to the fullest extent the enormous intellectual potential of our scientific and creative intelligentsia and the interaction with public organizations and independent formations, without abandoning, at the same time, our basic positions. It seems that those principles, thanks to which we have achieved impressive successes on the international scene, should be carried over into our country's domestic policies.

We will place the main emphasis in the political and ideological work on battling for the basic needs and demands of the working person, the veterans and the young people, and on defending such fundamental values as social justice, collectivism and internationalism, and give a decisive rebuff to any manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism and discrimination on the basis of nationality, religion or any other reason. Any constructive initiative and any kind of movement for the acceleration of perestroyka should receive organizational and political support in the party organizations.

It has been recognized that our mass media are carrying out important and necessary work. The main thing is that the acuteness and critical nature of their statements should have an adequate depth of analysis, constructiveness and objectivity.

The statements from this rostrum have again confirmed that Leningrad's communists and the Leningrad party organization do not intend to give up their positions and will not make any ideological concessions to anyone. And we have had enough of sprinkling ashes on our heads and saying that this is something we had overlooked, this is something we had not counted on and this is something we had not completed.

We are united in the opinion about the fact that the symptoms of a crisis situation are becoming more and more evident in Soviet society. The signs which confirm this conclusion, for the time being, are displaying a tendency toward growth and their specter is expanding.

The decline in the economic growth rate, which began in the middle of the current 5-year plan, has assumed a stable nature. The imbalance in the commodity-money relationships is becoming more profound and the growth of the shortage in the retail market has taken on an avalanche-like nature.

This, so to speak, is one side of the coin. And on the other side are the large troubles which have already been endured, the flare-ups of interethnic strife, fraught with the most bitter consequences, which have rolled across the country, and the unceasing wave of the strike movement.

I believe that there is no need to continue this list. As they say, all of us see it and hear it on all sides. All the more so, since many of the phenomena which have caused serious concern have not bypassed our region as well. And we are obligated to do everything which depends on ourselves so as not to permit the further development of events in this direction.

I have tried, as much as possible, to devote the little more than a month, which was at my disposal as first secretary of the obkom, to acquainting myself with the situation locally, in the labor collectives and at the industrial and agricultural enterprises of Leningrad and the oblast. I managed to meet and to talk with workers and specialists, organizers and managers of production and representatives of the creative and scientific intelligentsia. There were also simply conversations on the streets and in the stores of Leningrad and the cities and settlements of the oblast, which confirmed once again my own evaluations of the situation taking shape and of the region's most acute problems.

In this connection, without claiming to have made a comprehensive analysis, I would like to share with you certain observations and conclusions.

The most general of them consists of the fact that the vector of public consciousness is shifting more and more from the understanding of the necessity, the desire and the expectation of changes toward disappointment.

The production collectives, apart from everything else, are suffering from interruptions in the supply of material and technical resources and from a general decline in the discipline of deliveries in certain regions of the country.

The introduction of cost accounting and contract prices has led to complicated consequences. For example, displays of group egoism, which at times acquire, it would seem, the most unexpected foreshortenings, have become a mass phenomenon. The inexpensive assortment of products is being withdrawn from production and the prices for the produced output are being inflated artificially.

Furthermore, enterprises and scientific institutions are declining to conclude contracts with sovkhozes for the rendering of assistance in the gathering in of the harvest.

These situations, however, with all their anomalousness, are at least still somewhat understandable and more or less explainable.

But now, even the schools are being left without their own patrons. Or they are being told to pay an unthinkable amount for a listed machine tool on the grounds

that, as they say, we have cost accounting. Yet meanwhile, frequently, studying in this school are the children of those who are working at the neighboring enterprise.

The sphere of cooperative activities has been transformed into a zone of enhanced "social radiation."

There is no need to mention in particular the fact that many of them are providing a service which is useful and necessary to society. For example, in Luga, I managed to become acquainted with the activities of the Dymok Cooperative, established by the local rayon potrebsovuz. Small, with a collective of 11 people in all, from raw materials purchased on the open market, it produces nearly a ton of high-quality sausages and smoked pork a day. And they sell them, I would say, at prices which are extremely moderate. The cooperatives are also getting ready to organize their own farm for fattening cattle.

I believe it is difficult to find reasonable arguments against such a statement of the matter.

Yet, we are not talking about such cooperatives. The acute annoyance of the majority of the populace is being caused by the high prices for the cooperatives' goods, along with their absence in the state trade stores, and the disappearance from the stores' counters of foodstuffs and industrial goods which had previously not been in short supply. These phenomena, and others similar to them, are being connected in the public consciousness (in truth, not always justly) with the development of the cooperative movement.

But it must be recognized that this is just the tip of the iceberg.

It is also impossible to discount the fact that the cooperatives are objectively making their own contribution to the intensification of the inflation processes and are inflicting a lot of damage on our morale. Judge for yourselves: over the first half year, the banks have handed out to them nearly a half billion [rubles] of the ready cash, but have received from them less than 35 million rubles on account. The ratio is almost 15:1. What a large amount of goods must need to be put out on the counter in order to eliminate these excess funds in circulation.

There is a steady flow of personnel from the state enterprises into the cooperatives. Usually the most skilled workers. The most complicated production and conveyor lines are being stripped bare. The Kirovsk workers and the managers of many leading enterprises talked about this with bitterness. For this reason, just at the Baltic Ship Building Plant, since the beginning of the year, more than 400 work places have been deserted. There is a similar situation at the North Shipyard, in the Admiralty Association and at many other enterprises.

According to the data of the law-enforcement organs, the portion of cooperative workers and of that "haunting environment," which always forms around an unscrupulously managed and also iniquitous business, in the

overall increase in illegal actions and crimes associated with embezzlements, graft, forgeries and violence, is growing.

I will tell you straight out that the people of Leningrad have to contend daily in our stores with a large number of outrageous occurrences. Take, for example, the organization of the trade in vegetables this summer. The situation is turning out to be paradoxical. An excellent crop was grown in the oblast. But this produce is not getting to the consumer. The prices have been set for a long time at a level which is unusual for this time of the year. Yet the people of Leningrad see on the television almost every evening topics about the usual batch of vegetables and fruits sent to the dump.

At one of the sovkhozes, I was told about the fact that they are harvesting only half of the usual daily quota of potatoes—no place to sell them to. And this is while there are half-empty counters.

It is reasonable to ask whether or not the communists—the deputy chairmen of the ispolkoms of the Leningrad city and oblast soviets, under whose jurisdiction these matters come, and the administrators of the Main Administration for Trade and the Leningrad Main Administration for the Fruit and Vegetable Industry—are doing their jobs.

Now, about those measures which, so it seems, we need to undertake in order to get control of the situation, turn it around and get things moving again.

I would divide them into strategic ones, long-terms ones and those which can not be put off any longer.

I will start with the first ones. Of principle importance is the question of regional cost accounting. Currently, several of its concepts are being examined. This is a large scientific problem. Unwarranted haste and rash decisions are intolerable here. But slowing down is also impossible. Now the task has been put to a group of experienced and thoughtful economic scientists and management workers of thoroughly perfecting this concept by no later than the end of October of this year and presenting it for discussion by the public so that, as of the 13th 5-Year Plan, regional cost accounting would begin to operate. Undoubtedly, it should be based on a new economic strategy and take into account all the diversity and complexity of the price-setting mechanisms and the existing interregional ties.

An integral element of this is the widespread use of the new economic management forms by all sectors of our national economy and by enterprises of both local and central subordination.

And this is already a present-day concern.

The bases of the economic management methods are well known. It is necessary to ensure the personal interest of the workers, beginning with the basic worker and ending with the general manager, in the achievement of the final result: an increase in the amount of goods and a

high economic production efficiency. It is important to reach these goals by the selection of effective tactics, which are dictated by the structure of production and its special features. Our age-old trouble is the yearning for dogmatic schemes. An optimal and flexible combining of the obligatory nature of the state order and of the leasing contract and the cost accounting relations between and within subdivisions—all these questions should be settled without delay and be under the control of the enterprises' party organizations.

Returning to the problems of the oblast's agriculture, I would like to remind you of one truth which is generally well known to many of you: Leningrad can not be fed by the efforts of 120,000 rural workers (this is precisely the number of workers we have who are engaged directly in the agroindustrial complex). And the available farmland does not make it possible to do this.

It is all the more important to use with maximum efficiency the quite powerful production potential established by us in the rural area. But, in order to do this, it is necessary to render it genuine assistance.

There is, first of all, intellectual assistance.

Our scientific forces should generate various approaches to the intensification of agricultural production.

We can no longer tolerate the enormous produce losses which we are incurring today.

But this is also in the hands of our industry and our science. The party organizations should see to it that the design bureaus, the scientific research institutes and the enterprises, on a plan basis, using their own resources, try to find possibilities for the design, planning and manufacture of modern types of agricultural machinery and equipment for the processing sectors and take these problems under firm control.

But, as long as this is not so, I will tell you unambiguously—we can not avoid rendering direct assistance to agriculture.

It is well known that, with the existing equipment, the sovkhozes' workers can ensure the harvesting of only a fourth of the area occupied by vegetables and fruits. And yet, on the whole, the volumes are significant and we are risking coming up short tens of thousands of tons of agricultural produce.

We are still just developing the machines which could replace the labor of people. And, although the experimental models of them have been manufactured and have undergone quite successful testing, mass producing them requires time.

I know that the problems of agricultural work are perceived in some places as extremely acute and on the verge of being totally disastrous. As I have already mentioned, the introduction of cost accounting and the establishment of the STK has led to the aggravation of relations between the city and the rural area.

This is why we are making an appeal today to the working class, to the intelligentsia and to the students that they render assistance to agriculture, so that the crops that have been grown might be harvested and stored in time.

The principle question is a change in the structure of investments aimed at the social and economic development of Leningrad and the oblast.

I have in mind the necessity of investing significantly greater resources in the solution of the problems of increasing the amount of goods in the retail market: non-food consumer goods, agricultural produce, as well as the solution of such most pressing social problems as health care, education and municipal transportation.

As you know, at our request, Yu. D. Maslyukov, the chairman of USSR Gosplan, recently visited Leningrad. We acquainted him locally, that is, visually, with our troubles in light industry, in the food industry and in the city economy.

Our many proposals were examined and supported. In particular, a decision was adopted regarding the curtailing of production construction—this figure has already been cited today, but I will repeat it—by the sum of nearly 60 million rubles and directing these assets toward the needs of the city.

I will tell you frankly, in certain collectives, those where the hopes for improving labor conditions have been associated with new projects, this decision has been greeted without enthusiasm. But I ask you to understand us correctly and to support us: we simply have no other way out. There is no other way we can solve either long-term or current problems.

First of all, we are talking about the Housing-2000 Program. To a large extent, it was born, so it seems to me, in the silence of the cabinets. Hence—far from real life, not balanced with the resources of building materials, with the contract capacities and with human resources.

But this needs to be corrected. It will be difficult, but we should, having sharply accelerated the housing start rate, all the same, reach the planned boundaries and fulfill the adopted program.

The next question is the rebuilding of the city's center. Under the conditions of the housing shortage, scattering our rather limited resources, while engaging in the rebuilding of the center at the same time, is very difficult.

But this task is extremely important, not only in the social aspect, but also in the ideological aspect. The fact is that the center of the city is the focal point of its intellectual life, where the moral qualities and the cultural character of Leningrad are also formed. We can not permit this priceless legacy to be lost.

Moreover, comrades, there is one more problem of the center—it is precisely here that our blockade forces have remained and it is precisely these people who, in their own basic group, are living in the communal apartments. And this is the group, about which we should display maximum concern. And here we will go to any length, right up to involving foreign capital and foreign firms. We are conducting such studies.

Then there are the ecological problems, which make up an extremely complicated matter. On the one hand, we can not abandon industry. This would mean a loss of work places and the conversion of many regions into "bedroom communities," with all the complications which would ensue therefrom. But, on the other hand, we can no longer put up with the way we are using our natural resources, when Leningrad Oblast is being covered with exhausted quarries and we are discovering heavy metal salts and organic substances in the Neva [River]. Therefore, it is necessary to struggle uncompromisingly against everyone who disrupts the balance of nature. First, we must struggle economically. But, in addition to this, we need ideas, approaches and the accelerated establishment of ecological centers, including through the reconfiguring of certain planning institutes, and we need plans for treatment facilities and for the equipment for them.

To put it briefly, we need to place this problem on our own shoulders, without building illusions at the expense of the departments. There will be a conversation with them which will be separate and quite harsh.

I can not help but touch on discipline. Do not consider me a reactionary or a conservative, I do not subscribe to the "screw-tightening" methods. But, I absolutely should tell you about this, in order to obtain your support. It seems to me that, having proclaimed as a slogan of perestroika in our society: "Discipline. Frankness. Democratism and Glasnost," at some point, we switched the order of these words around and then completely lost the first item. I am talking about all the aspects and manifestations of this concept.

We need to begin with ourselves, with discipline in our party house. I will not be disclosing a secret, when I say that, in recent times, it has been significantly shaken. We need to restore the original democratic meaning of Leninist "centralism." We are for the total freedom of discussions at the stage of the discussion of questions and the consideration of all opinions, including those of the minority and non-party members, but we are also for the unity of actions after the adoption of decisions.

Without discipline in the party, we will achieve nothing. No matter what you say, the principle of democratic centralism was, is and shall be [valid] and it must be observed.

We can, as was proposed today, shift words around and will talk, not about the unity of opinions, but rather, about the unity of actions, I agree. Let there be such

unity. But our actions should be based on party discipline. We can promote and develop the pluralism of opinions and we can advocate our own point of view, even after a decision has been made, but, the carrying out of this decision is our strict obligation.

We are in favor of reviving an atmosphere of criticism and self-criticism, based on party comradeship, at party meetings, seminars and other forms of intercourse, so that any meeting of communists would simultaneously be a school for political responsibility and education in collectivism and, mainly, for party discipline.

Then there is production discipline. Whether good or bad, we have standards for work by time, by the number of operations and by the degree of carefulness with which they should be performed. We are losing production discipline and, thus, labor productivity as well, and we are creating empty counters and lossing quality. Even if those regulations by which we supervised only 3-4 years ago were rigidly adhered to, we would be able to achieve a lot.

Last year, the losses of work time were equivalent to the elimination from production on a daily basis of nearly 4,000 workers in industry and construction.

I have already mentioned this: a half-forgotten event of our everyday life has been revived—strikes. To what do they lead? In a bourgeois society, the workers thus force the employer to share with them the profits. But in our country? A strike is nothing more than the shifting of money from one pocket to another. The state has no ready cash. Thus, in order to give, it is necessary to withdraw these assets from somewhere else and to infringe on someone else's interests.

Will we not fall into a vicious circle with such distribution?

Meanwhile, the many questions which the strike committees are bringing to the government level have been constantly and regularly studied by the trade unions, the soviets of the labor collectives and the administration.

But they so frequently are on the side of protecting the interests of the workers and, what is more, in the event of the emergence of tensions, they readily become members of the strike committees.

The political evaluation of such a position, in the first place, of the trade unions, is unambiguous: this is unscrupulousness and a loss of face. The question arises: do we need such trade unions?

Then there is public discipline. On the streets there is dirt, cigarette butts, drunks and sloppily and improperly dressed people—these are not Leningrad's style and not Leningrad's character. There will be, of course, an account presented to the law-enforcement organs. But it needs to be presented not just to them. First of all, this is our pain and concern, yours and ours together, comrades and citizens of Leningrad.

Recently, a plenum of the city party committee on questions of public law and order took place. I heard speeches by district militiamen, the leaders of our services, workers and the managers of enterprises. All of them were disturbed by what is going on: crime is growing and new forms of it have appeared, such as group crimes and group banditry. A situation which is completely new for us is the mass disturbances on the streets and in the squares.

Under these conditions, we should support the law-enforcement organs. It is impossible to forget the fact that, throughout the entire world, there exists a definite lack of sympathy for the courts, the procuracy, the police or the militia. But, nevertheless, in the developed countries, this work enjoys high prestige. It is well-paid and society contributes enormous material resources for its own protection. We should follow this path.

It is necessary to unite the efforts of the law-enforcement organs—the courts, the procuracy, the militia, the other subdivisions of the internal affairs organs, the volunteer formations, the people's brigades, and the Komsomol operational contingents, so as to change the situation in Leningrad in a short period of time. First of all, we need to stabilize the situation and then achieve a sharp improvement in it.

The militia needs very serious support. If it does not feel confident on the street, it will not perceive itself to be the master of the situation and we will achieve nothing. Yet, we have done a lot to cause the militiaman to lose such confidence. The legal protection of the militia is guaranteed by law. Yet, there is a lack of social protection: the pay is low, often there is no housing and our militia's equipment leaves a lot to be desired. We will solve these matters ourselves, locally, and in interaction with the center.

We also require, of course, perestroyka of the activities of the law-enforcement organs themselves. In the first place, they should display a firm exactingness toward those new and very dangerous forms of organized crime—the corruption, the graft and the bribing of everyone, beginning with the lowest links (the struggle for a place at the market) and ending, finally, with the highest spheres, where the iniquitous apartment, automobile or other transactions are controlled. There can be no other path.

And a few more words about the cooperative movement, or more accurately, about the measures for regulating it and putting it in the right channel. Now it has been divided into two streams, one of which is flowing along the natural and correct channel—the increasing of the volume of produced goods and services for reasonable prices. The second is when, on the field of a shortage, cracks and holes are sought so that people can fill their own pockets as fast as possible. I have already mentioned the fact that 90 percent from the volume of the realization of services and products of cooperatives is being recirculated in the form of ready cash which places an

additional burden on the economic system, which was already unbalanced without it. In addition, this circumstance is a nourishing medium for the growth of crime.

I call on the healthy forces of Leningrad's cooperatives to look attentively at this situation and to help both themselves and society to recover the prestige and trust of the people.

It is also necessary to change the attitude toward the establishment of new cooperative, from principled positions and to examine the existing ones. All the laws for this exist.

I believe we will be acting correctly if we demand from the communists—the leaders of the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies—an end to the activities of cooperatives which act as middlemen, reselling industrial and food products, and engage in other operations not typical for them. This needs to be done without delay—in the coming month.

I must tell you straight out that the acuteness of the many social problems of the city and the oblast is not only not being reduced, but in a number of instances, is becoming more aggravated.

Starting from this point, at the upcoming extraordinary sessions of the soviets with reports from their executive organs, which are being held on the order of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the main attention, in our opinion, should be concentrated on how the planned social and economic programs are being carried out, how the perestroika of the structures and activities of the organizations and services under the jurisdiction of the corresponding soviets is proceeding and how everything which is undermining the faith of the people in perestroika is being overcome.

The results of these reports should give the soviets, as well as the party organizations, an opportunity to formulate more clearly a program of their own actions for the preparations for the upcoming elections for local and republic organs of people's power.

We are turning to the USSR People's Deputies with a call for more persistent protection of the interests of the people of Leningrad at their own congress, in the commissions and in the Supreme Soviet of the Union.

In Leningrad and in the oblast, a report-and-election campaign has been unleashed in small primary and shop party organizations and in all party groups. This year, in conformity with the decree of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo, reports will also be made by the bureaus of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms about their activities, as well as all party committees and party bureaus. This is, in principle, an important objective.

Its essence lies in the fact that, during the process of the reports and elections, it is necessary to achieve a basic restructuring of the political and organizational work of all the party units and their ruling organs.

The matter needs to be set up in such a manner that precisely now the reasons for the failure of many party committees and organizations to keep pace with the processes occurring in society can be subjected to a careful analysis, a new meaning can be given to their own work and the activities of each communist can be impartially analyzed and evaluated.

Sharp criticism is being heard of late aimed at the party obkom and its apparatus. Well, on the whole, it must be acknowledged as being just.

Recently, we had a detailed conversation with the workers of the oblast committee's apparatus. The matter was put thus: if you do not have the will for an active struggle, it would be better if you yield your place to another. This will be welcomed correctly, with understanding.

Today there is a special need for fighters, people who are active, full of initiative, capable of making decisions, not afraid to be responsible for them and capable of implementing them.

We understand this well and, on such approaches, we will build our own cadre policies.

We understand that it is necessary to get away from operational control and "expediter" functions, although life sometimes still compels us to do this. We will establish structures in the soviets, which are capable of taking upon themselves the pulling of all the management and administrative levers and we will absolutely relinquish this.

I will also tell you about the fact that, in the obkom's apparatus, the threads of an enormous array of information converge, which makes it possible to work out concepts and strategy, to support actively everything which is new and progressive, and, through the primary party units, to direct the worked-out policies into the riverbed of practical matters. We firmly intend to preserve these positions for ourselves in the future as well.

All instructions will be given publicly, with information through television, the oblast, rayon and mass-circulation press and meetings in the labor collectives.

It seems to me that I will be stating the opinion of the majority if I express satisfaction with the conversation which took place. It is proof of the profound understanding by the communists of the acuteness of the moment experienced, of the yearning to find a way out of a complicated situation and of the resolve to strengthen the foundation of perestroika by practical deeds.

This is the main thing for us—practical deeds in the name of perestroika.

**Profile of Leningrad Party Chief Gidaspov**  
90UN0055A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 17 Sep 89 pp 2-3

[Interview with Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom, conducted by S. Grachev: "Boris Gidaspov: With an Alternative and Without One"; date of interview not given]

[Text] [Grachev] Boris Veniaminovich, the newspapers carried a short biography of you, but I would like to acquaint LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA's readers more closely with the first secretary of the oblast party committee. Especially since in Leningrad, and probably in the country as a whole, such a post has never been held by a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. Incidentally, do you think your election was a matter of chance or a trend of the times?

[Gidaspov] As for biographical information, I have no secrets here. I was the only child in my family. Although my parents lacked a higher education, they were well-read, thinking people and real members of the intelligentsia, and I learned a lot from them. But life was not very easy for our family. We traveled around the country a lot and lived for a long time in Leningrad before the war. What else?—I graduated from the industrial—now polytechnic—Institute in Kuybyshev in the specialty of applied chemistry, or to be more precise, chemical physics and the physics of explosion combustion. And after that my entire life was connected with that work: defense plants, an institute, and starting in 1958—graduate studies in Leningrad.

[Grachev] I know that at the Technological Institute you were immediately offered the opportunity to defend a doctoral dissertation.

[Gidaspov] Yes, during the discussion of my candidate's work in the predefense, the professors from the Technological Institute and University talked about that, but I did not do it. Maybe I got cold feet, but I probably acted correctly, because my work was a bit raw for a doctoral dissertation. I dare say that even a year and a half later, when I defended my doctoral dissertation, it was not entirely complete; nonetheless, it contained all the elements that allowed me to keep afloat in the world of science for many years to come.

[Grachev] In any event, you very soon became a department head. Anatoliy Sergeyevich Dudyrev, the Technological Institute's current rector and formerly your deputy dean, told me that at the time you were the youngest department head and one of the youngest doctors of sciences in Leningrad.

[Gidaspov] That's all true, but you see in those days it was considered normal for a person to become a doctor at the age of 55 or 60, and naturally the appearance of a 30-year-old doctor seemed like an unusual phenomenon, although throughout the world that is the norm. But

maybe I was lucky in the sense that I managed to combine theoretical research and applied science.

Now for the second part of your question, about scientists' coming to office. Is it accidental? Although I am sometimes called a representative of the technocracy, in reality I am a resolute opponent of it. It is another matter that I consider the intelligentsia to be a key force in our age. And here you must understand me correctly. I am for the working class and I recognize its role, but today without a powerful intellectual potential not a single state will survive. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that in the developed countries scientists and scholars are more and more often being advanced to the positions of executives not only of major enterprises but also of governments. In the Supreme Soviet, say—academicians Primakov and Abalkin. Take the major production associations—the general director of Svetlana is a doctor of economic sciences. And I can name tens of more names of well-known doctors of sciences, corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences and academicians in Leningrad who engage in party and soviet work in addition to their principal jobs.

Note where ministers of defense come from in the civilized countries. As a rule they are specialists in the humanities and social sciences, university professors. Margaret Thatcher is a chemist by education, and she answers the question of whether that helps her in her government work as follows: "Of course. Because in both instances one must know how to analyze complex processes." But what is valuable, of course, is not the specific knowledge itself in one field of science, but the distinctive characteristics of a scientist's thinking, his ability to see many facts simultaneously, generalize them, and draw correct conclusions. People are needed who are capable of systematizing and processing an immense mass of information and making correct decisions. I became first secretary of the oblast party committee, and the party today is also a state management mechanism.

[Grachev] But the party—

[Gidaspov] But I did not misspeak myself. I mean state. With its detachment of 20 million, the party permeates all our society and gathers the data the analysis of which is the only basis for making correct decisions. Of course, this system can make mistakes. People who do not believe in the party's creative force can achieve success by using populist slogans, but on the whole, the person who controls the information system is victorious and governs. And here there is no alternative, whether someone likes that or not.

[Grachev] One way or another, your election to the office of obkom first secretary is connected with the results of the elections for people's deputy, when no one of the other obkom buro members gathered the necessary number of votes. How do you now assess the past campaign? Has anything in your views and attitudes changed under its influence?

[Gidaspov] I don't think so. For me almost nothing has changed, either in my political assessment of the situation or in my general philosophical outlook. It is another matter than I came to know certain categories of people better, received a powerful emotional charge, and gained a better understanding of the processes now taking place in our society.

[Grachev] But why did you enter the election campaign? After all, at the moment of your nomination your career, let's say, as a major scientist and research director was at its zenith. Back at the Technological Institute you made discoveries and completed the works for which you were awarded State and Lenin prizes—which, incidentally, is a great rarity among higher-school scientists. Then you took over as head of the State Institute of Applied Chemistry Research and Production Association, and then you established the Tekhnokhim Consortium, the first of its kind in the country.

[Gidaspov] You know, here there is a certain psychological factor to take into account: for me what is very important is not freedom as such but the possibility of using it and acting as I wish. Well, for example, in 20 years I took, perhaps, a total of three months' vacation. But as strange as it may seem, the awareness that I have a vacation and may use it at any moment gives me strength. The exact same thing is true of the elections. When it was proposed that I run for people's deputy, I did not immediately agree and first determined for myself what it might lead to. Of course, I took into account the fact that in the event I was elected my life would become much busier, and it would be harder to do scientific work.

But I was also interested in people's attitude. After all, what is the State Institute of Applied Chemistry, the collective that nominated me? It is just 500 doctors and candidates of sciences, and about seven workers. I worked in the same harness with them for so many years, but did they know me and really support me? Usually about 10 people in a large collective know the executive well, and no more than 100 know him fairly well; the rest know him only from seeing him on the podium. So it was impossible to predict the results in advance. Nonetheless, I wanted to see what sort of actual prestige I enjoyed in the collective.

[Grachev] You are often criticized for the fact that there were no alternative candidates in the 56th district.

[Gidaspov] That is so to speak. My opponents worked very actively. They pinned outright labels on me—both the nomenklatura and a technocrat. At meetings and gatherings I felt that my opponents were very familiar with my biography and had studied my weaknesses. But what were they offering in my stead? Usually populist slogans. Then I started reading books on populism and saw that many of my opponents were acting precisely in accordance with recommendations under various conditions of political struggle. But I also saw something

else—very often a person had nothing but promises to offer. And then I understood that it was impossible to simply give up that way.

If you see that a person for objective reasons, in terms of intellectual capabilities and organizational abilities is weaker than you, or that he is using glib slogans merely in his own interests, you have to fight to the end. That fight, of course, changed something inside me. Most likely, I became a tougher and more aggressive person, and I developed certain stereotypes of expression, but the main thing is that I grew, of course, to better understand different people. Previously society had consisted for me of the intellectual elite or the working class—the strata with which I usually had to deal. And now, for example, I learned about the problems of the elderly. I met with them a lot and meet with them now—let people not take offense at me, with "his grannies"—and I understood how it was necessary to help them both financially, and with housing, and with attention.

Or take the problem of the army. I had judged the army as an industrialist working for it. But now I became acquainted with officers, cadets and soldiers and came to know a different army. I got to know many party and soviet officials. Finally, I saw the Congress of People's Deputies. That, I will tell you, was also a first-class performance, where one had to form judgments about people right on the spot.

But the Congress was and then, at the time of the elections, the results showed that not one of my rivals got the number of votes necessary for registration. So it was a matter not of alternatives but of reality. Incidentally, that lack of alternatives cost me 20 to 30 percent of lost votes. Nonetheless I saw that the labor collectives supported me and my program. Now I have to fulfill my promises.

[Grachev] Nonetheless, you refused nomination to the Supreme Soviet?

[Gidaspov] I refused, and there is no contradiction there. I acted as I considered right, because I had given too much in recent years to the establishment of Tekhnokhim.

At first people did not believe in interbranch state associations. Moreover, interbranch state associations introduced serious discord into the activities of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the USSR State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers. The system of relationships that had been worked out over the course of decades was being reestablished, and under the new conditions we had to play the score, so to speak, "from sight"; moreover, we had to play a symphony, polyphonic music in which dozens of institutes and plants had to occupy their precise places. And after all, all that was not easy. And if today there are another 11 large organizations with about 50,000 employees asking to join Tekhnokhim, where for 60,000 employees there is a managerial staff of

only 24 people, it is obvious that the undertaking succeeded. How could I abandon it at such a critical moment? I have certain obligations to people and to myself! Moreover, I believed that what restructuring today needed to be reinforced with was positive experience. And when there was a possibility of a choice, an option, I took advantage of it.

[Grachev] But, returning to Leningrad, within literally a few weeks you nonetheless betrayed your principle: you agreed to the obkom buro's proposal and took the position of first secretary. What played the decisive role here, party discipline? Excuse my persistence and, perhaps, my indiscretion, but I have heard from many people the question that you were recently asked by your scientist colleagues from Tekhnokhim: and why does Gidashev need that?

I do not have in mind the loss of earnings, but lately the prestige of party official has not been very high in our country. In that sense the office of a major executive of the new type, the head of a consortium with extensive foreign ties, considerable autonomy, and a chosen team of likeminded people looks, quite honestly, far more attractive than your present office.

[Gidashev] Well, what can I say to you. The point is not only party discipline. There are situations where you are presented with a choice, and situations in which you have no choice. Don't consider me boastful, but I am a responsible person. Yes, I believed that my field was scientific activity, the organization of major research projects, and the development of the sort of new technology that would make it possible not to be ashamed of the results before our descendants.

In Tekhnokhim, for example, we took up the development of new technologies for the production of freon that do not destroy the ozone layer. I think there is no need to tell you the importance of the problem. But when the comrades in the buro told me about the situation, presented the prospects, and argued that it was precisely me, a scientist, who should head the Leningrad Party Committee, after thinking it over I agreed, although I repeat—it was not an easy decision for me to make.

But I myself saw the state that Leningrad was in, and I understand the situation in the party perfectly well—so what was I supposed to do, look at all these problems from the sidelines? In this case I believe I had no choice. Whether I acted correctly or not, we will soon find out. The report and election conference is not so far away. Leningraders and the party organization will take a look at me and evaluate me; by that time, obviously, serious alternatives will also arise, and we will move to a system of direct elections of the first secretary of the oblast party committee.

That's when we will return to this question. But in the given situation, I repeat, it would have been immoral to refuse the offer for my own selfish purposes.

[Grachev] Boris Veniaminovich, you have worked about two months in your new capacity. It is a relatively short time, but, you will agree, in our situation, there is no time for a shake-down. What have you succeeded in doing during this period? And wherein do you see the greatest difficulties?

[Gidashev] What have I succeeded at? In the first place, in becoming dynamically involved in the process of managing such a complex activity as party and soviet work. Here it is not enough to have one's own views and attitudes; one must have a good understanding of how to achieve a given result, say, in implementing the Housing Program, supplying the city with food, and upholding order. I think that those are the priority tasks.

The situation around us is so tense that the main thing is to prevent chaos and bloodshed. Right now a circle of people has already formed around me who accept my program and are prepared to help in everything. It is harder, of course, for me to speak of results. It would be unrealistic to count on the situation in the life of Leningraders changing drastically in two months. But it is gratifying that I constantly sense the activeness and help of Leningraders.

I recently was driving through Nevskiy Rayon—I was meeting workers at railroad facilities. Suddenly, along one of them a militia Moskvich drove up, and a woman captain, Anna Borisovna Martova, spoke to me: "Boris Veniaminovich, look what is going on in our rayon at the Nevskiy Vegetable Depot. Such disorder...." On the way back, returning from the facility, we stopped in at the vegetable depot, discussed the situation with the managers, and indicated a conclusion. It was not an exceptional case—on other matters, too, the same thing has occurred: people are constantly coming to be received and sending letters and proposals.

And I see one of my chief tasks as getting as many Leningraders as possible to recognize that today the state of affairs is no longer decided by the trenchancy of critical speeches and articles, nor by the number of alternatives. It is precisely the opposite—in very many spheres we have reached the point where there is practically no choice and no alternative, and one must act rapidly and in great accord. I realize perfectly well how unpopular such a viewpoint may seem, and that among a certain element of society it may be taken as an attack on democracy, but I am compelled to say that.

[Grachev] Incidentally, many of our prominent economists have warned that in restructuring it is necessary to hold to a certain consistency in reforms. That we first need economic stability, since it is impossible to speak seriously of democracy when the country is shifting to a rationing system.

[Gidashev] As far as I recall, in its slogans restructuring proclaimed first of all order and discipline, and then glasnost and democracy. In practice we first rearranged the elements of the formula and assigned order to the last place, and then dropped it entirely. And consequently we

have the present situation, with which we do not know how to cope. It's as though we caught a bear and have to drag him toward us but can't—he won't let us!

Today we have both glasnost and democracy. But at the same time we have a decline in production discipline, losses due to absenteeism, drunkenness again, and violations of technological requirements, and on that alone we lose 20 percent of our total output. Yet wages have risen! Take another question: the form in which many labor conflicts are resolved. If strikes are caused by the fact that people see no other means of breaking the bureaucrats' resistance, or of demonstrating their commonality, or of declaring the necessity of changes, such a strike should have the right to exist. But then it should be political in nature and not cause economic damage to society as a whole at such a difficult moment.

We are finding it very difficult to live; we are up to our necks in debt; moreover, we must not forget that in our society a strike does not result in a redistribution of profits from owners to workers, but often comes down to attempts by one social group to obtain additional benefits at the expense of other groups. Yet there are numerous other means of fighting for one's rights, but we do not know how to use them and therefore resort to the most extreme measures, which after a while result in even more serious consequences for us ourselves. So do we have any alternatives today?

Or take the growth in crime. Can we permit this dangerous trend to develop even further? Obviously, we cannot do that, either, and we need tough measures that will help restrain its rapid growth. Of course, we should think about the causes and about how to eliminate the shortage of goods, but we need to stop speculation right now, promptly. Finally, we should find measures to curb group selfishness, which today is constantly coming into conflict with general interests. I have already received protests from the residents of one apartment building, because they do not want to permit the construction of another one next door—you see, it will cut the light off from their windows.

And the fact that more than 500 families will receive apartments in the new building concerns no one. And try to build a garage or even a new school, and you will immediately receive an indignant collective petition: What do you mean, there will be kids running around and shouting. And take sponsorship assistance to a vocational-technical school or to a sovkhoz in harvesting vegetables—you won't get anywhere asking for that, either. So are we going to gather the harvest or not? Well, let's debate a bit now, but what about in three or four months?

That is why I permit myself to repeat: the process of democratization in no case contradicts the establishment of order. To the contrary, only with order is it possible, otherwise we will rapidly descend into chaos and will be even worse off than we are now. Moreover, at our meeting in the editorial offices I said that the main thing

is for there not to be bloodshed. And that is not a dramatization of the situation. We all know about events in Central Asia. Can it be that anyone thinks these events are remote from us? But I saw a rally in Luzhniki at which 150,000 people gathered and I well remember the atmosphere that reigned there and the crowd that was heated up to a dangerous state. Throw a match into it, and everything will flare up!

It would seem that we have nothing to be afraid of. Leningrad is practically homogeneous in its national composition, but take a look at what is happening next door. Today hundreds of people are already appealing to our Leningrad raispolkoms and to the directors of large enterprises. They have arrived with their children from the Baltic region and are pleading to be given any work, even without residence permits, just so they can live with their children in safety. That has to do with the question of alternatives in nationalities policy. Do we have any in the present situation? That is why I believe that today it is very important to understand clearly where we have alternatives and where we don't. On the level of decision making, debates are possible, but actions should be united. Well, just imagine that in traffic some drivers go only on the green light, while others can go on the red light. And here we have a state.

[Grachev] Boris Veniaminovich, you inherited a difficult economy. In many respects unfavorable objective circumstances played a role here, but there are also problems that are purely our, Leningrad problems. Which do you think are the most acute and important?

[Gidashev] Over long years of rigid administrative management we lost enterprising people. We have people who carry out orders, but few creative and enterprising people, and without them it's difficult to make a breakthrough on any front. A considerable number of us are still waiting to see how events turn out, and some are only criticizing, smiling sarcastically and saying "let's see what you come up with." So we need to arouse people and genuinely involve them in restructuring. A second thing: we need to revive the very concept of Leningrader. But how can we do that?

It seems to me that we can do so by first of all giving their due to our mothers and fathers, people who withstood the seige, those elderly people who are living today in ramshackle communal apartments and who have been shorted on concern and attention. There are a million such people in Leningrad—there's a specific Leningrad problem for you. This is not just a matter of respect for the elderly—these are "Petersburg" people, our roots; they have endured the hardships of the war and the seige, and they embody moral and cultural traditions.

The problem of restoring the city's former glory is directly related to the restoration of its central part and requires, of course, large financial outlays. But we have already found the money for that and will yet find the money for apartments, hospitals and shops, the money

to keep families from breaking up and separating off their elderly. After all, a healthy family needs them.

A third important and painful question: we have lost our intelligentsia. A very thin layer of it remains. Barely scratch it, and it will be gone. Look at how, over the course of decades, we have continuously lost artists, writers and actors. Indeed, even Zenit [soccer team] couldn't play any worse than they are today. The city is slipping, deteriorating. We underestimated the problem of the intelligentsia in the 1950s or 1960s, and then we acted out of inertia, but we have declined to the point that now every year we bring in tens of thousands of workers in the construction occupations from Central Asia, and now even from Vietnam, yet we cannot invite and give residence permits to two or three professors or a violinist.

[Grachev] Zhores Ivanovich Alferov once told me practically a detective story about how he had gotten a talented theoretician a job at the Institute of Applied Physics and a residence permit.

[Gidaspov] I also know how that is done and myself have had to do it. But why was Petersburg formerly the capital? Because it always attracted the best forces, yet now instead of intelligentsia and highly skilled workers, we are growing by the addition of relatively unskilled manpower. Of course, we also need construction workers and janitors and precinct militia officers, but as a consequence our cultural potential is declining. This problem, incidentally, is closely bound up with another one—the city's relationship with its industry, and the structure of that industry. So far we have developed the relatively routine branches, which on the one hand, did not require highly skilled labor, and on the other, have weighed on the city, worsened its environment, and exacerbated social and moral problems.

[Grachev] Moral?!

[Gidaspov] It's very simple. Because contradictions arise between the person who works in a plant and says, "I am creating items of material value, a material product, with my own labor; I am a proprietor." And what about the teacher, the physician, the pensioner, who do not produce items of material value? Should they enjoy fewer rights, and should their opinion be listened to less? Yet such a viewpoint exists today. Somehow the opinion has established itself among us that the material product and its producer enjoy priority, although throughout the entire world the matter is far from being that simple and straightforward.

The moral problem is very important, especially since we are moving to cost accounting. It can produce as many problems as benefits if we do not anticipate negative consequences in advance and do not try to protect ourselves against them. And they will exist. Cost accounting unquestionably contributes to economic development, but it may also result in further moral degradation. It is no accident that today many people are concerned not so much with their own earnings as with

other people's. Petrov looks at the pay roll to see how much Ivanov has earned, and God forbid that Ivanov should have earned more.

So far we are concerned with how to take away the "extra" from the person who, from our viewpoint, has earned undeservedly more. But the main thing should be something else—how to produce more. So that there is enough for everyone and that our society not become stratified into rich and poor.

[Grachev] The problems you are speaking about took years to develop. And we need results today. The prestige of the party as a whole and, specifically, of the Leningrad Party Organization will depend on them.

[Gidaspov] Under the influence of economic circumstances and mistakes, we really did lose our positions, and the party will regain those positions. But along with that I want to repeat—we have no alternative management structure to which the management of the country as a whole can be entrusted. And until we have another structure that would guarantee the security of everyone and the fact that he will be fed and clothed, and that the construction of housing and a great deal else will be continued, until then, talk of an alternative to the CPSU is empty talk. I do not accept it. It is another matter that party officials today are obliged to ensure that our society's vital activity proceed fully.

They should accomplish this task by disavowing false slogans and putting forward true ones, and what is most important, by selecting people, by promoting and supporting genuine—not pro forma—leaders, people who are competent, talented and enterprising. That also pertains to party officials, incidentally. And those who have occupied their offices on the basis of pro forma traits and by virtue of certain circumstances, must be removed, of course. And therein I see a substantial untapped reserve for enhancing the party's prestige.

[Grachev] The accomplishment of that last task depends in many respects on elections to local soviets.

[Gidaspov] Everything depends on how we conduct them. We need a dialogue with voters and, simultaneously, clear-cut assessments of the extent to which candidates' plans and programs are realistic. So that the elections don't turn into a competition in making promises. A substantial number of people in our country, unfortunately, still react primarily to promises. And if someone promises meat at a ruble and free potatoes tomorrow, and promises it using a microphone, moreover, he will probably be elected. Yet what needs to be evaluated is a person's competence and responsibility and the effectiveness of his program. I am certain that we will find and advance those talented, responsible people. We do have them.

**Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Meets 5-6 Oct****Ryuytel on Local Election Law**

*90UN0117A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian O6 Oct 89 pp 1-2*

[Speech by A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 11th Convocation, 13th Session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet held 5-6 October 1989: "On the Third Item of the Agenda"]

[Text] Esteemed deputies!

On 16 August in Moscow at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, I had occasion to give an explanation concerning certain provisions of the Law on Elections to Estonian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies that we adopted on 8 August.

That serious discussion was carried on Central Television, and for that reason there is no need to dwell on the details.

I shall only add that our Law on Elections evoked contradictory opinions not only in our republic and other regions of the country, but in a number of foreign countries, as well.

In the course of the discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the opinion was expressed that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet should reconsider certain provisions of the Law on Elections.

By a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Article 3, Part 1, and Article 4, Part 1, of the 8 August 1989 Estonian SSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Estonian SSR, and Article 2, Parts 1 and 3, and Article 8 of the Estonian SSR Law on Elections to Estonian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies are deemed incompatible with the USSR Constitution and the USSR's international legal commitments.

Article 3, Part 1, of our law on changes and additions to the Constitution declares that the right to elect and be elected is possessed by citizens of the Estonian SSR who have reached the age of 18 and have lived on the territory of the appropriate soviet of people's deputies or in the Estonian SSR for the period of time stipulated by law.

This provision is elaborated in detail in the Law on Elections.

Article 4, Part 1, of the Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution states who has the right to nominate candidates for deputy.

In comparison to Article 100 of the USSR Constitution, after the amendments to Article 89 of the Estonian SSR Constitution these rights are not narrowed but, to the contrary, the range of those who have the right to nominate candidates for deputy is expanded.

Granted, this list does not include meetings of military personnel, but the participation of military personnel in elections is stipulated in Article 85, Part 2, of the Estonian SSR Constitution.

As you know, Article 8 on the participation in elections of military personnel living on the territory of their military units is included in the Law on Elections to Estonian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies in order that they might participate in elections despite the establishment of the residence requirement.

After all, a military unit is located on the territory of a given rayon or city, and thus the participation of military personnel through their representative in the accomplishment of tasks facing the soviet in question is essential.

How is one to evaluate today the Law on Elections that we adopted, in accordance with which the campaign has begun for elections to local soviets?

One can say that public opinion regarding both the need for a residence requirement and the participation of military personnel in elections in the form in which the law provides remains the same.

The establishment of the residence requirement for candidates for deputy has met with understanding.

Taking our republic's interests into account, the participation of military personnel in elections in the form stipulated by the law is also warranted.

In this connection, proposals have been received from a number of military units that we think about a change in article 8; evidently, people in those military units do not understand the situation in the republic as a whole and the real content of that article.

An explanation should be given to the Supreme Soviet Presidium on this matter.

The question of a residence requirement for voters in upcoming elections has been discussed a great deal.

It has been discussed by commissions and deputies' groups, and was also discussed twice by a consultative committee of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and yesterday by a party deputies' group.

In the course of these discussions it has been stressed that most countries of the world require residence for a certain period in that state, and that period is by no means short, as well as knowledge of the country's language and customs in order to obtain citizenship.

Only after these conditions are fulfilled can one become a citizen of that country, which, along with other civil rights, gives one the right to vote and be elected.

Since the legal content of citizenship of the Estonian SSR has not yet been determined in our republic, the requirements that are made of a citizen in order to obtain the right to vote are included in the law on elections to local bodies of authority.

At the same time it was noted that in not a single law-governed state are restrictions on citizens' rights established in such a way that they are retroactive.

We, who are also striving to create a law-governed state, nonetheless did that.

The establishment of the requirement of two years' residence on the territory of the soviet of people's deputies that is being elected as a condition for participation in elections is indeed a restriction with two-year retroactivity that was not known beforehand to citizens.

In world legal practice such restrictions usually take effect at the end of the period specified for the restriction, so that citizens to whom that restriction will apply are warned of that in advance.

As is evident from the appeals by citizens that we have received since the adoption of the Estonian SSR Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies, and from a survey of the population, dissatisfaction has been expressed precisely with the establishment of the residence requirement for voters.

We have received 18 resolutions of meetings of labor collectives demanding revocation of the residence requirement in the Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

These proposals have been made by all the enterprises that participated in strikes.

Many citizens have made the same sort of proposals to us. At the same time, we have received numerous letters from institutions, organizations and labor collectives and statements by citizens expressing support for the Estonian SSR Law on Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

A survey of the population conducted in the first half of September showed that the establishment of a residence requirement for a candidate for deputy is supported by 86 percent of those surveyed, including 96 percent of the Estonians and 67 percent of the non-Estonians.

The establishment of a residence requirement for voters is considered necessary by 73 percent of the population, including 92 percent of Estonians and only 39 percent of non-Estonians; moreover, 53 percent of the latter oppose the establishment of a residence requirement for voters.

This shows that in deciding a number of questions that have arisen in the restructuring period, we have been out ahead of the rest, and therefore we are not understood.

The transfer of the right to decide local matters to those who have lived for a certain period in that region is obviously a correct step.

However, we should also recognize how we must act in the specific situation in order to develop the processes we have planned.

The present political situation in the republic is fairly complex.

Therefore, we must carefully think over each step.

Proceeding on the basis of what has been said above, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has thoroughly discussed this question and weighed all possible alternatives presented, and it proposes that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet not apply Article 2, Part 1, in the part pertaining to the residence requirement in the elections this 10 December.

Let us hope that all deputies will understand the need to make such a decision.

We find that in the present political situation this is the only possible decision.

#### Ryuytel on ESSR Supreme Soviet Election Law

90UN0117B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 7 Oct 89 p 2

[Speech by A. Ryuytel, chairman of the of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On the Third Item on the Agenda"]

[Text] The authority of our Supreme Soviet expires in February of next year. For the election of a new, permanent parliament, we need a new Law on Elections. The draft Estonian SSR Law on Elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet that is presented today for first reading was drawn up by the working group on constitutional legislation headed by ESSR Minister of Justice A. Kiris.

The draft law was discussed at a meeting of the legislative proposals commission and in a joint meeting of the chairmen of the standing commissions and heads of deputies' groups. A thorough discussion of the draft law took place at meetings of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 26 and 28 September. Assuming that the deputies have had time to familiarize themselves with the draft law, I shall touch only on certain fundamental provisions in my report.

The majority of people's deputies and voters have long recognized that there is no need in our small republic to elect a large representative body, a Congress of Estonian SSR People's Deputies, which would, in turn, elect an Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, the first article of the Law on Elections specifies that deputies of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet are elected by citizens of the Estonian SSR by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage. The wording of Article

2, which concerns the general election law, has elicited various opinions. At a meeting of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium the content of that article was discussed very thoroughly. We believe that until the legal status of citizen is defined, the right to vote must be extended to all citizens who have reached the age of 18 and who live in our republic. Thus, our Law on Elections does not deprive those citizens who elected USSR people's deputies this year of the right to vote. We are thereby following the principle according to which a law is not retroactive. However, we have deemed it necessary to establish a residence requirement for candidates for deputy. We have reached the consensus that a candidate for deputy to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet should be a person who knows the republic's life. And in order to do so he should live in the republic several years. Therefore, we have worded Article 2, Part 3, as follows: "Any citizen of the Estonian SSR who has reached the age of 18 and has lived in the Estonian SSR for at least the five past years may run as a candidate for deputy."

The draft law does not give public organizations the right to the direct election of deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, in Articles 3 and 4 it is specified that in electing deputies to the Supreme Soviet a voter has one vote, voters take part in elections on an equal basis, and citizens elect deputies directly.

Article 8 concerns the participation of military personnel in elections. We believe that military personnel and the members of their families who live on the territory of military units and who have reached 18 years of age, regardless of the time they have been living on the territory of their military unit, may elect four deputies to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet in single-seat election districts formed in military units located on the territory of the Estonian SSR. This will also make it possible to have representatives in parliament of various types of forces deployed on the republic's territory.

Various opinions have been expressed as to whether single- or multiple- seat election districts should be formed for elections to the Supreme Soviet. Article 11 of the draft law provides for both possibilities.

How many deputies should be elected to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet? It should be taken into account that the Supreme Soviet will operate on a permanent basis. We believe that the optimal number is 105.

Another question: how should rayons and cities under republic jurisdiction be represented in the parliament? We are submitting for your discussion two versions of Article 11, Part 2.

The first version provides that no later than three months before election day, taking into account the proposals of rayon and city soviets (for cities under republic jurisdiction), the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium forms, in addition to the four single-seat districts for military units, election districts for elections to the Supreme Soviet in such a way that each rayon or city under republic jurisdiction receives two deputy

seats, and the remaining deputy seats are distributed according to the principle of a simple quota and the greatest remainders, based on the approximate number of voters living in a given rayon or city under republic jurisdiction.

The difference between the first and second versions is that according to the first version Tallinn is granted a number of seats equal to those of the rest of the cities under republic jurisdiction—two, while according to the second version each rayon in Tallinn gets two, for a total of eight seats.

If you take the number of voters who took part in the election of USSR people's deputies as the basis, according to the second version 101 deputy seats are divided among the rayons as follows: Khiyumaaskiy—two; Khaapsaluskiy, Yygevaskiy, Kingiseppskiy, Kokhtla-Yarveskiy, Paydeskiy, Pylvaskiy, Pyarnuskiy and Raplaskiy rayons—three, Tartuskiy, Valgaskiy, Vilyandiskiy and Vyruskiy—four, Rakvereskiy Rayon—five, and Kharyuskiy—six seats.

In cities under republic jurisdiction the distribution is as follows: Sillamya—three, Pyarnu—four, Kokhtla-Yarve and Narva—five, Tartu, Kalininskiy, Leninskiy and Oktyabrskiy rayons of Tallinn—six, and Morskoy Rayon of Tallinn—seven seats.

Altogether, if the second version of Article 11 is adopted, 53 deputies will be elected from rayons, 48 will be elected from cities under republic jurisdiction, and 4 will be elected from military personnel, for a total of 105.

New principles are incorporated in Part 5 of the draft law, which concerns the system of election commissions. Elections to the Supreme Soviet are prepared and conducted by an Estonian SSR election commission, rayon and city (for cities under republic jurisdiction) election commissions, and precinct election commissions; the first two have a term of office of five years.

The republic election commission is formed by the Supreme Soviet no later than three months prior to election day.

Proposals concerning the membership of the election commission may be made by the soviets of people's deputies of rayons and cities under republic jurisdiction, or by their ispolkoms, as well as by republic governing bodies of public organizations and public movements having the right to nominate candidates for deputy.

No later than three months before election day, the appropriate soviets of people's deputies form election commissions of rayons and cities under republic jurisdiction.

Representatives to rayon and city (for cities under republic jurisdiction) election commissions are nominated by the labor collectives of enterprises located on their territories, or by of labor collectives' councils and subdivisions, as well as by rayon or city bodies of public

organizations and public movements having the right to nominate candidates for deputy.

Precinct election commissions are formed by the appropriate rayon or city (for cities under republic jurisdiction) election commission no later than 45 days before election day.

Representatives to precinct election commissions are nominated by labor collectives or their councils and subdivisions located on the territory of the appropriate rayon or city under republic jurisdiction, by the rayon or city bodies and primary organizations of public organizations and movements having the right to nominate candidates for deputy, and by meetings of voters by place of residence.

The procedures for nominating and registering candidates for deputy are defined in Part 6 of the draft law.

The right to nominate candidates for deputy belongs to the Communist Party of Estonia; trade unions; cooperative organizations; the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia; associations of women, war and labor veterans and scientific personnel; creative unions; labor collectives; and also public organizations and public movements that are registered according to procedures stipulated by law, and election alliances formed by them; meetings of voters by places of residence; and voters who have united for the purpose of nominating candidates for deputy by way of civic initiative.

Candidates for deputy may be nominated by meetings of labor collectives located on the territory of an election district, or of their subdivisions, if at least 150 employees take part in these meetings. Small labor collectives may nominate candidates for deputy jointly under the same conditions.

The right to nominate candidates for deputy in election districts belongs to republic representative meetings (conferences, meetings of authorized representatives, and plenums) of republic organizations.

Candidates may also be nominated in an election district at a voter meeting by place of residence, if at least 150 voters take part in it. Every labor collective and subdivision located in a different rayon or city under republic jurisdiction, every republic representative meeting of a public organization or public movement, and every meeting of voters by place of residence may nominate one candidate for deputy in one election district.

The voters of an election district who have united by place of residence to nominate a candidate for deputy by way of civic initiative may nominate one candidate for deputy in that election district.

A meeting to nominate a candidate for deputy is open, and the territorial election commission is informed of its having been convened.

The nomination of a candidate for deputy may be proposed by any voter, including the possibility of his nominating himself as a candidate.

The basic guarantees of the activity of a candidate for deputy are specified in Part 7.

The procedures for voting and determining election results are specified in Part 8. This part contains no fundamental disagreements with the Law on Elections to Local Soviets.

I would only note that the results of elections for an election district are established by the appropriate territorial election commission by the method of the transmission of the individual vote. The Estonian SSR Election Commission provides detailed instructions on this.

On the basis of the records of the territorial commissions, the Estonian SSR Election Commission determines election results and registers the deputies elected.

Today the draft ESSR Law on Elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet is presented for first reading. This draft law should be brought to the attention of every voter. Therefore, it must be submitted for public discussion and published in the newspapers.

It would be advisable for the proposals and criticisms that are received in the course of the public discussion to be gone over by the Commission on Legislative Proposals. Every deputy must discuss the draft law with his voters. Deputies' groups should go over their own proposals and criticisms in detail in their meetings and present them to the Commission on Legislative Proposals.

Today, however, it is inadvisable to open debate on the draft law.

After the public discussion, the Commission on Legislative Proposals should report on all proposals and criticisms to the ESSR Supreme Soviet, after which discussion in the parliament can follow.

The membership of the new and permanently operating ESSR Supreme Soviet depends in many respects on what sort of Law on Elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet we adopt.

Let us all consult together with the people in order that the law may become a step on the path toward the establishment of a law-governed state.

#### Toome on Local Government Law

90UN0117C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 3

[Speech by I. Toome, chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, at the 13th Session of the 11th Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Sixth Point on the Agenda"]

[Text] Esteemed deputies!

We have started building a new house, the house of Estonian economic self-management that is common for us all. Its foundation should be deep and solid. The administrative reform that is planned indisputably pertains to the foundation of that house.

At the previous, August session we made a decision in principle on conducting the administrative reform. For today, the draft Estonian SSR Law on the Basic Principles of Local Self-Government is ready for discussion as one of the priority decisions in that area. The chief principle of this document is the establishment of a two-stage administrative system of popular self-government based on the principles of self-government and the autonomous resolution of questions and exercise of administrative authority.

Administrative reform can be successfully conducted only in the event that we have the general political prerequisites to do so. Do we have them?

I am certain that we do. The period of preparation for Estonian economic self-management is coming to a close, and the process of introducing republic cost accounting has begun. We can find support for our current business in decisions made by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 July, in the meetings of the three republics' leaders with M. S. Gorbachev, and to a certain extent, in the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee's plenum on nationalities questions. Support for Estonian economic self-management was expressed everywhere. That fundamentally good general political background has favorably affected specific negotiations in Moscow connected with Estonian economic self-management. In the discussions there we have come from superior-subordinate relations to the principle of contractual partnership. Of course, there has been no shortage of misunderstanding and opposition, either, but that is natural for dialectical development.

In negotiations with the central authorities we have entered the period of decision making. The budget, the transfer of union enterprises to republic administration, work on the conclusion of a trade agreement, the exchange of views in many other areas—all that allows us to assert that today we have the essential general political minimum for autonomous decision making that allows us to begin and carry out the reform of local government. The second question is whether we ourselves are ready to do so. After all, the draft law submitted today for first reading is essentially the first in a package of fundamental draft laws concerning Estonian economic self-management. Moreover, the draft Law on Self-Government is connected in the most direct way with the laws on taxation, the budget, property, entrepreneurship, etc., the texts of which we have not yet read. Hence the question of whether it would not be more proper to wait a while, in order to discuss them together, as a package. Putting the matter that way probably has a certain logic. But there is another logic, as well, the one that time dictates to us. And dictates mercilessly.

December 10 is election day for local soviets. That is the first date that we should take into account. If we are unable by that time to define with a lawmaker's authority what the local government's real full powers will be, what sort of purse it will have, and what the conditions of economic operations as a whole will be like, there will be no sense in talking about elections of substance, or about interest in those elections.

That is the first point. Secondly, in many respects the adoption of the basic principles of local self-government as a framework law will contribute to the drafting of the aforementioned laws themselves. In carrying out administrative reform, the units of measurement are not weeks or months. World practice unequivocally persuades us that the period of implementation is measured in years. And we need a framework law as fast as possible, in order to begin the administrative reform and create a foundation for drafting other laws.

That, in brief, is the course of my reasoning, in order to persuade myself and attempt to persuade you that the time has come to discuss this draft law.

Today's discussion begins the practical examination in the republic's parliament of legislation connected with Estonian economic self-management. Many analogous draft laws are being prepared in more than twenty government working groups. What should the shortest possible but absolutely scrupulous path of discussing and adopting them by the Supreme Soviet, a path which allows us to avoid mistakes, be? We need to exchange views on this question, among others.

And now for more detail about the draft law itself. It is said that ink has two important abilities: to express ideas and to create blots. What is the guarantee that today's draft law with its new chapter and 22 articles has no blots? In June the working group led by Enn Markvant and consisting of scholars and specialists published the principles by which it was guided in the press. Many deputies to local soviets, their leaders and specialists have expressed their opinions of the draft. On 21 September chairmen of city and rayon ispolkoms discussed the draft together. Prior to the discussion of the draft law by the republic's government, the collegium of Gosplan provided its evaluation of what had been done. In addition to that, the republic's ministries and departments, deputies to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, and party agencies presented their criticisms and amendments to the draft law. The recent plenum of the Paydeskiy Raykom can serve as a good example. A thorough discussion took place in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. There has been a fair amount of all this. At the same time, the debates that have been held also showed that we do not yet have unequivocal answers to many questions. Popular discussion and discussion here in the parliament should provide final clarity.

What should be singled out in the draft law itself?

The draft law stresses the role of the primary level of government. That is as it should be. We cannot stop

half-way in breaking up the command system. After all, the goal is not shifting power from a department, say, to Pylvaskiy or Vilyandiskiy ispolkoms, but genuine popular self-government at the local level. And self-government can operate effectively only very close to people, whether it be a small city, settlement, or volost. And at the same time—popular authority still must be established at the local level. That cannot be done without a real legal basis. That is why the proportion of organizational provisions is relatively great in the draft law. The precise specification of the rights and duties lying within a soviet's exclusive jurisdiction creates the prerequisites for creating real local self-government. The right to an independent budget; the introduction, on the basis of Estonian SSR laws, of local taxes; and the definition of the legal status of municipal property—those are landmarks on the path to self-government. The relations of the governing soviet with the economic-management agencies and the population—here, too, the drafters strove for concreteness, proceeding from the demands of the present day. After all, the Law on the Soviet of People's Deputies that we presently have can serve as an extremely good example of empty and unsupported declarations. Thus, that law defines the rights of the local soviet with nearly 20 terms, all of the sort: "takes measures," "provides," or "provides assistance"; and only in three cases does the soviet presently have the right, according to that law, also to "decide."

I would particularly single out in the draft law the future contractual nature of relations between various government agencies and other juridical and physical persons. It is clear that it is impossible to transfer power to the primary level by means of orders. The only basis here can be appropriate contracts. We should be flexible here. After all, the differences among republics in the economy and the social sphere are very great. The ability of primary-level government agencies to perform all the functions of self-government provided by law also differs. Therefore, a gradual shift based on contracts should mitigate the contradictions among local self-governing units of various levels, as well as contradictions with institutions and enterprises located on their territories. Granted, the draft law makes an attempt to define the jurisdiction of and relationships among the various levels extremely specifically, on the one hand, but broadly enough, at the same time, to prevent this from becoming an obstacle to local initiative and autonomy.

In this connection, it must be stated that defining the limits of the jurisdiction of government agencies was one of the most controversial issues in the course of the preceding discussion. The difference in interests is sometimes very great. As always in life, highly antithetical, extreme positions clash here, too. It seems to one person that primary-level government means the right to adopt final decisions on any issue. Nonetheless, that cannot always be the case. We speak of a future Estonia as a sovereign state in a union of equal states. That is correct. But the same relations cannot be translated to the level, say, of relations between the republic and a volost. There

is a fundamental difference here. Only a republic may be sovereign. After all, we are not getting ready to establish a confederation of sovereign volosts. We need to think further about these and many other questions. Let us hope for new ideas from the public discussion.

The separation of powers is a special problem. A great deal has been said about the need to put an end to the diktat of the "apparatus." Including diktat vis-a-vis local agencies. On the other hand, the transitional period has its own specific features. This is the source of one of the viewpoints that have been presented, one of the variants that have been proposed, namely that it would be a good idea initially to combine at the primary level the functions of soviet chairman and those of the volost or settlement elder or city mayor, in order to effectively resist the economic pressure of any enterprise or farm. I stress—this is a question of the primary level.

Various opinions can be evoked by the question of whether a city mayor, for example, should be a deputy or not. On both questions, alternatives have been presented for discussion. Let us once again weigh all the arguments both "pro" and "con"!

The draft makes an attempt to reflect the work of the government apparatus. Here, as elsewhere, world practice served as the basis. For example, the relationship between the individual executive and the collective body—the ispolkom. Also new are the government secretary and the legal foundations of his activities and functions.

The draft law provides for the appearance of a new agency—an auditing commission—in local government. One may assume that at the primary level the influence of the new agency will be considerable, since it is there that the functions of self-government have a certain significance. Problems arise at a higher level, where state functions are also performed. This again raises the question of the place and functions of state control in the future Estonia. The draft contains a good many more questions that require further interpretation and a continuation of joint work by practitioners and scholars. The questions of whether we should try to regulate everything with the given draft law, or should resolve some questions by adopting other normative acts, and so forth also require clarification.

In connection with the draft questions also arise that cannot be answered today. For example, how will the administrative reform be carried out in Tallinn's rayons? On the other hand, there are also questions that we must hurry to provide answers to. Whether the use of natural resources will also be under self-government, questions of municipal property, the granting of independence to the subsidiaries of enterprises and institutions, and many more. Take the question of subsidiaries. In Vyruskiy Rayon there are altogether 21 of them. Only seven are ready to become independent. And the rest?

Who is preventing them? Why? In these matters, Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, and other republic departments should make more active use of the powers granted them.

These are only a few thoughts in connection with the draft law. Let me add further that it is a thousand times easier to discuss and condemn some innovation than to support and develop it. Everything is on the side of the person who condemns it—traditions, human laziness, and the stagnation of thought. I hope that with lengthy discussion this will not be the case. There is a fundamental difference between today's administrative reform and, for example, the one that was carried out in 1950. At that time volosts and uyezds that had been established as the result of lengthy and natural development were eliminated. In their place, 39 rayons were created, of which 15 have remained until our day. Three oblasts established a little later did not last even a year. Today it is nice to recognize that the principles of the administrative reform as a whole, as well as the program for establishing historical administrative units that are in keeping with the traditions of the Estonian language and culture, are meeting with public understanding and support. People, regardless of their nationalities, want to take part in arranging their life, and want to create a dependable home for themselves. It is this desire that should be deepened by the course of the administrative reform, and it seems to me that in the broad sense the draft law is already meeting these expectations today.

But in and of itself a good principle, a good draft law, is an empty cube. How many good ideas have grown faint from thirst amid empty vessels created by us ourselves. Only a fool takes pride in them and places them in front of the house for everyone to survey. But an intelligent person fills the cube—carries out what he has planned.

Our present-day wisdom consists, in the first place, in involving the best heads in the public discussion and making corresponding adjustments in the law. And in the second place, in involving various levels of the economy and management in the administrative reform. The government considers the primary task in this connection to be the establishment of the normative base that is necessary for the practical exercise of the skills of the personnel involved, and the establishment of sufficient motivation for actual local leaders to take on work as formal leaders.

Some things have already been done here. The government has adopted a program of advanced training. The Ministry of Finance is looking into the wages of the employees of local agencies, etc. Nonetheless, it seems that the complexity of the self-government relationships presupposes the presence of permanently operating coordinating bodies. For example, of a ESSR Supreme Soviet Commission on the Preparation of the Administrative Reform, and an interdepartmental republic agency of the ESSR Council of Ministers.

Esteemed deputies! In my speech there have been more unanswered questions than iron certainty. One can err in various ways, but for correct actions there is usually only one possibility. The only way we will be able to determine it is by pooling our efforts.

Of one thing I am certain: the draft law that is presented today for discussion merits reflection and merits implementation.

### Divisions in Estonian Communist Party Analyzed

18150089 Tallinn *RAHVA HAAL* in Estonian  
5 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Karl Kasikov, Estonian CP Central Committee member: "Political Pluralism in the Party"]

[Text] The draft program of the Estonian Communist Party is supposed to be released for general discussion this summer. This document will form the political basis for bringing the society out of the crisis situation. For that reason it would be more appropriate to call it the program of the Estonian CP, and not a plan of action. In essence, talk about the draft program will also open up discussion on the role of the Estonian CP within the republic and the USSR.

It could be foreseen even now that in the course of the discussion, three substantially different positions will emerge from among the members of the Estonian CP. Some think that we have one state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one party—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a uniform party program and constitution, and that the internal life of the party does not need to be democratized.

Others maintain that centralized power as a form of leadership has exhausted itself. Along with more sovereignty for the republics, the party organizations of the republics should also be given freedom to work out policies according to their local interests. The Estonian CP is a part of the CPSU. However, it should have its own program allowing for local differences, the execution of which would be assured under the constitutional guarantee of the CPSU.

A third group holds that the national goal of Estonia is independent statehood in a state where there are only independent parties. Therefore the Estonian CP would have to be completely independent with its program and its constitution.

It is already clear that discussing the outline of the Estonian CP will expose the internal contradictions of the party, and leave the communists seeking their own solutions and freedom of action. What should be done in this situation? Should we close our eyes and pretend that everything is very interesting, and that political pluralism in the party is a normal phenomenon? Or should we call a team game in the party: everybody who's with us is wise and on the right track, all the rest are suspect? This, I think, is the approach that has been used in the

party for decades, while objective legalities and hurdles in the way of progress have been concealed subjectively, by setting up one-sided goals and choosing the wrong methods to guarantee results. "Find the culprit and make five demands" (never more than five, otherwise you may get confused yourself)—this has been the leadership pattern for our society for decades: wishful thinking passing for reality, major contradictions concealed, and effects castigated without any understanding of the causes.

**Why is it that differing positions have evolved within the Estonian CP?** To understand this, we must acquaint ourselves with the immediate past. In 1985, the course of democratization and disclosure was announced in the USSR. Among the first to have an awakening were the small nations, whose level of development is somewhat above average for the USSR. Besides, they were the ones to experience socio-economic and national injustice most acutely. National-democratic movements developed. In the summer of 1988, the Estonian CP Central Committee avoided conflict by acknowledging the growth of national awareness, and announced a new political course that would also enable the pursuit of national interests through party politics. The Central Committee started working with the more liberal wing of the nationalist-democratic movement, and criticized the radical wing of the nationalist movement for activities which were not considered carefully enough. The CPSU Central Committee has not, up to this time, recognized the need to work with democratic and nationalist-democratic movements. This is why the political activity of the Estonian CP Central Committee was not acceptable to one part of the republic's communists. When national and humanitarian interests were elevated to the level of ideal, it was interpreted as an erosion of the party's ideological base, the splitting of the party along national lines. Out of the dissatisfaction grew the **rightist, conservative wing of the Estonian CP**, which in March of 1989, made a switch to public oppositional activity. Communists of this mold of thinking attribute too much significance to the evolutionary development and not enough to radical changes. Their conservative attitude is reflected in their efforts to force life back into the frame of their old convictions.

The right-conservative wing of the Estonian CP has its idealistic, socio-economic and intuitive roots. The idealistic root is embedded in the understanding that progress in the USSR depends on achieving conformity, and on denying any local differences. It is derived from the arrival-principle of the communist society, where all class and nationality differences disappear, and a period of overall happiness and plenty arrives. Time has shown, however, that it is still too early to speak of all that. A mechanical interpretation of conformity and equal rights can divert the innovation process to a course of mini-reforms, giving up democracy, and to the formation of a strong unified state. Attention to local interest is viewed as separatism, nationalist-democratic movements are seen as nationalism, efforts at more independence for

making new contacts for collaboration are called wrecking our common home, economic autocracy. The need to work out a contemporary theory of socialism is underrated, while the positions of classics are overrated, along with the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of less educated working classes in reorganizing the society; underrated is also the role of creative and technical intelligentsia in securing such development.

The socio-economic root of the rightist-conservative wing is tied to the trade-ministerial leadership of economic activity, and to establishing production as a goal in itself. Interests of trade ministries and false economic stimuli lead to ignoring regional, national and ecological problems. The worker gets estranged from the product, the means of production from the people of the region. The people are estranged from dictating production needs within their own historically evolved territory. The expansionist, ministerial economy is perpetuating nationality conflicts through immigration. Ignoring economic relations in the marketplace, and sticking to a subjective pricing policy prevent the value principle from taking effect in the society. Money is no longer the standard of value, but a means of securing equalized channels of distribution. At the same time, all of the Union republics have come to the realization that they are getting defrauded in their economic dealings. The initial party organizations within industry have by now switched to looking out for the interests of producers. The higher ranking organs of the party, however, have not yet managed to pull together the components for radical economic reform needed on the Union level. The Estonian SSR offers the IME (Self-Managing Estonia) program as a solution that would eliminate the Union subordination altogether. Some of the communists do not like that.

The intuitive root of the rightist-conservative wing is wrapped in a feeling of national instability. The Russian-speaking population of our republic accepted the national awakening of Estonians with a certain anxiety. Up until now, there has been a beautiful yet remote prospect that small nations will blend together with the bigger ones in a sharing of happiness thanks to their accelerated development and rapid growth of well-being. Such a view of development made it possible to equate the Soviet Union with the Russian Federation, and created an illusion that a person's nationality is not relevant. What is relevant, however, is being a Soviet citizen, who can live well anywhere. Understandably, such an interpretation is not acceptable to small nations. From this derives the obligation placed on the republic's non-Estonian-speaking population to study the language and culture of this country, to know and to understand the history and the strivings of the people among whom they live. Not all communists are prepared to take on such additional tasks, because they are used to taking their orders from the Union-level central organs. And it is there where more time is needed to understand the injustices accumulated in dealings between small and large nations. The position of the Estonian CP Central

Committee is that by protecting the national interests of Estonians, we can also guarantee the protection of the interests of all other-national inhabitants.

Now, the question could arise that since there is a rightist-conservative wing of the party, is there going to be, or is there already a leftist-radical wing? The leftist could mean attributing too much significance to revolutionary changes, having the right goals, but using the wrong means. In my opinion there is no leftist-radical wing in the Estonian CP as yet. But, should the conflict escalate between the national-democratic movement and the local and Union-based conservative forces, this could still happen. The emergence of a leftist-radical wing depends largely on the policies of the CPSU Central Committee. If the sovereignty of the republic and the IME concept get only partial support from Moscow, if an economy based on territorial and national traditions is no longer seen as a hallmark of a nation, if local differentiation is allowed only within the limits of conformity and unity, if the parties of individual republics do not become representatives of local interests, if suppression of people's awareness is once again applied to hide the deeper causes of conflicts, then, inevitably, part of the communists will go along with the national-democratic radicalism. Therefore, the Estonian CP Central Committee will have to make a choice: to go along with conservative positions and force them on the people, or to go along with the masses of people, supporting the idea of the Estonian SSR seceding from the Union, and thus enter in open conflict with the Union-level organs, while attempting to maintain socialistic order in the independent society of the future. This is a black scenario, of course, but in the meantime we have not excluded the active participation of the black berets. Global experience has shown, however, that special forms of government or—simply put—military dictatorships defy projections for growth; they will, however, in the awareness of the people, and for decades to come, sow seeds of national hatred and hostility against everything connected with socialism, the Soviets and the communist party. Therefore, to avoid an impasse, we expect such policies from the CPSU Central Committee that would recognize the individuality of the regions and give power and the right of decision-making to the local authorities. Are the leading organs of the USSR willing to do that? Would public opinion across the Union be ready to allow that, and would all instances down the line be willing to assume this full measure of power? These questions, for the time being, are equations with several unknowns. It is also clear, however, that Estonia cannot hold back on the planning and execution of its program while waiting for others to catch up. It is not even clear what one should be waiting for (is it the equalization of the Union-wide level of development in different regions) and how long one should wait.

Therefore, the conflict between Union-level social awareness and that developed in our republic forces the party to maneuver and make political decisions that correspond to the needs of the masses, but that cannot be

justified theoretically, because there is no theory of socialism dealing with contemporary conflicts, and recognizing the unique nature of the republics. Objectively speaking, the main cause of splitting within the Estonian CP is the fact that socio-political processes mature faster here than they do across the Union. Because of that we need to make new decisions, decisions that the USSR central organs and the public opinion across the Union are not yet ready to deal with. It is the awareness of this conflict that drives the inhabitants of Estonia to seek answers in greater independence, sovereignty, and in the rights of self-determination and self-government. Hence a small Union republic's strivings for independence are, quite objectively, inevitable. The subordination of local interests to the average Union-wide opinion has thus been avoided. During the stagnation years, regrettably, the CPSU was excessively centralized. Guidelines for action were born in narrow offices, and thought was suppressed by force. Now, what is causing the splitting in the CPSU is its inability to consider the interests of the minority when making Union-level decisions. This contradiction forces the communists of a small nation to seek support from the democratic and national-democratic movements outside the party to help them devise a mechanism that would give public opinion control over the party, and avoid making compromises with Union-level organs that are unacceptable to local interests. To counterbalance this, movements will sprout on the mentality level of a unitary state that would try to strengthen Union-level leadership, even at the cost of suppressing local interests. This contradiction did not emerge on the national plane, in the setting of the Estonian SSR, however, it has assumed a national coloring. Actually, we are dealing with a contradiction between the proponents of the innovation process and its opponents, between centralized and democratic thinking, between objective reality and perceiving the same in a one-sided, subjective manner. Within the Russian Federation, national awakening has taken some contradictory forms lately. The intelligentsia is going along with the quest for democracy, the less educated working class sides with the strengthening of central power. Causing this polarization is the fact that theoretically, it has not yet been resolved how the party of the working class can represent popular interests in a setting where class distinctions have disappeared. Life has shown that our ethical climate has deteriorated as a result of underrating the creative intelligentsia. It has generated egotism, lax behavior and a general lack of culture. And, because we have also underrated our technical intelligentsia, we have not been able to carry out the scientific-technical program. The development of a social theory, however, has often been replaced simply with the opinion of a group of workers. Very often, effects are justly criticized, without ever touching on the removal of causes. Opposition within our party organization has developed along the same lines.

It follows, then, that prevention of splitting within the Estonian CP depends on the political prerequisite of having more in the way of Union-level democratic

measures; the **ideological** prerequisite of developing a contemporary theory of socialism leading to social reforms; the **economic** prerequisite of liquidating Union-level trade ministries, and moving toward a consumer-oriented economy according to the IME program; and the **intuitive** prerequisite of having an equitable solution to the ethnicity problem throughout the USSR. Obviously, this is a time-consuming process. And this is why the existence and the spread of such splitting is inevitable, indeed. With the development of democracy, new parties can emerge from the conflict. In the case of multiple parties, a democratic system is created so that the people will have a chance to decide which ideas or which party they will support. A mechanism for harmonizing different ideas and interests will develop. Opposition will develop in relation to the party in power, and that will force the party in power to more vigorous activity on behalf of the whole nation. Presumably, the social base of the parties will loose its distinct boundaries. I am fully aware that such a position could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt at clouding the clear ideas of V.I. Lenin regarding relationships between mass, class, party and the individual. But we also have to understand the dialectics of V.I. Lenin in interpreting life. Actual experience forces us to find ways other than building democratic socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The disappearance of class distinctions, and the emergence of all-humanitarian values force us to find new theoretical solutions for creating a people-centered society. If we, the communists, cannot find them, or if we consciously refuse to look for them, then there's no point paying lip-service to a state of justice, democratic socialism, or a people-centered society. Where are the guarantees, however, that these solutions will come about without advancing the theory? For that reason, let's all set out together to find answers to all of these questions.

#### **Estonian Local Election Law Compromise Protested**

*18150091 Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian  
4 Aug 89 p 1*

[Three open letters]

[Text]

#### **Memorandum to Arnold Rütel, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium:**

The organizations making up the Tallinn Cooperation Task Force are appalled that the Supreme Soviet Presidium, at its session of 24 July, submitted for discussion a draft of the election law in which the proposals of progressive organizations have been blatantly ignored. Talk about a two-year residency requirement is a mockery of the Estonian people. According to international law, decisions about a country and its people are made by the indigenous people. The proposals on the residency requirement made by progressive groups were

compromise proposals already, allowing for the possibility of giving voting rights to those who have settled in Estonia and established permanent ties with Estonia.

Thus, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has reached a compromise with the imperialist enemies of the Estonian people, who represent neither a given political movement nor a solid segment of the population.

Based on the above, the Tallinn Cooperation Task Force declares the following:

Both the voter and the person being elected should be, in essence, citizens of the state in which they live. This is why we consider the 15-year residency requirement in Estonia to be imperative for both voters and those being voted for.

A language requirement for those being elected will also be necessary. Without mastering Estonian, the deputy cannot understand what is being discussed in the congress, and cannot explain to others the proposals being offered.

The power monopoly of the CPSU for making nominations for deputy candidates should also be discontinued in future elections. We repeat our demand: nominations for deputy candidates should be made by all parties, political movements and voting alliances formed by them. We also demand the registration of all democratic parties and movements.

The Tallinn Cooperation Task Force hopes that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will handle the current political situation in a realistic manner, taking into account the current relations between progressive and reactionary forces. The Estonian people are on their way to restoring independence. The Supreme Soviet will, by responding to the positions stated above, have an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to deal with political realities. If the election law being passed cannot satisfy the majority of the Estonian people, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet can lay down its function as an administrative power organ, and the Estonian people will have to find a different way.

[Signed] *Tallinn Cooperation Task Force, 1 August 1989*

#### **Open Letter to the People's Deputies of the Estonian SSR and To All Inhabitants of Estonia:**

The draft of the election law submitted to the 24 July session of the republic's Supreme Soviet was a compromise between divergent positions made to the detriment of progressive forces.

The concessions made on these positions due to political strikes amount to capitulation that does not take into account the current relations between the progressive and reactionary forces in Estonia.

The cabinet agreement between the top leaders of the Estonian SSR and the extremist groups is not permissible. It also has the effect of deepening the political crisis.

For purposes of the election law, we demand a 15-year residency requirement in Estonia for candidates for deputy and voters alike, along with the language requirement of mastering both Estonian and Russian to be set for those running for deputy.

We demand, as the session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet continues, to have each candidate's position identified in the final vote for the measure.

If our demands are not met, we are forced to prevail on all inhabitants of Estonia not to participate in the elections.

*[Signed] The Board of the Physicians Union; The Board of the Estonian Democratic Workers' Party; People's Front Board of the Harju Region; The Kalamaja Association for Preserving the Living Environment; People's Front Board of Northwestern Tallinn; Latvian Cultural Association; People's Front Board of the Lenin Region of Tallinn; People's Front Board of the Mere Region of Tallinn; People's Front Board of the October Region of Tallinn; People's Front Board of Tartu*

2 August 1989

**Statement of the Estonian People's Front Board  
Regarding the Work of the Estonian SSR Supreme  
Soviet 12th Session:**

The Board of the Estonian People's Front expresses anxiety about the irresolute behavior of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium during recess of the Supreme Soviet session. We consider yielding, without argument, to undemocratic demands made in a threatening manner to be extremely dangerous to the future course of democratization.

We find it impermissible to retreat from the principles of proposed legislation, as they had been prepared for the session.

We find it necessary to follow consistently and decisively the democratic principles such as establishing a full residency requirement for the voters, and withholding voting rights from USSR military personnel staying in Estonia on a temporary basis.

In the interest of continuing the peaceful process of democratization, we find it necessary to pass the strike law.

We invite the democratic general public of Estonia to meet with the deputies of the Supreme Soviet to instill in them determination to protect the democratic positions of the election law.

On 16 November 1988, the Supreme Soviet showed its willingness as a legislative organ to stand up for democracy and the interests of the Estonian people. We hope that the deputies of the current session will continue to

advance the cause of democracy, a direction that has earned it the support of the people.

*[Signed] Rein Veidemann, on behalf of the People's Front Board.*

**From the Editor:** In yesterday's NOORTE HAAL we published several "Proposals Regarding the Draft Law on Elections of Deputies to the Local Soviets of the Estonian SSR" as submitted by the republic's council of strike committees of the Estonian SSR enterprises, the Estonian SSR Joint Council of Work Collectives, the Estonian SSR Intermovement and war veterans, armed forces veterans and the republic's section of militarists-internationalists.

We think that the deputies continuing work on Tuesday should also be aware of opinions "from the other wall." The question is, above all, one of **being informed**. This is why we have published these three reports.

*Political Department, NOORTE HAAL*

**Estonians Petition for Repeal of Annexation Act**

*18150092 Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian 6 Aug 89 p 4*

*[Appeal to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers]*

*[Text]* Our people have, with 404,000 signatures, voiced protest against the fact that on 6 August 1940 the regime of terror then governing the USSR concluded the annexation of Estonia, making Estonia part of the USSR. The apparent source of this was the unauthorized State Council that had been convened **ignoring the constitution of the Estonian Republic**, and who, without a mandate from the people, passed the act about Estonia joining the USSR.

Our nation has with 404,000 signatures asserted that through the ages, a longing has survived in its soul for truth, freedom, and independence.

Our nation has with 404,000 signatures asserted that the Estonian people have not lost sight of this goal during the years of Stalinist terror, nor under the Brezhnevian pressure of Russification. The intellectual independence of our people has brought Estonia its first advances in restoring historical justice.

Yet, we have to admit that it will take a lot of hard work and a constant struggle to rejoin the free nations of Europe. With deep respect and deference to those who have sacrificed their freedom and their lives in the course of this struggle, and those who are still waiting for their political and legal rehabilitation, we turn, **supported by 404,000 signatures** to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet with the demand to void the illegal act of 22 July 1940 as one not corresponding to the will of the Estonian people.

Supported by 404,000 signatures, we demand official recognition of the **annexation and occupation** of Estonia.

Supported by 404,000 signatures, we demand from the USSR government that it respect the sovereignty of the Estonian state and its territorial inviolability, as established by the 1920 peace treaty of Tartu, and recognize it unconditionally in all future political or economic dealings with Estonia.

We emphasize, with 404,000 signatures, our readiness to continue this struggle, by democratic and parliamentary means, for the independence, demilitarization, and economic progress of our native country.

We are convinced that the Estonian people's striving for independence can be realized in a way that would not endanger the human rights of any inhabitants of Estonia, and in a way that would contribute to the continuing democratization of the USSR, while enhancing its international prestige in the efforts of developing a common European home.

The paths taken by the European nations may be different, but our goals are the same.

[Signed] *Physicians' Union—Andres Kork; Democratic Alliance Themis—Kaido Pihlakas; Estonian Association of Academic Law—Ando Leps; Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church—Einar Soone; Estonian Jurists' Union—Maido Pajo; Estonian Writers' Union—Lennart Meri; Estonian Christian Union—Illar Hallaste; Estonian Artists Union—Andres Tolts; Estonian Heritage Society—Ott Sandrak; Estonian Trade Unions—Raivo Paavo; Estonian People's Front—Kostel Gerndorf; Estonian Green Movement—Andres Tarand; IME Problem Council—Liina Tõnisson; Cultural Council of Creative Unions—Jaak Joerüüt; Memento—Aadu Oll; Independent Infocenter—Mart Nutt; Alliance of Work Collectives—Ulo Pärnits; The Virumaa Foundation—Mart Maidla; Orthodox Church—Orvo-Johannes Sepp*

#### **Latvian Responses to CPSU Statement on Baltics Detailed**

18001653A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
31 Aug 89 p 1

[Untitled article by own correspondent A. Timkov responding to CPSU statement on Baltic republics]

[Text] The statement by the CPSU Central Committee on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics has drawn a far from uniform response. The spectrum of forces emerging in the arena of the political struggle is too variegated; goals pursued and realized under the banner of perestroika are too disparate.

For example, the view is expressed that this document represents the "heyday" of Interfront and its supporters. Another view is the following: that the center is restricting the achievements of democracy with a firm hand and opposing pluralism. The CPSU Central Committee's statement has been sharply condemned by a group of USSR people's deputies from Latvia and from the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as by the

Latvian Popular Front Duma. They consider the statement an encroachment upon the rights of the Lettish people, who are directing the course of society's rebirth.

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau gave a more carefully weighed response to the statement. The Bureau notes that the statement carries great political significance for the fate of the republic and requires a profound understanding of the political situation. During the course of perestroika nationalist and separatist groups have become active and are destabilizing the atmosphere in the republic and are sowing distrust among its inhabitants. The Central Committee Bureau has called upon the population to remain calm and exercise restraint; rather than give in to emotions, it cautions, they should subordinate their actions to reason. The Bureau affirmed its determination to defend the republic's sovereignty within the new USSR Federation and to struggle for an independent Latvian CP within the CPSU.

A different assessment was given by the Latvian CP Saldusskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] Bureau. The Bureau disagreed with the CPSU Central Committee's statement. The raykom bureau's view is that the party and government control the political situation, and that this "center" only aggravates the situation with incompetent meddling. The statement has also been condemned at several meetings of workers' collectives in Riga.

What arguments are used to support this dissent? They mainly boil down to the claim that the Lettish are a characteristically sober-minded, calm people not given to nationalistic feelings. Thanks to this, despite the exacerbation of relations amongst the population, there have been no confrontations or open animosity among nationalities. The republic has also managed to avoid political strikes. Understanding is growing within the Russian-speaking community about the problems of the Lettish nation: all of this serves as a basis for tranquility.

Some party workers have seen in the CPSU Central Committee statement an attempt to shift the responsibility for the situation to the localities, thus relieving the "center" of responsibility. Speaking generally of the need for such a document, they observe that the statement has met with strong opposition. Separatist ideas have acquired a certain popularity and have strengthened the positions of leaders of informal public organizations. The Latvian CP Central Committee's indecisiveness in its struggle against manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, anti-socialist and anti-Russian sentiments has also been observed. These phenomena are explained by the absence of unity in the ranks of the party itself. Many communists who have become members of informal organizations are taking positions which are far from the party line.

My interlocutors also emphasized that, against a background of a redoubled economic crisis and furious attacks on the party, it is difficult for them to struggle against their opponents who lay claim to a leading role in

society. They also spoke of the despair of a number of party workers over the reduction of staff and the restructuring of their functions at a time when the soviets are in no position to truly take on absolute authority or responsibility for the economic situation.

In the view of opponents of the statement, a serious shortcoming is its evaluation of processes taking place in three republics within a single general context. The situation in Latvia, for example, is noticeably different from what has unfolded in Lithuania and Estonia.

It would be wrong to oversimplify the political situation in Latvia. Social tensions remain. The discussion proposed by the NFL [Latvian Popular Front] Duma about the possibility of Latvia leaving the USSR remains alive. The Movement for the National Independence of Latvia, under whose aegis the so-called "citizens' committees" are acting, has not given up its claims either. A campaign for transforming the Agricultural Alliance into a political organization has unfolded. Concerted efforts are being made to create a multi-party system in the republic.

Only time can tell where these events will lead us. But more and more people are asking themselves: Are these the goals for whose sake perestroika was conceived? In addition to triumphs along the path to democratization and the truthful evaluation of historic facts, perestroika requires a solid economic foundation. This can only be achieved if we consolidate and weigh our actions and learn to trust and respect one another.

#### First Sitting of Latvian CP CC State-Legal Affairs Commission

*18001658A SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
12 Sep 89 p 3*

[Report by Latinform correspondent B. Sebyakin: "Supported by the Force of Law (From a Latvian Central Committee Commission Session)"]

[Text] The participants in the first session of the Latvian CP Central Committee Commission on State-Legal Affairs functioned from the very beginning in businesslike harmony. They approved an agenda without long discussions. The chairman of the commission, Latvian CP First Secretary Ya. Ya. Vagrīs, proposed that, besides organizational matters, discussion focus on the question of the role and place of the republic's party committees and party organizations in the solution of problems related to strengthening law and order and intensifying the battle against crime. The chief of the juridical administration for arbitration of the Latvian SSR Gosagroprom, Ya. A. Salenieks, was elected secretary of the commission.

Discussing the proposed draft statute concerning the commission, the sessions participants gave expression to a number of proposals and desires, after which this document was approved.

Summing up the results of the discussion, Ya. Ya. Vagrīs said:

"It is not our goal to call people 'on the carpet' and issue grades. But if, somewhere, one or another decision in the area of state-legal work is being implemented badly, it will be up to us to make an analysis of the situation and to present results of this to the Central Committee Buro. We will also have to be involved in supervisory work. In anticipation of apprehensions that the commission will become just another organ duplicating already existing structures, let us discuss right away how to structure our activities. Obviously, it is necessary to plan them in some way. Of course, each of us here, as representatives of various law enforcement and administrative organs as well as of juridical science, has his own burning problems. In the first instance, these relate to working conditions, wages, and technical support. We will, of course, not solve these problems ourselves, but we can propose to the republic's peoples deputies how best to solve them. With the help of the Communists and party organizations, we must make a study of our urgent problems and work out proposals regarding them. There are questions which the republic itself can solve, but there are also those that are on an all-union scale. It seems to me that the struggle against crime is particularly important today and that we must think about this first of all."

Taking the floor next, Latvian SSR Procurator V. B. Daukshis presented a large amount of data characterizing the status of crime within the republic. He noted that the population of Latvia has grown by 6 percent during the past 10 years, that crime has increased almost 1.5-fold, and that we have become one of the leaders in this sad statistic. Moreover, this year, there has been a steady, month-by-month, increase in the level of crime, and this is occurring against the background of negative social and political processes. During the past 8 months, a total of 18,123 crimes have been recorded, 4000 of them during August alone. The number of premeditated murders is a cause for particular alarm—122, or 42 percent more than during the same period last year. The relative share of crimes based on mercenary motives is growing. While four years ago burglaries, thefts, and robberies accounted for barely more than half the total number of crimes, they now make up more than 70 percent.

There are highly organized criminal groups operating in our republic, the procurator noted further. They are engaged in extorting money from cooperatives as well as from people who are engaged in individual labor activities and they sometimes have inter-republic connections. These bandits are arming themselves with the operating methods of the mafia in the West.

V.B. Daukshis cited as sore spots the problems of combatting parasitism, finding jobs for former convicts, and alcoholism. At the same time, he noted, the only result of introduction by the republic's Council of Ministers of a price increase for alcoholic beverages sold in cafes and restaurants has been that they once again are disappearing from the trade network, and this only plays into the hands of parasitic elements. The procurator is also disturbed by the fact that, because the situation has

become highly politicized, the public has withdrawn from the struggle against crime. In order to correct the situation he proposed, in particular, that a timely series of changes be made to the law.

"It cannot be said that the situation is critical, but the operational situation today is very complex," Latvian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs B. Ya. Shteynbrik noted at the start of his report. "Damage to the national economy continues to grow because of the fact that a number of directors treat state and public property with excessive tolerance and indifference and are have no interest in preserving it. Rural stores, warehouses and kolkhoz safes are being robbed daily. At the same time, products that are in very short supply are increasingly becoming the targets of criminals: sugar, washing substances, and others. At the same time, one often hears the view expressed that it is cheaper to write off the stolen goods than it is to post guards. It is possible that it is in pursuit of a political objective that some people are so careless in protecting property entrusted to them: to demonstrate in this way the weakness of Soviet power."

The minister also discussed in detail the problem of accidents on the republic's highways. Thus, while 575 people died during all of last year as a result of accidents, the same figure for the first 8 months of this year has been 500. From an analysis that has been made, B. Ya. Shteynbrik has concluded that liberalization of traffic regulations has not produced the desired results. Serious thought should be given to bringing back warning tickets and to introducing a penalty such as vehicle confiscation.

The minister is also alarmed by the ever increasing losses from fires, by personnel problems within the militia, and also by the fact that militia employees are constantly having to be diverted to protect order at various kinds of mass events.

Characterizing the situation in his department, the chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Court, G. A. Zemrivo stressed that the number of convictions has declined in recent years. At the present time, types of punishment that do not involve deprivation of freedom are being applied with increasing frequency to many persons who have committed crimes. If we look at types of crime, then we find that we hold third place in the country for theft of state and public property; the situation is analogous for hooliganism and violations of highway traffic regulations. We lead, however, in terms of the number of convictions for theft of personal property, and also for robbery and burglary. Increasingly, minors are ending up in court and, in this too, Latvia holds first place, exceeding by more than 1.5-fold the average all-union level. Adolescents account for about 15 percent of all persons convicted in Latvia during the past year, or 1,139 persons. Unfortunately, experience shows that early convictions do not lead to rehabilitation but rather, to the contrary, develop in a young person an abnormal attitude toward the public wealth.

Among the problems that disturb him, G.A. Zemrivo pointed also to the necessity of keeping convicted adolescents within the territory of the republic and to the increase in the number of unfortunate incidents resulting from carelessness and laxity, to a lack of concern on the part of citizens with regard to their own property. He is particularly alarmed by a decline in the prestige of the profession of judge and by the high turnover of specialists resulting mainly from the disorder and poor living conditions of judicial workers.

The first deputy chairman of the republic's KGB, Yu. Ye. Cherbinskiy, noted at the start of his report that the range of activity of these organs has recently become broader on account of their involvement in the struggle against organized crime. He said that spheres of responsibility should be delineated with the MVD, so as not to dissipate modest available assets. Today, there is no precise juridical definition of organized crime in normative acts and it is being confused with group crime, which disorients public opinion. It is therefore necessary to set these acts right as quickly as possible while taking account of the special political and operational circumstances in the republic. KGB workers are also disturbed by the way that mass measures of a political nature are sometimes taking place—in a number of situations these have nearly become mass disorders and it was possible to avoid this only due to the inhuman efforts of law enforcement workers. The anti-army speeches that have become increasingly frequent are creating a tense atmosphere among the troops—this is also fraught with serious consequences.

Summing up the results of this discussion of today's burning topics, Ya. Ya. Vagris suggested that the participants in the session think about how party organs could help here. Various views were then expressed as to whether it is necessary to have a complex program and, if so, who should develop it, or whether simply to solve the "sore" points.

In a controversy with V.O. Miller, a corresponding member of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences and director of the academy's Institute of Philosophy and Law, Academician V.P. Samson, scientific secretary of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, said that the phrase "complex program" has the smell of earlier times. It is more expedient to address the most pressing problems and to propose specific solutions to them at once. We should now occupy ourselves with the struggle against organized crime, violations of the law by minors, and also with arranging work for former convicts and with resurrecting the voluntary public order patrols [DND]. It takes a year to develop a program and during this time it becomes outdated. And another thing—Can't the energies of the informal organizations be channeled toward solving the problems of young people? We are preserving nature, but who is protecting our youth?

"It is obvious that we should not create enormous programs, that it is not even important to use this name, but rather it is necessary to determine the main elements

in the upcoming work of this commission," said Ya. Ya. Vagris. Let us have just a dozen points, but with specific assignments. Precisely allocate who will do what, who will be responsible for what. And then things will move along.

### Provisions of New Latvian Electoral Law Explained

*18001620A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
19 Aug 89 p 3*

[Interview with Latvian SSR Central Electoral Commission Chairman G. A. Blum conducted by LATINFORM correspondent V. Semenov: "A Reference Point—Democracy and Justice"]

[Text] The editor is getting a lot of questions from voters about preparations for the election of new deputies to local Latvian SSR soviets and the Republic Supreme Soviet's acceptance of the new law covering elections. LATINFORM correspondent V. Semenov asked Central Electoral Commission Chairman G. A. Blum to explain some of the law's provisions and the main features of the present electoral campaign.

G. A. Blum said that the new law envisions a number of innovations. First, the length of time deputies to all soviets are in power has been doubled to five years. He would like to note that the law does not infringe upon the rights of voters and all adult citizens who have a permanent address within the territories of local soviets can take part in the voting. There are no limitations and no qualifications have been established for the voter's way of life. The primary distinctive trait of the law is that it guarantees more extensive rights to voters when taking part in elections and candidate discussions. For example, according to the old law if a voter had to be outside his electoral district on the day of the election and could not personally take part in the elections in that district, he for all intents and purposes lost the right to vote for his candidate. The new law provides additional rights. If a person knows that he has to be on a trip for objective reasons, he has the right to go to the voting site starting on the twenty-first day before the election (five days after candidates for deputy complete their registration), get a ballot, and leave the name of his candidate on that ballot after striking out all the rest. This ballot is placed in a special ballot box that is opened on the day of the election. I only want to stress that this right must not be abused and there must be objective reasons for the person to be absent. These reasons must be proven to the local electoral commission.

There is another innovation. If for some reason a man cannot come to the voting site on the day of the election he has the right to give his power of attorney to any citizen. After presenting that power of attorney, the empowered person obtains a ballot and an envelope at the voting site, then visits the voter who votes and places the ballot in the envelope. The empowered person leaves this ballot in a ballot box without opening the envelope.

This allows those people who have not lost their right of residency in a given territory, but who are on extended official travel or in training or on active service in the army to take part in elections. They can be put on the voter list and can vote for their candidate for deputy in the territory where they have permanent residence.

These changes not only give voters more rights, but also increase the responsibility of deputies, for this allows people with whom they have had to work for all five years to vote for them.

[Correspondent] There are cases where a candidate recalls his candidacy even after registering. There were a lot of arguments about this during elections for USSR Peoples' Deputies and it turned out that many voters lost their right to vote for the deputies they wanted. How will this problem be resolved during the present elections?

[Blum] The new law stipulates that if a candidate for deputy recalls his candidacy for any reason or if the voters have to do this, if at least ten percent of the total number of voters in a district want, for two weeks they have the right to nominate a new candidate for deputy. The recall can take place right up to the eve of the election. In that case, if at least ten percent of the voters insist on making a new nomination, despite the fact that there are already several candidates on the ballot in the district the electoral commission can either take measures to register the new candidate as quickly as possible or decide to postpone the election for two months, including the new candidate for deputy at that time.

[Correspondent] Many people are interested in whether the new law affects the voting rights of servicemen?

[Blum] All servicemen vote in their own districts which are established in military units and their subunits. A serviceman's right to vote is totally independent of his length of service in the given territory and his length of residence there. The same thing applies to the nomination of servicemen's candidates for deputy. There are no infringements on these rights. One has to take into account that all officers who serve in units, but live in other locations, have to vote in the districts that are established in military units and subunits and for their own candidates. This will also help increase the responsibility of the deputies they have elected. The number of districts that will be set up in military units and subunits is determined by the Central Electoral Commission in coordination with unit commands and local soviets. I feel that we will find a common language and do not think there will be any conflict.

[Correspondent] Can all citizens be elected to the position of deputy?

[Blum] The new law has some limitations. Any citizen of the republic who has lived in it for the last five years has the right to be elected to the position of deputy to Latvian SSR local soviets. This sometimes causes arguments, but I feel that a man who is elected deputy must know the specifics of his city, rayon and republic.

[Correspondent] Please tell us about the organizational side of the elections.

[Blum] Electoral commissions organize elections for all soviets at all levels. Soviets of People's Deputies and their presidiums or executive committees confirm them. But voters nominate representatives to the commissions. Labor collectives, social organizations and voters in their residential areas must take part in this process. District electoral commissions must be set up so that every social strata of residents in a given district are represented because the district electoral commission is the most critical link in the electoral campaign and the most critical in carrying out the electoral law. This commission has personal business with every voter. Any inattention to its interests or infringements of rights can cause irreparable harm.

The law envisions tremendous glasnost in the electoral campaign and participation in it by every resident and social organization. Representatives from the press, television and radio can come to any meeting or session of the electoral commission without advance notification and can cover every issue that is examined there.

I want to remind you that the law envisions financing the entire electoral campaign through state means. The use of assets from other sources could create advantages for some candidates for deputy. Everyone who follows the course of the electoral campaign must consider this and support having the law applied equitably throughout the entire republic. The central electoral commission will monitor this carefully.

The law also contains limitations on combining the position of deputy and a position that an individual holds. Ispolkom [executive committee] members, department managers and deputy ispolkom chairmen may certainly be on the ballot for deputy, but if they are elected, they must give up the job that they hold. The only exception is the ispolkom chairman. Candidates for deputy cannot be members of electoral commissions.

[Correspondent] Were the errors that were allowed while setting up electoral districts during elections for USSR People's Deputies taken into account?

[Blum] All electoral districts in the election for each corresponding soviet must have an identical number of voters and we will closely monitor this. But I again want to stress that this applies to electoral districts in the election for a corresponding soviet. The number of voters in a district in Riga and, let's say, Liepaya or Daugavpils cannot be identical because the maximum number of deputies to a local city soviet is 150 and the population of Riga is many times that of the other cities. The number of voters in each district will be published.

[Correspondent] Thank you for this discussion.

[Blum] I would like to end by reminding voters that the Central Electoral Commission is working in the Republic Supreme Soviet building in Riga at 11

Komyaunatnes Street. We would be happy to listen to any requests and observations in setting up the elections or answer any questions.

#### Latvian SSR Constitution Draft Amendments, Okrug Size Change Discussed

##### Amendments to Articles 98, 112

18001617A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
2 Sep 89 p 1

[Law of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Amendments and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law); chairman and secretary of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

To draft articles 98 and 112 of the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) using the following wording:

"Article 98. The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet consists of 160 people's deputies, chosen in the following manner:

—One hundred fifty-four deputies from territorial electoral okrugs formed in accordance with the republic's administrative-territorial divisions and having equally large populations, but with no fewer than two deputies chosen from a given rayon, city rayon, or city under the republic's jurisdiction.

—Six deputies from among servicemen who have carried out active military service within Latvian SSR territory."

"Article 112. The Latvian SSR Constitutional Court is chosen by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet for a term of 10 years from among a group of law specialists to include a chairman, deputy chairman, and five members of the court.

Persons elected to the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court may not simultaneously serve on the staff of organs whose acts are under the Constitutional Court's supervision.

Upon the completion of their duties, persons elected to the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court are independent and subject only to the Latvian SSR Constitution.

The Latvian SSR Constitutional Court, by its own initiative or by a directive from the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet:

1. Presents the Supreme Soviet with its findings on whether Latvian SSR draft laws under consideration by the Supreme Soviet are in compliance with the Latvian SSR Constitution;
2. Presents the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet with its findings on whether acts by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet are in compliance with the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws;

3. Considers whether normative acts of other Latvian SSR state organs and republic organs of public organizations are in compliance with the constitution and laws;
4. Considers whether acts by USSR organs of state administration are in compliance with the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws;
5. Makes pronouncements on violations of the constitution and laws by top-ranking officials;
6. Considers whether the charter, programs, and activities of the republic's public organizations are in compliance with the constitution and laws.

Upon establishing a conflict with the Latvian SSR Constitution in a law adopted by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court directs its findings to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. Passing on such findings suspends the implementation of the Latvian SSR law in question.

Upon establishing a conflict with the Latvian SSR Constitution or law of another normative act, the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court makes a decision about whether to declare such an act null and void.

A decision by the Constitutional Court on the violation of the constitution and laws by top-ranking officials provides the basis for removing convicted high officials from office or calling these persons into account.

Upon establishing a conflict with the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws by a charter, program, or activity by any of the republic's public organizations, the Constitutional Court directs its decision to the appropriate organization. Directing such a decision suspends the enactment of the charter or acts by these public organizations until they are revoked or until the appropriate changes are introduced.

Members of the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court can be relieved of their posts before the end of their terms by personal request, in the event that they are convicted of a crime, or if they are unable to carry out their functions as a result of loss of competence or the inability to work. The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, at the request of the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court, is authorized to make the decision on the removal of a chairman, deputy chairman or member of the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court before the end of his term.

A member of the Constitutional Court cannot be arraigned, detained, arrested, or subjected to search or to judicially imposed administrative penalties without the agreement of the Constitutional Court based upon a two-thirds majority vote by the members of the Court."

The organization and procedures of the Latvian SSR Constitutional Court are determined by law.

**Supsov Presidium Dept on Okrug Size Change**  
18001617 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA  
in Russian 2 Sep 89 p 1

[Report by the Department for Questions on the Work of the the Soviets of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "Towards a Second Version of the Latvian SSR Draft Law On Amendments and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)"]

[Text] The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree at its 12th session (on July 29 of this year) on the need to develop a second version of the Latvian SSR draft law "On Amendments and Supplements to the Latvian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)." In considering the question of creating a supreme organ of state authority in the republic in the form of a standing Supreme Soviet (without a congress of people's deputies), this decree takes into account a number of factors: the experience of the last elections of USSR people's deputies and remarks and suggestions by the population, by public organizations, and by the local soviets of people's deputies.

The version of the draft law which has been developed provides for direct elections of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, which is considered more acceptable under the conditions of our compact, non-autonomous republic, whose size and population are small.

The document specifies that 160 people's deputies be selected for the Supreme Soviet based upon equal and direct suffrage.

The proposed number of deputies in the Supreme Soviet (165 fewer than the present number) will allow the Supreme Soviet, without damage to itself, to fulfill all of the functions of a supreme organ of state power and to form the necessary committees and commissions. It will also stipulate that roughly two-thirds of the permanent deputies in the Supreme Soviet be relieved of their official duties and that the remaining one-third combine their work as deputies with their principle duties.

With the present number of deputies, based upon the formation of electoral okrugs with relatively equal populations, there is a real opportunity to assign no fewer than two deputy mandates to an administrative-territorial whole, including the republic's least populous rural rayons; i.e., no fewer than two electoral okrugs will be created in every rayon and city.

With a smaller number of deputies, a number of rayons would be allowed to select only one deputy.

With 160 deputies, the population difference between the largest and smallest electoral okrugs comes to approximately 6,000 people, or 30 percent (with the exception of the Ventspil'skiy rayon, where one okrug has around 8,000 inhabitants). By way of comparison, with 120 deputies, this difference would amount to more than 12,000 people.

According to preliminary figures, of 160 electoral okrugs in the republic, 26 rural rayons are broken down into 76 okrugs, 6 republic cities into 26 okrugs, and 6 rayons in Riga into 52 okrugs. In addition, six deputy mandates go to servicemen.

### Lithuanian Social Democratic Party Platform Discussed

18001700A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
6 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with I.K. Burdulis, member of the organizing committee of the Latvian Social Democratic Party, by own correspondent; prepared by N. Zdanovich: "So far just an acquaintance"]

[Text] Not long ago a report appeared on the reemergence of a social democratic party in Lithuania. Its constitutive conference has taken place. At this moment preparations are under way for the congress planned for October of the current year.

For the majority of the republic's residents the appearance of the social democrats in our saturated public life is one more piece in the mosaic of events in recent months. People know too little about the groups of their fellow citizens who declare themselves to be a new political movement in the republic.

I.K. Burdulis, a member of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party's organizational committee, responded to questions by our correspondent on the tasks the party faces, its character, and its ideological platform and organization.

[Burdulis] The principal claim we can make concerning our activities is that they aspire to a state of things in which it is a natural, daily occurrence for everyone to care about the general good, about society and all of its members. For this to happen, of course, we need not only traditions and the means to bring such a state about, but also organization.

Our Social Democratic Party has acted and will continue in the future to act in the spirit of the Socialist International. This means that we will work towards creating democratic structures like those which were founded long ago in Europe.

[Correspondent] How do you envision this happening?

[Burdulis] Only through Lithuania's independence. This is one of the goals of our activities as well as the means for solving subsequent problems. The historical course of the Lithuanian people's development and our present situation are complex and full of contradictions. If you carefully analyze the way we became part of the USSR and what we gained and lost in the process, it will become apparent that it is neither blasphemous nor criminal for us to strive for our freedom. The sacrifices of the Lithuanian people are well-known. They weigh heavily on our hearts. But we are not seized with some

kind of thirst for revenge. We look at life soberly. If we leave the Soviet Union, it will be by solely peaceful means, without insurrections, weapons, or blood.

[Correspondent] And what if this or the other obstacle arises?

[Burdulis] Our principle is: struggle by peaceful means.

[Correspondent] I would be curious to know your party's attitude towards the economic side of Lithuania's independence. I have spoken with several economists in the republic who think it will be difficult for Lithuania to enter a market other than the internal one, within the USSR. Moreover, the republic's production and economic ties are so closely intertwined with all-union ties that it would be impossible to break them without doing harm to Lithuania.

[Burdulis] That is what many people think, and I am among them. But independence is not an economic concept. It is the possibility of holding real, sovereign power.

[Correspondent] Is the struggle for a socialist society one of the aims of your party?

[Burdulis] We have often heard that we must struggle for various things: for the bright future, for the new man, for a higher milk yield, and other such achievements. The stage of struggling, of devoting all of our energies to the task and leaving nothing for ourselves, is one we have already passed through. We are not going to struggle for the new man or for the bright future. Any struggle presupposes some form of tyranny or coercion, which we categorically reject. An evolutionary course in a society's development must rule out numerous human sacrifices.

[Correspondent] But the classics of Marxism also recognized an evolutionary course in society's development.

[Burdulis] Yes, but so far it has not succeeded. Apropos of "socialism," many in Lithuania have an aversion to that word because what we have for decades held up as socialism has, in fact, little to do with it.

[Correspondent] How does your party understand "socialism"?

[Burdulis] You see, this question is still controversial. If you think of socialism as a means of controlling production, achieved when the means of production are nationalized and under governmental control, then we are a socialist country. But as for the political order, many people today think we have a totalitarian government. Let's look at the question from the other side. They say that there is socialism today, for example, in Sweden and Finland... We are not claiming that only our party knows the answer to this question. We would probably put things differently... A society should be in constant movement. It cannot have a goal in mind other than itself. And this goal—to achieve the possibility of free and democratic progress in society—is the essence of democratic socialism.

[Correspondent] Do you intend to have a dialogue with the Communist Party?

[Burdulis] We are not excluding the possibility, although several things are unclear: perhaps our faith in the party differs...

[Correspondent] But at one time the sources were the same.

[Burdulis] Yes, that's true. But now we even differ in our approach to theoretical problems. For example, we reject the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Practice has proved it untenable. There is not even a dictatorship of the Party! The machinery of state and the bureaucracy dictate.

[Correspondent] The press has reported that the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party has acquired legal status. What were its activities before this occurred?

[Burdulis] In Lithuania it was a small, underground party. Since 1944, when many members of its leadership emigrated to the West, those who have remained have made efforts to keep it alive. Our delegation abroad enjoyed the status of an observer-member of the Socialist International and considered its primary goal the representation abroad of democratic forces in Lithuania.

[Correspondent] Was your party able to continue its activities in the years of the Hitler occupation?

[Burdulis] In 1943 a Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania was created which defended the interests of all Lithuanian people—not just individual groups of people. The Social Democratic Party did not stain its conscience by collaborating with the German-fascist occupiers.

[Correspondent] How would you characterize your party's organization today?

[Burdulis] In an effort to avoid the disease of "leadership mania" we are trying to manage without a hierarchy within the party. In our party the minority is not obliged to defer to the majority: fractions are possible. If, say, one is dissatisfied with a decision that is made, one has the right not to carry it out. The main thing is that one not prevent its implementation. We prefer party etiquette to party discipline.

[Correspondent] Who can become a member of your party?

[Burdulis] Admission requires no recommendations or period of candidacy. It is enough to express the desire to become a member. It is important that the prospective member should have in no way been compromised and should express a willingness to work for the benefit of the Lithuanian people.

[Correspondent] In other words, the party will have a narrowly national character?

[Burdulis] By the Lithuanian people I mean all people living in Lithuania. A person's nationality plays no role

for us whatsoever. Internationalism is one of the principles of our activities. Our slogan is "Freedom, Justice, Solidarity."

[Correspondent] What is your relationship to "Sayudis"? What is your reaction to criticism of the LDP [Lithuanian Democratic Party] concerning some of its administrative-command methods?

[Burdulis] The Lithuanian Social Democrats consider themselves an integral part of "Sayudis." Indeed, today "Sayudis" is a civilian opposition to bureaucratism. It could not have appeared in any form a year ago. We are a political opposition. Many think that the need for "Sayudis" will pass with time. I in no way want to oppose "Sayudis," since I myself am a member. But of course, one can agree that there are flaws in its work. I personally am troubled by the circumstances that prevent many active members from realizing their potential. They are prevented by the "Sayudis" hierarchy. However, on the whole the movement's activities must be seen as positive.

[Correspondent] What do you see as your primary task? Why do you think society today is in need of you?

[Burdulis] Our primary concern is with reviving the worth of the individual—with restoring his spiritual freedom, his own "I." How can we divest people of their "cog" mentality, of their blind devotion to leadership? It is not easy, and slavishness is probably in our genes...

In closing I would like to say that the world is highly complex and interrelated. Therefore we must look soberly at life and weigh our desires, making them commensurable with the possibilities before us. Yes, we want independence. But we cannot achieve it overnight. Before us is a great deal of hard work.

I think this interview will serve as a "visiting card" for our readers from the Lithuanian Social Democrats.

Today, with all of the movements, centers, unions, and parties appearing on the scene, it is becoming increasingly difficult to orient oneself in the public and political life of the republic. And each of these organizations must prove its right to exist with actions. Then the people, for whose sake they emerged, can decide whether or not these organizations are really needed.

#### Report by Chairman of LiSSR Commission on Military Service

90UN0074A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
3 Oct 89 p 2

[Speech by Yustinas Antanaytis, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Military Service: "Military Service by the Republic's Young Men"]

[Text] Dear deputies, in addition to the state and general human problems that have accumulated and, unfortunately, are not decreasing, a large number of which problems have already been discussed at this session, everyone

is troubled and concerned by the negative manifestations in the USSR Armed Forces. Obviously we are not speaking about the army as a whole, and not about its professional affairs, but about the conditions under which Lithuanian young men are serving, the interrelationships among those young men, and frequently their fates also.

Today it is no secret to anyone that, practically speaking, the winds of perestroika have not yet touched these conditions or relations; that in many barracks the law of the fist, the law of force, is flourishing; that weak individuals, especially the newcomers, frequently are subjected to mockery and humiliation; that frequently, by means of force or blackmail, their personal articles and money are taken away from them, they are forced to work for others, and, in the event that they disobey, they are beaten or even crippled. This atmosphere renders a negative, or even tragic, influence upon the mental state of individual young men; there have been suicides; and certain individuals, incapable of withstanding the situation, have been going absent without leave.

I do not want to say that this has been occurring everywhere, in all military subdivisions, but our commission has grounds for asserting that there are a large number of disturbances in the army and no positive shifts can be discerned.

The Commission on the Military Service of Young Men, which was created on 3 May 1989 under the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, in its turn is attempting, to the extent that its manpower and competency allow, to combat the negative situations that have been mentioned and to help the young Lithuanians who have found themselves in a serious position. For this purpose the commission, on 58 occasions, sent telegrams and letters to USSR Ministry of Defense and personally to Minister D. Yazov. Those messages contained an attempt to resolve the specific conflicts, as well as demands that wide-scale steps be taken to carry out perestroika in the army. In order to review our recommendations and the claims, during the past few months three commissions from that department, which were headed by generals, came to Vilnius. With their assistance we not only resolved several conflicts, but also attempted to convey the mothers' concern and grief with regard to the unfavorable processes in the Armed Forces. In our opinion, after these meetings and long, heated debates with representatives of the public and with our commission, the military leaders left with a better understanding of what we are striving for, and we hope that this will also be conveyed to the ministry administrators.

At one time we sent recommendations to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and to the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet. On 126 occasions dealing with relations and conditions that were abnormal from the point of view of army regulations, we contacted various military administrative levels, commissariats, and medical institutions. True, the reaction to our letters was not always immediately the correct one, and many of those letters did not receive a reply, but nevertheless dozens of young

men from Lithuania were transferred from unbearable conditions of service to other subdivisions, which frequently were closer to home, and others, for reasons of health, were released from service ahead of time and were given medical and other aid.

Having received the warning message about more serious conflicts and disturbances, the members of our commission travel to the troubled military subdivisions, regardless of how far away they are, and they usually find a way out of the situation. We meet with the inductees and study their opinions.

For example, in this building the members of our commission have been regularly accepting visitors for four months. Approximately 500 persons have asked us for assistance on matters of military service, and no end to this stream is in sight. The commission proves to be in an especially complicated situation when the people coming to us asking for aid are young men who, unable to withstand the mockery and the insults, have gone absent without leave from their military unit. During the past four months there have already been 38 such cases. Most of these young men returned with signs of violence on them or in a state of profound mental depression, and they require in-patient treatment. We managed to protect 20 of them from harsh, but actually undeserved, punitive articles in the regulations, and to transfer them to another place of service. How the situation will turn out for the others is still being decided. But we are alarmed by the fact that the persons who have decided to take advantage of the commission's assistance include several deserters who committed crimes in their units, but who are posing as victims of relations that do not conform to the army regulations. Obviously, young men such as these should not count on receiving the commission's assistance.

I have listed only the main trends and forms of the commission's activities. Practically speaking, there is a considerably larger number of concerns and matters. Despite the selfless—and I use that word without exaggeration—work performed by a number of commission members, such as V. Eydukaytis, P. Radzyavichiyus, G. Sausenavichiyus, V. Shadreyka, D. Tareylene, M. Trimonene, V. Zhilinskayte, and others, the commission's work load already considerably surpasses the capabilities of the public subdivision. It would seem that, if one carries out a better search, it might be possible to find employees at state enterprises who are not too busy, who could be transferred to this work sector that is so important for the nation. The attention of the Presidium of LiSSR Supreme Soviet should be directed to this as quickly as possible.

Dear deputies, today the Commission on Military Service, with the consent of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, is bringing up for the session's discussion the draft of a resolution. The purpose of the resolution is to accelerate the development of perestroika, and to implement the principles of real democracy, humanitarianism, and glasnost in the army. The

essence of the recommendations has been set forth in the document. Nevertheless it is necessary to comment briefly on a few of them.

Like the residents of other republics, the residents of Lithuania are making increasingly persistent demands that their sons perform their mandatory military service in their own republic, or close to it. These demands are influenced by the climatic, psychological, and social adaptation, infrequently by the complicated family relations, etc. But at the present time only one-fourth of the young Lithuanians who have been inducted into the army are serving in the Baltic Military District and the Baltic Fleet, taken together. Military men attempt to assuage us by saying that 80 percent of all our countrymen are serving in the European part of the Union. Obviously, this is better than serving somewhere in the Kurile Islands or Central Asia, but you cannot say that this is "closer to home," as was promised.

Unfortunately, one cannot see any substantial shifts on the part of Ministry of Defense to correct the situation. And the arguments given by its representatives are, to put it mildly, unconvincing.

For example, don't you think it rather strange that on a Baltic naval vessel that bears the proud name of Komso-molets Litvy [Lithuanian Komsomol Member], the crew of which is made up of approximately 200 persons, only four Lithuanians are currently serving? It is also difficult to explain why, in the military units of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that are deployed in our republic, only 8 percent of the young men are from Lithuania. One could ask many more "whys" like this. That is why we recommend adopting the formulation of paragraph A in the first resolution.

Public opinion has been insisting with increasing stubbornness and demandingness upon the cessation of inducting young men into military construction units. What kind of army is this if, for practically their entire period of service, these soldiers "fight" with a shovel, crowbar, or saw in their hands? Especially since the people serving in these military units include a large number of persons who have been previously sentenced and who are carried on the rolls of the internal affairs agencies, alongside of whom young men with mental deviations or physical defects are also working. It is not accidental that every second warning message received by our commission pertains to disturbances in an army specifically of this type. Seventy percent of the persons who deserted as a result of relations that did not conform to army regulations also came from this kind of army. And no one can see that the situation in the construction units has improved noticeably, although we have heard more than a sufficient number of discussions and pretty promises. There is obviously just one way out: each person should do what he is supposed to do. The soldier should protect and defend his land, and the construction worker should engage in construction.

The number of all kinds of problems and accidents in the army would be considerably smaller if the medical processing of the inductees were to be conducted in a more demanding manner. At the present time the army inducts indiscriminately young men with poor vision, with signs of debility, and with other physical shortcomings. It is simply inhuman to think that these are the people who are used to form the construction battalions that were previously mentioned. As a consequence, these people who have been given a hard time by fate become the object of practical jokes and mockery, or even the first candidates for victims of accidents in construction. Frequently they return home with mental and somatic ailments that have been made even more acute or that are incurable.

Medics who carry out the medical processing explain that they are guided by the notorious 1987 Order No. 260 of USSR Ministry of Defense. True, a few days ago we learned that certain changes have been made in it, in the direction of making the processing more humanitarian, and those changes will go into effect on 1 October 1989. Nevertheless I want to ask the republic's medics, and primarily Minister Antanas Vinkus, the following question: aren't your commissions that have been created at city and rayon voyenkomats [draft boards] demonstrating too much zeal? Especially since the voyenkomat administrators assert that the medics' findings are final.

Since we have touched upon the voyenkomats, I would like to add the following: when, at the previous session of the Supreme Soviet, our commission, in its inquiry to the republic's voyenkomat, expressed serious claims, things in that administration began to get better: there was an intensification of its contacts with the public, and also with our commission, and the questions here began to be decided in a less formal, more well-wishing manner. This should be said first of all about the administrators of the voyenkomat subdivisions, Colonels Konstantin Golubayev and Algirdas Stulginskas. I would like for commissar Colonel Algimantas Visotskis to resolve these critical problems more decisively and more attentively.

While positively evaluating the efforts of the republic government, and especially the leadership of the party's Central Committee, that have been directed at conducting negotiations with the administrators of the USSR government and the Department of Defense concerning the taking into consideration of the persistent demands of the republic's public and of Sajudis, the commission recommends that this work be continued in order to achieve the real shifts that the public expects. This is mentioned in the draft of the resolution to be discussed.

Our commission must also do more in this direction.

We hope that, in their turn, the school system, youth organizations, and families will pay more attention to the better physical training of the young men, to the

reinforcement of their will, stamina, and the inculcation of noble human qualities, this facilitating the overcoming by our young men of the difficulties of military service.

It must be added that any spontaneous, incompletely thought-out actions, for example, attempts to return the military service card or the boycotting of military induction, will only complicate the dialogue that has already begun at various levels, but that gives hope, and will lead to negative results.

The republic's population hopes that this resolution of the Supreme Soviet will receive the proper response from the center and that population links high hopes with the USSR people's deputies, especially the deputies from Lithuania. Especially since three of them—Egidiyus Bichkauskas, Yuozas Olekas, and Stasis Kashauskas—are active members of our commission.

We realize that the path that this draft will take is no easy one. But we hope that, by carefully thought-out actions, and by consolidating our efforts, we shall overcome all obstacles.

#### Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Discusses Draft Laws

90UN0074B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian  
3 Oct 89 pp 1-2

[Speeches at the 13th Session of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation: "Debate on the Report on the Draft of the Lithuanian SSR Law Entitled 'Amending and Supplementing the Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Basic Law),' the Draft of the Lithuanian SSR Law Governing the Election of Deputies to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Extension of the Powers Exercised by Deputies to Local Soviets of Lithuanian SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] Speech by Kazimeras Antanavichyus, USSR People's Deputy

Subsection 7 of the same Article 97. It states that the Supreme Soviet is granted the right to approve the long-range basic programs for economic and social development, and to approve the state plans for the economic and social development of Lithuanian SSR. But, with the changeover to work under conditions of economic independence, they will not exist, that is, after the New Year! What will there be to approve? Only the long-range ones. And also: monitoring the rate of plan fulfillment. It is completely impossible to agree to this. The Supreme Soviet will monitor the rate of fulfilling a nonexistent plan. Nor will the Council of Ministers have this right. I shall be speaking more about this. This is interference in the economic affairs of each independent organization, and that should definitely not be retained.

Subparagraph 23 of the same article: "to resolve other questions that fall within the competency of Lithuanian SSR." This is linked with what I have previously said.

The wording should be: "to resolve other questions of the state activity of Lithuanian SSR, which do not fall within its competency," because everything can be resolved. In this instance it should also be stated that the right to discuss and decide is being granted.

Article 98, which mentions 141 deputies. If we elected 111, we would save at least one million [rubles] for administrative expenses. We ought to think a bit about this. As an economist, I am speaking seriously about this. A constantly operating parliament consisting of 140 persons? I think that Lithuania is not rich enough to maintain such a large parliament.

There is a small contradiction in Article 99. But, once again, it should not be retained. It is written here that the sittings of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet are headed by the Chairman of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, and, in the event of his absence, by the deputy chairman. But in the very next paragraph it says that the first sitting is opened by, and then conducted by, the Chairman of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or his deputy. Obviously, the wording should be the same: "or, in the event of his absence, by his deputy." Or it should be stated there also: "is conducted by the chairman or his deputy." I think that it should be "the chairman or deputy." Possibly the chairman is hoarse. He is actually present, he wants to be present, but he just does not have any voice that day. Why, then, must we limit everything here in this way?

In Article 109, relative to the deputy: "he cannot be brought to criminal responsibility or arrested." "And in the interval between sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet." In my opinion, one should retain the wording "without the consent of the Supreme Soviet."

And the entire Article 12, "Council of Ministers"—this has to do with how I began my speech and came to the rostrum. This chapter must be eliminated from the corrections, because it is not linked with the present election. We have Council of Ministers statutes that are in effect. Therefore I recommend retaining only Article 123. "The competency of Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers and its Presidium, the procedure for conducting their work, the relationships between Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers and other state agencies, as well as the list of Lithuanian SSR ministries and state committees, are approved by the Law Governing the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers in the light of that Constitution." And end it there.

This chapter contains a large number of inaccuracies. First of all, it is stated in Article 116: "first deputy chairmen." Keeping in mind the elementary logic of administration, there must be just one first deputy. How is it possible for three people to be the first in line? That is complicated.

And now some comments with regard to the economic independence of enterprises. Article 118 states: "Organizes the administration of industrial, construction, and

agricultural enterprises, associations, enterprises of transportation and communication, and other organizations and institutions of republic or union subordination that are located in the republic." In a word, again it organizes, again it administers, again it establishes order. This should not occur after the New Year. The same thing applies to reports on plan fulfillment. If the Council of Ministers submits reports, then, once again, it is administering all the primary economic organizations, enterprises, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes. The third paragraph—"directs the activities of the executive committees of rayon and city (in cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies." What kind of self-government can there be if the Council of Ministers directs all the activities, as it did previously?

Seventh paragraph—"forms, if necessary, committees, main administrations, and other departments that are maintained at state expense, under Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers for matters of economic, scientific, and sociocultural construction." The Constitution states that these questions are the prerogative of the Supreme Soviet, and therefore they cannot be entrusted to the Council of Ministers.

In Article 120 we read that the Presidium of Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers operates in the following makeup: Chairman of Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers; first deputy chairmen and deputy chairmen; other members of the government. That is, everyone. This is the Council of Ministers. Why do we need a Presidium, then?

Article 121 states that Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, within the confines of its competency, has the right to repeal acts enacted by Lithuanian SSR ministries and state committees, and other agencies subordinate to it, and decisions and orders of the executive committees of rayon and city (in cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies. This is totalitarianism, and nothing more. If these acts do not correspond to the Constitution, then they must be repealed by the Supreme Soviet or the constitutional court, rather than by the Council of Ministers. It is precisely for these reasons that I recommend withdrawing from the corrections the entire Chapter 12 or revising it considerably.

#### Speech by Deputy Geriminas Ventslova

Dear deputies! By stating that soldiers performing their mandatory military service in Lithuania should not participate in elections to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, I risk being accused of making an attempt to split the unity between the army and the nation, to separate the army from the nation. However, this is only formally. Let us think a bit about whether, realistically speaking, a soldier can engage in the political and economic life of the republic if it has been only a half-year since he was inducted into the Soviet Army, if he has only a half-year left to serve, etc. So, let's not delude ourselves. The only time that the soldiers will be united with the nation is if

they participate in elections at their own place of residence, that is, the place from which they were inducted. I am in favor of this formulation of the law, although I know that, practically speaking, it is a complicated matter to do this.

By adopting the law with the proposed formulation that the military personnel who have been inducted from Lithuania will participate in the election, we make it impossible for the interested forces to manipulate the military units during the election with the purpose of creating advantages for a particular deputy, which would distort the true will of the local voters. I am in favor of the unity of the army and the nation, understanding the army to be the republic's national military formation.

Young men who have been inducted from Lithuania and who are performing military service outside its confines would be able to carry out their right to elect their republic's Supreme Soviet only in the event that they have received an invitation to come on election day to the election wards in the place from which they were inducted. Those who are serving in the republic would need only one day.

I would also like to speak briefly about the election date. We have already voted about it, and we have approved the period of time necessary for conducting the election. A very large number of arguments were proposed, and there still remains, possibly, the last one, which no one has mentioned. Let us imagine the situation in which the pre-election struggle this time occurs differently from the time when we were elected, and in the first round of the first stage it might happen that not even half the deputies have been elected. The election date has been established in February, and by that date our term also will be coming rapidly to an end. Our time has ended, but the new deputies have not yet been elected. The republic remains without a parliament. Let us think a bit about this situation.

#### Speech by Deputy Algirdas Zhukauskas

Dear session participants! As the Chairman of the Budgetary Planning Commission, I would like to discuss the draft of the Law Governing the Election of Deputies to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet from the point of view of economics and finance. Article 98 of the draft states that Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet consists of 141 deputies; Article 99 stipulates that the sessions of Supreme Soviet will last for six to eight months a year; and the deputies will work constantly. So, whereas now the deputies to Supreme Soviet work and receive earnings at their basic place of work, the basic place of work for the deputies to the new Supreme Soviet will be the Supreme Soviet, and it is here that they will receive their earnings. As we can see from the example of the work performed by USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments of other countries, each deputy will have a paid secretariat and appropriate accommodations with the necessary furniture and equipment. That means that the maintaining of each deputy for one year will require the

additional payment of 20,000-25,000 rubles, and his accommodations will cost 120,000-150,000 rubles, or a total of approximately 3 to 3.5 million rubles from the wage fund and 16-18 million rubles for the accommodations. Up to now, in our country funds at all levels have been used indiscriminately, as though being withdrawn from a bottomless well, without any consideration of the economic conditions. Today we see where our economy is heading, and we can see inflation growing. Therefore I propose establishing the number of deputies in conformity with the economic situation.

Previously the Lithuanian Diet had 80 members. Keeping in mind the fact that today Vilnius and Vilnius Kray are part of Lithuania, I propose establishing the quantitative makeup of the Supreme Soviet with a total of 100 or 99 deputies. The reduction in the number of deputies from 141 to 99 will make it possible to save approximately a million rubles from the wage fund and 5-6 million rubles for the accommodations. Those are considerable amounts of money and they would make it possible, for example, to increase the pensions for 2000 retirees by 40 rubles a month, or to provide 50 families of newlyweds with two-room furnished apartments. I think that, with an improvement in the economic situation in Lithuania—maybe 4 or 5 years from now, at the next election—it will be possible to increase the number of deputies. For purposes of comparison I would like to mention that the rich United States of America, with a population of 250,000,000 persons, has only 100 senators and 425 members of Congress. Undoubtedly, with a reduction in the number of deputies, many of the people present here will have reduced opportunities to be elected. However, we must consider not what we can receive from our Motherland, but what we can give to it and its people, to a Lithuania that is moving toward sovereignty. It is necessary to begin to run the economy efficiently and economically everywhere. And we, the Supreme Soviet, must serve as an example.

Dear deputies, we have done a lot on the path to independence. We are enacting and creating new democratic laws. But we frequently forget today's economy, the difficult economic situation of a considerable number of retirees and young people. I think that the Council of Ministers, the government, and we deputies, when resolving the majestic tasks of the future republic, can and must resolve the fundamental economic problems of the present period. As for the election, I doubt whether it is necessary to change the Supreme Soviet resolution that was enacted in May, or to shift the date of elections to the local soviets of people's deputies.

#### Speech by Deputy Algimantas Brazaytis

Please forgive me, dear deputies, for asking for the floor the second time at this session. But what can one do? One must get rid of the poor habits of the past. The basic question that has evoked a large amount of polemics is: is it necessary to hasten the election to Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or is it necessary, in parliamentary practice, to use a special measure—should that election

be conducted prior to the deadline for the expiration of the term of office of the Soviet of this convocation?

The motivations for raising this question are as follows. First, the present Soviet is allegedly too conservative, and, secondly, its deputies are not aggressive and they are somehow afraid of taking decisively steps to resolve the questions in the current complicated situation.

As far as the deputies' passivity is concerned, it is true that there are still, in our ranks, some persons who are inclined to remain silent, to wait for the drafts that have been approved. But the course of events indicates convincingly that they are successfully ridding themselves of this burden. Compare the three most recent sessions and you will be convinced of this. Scientists and farmers are coming onto the scene, and worker deputies have already begun speaking. True, for the time being, the party workers consider themselves to be repressed, especially after the warnings by Romualdas Ozolas in VOLNA VOZROZHDENIYA. But we are convinced that those warnings are not destined to come true, and the deputies will become more aggressive. The voice of the Soviet administrators at the city and rayon level has not always been finely tuned. It would seem that this is a temporary phenomenon. After the extension of the term of office of the local soviets, the most important deputy link, the one that comes into closest contact with everyday problems, will also be restored. Thus, by assuming the criticism with regard to passivity to be only provisional, we can look optimistically into the future.

As far as the conservative nature of the Soviet of this convocation is concerned, the enacted documents attest to something else. This has been admitted both by the public and by the deputies who have spoken. In addition, in this unstable positional situation, when a large number of dangerous whirlpools exist in the course of events, a certain amount of conservatism is really no sin. For example, are we really to believe that the conservatism of Churchill, Reagan, and Thatcher did not serve their nations? Conservatism is a bad phenomenon when there is a shortage of ideas. But today no one can complain about a shortage of them. A problem that is more important is the problem of selecting from among them, in order to prevent a situation such as the previous one, when we were shackled by unanimous and complete approval, all of which came only from the other end.

Third, if we want, we can elect, but we must know whom to elect, and what kind of agency of supreme authority we shall form within the confines of the new democracy. Unfortunately, during the discussion of the draft of the new Constitution, and also the statute governing the election, the public did not pay sufficient attention to what kind of parliament the new parliament should be. The proposal has been made that it should be elected in a considerably smaller makeup. However, no one will convince me that a parliament with a narrower representation will be more democratic. Politics is the representation of interests, and the coordination of those interests. Will a 140-person parliament be able to absorb such

a large number of interests that are arising in our turbulent society with every passing day? That is completely unclear. There are no guarantees about anything. In the rally situation, writers and philosophers will nominate as candidates in every district their own representatives—therefore we will be able to hear in parliament poetry and abstract truths. The newly engendered political formations, the production and social associations, and the parties that are forming, will remain overboard. We must not forget that, at this very session, we heard clear expressions of the ideas that politics is the reflection of real life. We cannot carry out politics when our heads are in the clouds.

Why is it, when thinking about democracy, and, perhaps, only taking refuge in it, we adhere to a course aimed at an elitist parliament? Why do we blindly copy the forms of Western democracy? In this instance, even a person with a weak knowledge of history can discern the model of the small-sized parliament of Tautininki members that people are attempting to transfer into our era. This remark is directed to you, Comrade Zhukauskas.

In the search for forms of a new democracy, why not, for example, think a bit about the bicameral system. One house could be formed according to the territorial principle, and the other according to the representation of the production and social interests. The most important questions, the ones that determine the country's fate, must be resolved only on the basis of a consensus of both houses. It is necessary to seek ways to form an aggressive, professional nucleus in this parliament, and to pay a salary only to its deputies. This would actually help in the situation when the parliament is obliged to take into consideration all the various interests, and it would also make possible the appearance of an opposition, without which there can be no real democracy. It would also make it possible to avoid the insufficiently thought-out, adventurous decisions which, with unsubstantiated hastiness, violate the economic and social structures that have developed. On this path we might find the answer to the problem of national representation, which problem is arising with such acuity. Let us imagine that, out of 140 deputies, two or three representatives of other nationalities will be elected. Is that enough in a democratic state? I doubt it. In addition, it must be kept in mind that the parliament is obliged to guard our republic against the unending revolutions, and to turn life into the most reliable and most civilized channels of seriously thought-out reforms. I realize what a utopian idea I have expressed. But I do this in order to appeal to the conscience of those who are rushing ahead. We have a large number of opportunities that have not yet been completely analyzed.

That is why I propose not rushing with the election. It is also possible to get rid of inactive deputies by means of partial renewing, by having persons resign voluntarily. With the purpose of increasing the amount of permanent work, it is possible to expand both the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and its powers, and to reinforce the leadership with more aggressive people. And the election

should be held only when we are completely aware of what kind of parliament the nation wants to have. In order to have national discussion, we should offer several models of that parliament. Having thus carried out a broad sociological survey, we would know people's opinion. Possibly, if we already have a Referendum Law, then it would be desirable to take advantage of it. I am profoundly convinced that if the parliament of the Lithuania that is being reborn is more innovative and more democratic than any currently operating parliament in the West, then we will only prove by this means that perestroika is not a step backward, but movement ahead, that this is actually progress, the real democracy that currently everyone is taking refuge in, but for which by no means everyone is fighting.

I support the proposals made by the deputies who spoke recommending the stiffening of the procedure for registering candidates for election as deputies, since there exists the danger that, in the first stage of the election, it is possible that it will be necessary to vote for a good hundred of candidates in many districts.

I do not approve the hasty changing of Article 6 of the Constitution because I am convinced that the Lithuanian CP currently is the most democratic and most tolerant political force. It is consciously fulfilling the mission that is prescribed to it in the article that was mentioned.

I have an opinion concerning the constitutional statute concerning the division of church and state. It is absolutely harmless for the church and the believers. If we consider ourselves to be progressive people, let's not touch that statute. However, it is necessary to refine the wording of the article. Comrade Landsbergis has proposed a wording that reflects rather exactly the current interrelationship between church and state. Not only in Lithuania, but also in the Soviet Union. And that is good. When the drafts reflect the real situation, it is easy to accept them. The problem of the procuracy also requires discussion. I propose resolving this not extemporaneously, but in an established procedure.

#### Reply by Deputy Algirdras Zhukauskas

Dear deputies! My esteemed comrade, Brazaytis, has accused me of proposing a parliament of Tautininki members. I want to say that the 80-member Diet that was elected in 1926 represented all the parties. There were Christian Democrats, Lyaudininki, Social Democrats, and representatives of the national minorities. In the 80-member Diet, the Tautininki had only three representatives. Thus, this was not a parliament of Tautininki members.

#### Speech by Deputy Anatoliyus Rasteyka

Dear deputies, I shall take only two minutes. With regard to two questions... First, concerning the time of the election. I feel that there is good reason why this question has arisen and keeps arising constantly, and I

think that if, in May, we voted in this way, this does not mean that we cannot vote differently today. Why? A large number of arguments have been cited here, but it would seem that no mention has been made of one of them. We are all completely aware that the Supreme Soviet of the current convocation was elected undemocratically. We should all admit this. Both because the candidate lists were prepared ahead of time and were distributed in one copy each to the different districts. The people—our voters—did not have a choice about whom they could vote for, and this always caused discontent. People were discontent, but they remained silent. They mechanically dropped their ballots into the ballot box—one ballot for an entire family. We all are completely aware of this, and I think that there is no need to explain this. And when, now, that possibility has arisen, when people—our voters—can vote democratically (which they have, indeed, already done during the election to the USSR Supreme Soviet), then, why not create for them the opportunity to take part as early as possible in that kind of election, in a real election? I think that this would truly be a satisfying of the will of the people, of our voters, and there are no reasons for protest here. What are we dealing with—a month earlier or a month later? I am in favor either of 14 January or 4 February, as someone here proposed. Why not? Why be stubborn? If the majority of the inhabitants of Lithuania want this, then let's do it.

And now for the second question, the question of the referendum. If we elect the Supreme Soviet democratically now, it will be necessary to have confidence in it. If, during the new election, the voters show confidence in it, then we shall have trust it with the resolving of questions. I think that the attempt to limit the rights of the new Supreme Soviet is absolutely unacceptable. Both in questions of announcing the referendum and in others, it seems to me that this is incorrect. If we elect, trust, and believe that the Soviet in the new makeup will operate in a new way, on a democratic basis, then let's give the deputies as many more rights as possible, since they will become the true expressers of the nation's will.

#### Speech by USSR People's Deputy Vitautas Landsbergis

I propose paying serious attention to the comment that was made by Deputy G. Ventslova. Actually, the election will be held on the eve of the expiration of the term of office of the Soviet of this convocation, and it is very possible that a second round will be required. The Soviet will be inactive, and the new one will not yet be elected. It is necessary to think about this. It is necessary keep in reserve the time required for two rounds prior to the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of this convocation. Therefore, if there is going to be any discussion of retaining the date or bringing it closer, please take a very serious attitude toward this.

#### Grossu Addresses 30 Aug Supsov Session on Language Law

180016594 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 31 Aug 89 pp 1- 3

[Speech by Deputy S.K. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, at the 30 August 1989 Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Session]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

The processes of perestroika which are evolving in the republic and in the country as a whole have made one of the most important problems the just resolution of the questions in the sphere of ethnic and inter-ethnic relations which accumulated during the years of stagnation and lawlessness.

Without just resolution of these most important questions, the qualitative transformation of other fundamental aspects of our lives is simply impossible. The renewal of society insistently demands renewal of the national policy as well.

The historical experience and socialist choice of the Soviet peoples convince us that in resolving the national question one should proceed from the only proper position—ensuring the actual equality of nations and the actual equality of the people, without regard to their national origin, out of the objective necessity for deepening internationalistic consciousness and the further cohesion and convergence of the nations in the name of realizing our common ideals and interests.

The questions of one's native language, culture and traditions have become especially crucial in the contemporary stage of development of inter-ethnic relations in the conditions of Moldavia. Testifying to this fact is the current controversy evolving at numerous meetings and gatherings, in the press and on television, which finally resulted in a mass popular movement to declare the Moldavian language the state language and to change the Moldavian written language to Latin script, as the conditions for elevating its social status. The present movement is the focal point for the Moldavians' pain over the perceived degradation of their language, for their concern for its future, and the growing understanding of the present generation of their responsibility for the fate of their ethnic group.

But the Moldavians do not live in a vacuum; they live together with representatives of many other nationalities who have cast their lot with our region, which for them has become their native land. This makes the resolution of the language problem a very weighty matter, and makes it necessary to define legal guarantees for the free functioning of all languages on republic territory.

All this, as you know, was given maximum consideration in choosing approaches to the resolution of the question of the status of one's native language and other languages in our republic, and in working out the legal bases for their functioning. As expected, the draft laws brought

forth for public discussion in July and August generated enormous interest among the populace. A large number of proposals were submitted to improve them. It is fitting to note that the deputy commissions, experts, and members of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium worked seriously, competently and with great interest in this complex atmosphere.

As a result, in my view, we have managed to prepare and submit for discussion at the present session a variant of the draft Laws, which testifies to an objective approach to the problem at hand and to our striving to find an optimal solution, one which most completely matches the CPSU's national-language policy and the spiritual needs of the entire population of our republic.

The deputies were presented a complete package of the most important documents; these are: the Draft Laws "On the Status of the Moldavian SSR State Language," "On the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR," "On Returning Latin Script to the Moldavian Language," as well as a draft of the State Comprehensive Program for Ensuring the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR.

It is difficult to overstate the significance of these legislative acts. In essence, with their adoption a new historical stage begins in the solution of the national question and in the cultural development of our region on socialist principles, and the actual renewal of social life in the republic will commence.

Attributing to the Moldavian language the status of state language will have a significant effect on expanding its functions and elevating its social role, and on the need for representatives of other nationalities to study it.

Latin script, while stressing the Roman origins of the Moldavian language, will enhance its defenses against degradation and will accelerate the process of purging and further development of the language.

And, introducing to Article 70 of the Moldavian SSR Constitution a clause on the fact that the republic will guarantee the conditions on its territory for the development and use of the Russian language as the language of international intercourse in the USSR, and for the use of the native languages of other nationalities, reduces many of the fears of the Russian-speaking populace brought on by the declaration of the state language.

In addition, it is set forth in the Constitution that the republic shall guarantee the preservation and development of the language of the Gagauz people. This has exceptionally great significance for these people, the majority of whom live in our region.

Thus, we have every reason to say that the draft laws under examination possess indisputable advantages over the first edition of the Laws. And it could be no other way; after all, they contain many of the proposals offered in the course of the popular discussion; and the amendments introduced are those which consolidate the points

of view and meet the interests of all the nations and peoples which dwell in our republic. In the form in which the draft laws are presented in this session, they have been fine-tuned in the legal aspect; they correspond with a conception of genuine bilingualism; they support the weighty interests of the polyglot population of our region; and most importantly—they create the conditions for the genuine development and functioning of both the state language and the Russian language in all spheres of life in the republic. The laws not only guarantee state protection to the Moldavian language, they also establish guarantees for satisfying the language needs of all the nationalities which dwell in the republic, and their spiritual, cultural and social development.

All these things are exceptionally important. Without universal concern for every national language and every national culture, and without the weightiness of the demands of the parties, we could be faced with the fact of devaluation of the Laws themselves, and would encounter difficulties in their execution. Therefore, I would like that in the course of discussion of the drafts, we would devote more attention to bringing together the various points of view, and not digress in the direction side of making the demands of the language decree stricter—nor toward weakening them either.

Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

While examining the published draft laws, we must at the same time be fully aware of the state's concern to guarantee they are put into effect. This is all the more important since, as the discussion on languages showed, the approach to the Language Law is far from identical. There is no lack of far-left, maximalist opinion; nor of far-right opinion. There are also ultimatum demands, which are especially dangerous since they may lead to unforeseen consequences.

We are all deeply concerned by the extremely complex situation which has come to pass in the republic, by the inter-ethnic confrontations which have taken shape, and by the continuing strikes which have upset the normal rhythm of the republic's economic and socio-political life.

An especially sharp discussion is revolving around the question of the language of international intercourse. This is indisputably a principal question. The deputies have been speaking of this as well. In Article 1 of the draft Law, "On the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR," it is stated that the functions of the language of international intercourse in the republic will be fulfilled by the Moldavian language. And after all, dear comrades, it has historically come about that the language of international intercourse during all the years of existence of Soviet Moldavia, and in the country as a whole, has always been the Russian language. This tenet was also confirmed in the draft CPSU platform, "The National Policy of the Party in Contemporary Conditions."

One would think that the status of the Moldavian language, fixed in the MSSR Constitution as the state language, its return to Latin script, and the procedure for the functioning of languages on the territory of the republic as established by Law, would create the necessary guarantees for the complete and universal use of the Moldavian language in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life; would eliminate corruption in linguistic structure and completely satisfy the cultural needs of the Moldavians for their native language; and would support the preservation and augment the originality of its national culture.

Therefore, while supporting the deputies who have spoken, I propose eliminating the words "and fulfills in this connection the functions of the language of international intercourse on the territory of the republic," in Article 1 of the Draft Law "On the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR," (paragraph 1). At the same time I propose that the penultimate paragraph of the Draft Law, "On the Status of the State Language of the Moldavian SSR," be formulated as follows: "The Moldavian SSR guarantees on its territory the conditions for the development and use of the Russian language as the language of international intercourse, and also the native languages of the populace of other nationalities."

Such an approach to the resolution of this most important question will reduce tensions and confrontations, will promote the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, and should return the strikers to their places of work.

The Moldavian CP Central Committee appeals to the workers of Tiraspol, Bender, Rybnitsa and other cities and rayon centers of the republic to ponder the importance to fate of the republic of the draft laws on language under consideration, to have faith in them, and to see in these documents the bases for compromise and a genuine aspiration toward true bilingualism in contacts among the people.

We appeal to them to reject groundless demands; and, having resumed work, to set all the enterprises to functioning rhythmically, make up for the losses, and ensure the fulfillment of the state orders for manufacturing products. The republic's railroaders should ponder the severity of the exceptional situation which has come to pass in the delivery of just-harvested food products to the industrial centers of the country and to the cities of the republic, and to ensure that work on the railroad is just as rhythmic and highly efficient as it had been in recent times.

The Moldavian CP Central Committee appeals to the common sense of the representatives of all nationalities in the republic. For the sake of our common interests it is time to bring the negative course of events to a halt, and to put an end to the strikes, ultimatums and threats. It is time to reject baseless demands, ill-considered

political slogans and estimates, mutual accusations and insults which as you know had been heard more and more often at the meetings.

We call upon all representatives of independent organizations—the People's Front, Intermovement and the "Gagauz Khalky" movement, for the time being not to hold demonstrations, meetings and gatherings; to reject mutual accusations, and to calm the people. Right now, at the very peak of the harvest, it is namely there that we must direct their efforts, in order to gather in and store the unprecedentedly rich harvest.

We call upon and ask all the workers to support the work of the deputies on the final revision of the Language Laws, and to take an active part in carrying them out.

After the discussion is completed and the draft laws are adopted, we shall all have to work even harder to explain each article of the Law to the people, to formulate proper public opinion on them; work, which in terms of its significance and volume must be not a bit less than that which we had to carry out in the process of preparing the draft laws. The masses must become convinced of the fact that true internationalism is possible only with mutual study and use of one another's language by the Russian-speaking and Moldavian-speaking populace. And this must begin with the children's pre-school institutions.

Everything must be done so that—in the process of introducing the state language; that is, in its broad functioning—a tone of ultimatum or arrogance not be permitted. On the contrary we must strive for polite, businesslike relations among the people of different nationalities; that is, affirmation of the intellectual-moral foundation on which the concord of language interests must be built. The state language must not divide, but unite people of different nationalities. We must constantly bear this in mind when carrying out explanatory work and in the course of the functioning of languages.

After adopting the draft laws, the mastery of the state language by the Russian-speaking populace and the Russian language by the Moldavians, will become the central question. This is not an easy matter, and we probably should not have to convince one another of it. The Council of Ministers, as you know, has already begun drafting a State Program for Putting into Effect the Law on the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR. Many practical questions are stipulated in it.

Mutual propriety and good will on the path to true bilingualism, to mastery of the state language, and not coercion—these are no doubt the proper moral criteria to which we should all aspire. Only then will we be able to count on success in the language question and on the normal development of inter-ethnic relations.

Dear Comrades Deputies!

Today we are discussing a very important problem for the republic. We can solve it properly only if we are conscious of our great responsibility to the people, to the people of all nationalities who dwell in the republic. I call upon you to be responsible, to display in-depth reasoning and wisdom in discussing the drafts before you. I summon you to dialogue and to consolidation, to a democratic method of overcoming the accumulated negative phenomena, and to resolve the controversial questions in the language sphere. I call upon you to vote for the draft Laws, presented by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In conclusion, dear comrades, permit me to report to you that yesterday evening CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, phoned. He was interested in the state of affairs in the republic, the course of the harvest, and the procurement of agricultural products; and in how the important questions placed on the agenda of this session are being resolved. Mikhail Sergeevich asked me to send you, the deputies of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, and all the workers of Moldavia, his wishes for successful solution, on the principles of the draft CPSU platform, of the extremely important problems in the spiritual life of the republic; and his desire to support the realization of all the economic, social and cultural programs, and those tasks which proceed from the resolutions of the Congress of Peoples Deputies and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I wish you good health and great success, my dear comrades.

Thank you.

#### Proceedings of Ukrainian People's Movement Congress Analyzed

90UN0011A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
14 Sep 89 p 4

[RATAU report: "What, Then, Has the UPM Constituent Congress Decided?"]

[Text] For three days the constituent congress of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika [UPM] worked in the capital. The speech of welcome to its participants was given by writer O. Gonchar, USSR people's deputy.

A report "The Activity of the Organizing Committee and the tasks of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika was given by the organizing committee chairman, writer V. Yavorivskiy, USSR people's deputy.

The congress participants listened to several more reports encompassing various aspects of the future activities of UPM.

The congress materials reflected many real problems that have accumulated in the political, economic, ecological, national-cultural, and other spheres. Just criticism was leveled at the system of administration by fiat, at the bureaucratic practices of the soviet and economic agencies, and at the delayed rates in implementing the requirements of the economic reforms. Practical comments were expressed with regard to the draft versions of the election and language laws that are being discussed in the republic. Alarm was expressed concerning the attempts to delimit our society, to push people together. It is impossible not to see that there also exist in the Movement healthy forces that stand on realistic positions, that want to take part in resolving the acute problems of perestroika. We must not allow even a single attempt to stratify Soviet society, we must push people together—that is precisely what was emphasized in Saturday's statement over Central Television by M. S. Gorbachev. However, the congress did not provide an answer concerning what should be done or how, and it did not define the UPM's own participation in resolving the problems of perestroika that have been brought up by the party. Almost all the documents adopted by the congress are of a declarative nature and are oversaturated with emotions and euphoria.

The reasons for this are various. First, the congress, as its organizers stated, was prepared hurriedly. Secondly, the congress attested to the neutral attitude toward the perestroika that had been defined by the party. Thirdly, no consideration was taken of the real placement of the political forces. This was more a congress of representatives of the intelligentsia than of the entire nation. Without having absorbed the thoughts, yearnings, and heartfelt interests of the nation, it could not make any concrete, constructive decisions.

The work of the congress, which was held in the auditorium of Kiev Polytechnical Institute, and its final decisions were also affected by the atmosphere that prevailed there.

The auditorium was decorated with ancient coats of arms and pennants of the lands and cities situated on what is now the territory of Ukraine. The decorations that dominated were the yellow and blue banners in the midst of which the State Flag of Ukrainian SSR stood alone. The stage was also decorated with yellow and blue bunting. Ancient coats of arms, crowned with a trident, hung over the presidium table.

Both the congress organizers themselves, and certain of those who spoke, heated up the audience's passions. There was a constant playing up to the people who were standing in the square alongside the palace. One could hear frequently at the congress the salutations *pane* and *panove*. Even a birthday greeting in the name of the congress to a certain Ivan Svetlichnyy from Lvov proceeded along a well-trodden path—*pane Ivane... Rukh z vami*.

Sometimes petty and unverified communiques were reported in the congress auditorium. A report was given on the receipts of monetary dues to the UPM fund, etc.

Couriers from the square were invited into the auditorium, bringing donations or demanding the immediate consideration of a question concerning the national symbols.

Very frequently the congress exploded in cries of "Unity!" But that word was chanted by more people and for a longer period of time after the appeals to unite in the struggle against the CPSU, the Soviet authority, and socialism.

Never before under the arches of the beautiful auditorium, the real palace for students that was built by the Soviet authority, have people expressed so many many words that canceled out everything—that authority, the party, and socialism.

In the breaks between the sessions, there was lively trade in the foyer in yellow and blue flags, badges with a trident, and *samizdat* newspapers and leaflets. They included VILNE SLOVO—the newspaper of the Ukrainian People's Movement groups. The words "for perestroika" were absent in it. And that is rather symptomatic.

All these things put the congress participants in the proper mood.

Most of the statements were based on emotions, had the purpose of exposing situations in the past and the present, and did not contain any constructive proposals.

Take, for example, the basic report of the congress's organizing committee. It was nothing but a completely metaphorical speech that was saturated with images for effect.

As a result, even the correct words about tolerance, about cooperation with the public, state, and party agencies and organizations, informal associations, people of various nationalities, and all those to whom the fate of perestroika is not a matter of indifference, did not find a practical outlet. The report did not even contain any recommendations relative to the way in which that cooperation will be carried out, in which the Movement's program will be fulfilled.

A considerable amount of the report and its emotionalism was directed against all the former and current leaders "who have sold out our land, our water, all of us together, and the future of our children."

USSR people's deputy V. Chernyak, doctor of economic sciences, gave one of the keynote reports on the Movement's ecological measures.

According to the speaker, one of the levers for improving the republic's economic situation is the supremacy of pluralism: economic, ideological, political. For this purpose, in addition to other innovations, he proposes enacting a law governing the republic's economic independence, a law which would promote the development of a free market. From free zones and a free market to a

free Ukraine—that is how economist V. Chernyak sees the path of the development of the republic's economy.

Although it is completely unknown what the speaker has included in the concepts "free market" and "free zones." Doesn't he have in mind that this is the capitalist system of management? If so, it is a rejection of the socialist means of production. And perhaps it is precisely for that reason that the speaker called for a change in the model of socialism.

Incidentally, on 6-7 September 1989 the republic press published the draft of the general principles of the economic independence of Ukrainian SSR, a draft which had been developed on instructions from the republic's Economic Council by a group of scientists and specialists. And several congress participants referred specifically to this draft during the discussions of the keynote documents, remarking that the published draft contains more common sense and is more harmonious than the movement's rough drafts.

The supplementary reports by authors I. Drach and D. Pavlychko sounded at the congress like real literary essays.

In order to increase the emotional effect, I. Drach used in his speech excerpts from works by N. Khvylevoy, A. Dovzhenko, Yu. Yanovskiy, and V. Stus. In the speaker's opinion, the Ukraine has been completely unable to get out of the civil war, and the time has come to put an end to this.

D. Pavlychko remarked that the Movement, which includes not only Ukrainians, but also Russians, Jews, Poles, Belorussians, and other representatives of the republic's national minorities—and the Movement is attempting to consolidate and develop this interethnic structure—can become a significant force for preventing a catastrophe of internecine interethnic strife in the Ukraine.

However, something that sounded a dissonant chord in this report was the assertion that "demonstrations and strikes, 'international fronts,' and 'unities' of the Russian-speaking population in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Moldavia not only have not been encountering censure on the part of high party and governmental circles, but, on the contrary, the center has been showing indulgent attention, and sometimes even sympathy, to manifestations that are obviously of a great-power, chauvinistic nature. Certain central newspapers and programs on Central Television create an encouraging atmosphere for those who speak out against the introduction into our life of democratic principles of national policy."

The impression is formed that the author is unfamiliar with the principles in the draft of the CPSU platform on the national question, with the Statement by CPSU Central Committee concerning the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics, or the many statements by M. S.

Gorbachev on television and radio, in which the party's position on these questions is clearly and unambiguously asserted.

Incidentally, other supplementary reports also were not distinguished by their constructiveness or the depth of their analysis of the state of affairs, but were replete with irresponsible assertions, references, and appeals.

Much was said, and about everything. However, certain questions on the congress agenda were not profoundly analyzed. Instead of hearing the expected supplementary report by assistant professor G. Musiyenko concerning the problems of social justice, those present in the auditorium heard a glorification of the historic symbols—the trident and the "sacred" yellow and blue flag. He ended with a fear that the lack of a clear-cut ideological platform (obviously, in definite colors) would transform the "Movement into an artificial satellite orbiting above the CPSU." Judgments such as this caused the following statement by S. Furmanyuk, construction worker from Donetsk: "For two days all we have been talking about is symbols, and not a single action has been taken."

Fighting in favor of Ukrainian separatism, certain speakers, in verbal ecstasy, have linked that separatism with hopes for help from without. It is impossible otherwise to evaluate the statement made by writer P. Movchan: "We are forced to declare our republic a resuscitation zone, the returning of life to which, and the health of which, require colossal international efforts."

A confused statement which was replete with adventurous fabrications was made by the leader of the Movement guard, D. Poyezd. At the present time, he noted, workers' detachments to assist the militia have been created. But, as I have been told, the persons who are sent there are the ones who are working poorly, the loafers. One of the republic leadership—I do not know specifically who, because I did not hear it myself—said that we will create these detachments and direct them against the extremists in Lvov and Kiev, and only then against organized crime.

For the congress participants, this blather remained nothing but empty sounds, although it was accepted with applause. Incidentally, there is nothing to be surprised at, because almost every attack against party or soviet agencies evoked euphoria in the auditorium.

It might be fitting to remark that there was a sufficient number of statements which, although they possibly flattered certain people's pride, were far from any concrete work. One discerned at the congress more than enough political arrogance and open threats, and attacks were permitted against everything and everyone whose opinion did not impress the delegates representing the militant majority in the auditorium. Any point of view that varied to even the slightest degree from the position of the UPM leaders was subjected to obstruction, and those who expressed it were whistled at. But those who attempted to dictate their will to the nation of the

Ukraine—to force upon it as national symbols the yellow and blue flag and the trident, symbols under which the followers of Petlyura and Bandera had waged the struggle against the Soviet authority—were treated as heroes.

Even in the presence of USSR people's deputies, everything was done to besmirch the Soviet Union, the party, and the Soviet authority, and mud was slung at the friendship of nations and at internationalism. But, unfortunately, not a single chosen representative of the nation made even a shy objection. Moreover, individual deputies, as was shown by their statements, had come to the congress for the specific purpose of inciting antisocialistic passions. And they did that not without success.

What was the purpose, for example, of the unsubstantiated statement, made with Bonapartist force by V. Martirosyan: "I have the impression that someone is pulling down our country and is attempting to usurp the power with the aid of the army. As long as the army has commanders like myself, we shall never send regiments against our people." And USSR People's Deputy S. Konev went so far as to call the CPSU Central Committee's Statement Concerning the Situation in the Baltic Republics "the latest in a series of provocations."

This behavior by the congress bosses loosened the hands and tongues of its guests. The statements made by guests from the outside, representatives of people's fronts and other politicized informal associations from the Baltic republics, the trans-Caucasus, Moscow, Leningrad, RSFSR, Belorussia, and Moldavia were, in most instances, of a provocative anti-Soviet nature, and they were met by applause and a standing ovation.

The atmosphere at the congress was aptly characterized by a guest from Moscow, USSR People's Deputy Ye. Stankevich.

"Democracy has never been adorned by bulging eyes or stentorian voices. Foam on the lips is not becoming to democracy," he emphasized. "If something does threaten our democracy today, it is the risk of choking on that hatred that we are ourselves creating. It is very disappointing that the lexicon of the new politicians, people who have just assumed the political throne, is limited only to four phrases: "gimme," "down with," "hail to," and "shame." The political lexicon cannot be limited to this. In order to become politicians, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what will happen to the country, to the republic, and to the peoples inhabiting the country and the republic five, ten, or 15 years from now. One gets the impression that the emotions prevail here over constructive thinking."

After prolonged discussion, a charter and a program were adopted, as well as a number of statements and resolutions that define the basic directions in the activity of, and the structure of, the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka.

Among the principles governing its activity, the principles proclaimed are, in particular, glasnost, pluralism, and the guaranteeing of the real carrying out for every citizen of his right of access to information. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the congress and during the period when it was working, those principles were frequently violated.

Take, for example, such an important moment as the election of the managerial agencies of the UPM. In the charter that was adopted by the congress, it is stated that these agencies are elected by secret voting. However, the congress immediately "forgot" this and elected all the agencies, including the Movement chairman and his deputy, by open voting.

And how are we to understand, for example, the "democratic innovation" by which certain congress documents are not recorded and no one has familiarized himself with them? They were accepted on faith and were mechanically approved.

It is very bad when, from the very first steps, a disdainful attitude to one's own decisions is firmly established. And no references to a shortage of time can justify the juggling of principles.

And there were many such so-called "petty points" which completely nullify the democracy and glasnost that were proclaimed by the Movement.

How can one explain the refusal to accredit at the constituent congress the representatives of the editorial board of PRAVDA UKRAINY newspaper and of certain oblast newspapers? One is surprised at the actions of the congress organizers who demanded that the workers in republic television leave the auditorium. The reason given for this was the statement made by the press-center administrator that the television journalists had allegedly been throwing light unobjectively on the work performed by the congress. But how do these actions jibe with the UPM keynote point concerning the guaranteeing of the broadest publicity in the activities of the public organizations and with the real opportunity for expressing one's opinion?

And how does one tie in with the democracy proclaimed in the Movement's program the fact that most of the delegates were not elected in their labor collectives, but were appointed from the "center"? The organizers ignored the representation quota that they themselves had established. It turned out that, from the oblasts where there were most loudmouths from the so-called "Movement-support groups," the number of delegates was also larger (Lvov, 190 persons; Kiev, 170; Rovno, 100; and Ternopol, 60). At the same time, Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, Donetsk, Nikolayev, and other oblasts were allocated only 20 mandates each.

How does one understand the fact that the official delegation from Odessa Oblast, which had been elected by the people, as well as the representatives of worker collectives from Kirovograd, Sumy, and Chernigov

oblasts, were unable to break through the solid cordon of the "guardians of order," and therefore did not get into the auditorium where the sessions were being held?

It is no accident, evidently, that being a bit afraid of this kind of "democracy," in many parts of the republic people are organizing resistance groups with elements of the international fronts. Hundreds of letters and telegrams have been received by the mass media, with those letters and telegrams protesting the undemocratic nomination of the congress delegates. They are still coming in, after the congress that people say was not a people's congress. Even the person presiding at the congress has admitted that, while the congress was in session, antimovement rallies and meetings were being held in the labor collectives of a number of oblasts.

Despite all the efforts of its organizers to create large policy, the congress failed to attract the attention of broad segments of the population. The Movement's goals and deeds failed to touch people's souls. They had already heard and seen this in the example of the people's fronts of the Baltic republics and Moldavia, and they know what it leads to.

There is something else that upsets people: who do these travelers from other regions try to instruct the Ukraine about where it should go, and by what paths? Naturally, the question arises: do the Movement leaders really want to follow blindly the experience of the other republics? Can't they recommend something that is our very own, something that would correspond to the present-day realities and that would take into consideration our past, our history, our traditional friendship, our gravitation toward unity with the Russian, Belorussian, and other nations?

In the charter of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka that was adopted at the session, it is asserted that the Movement was created by the people's initiative for the fundamental renovation of society. Why, then, with this assurance of support by the entire nation, have we heard the excited voices of one of the persons presiding at the congress: I am afraid that the Movement will not be able to cope with the burden that it has assumed, since we are all atamans, we are all wisemen.

Probably he is well aware that this is not enough, that it is necessary to rest upon the people and to take needs into consideration. But millions of workers and peasants, and intellectuals and young people in the republic, are completely unaware of who, acting in their name and in the name of the nation of the Ukraine, was present at the congress, prepared the statement or the other documents, who spoke, branded, exposed, intimidated, whistled, and jeered. Something else that confirms this is the communique from the congress credentials commission: only 109 workers and 16 peasants out of the 1109 delegates took part in the work of the congress.

In the same charter, the Movement is defined as an independent sociopolitical organization that is not subordinate to any public organization or state institution.

As is well known, independence presupposes noninterference in the internal affairs of organizations or formations. That position was clearly defended at that congress when the Movement was the topic of discussion. Why, then, did a rather large number of the speakers forget that principle when the topic of discussion was the CPSU? Why was the party defamed as an organization? How should one understand this? It is nothing else but unconcealed interference in the party's internal affairs.

The congress has ended its work. The words of USSR People's Deputy V. Chernyak can serve as its epigraph: "Time has imperiously asked the question: who will conquer whom? We must take the power by peaceful, parliamentary means." One cannot state the situation more eloquently.

The goals proclaimed at the congress are far-reaching ones. But the congress did not provide a concrete answer to the question of what should be done today, how should one help people to resolve their burning problems, and how should we find our place in this large job that affects the entire nation? The congress eloquently

demonstrated the great striving of its organizers and inspirers to be the first to seize the fresh wind of changes in their sails.

In our republic, thousands of spontaneous public formations have arisen during the perestroyka years. One can only welcome the increase in the rate of people's political participation, and their striving to speed up the renovation of our life and to help the perestroyka.

The idea of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka arose on the wave of the perestroyka processes. The only disappointing thing is that one observes on that wave a large amount of foam, political dillitatism, legal ignorance, and blather.

The congress elected the managerial agencies of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka.

Writer I. Drach was elected Movement chairman.

L. Kravchuk, head of the Ideology Department of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, took part in the work of the congress.

**U.S. Experience with Interethnic Relations Considered**

90UN0040A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 89 p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent N. Turkatenko: "USA: No Pass Required"]

[Text] *Washington—As we know, emigrants from various regions of the world reside in the United States. Evidently, after the USSR, it is the largest multiethnic country. In this respect, it would be interesting to find out whether the "nationality question" exists there, how the rights of the various nationality groups are legally regulated, and whether antagonism arises between them.*

*A. Petelina, economist*

We have asked the TASS U.S. correspondent to respond to this question.

The "nationality question," as we understand it, does not exist in the United States. The American federal arrangement does not comprise national formations, as in the USSR, but administrative ones, that is, the 50 states plus the "self-governing" territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and a series of "non-self-governing territories" under the aegis of the Department of the Interior.

There is no such thing in the United States as domestic and foreign passports. In the course of daily life the American simply has no need of a passport, inasmuch as the standard document establishing identity is the driver's license (with a photo, home address, and social security number) or a bank passbook, in which all the essential data regarding the bearer's account, easily verified by computer, is encoded. These documents contain no information on citizenship.

However, a U.S. citizen can obtain a passport confirming his U.S. citizenship simply by asking. With this document a U.S. citizen can leave the country freely at any time without asking anyone's permission and return (for the U.S. citizen there is no such thing as exit and entrance visas). A citizen of the United States can have his passport taken away (or rather, suspended) only by a court when that person has been accused of a crime. In the United States, a passport is a document unarguably (barring any relevant court action) belonging, according to his "right as a citizen," to any citizen of the United States, including those born and residing in the "self-governing" and "trust" territories. This document does not contain information about the bearer's nationality or racial background. On the line for "nationality" there is only one answer: "United States of America." For all practical purposes, the only thing someone in the United States would need a passport for would be to travel abroad or to return to the country when passing through immigration controls.

Nonetheless, ethnic groups in the country are still registered, by the census office of the U.S. Department of

Commerce. As I was told at that office, this is done "by force of historical tradition," in order to "get a picture of the dynamics of the development of immigration trends over the last 200 years." After all, the United States is a land of immigrants. The only indigenous inhabitants are the Indians and smaller peoples of the North (Alaska).

According to the data, in late 1988 the country had a population of 241,000,000. These data include only U.S. citizens and not, for example, temporary residents with permission to work or study, as well as "illegal immigrants." The numbers for the latter are estimated at about 5,000,000.

The inhabitation in California of a Spanish-speaking population that has grown constantly due to a high birthrate and new immigration, has reached the point where in entire districts of the state Spanish is the dominant language of daily life, public life, and commerce. A multiplicity of publications come out in Spanish, and there are Spanish-language radio and television channels. In many elementary schools teaching goes on in Spanish, but with mandatory study of English. As they say, no one has abrogated the official status of English. Without sufficient knowledge of English, a Spanish-speaker, like any other American, cannot complete his secondary education, go to college, or get a prestigious or high-skilled job in any state, including California.

According to official data, between 1907 and 1983, 10,813,321 people became U.S. citizens. At the present time, as representatives of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have announced, U.S. authorities are striving to limit the influx of new immigrants to 30,000-35,000 per year (this does not include those who, in the opinion of the U.S. authorities, fall into the political refugee category). Once the permission to enter has been issued, they are not subject to the strict criteria (presence in the United States of close relatives, state of health, level of professional training, knowledge of English, etc.).

The naturalization law works in the following way: any person living in the United States as the spouse of a U.S. citizen automatically receives citizenship three years after arriving in the United States (the problem of obtaining an entrance visa for the United States for immigrants is another question, and it is resolved in each case separately, as an INS representative emphasized in a conversation). If a foreigner arriving in the United States with the proper visa and permission to work or study in the United States does not have a spouse with U.S. citizenship, then he has the right by law to receive U.S. citizenship after five years of "legal" residence in the United States, although the same service examines each case individually.

The right to be elected to legislative organs of the United States is regulated by the Constitution, where it is written: No one can be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives who has not reached the age of 25, who

has not been a U.S. citizen for seven years, and who at the time of the elections is not a resident of the state where he is elected. In order to have the right to be elected to the Senate, at least nine years' residence is required. And someone who was not born a U.S. citizen cannot be a candidate to be elected president of the country.

There are no formal restrictions on residing or working anywhere in the United States (we would say they have no concept of a residency or work permit) for representatives of any ethnic group, which are, in principle, scattered across the entire country. But there are, naturally, historically occurring communities of people of given backgrounds in various areas. Thus Americans of Jewish background are to a significant degree concentrated in New York; Armenians in California. A large number of Americans of Italian, Irish, and Norwegian descent live in New York. Americans of German, Swedish, and Norwegian descent are concentrated mostly in the states of Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Wisconsin, and of Polish descent in Michigan, etc.

The only ones who are more or less firmly attached to one specific place of residence are the smaller peoples of the North and the Indians.

These latter generally reside on reservations set aside for them by the government on those lands which went to the Indian tribes as a result of various treaties with the U.S. government.

The Eskimos and Aleuts live in Alaska in their communities on 44,000,000 acres of land in sovereign reservations, territories which they themselves chose. In addition, Congress set aside about \$1,000,000 in a fund for the "natural development" of the reservations.

The conflict situations that do arise from time to time in the United States are related not to nationality relations but to race. Moreover, friction can arise not only between white and black but, say, between Latin American and black communities.

#### Letters Discuss Soviet German 'Statehood'

90UN0134 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Oct 89 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet member G.N. Kiselev, chairman of the Commission on the Problems of Soviet Germans, based upon readers' letters, by N. Garifullina: "To Live in Accord"]

[Text] They say that time heals. But in this case, the years had no power over the pain and the memory. During the forties, many of our country's peoples suffered lawlessness and forced deportation from their native areas, and the wounds inflicted on them by Stalinism have not yet healed, not all issues have been finally and justly resolved. The process of rehabilitating the peoples who suffered, which began after the 20th CPSU Congress, has extended over many years, and this affects people's

social self-perception. That is why they accepted with hope the lines of the CPSU platform on nationalities policy: "To take all measures toward the resolution of the problems of the Crimean Tatars, the Soviet Germans, Greeks, Kurds, Koreans, Meskhetian Turks and others."

On 12 June, 1989, a special deputy committee on the problems of the Soviet Germans was formed by the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On 6 September, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published under the heading "German Autonomy" an interview on the commission's work with commission members, USSR People's Deputy V.Ya. Medikov and Chairman of the "Rebirth" All-Union Society of Soviet Germans, G.G. Grout. The publication elicited a stream of readers' responses. Complicated opinions are expressed; some letter writers manifest a complete ignorance of the topic of conversation, and this influences their attitude toward the problem itself and the choice of roads to its resolution. A need has emerged to return to the topic once again.

Today, USSR Supreme Soviet member G.N. Kiselev, chairman of the Commission on the Problems of Soviet Germans answers readers' questions.

[Garifullina] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, judging by the response to our "German Autonomy" interview, the readers are following the work of your commission with great interest, and thousands of Soviet Germans link their fate to its conclusions.

Many letters on this topic have come in the editorial mail. Here is one of them. "We, the Soviet Germans, welcome the fact that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has spoken of our tormented fate. I was born in the village of Orlovskoye (now Marksovskiy Rayon, Saratov Oblast) in 1912. All my ancestors are at rest in the cemetery of this and other villages, and in the city Marks. This is hallowed ground for myself and my children; this is our small and dear native land. I was 29 years old when they sent us all away, defaming us with a single wave, crossing off the past and the present, depriving us of a future," writes Aleksandr Gasselbakh, a Komsomol member of the twenties, a writer-communist from the Kazakh city of Tselinograd. And there are dozens of such letters. Their authors ask, what has the commission managed to do already?

[Kiselev] Working groups visited the Povolzhye, the Altay, Kirghizia, and Kazakhstan. They met with the population, leaders, and the aktiv. We were especially interested in rayons of Volgograd and Saratov oblasts, where the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Povolzhye Germans had been previously. It must be said that the conference of the representatives of the "Rebirth" society proposed to reinstate autonomy specifically in this region. During the trips, the people's deputies and other members of the working groups studied the situation, people's suggestions and comments in order to take them into full consideration while working out the commission's position. We are all the

more coming to the conclusion that the problem cannot be put off, and that it must be solved, without any postponement. In our view, this will be aided by the decisions of the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the party platform adopted there on a nationalities policy; these decisions defined more precisely the principle approaches to untangling the exclusively difficult knots which were left to us as an inheritance from the past.

[Garifullina] The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers support posing the issue in such a manner. Pensioner Dina Georgiyevna Laukhina writes from Leningrad: "I fully subscribe to and vote for the reinstatement of German autonomy." Larisa Semenovna Avdeyenko, a veteran of pedagogical labor, sent an analogous letter from Moscow. Muscovite Nikolay Vasilyevich Radko also feels that "The Soviet Germans must have autonomy, but where and how? Returning to previous territory and a republic arrangement is unrealistic." And here the residents of the Saratov village of Borodayevki sent the editors collective and individual letters; N.G. Shcherbakova from Stavropol, S. Petrova from Bryansk, and Ye.N. Latkina from Tikhoretsk are afraid that the reinstatement of German autonomy will infringe upon the interests of the local population, and that this will cause undesired consequences. What is the commission's opinion on this count?

[Kiselev] Letters such as those come to us, too; we have studied the mood of the various groups of the population during our trips to the scene as well. I think that it would be unforgivable to close our eyes to the real picture. In particular, the sources and causes for part of the population's unacceptance of the idea of reinstating German autonomy must still be understood. We are convinced that many do not know the essence of the issue, do not have complete and objective information about why the very problem of the Soviet Germans arose. And in a number of cases, people simply do not know the most elementary facts.

[Garifullina] For example, how did the Germans get to Russia? One of the letter writers, I will not name him in order not to put him in an awkward situation, asks quite seriously, "Why should we grant autonomy to former prisoners of war who remained in our country after the war?"

[Kiselev] Indeed, if we were to explain the essence of the problem to people in a timely manner, the historical facts and the situation today, then there would be no diametrically opposed points of view. That means that without delay, we should conduct explanatory work among the population, in order that an objective, balanced, and serious approach prevail in public opinion. The commission is unanimously for overcoming extremes, as they do not help resolve the problem, but only aggravate, perturb, and provoke bewilderment, a negative reaction on one side or another.

[Garifullina] That is exactly what "Communist" factory worker Albina Petrovna Voronina writes about from the city Marks: "the leaders of the "Rebirth" society are categorical in their demands; they view the problem unilaterally and do not take into consideration that the majority of those who live here were evacuated here during the war years, and suffered no less than the Germans. In our parts, Germans make up 6 percent of the population, and the rest are people of 30 nationalities. There is not a single line about them in the program of the "Rebirth" society leaders. I persuasively ask you to acquaint the reader with their program."

[Kiselev] Our commission feels that an effective resolution of the problem of Soviet Germans is possible only if it is the case that the rights and interests of those who are in one way or another affected by the reinstatement of autonomy are not infringed upon. After all, this decision is necessary for the good of the name of all Soviet people. No one must suffer here; it should not be bad for anyone. As far as we know, the "Rebirth" society holds similar positions. At its founding conference, its representatives adopted an appeal to the population living in the territory of the former ASSR of the Povolzhye Germans, which states in part:

**"...it is sometimes heard that if German autonomy is reinstated on the Volga, then what will happen to the people who live there today. Are they supposed to move away? And if they do not move, will there not then be nationalities conflicts after the Soviet Germans return there? These questions and fears sound at the very least quite unserious to us, for previously, one third of the German population lived in the autonomous republic; there were Russian, Tatars, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Kalmyks, etc. And they all lived as friends, there were no conflicts. Yet we fully allow that today, when the nationalities issue is exacerbated due to pressure and a lack of attention to it during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation, the thought of possible conflicts with the reinstatement of autonomy on the Volga may also be perceived as being well grounded. Not desiring to have intermediaries in these matters, we have resolved to appeal to you directly, as a people to a people.**

**"We extend the hand of sincere friendship to all people living today in the territory of the former ASSR of the Povolzhye Germans. We assure you that we want to live with you in peace, friendship, and accord, jointly resolving our mutual problems, in order that the representatives of all nationalities may have every opportunity to preserve and develop their native tongue and national culture. We declare that having lived with the Soviet people through the tragedy of war, with its innumerable victims, we consider it impossible to demand for ourselves the return to us of our houses and property illegally confiscated upon deportation in 1941, for the Soviet people are not to blame for this, all the more so those people who live in our houses today. Let our houses, the houses in which we were born and which have become shelter for you be as dear to you as they were to us."**

Unfortunately, far from everyone knows about this appeal, and as a result, some portion of the population, exploiting rumors and fantasies, is expressing a negative attitude toward the idea of a rebirth of autonomy. If they were widely known by the people of the Povolzhye, would not, for example, such lines from the appeal play their positive role:

**"We are all Soviet people; not only a common territory unites us; we have one country, one socialist state, a common burdensome history, common difficulties, and common causes. And only all together, respecting the rights and dignity of every one, helping each other and supporting each other, will we overcome our difficulties and bring order to our country, to its every corner..."**

**Here, apparently, party and soviet workers, the public, must all the same function more actively?"**

Undoubtedly, incidentally, in visiting places, we denoted this task among the primary ones. And there are many issues, just as acute, both major and minor, simple and complex. Let us say that the decision on reinstatement of autonomy has been made. This will inevitably cause people to flow into the territory set aside; it will affect the regions they are moving to and from which they are moving. They must be greeted, and set up, but not to the detriment of the people with whom they will be living. It is important to know and consider the various points of view, proposals, and variants, in order to choose the most rational and effective ones.

[Garifullina] And if all 2 million Germans feel like moving? Is it possible to solve the problem in such a case?

[Kiselev] Judging by the information we have, that will not happen. Many Germans have never lived in Povolzhye. Before the deportation in '41, only about a quarter of the Soviet Germans were here. Today, their majority lives in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Siberia, and the Ukraine; many of them have work they love, their own homes, farms. As a rule, the atmosphere around them is benevolent. The overwhelming majority of them do not think about moving. Nor do the Germans themselves strive to gather everyone in the same place. This would create colossal difficulties from the socioeconomic point of view. After all, it would be necessary to create once again a social infrastructure, provide work and housing for over a million people...

[Garifullina] All the same, there is such a question in the readers' letters.

[Kiselev] But there is also something else in the letters: We do not plan to move anywhere; we are only concerned that historical justice and legality triumph. Weighing the situation out realistically, we can surmise that no mass resettlement will occur. All the more so because in accordance with the CPSU platform on nationalities policy, reinstatement is stipulated for nationality rayons, village and settlement nationalities

sovietes in areas where representatives of those nationalities which do not have their own national-territorial formations are living together in close association.

[Garifullina] When do you intend to finish the work? Of course, this is a complex issue, and no one is rushing you, but apparently, you have been issued some deadlines?

[Kiselev] Today, I would not speak of concrete deadlines for completing the commission's work, nor has anyone officially set such deadlines for us. The Soviet of Nationalities formed our commission and set a task for it—to study the problem and make proposals. We determined our own work procedure for ourselves—and we will introduce our proposals even during the course of the current session. The USSR Supreme Soviet has the final word. I think that a principle political decision could be made in the near future. But its realization is a complicated matter; it must be phased, planned, and consistent in order that the process be more natural, not arousing national conflicts, socioeconomic disproportions, etc. And both on a political, and on a moral-psychological level, and on an everyday level. Let us say, in order that people not move until the necessary material base has been created, with, of course, the active participation of the Germans themselves.

I want to emphasize that first and foremost, the commission will propose a political resolution of the problem. We must speak of the complete political rehabilitation of the Soviet Germans, of the reinstatement of their statehood.

[Garifullina] In some of the letters, the growth of the emigration mood is linked to the fact there is not yet a final decision on the reinstatement of autonomy; is the commission interested in this facet of the problem?

[Kiselev] We asked specialists to evaluate the socioeconomic consequences of emigration of Soviet Germans to the FRG. Materials on the nature, scale, and motives of this emigration (which are in some ways moot) have been received. Yes, emigration is growing, and at a fairly high rate. The flow doubled last year. Of course this troubles us. However, it must be said that a principle political resolution of the problems of Soviet Germans will obviously not stop the emigration immediately. Why? The thing is that the base for emigration is expanding. One of the reasons or causes for departure abroad is family reunification, the invitations of relatives. Recently, there are more people who have left the Soviet Union, therefore our Germans are now moving to a milieu more dear to them. That is, the more people who emigrate, the more favorable the conditions for emigration growth become.

[Garifullina] Of course, both the complexity of the problem and the level of responsibility of the task assigned to you are understandable. Who is helping you in this difficult work?

[Kiselev] The commission works in contact with the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Council of Ministers;

the problem concerns the rayons of the Povolzhye, where the autonomous republic of Soviet Germans had been, and almost one-half of the country's German population lives in Russia today. Absolutely everyone whom we have asked for assistance is helping us. For example, we sent one of our inquiries to USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History, to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, to the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], to the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee. We are interested in how Soviet Germans are represented in the leading organs. It is not a simple picture; it must be analyzed.

[Garifullina] In one of the interviews in the "German Autonomy" materials, a proposal was expressed on holding a referendum on the matter of reinstatement of autonomy in order to take the opinion of all population groups into more complete, multilateral, and democratic consideration. This proposal, however, provoked a sharply negative reaction and even offense among several readers. "We have been branded as enemies from childhood, and the brand has not been removed to this day. Reinstatement of autonomy is the only chance to remove this brand from ourselves, our predecessors, and descendants. So is it really possible that such an issue be resolved with the help of a referendum?" write I.P. and T.P. Ryub, E.A. Geyntse, T.A. Shavaleyeva, and V.A. Shtab from the city of Chernogorsk, Krasnoyarskiy Kray. "Nobody asked for consent when they were deporting peoples. So, no referendums are needed now. In 1918, Lenin personally signed the decree on the formation of the Povolzhye Germans' autonomy, and we must now return to Lenin," proposes V.N. Bauer from the city of Kemerovo. The commission's opinion?

[Kiselev] We feel that the issue of reinstating historical justice, the rights of a people groundlessly repressed, must not be decided with the aid of a referendum. Here, things should be based upon the principle of consensus, that is, the agreement of interests of all the peoples and of each individually. People have to be drawn into an open and frank discussion of the problem, they have to get away from being overly categorical, oppositional, which is in part taking place in Saratov Oblast, when some say only that they are "for" it, while others are simply "against." And they are not taking very many steps toward one another. It is necessary that people form a reasoned opinion, not one born of emotions and rumors. It should be based upon the basic principles of the structure of our federation, of Soviet society, of Leninist nationalities policy, of the CPSU platform, and finally, of the principles of international law.

[Garifullina] Perhaps we should also recall some common human characteristics? Mercy, kindness, and humanism; sympathy with another's misfortune—all of this lives in every people, only the right strings need be played...

[Kiselev] True. Moral forces also have to be put into motion, but I want to accentuate that we, after all, are

forming a law-governed state, and here, the rights of a people were violated; it is therefore required that these rights be reinstated. Of course, this must be done with consideration of the changes which have taken place over a half-century. This comprises the complexity of the situation, but a cure for the neglected disease cannot be postponed. The commission is of a single opinion here.

#### Interview with Secretary of Russian National Front

*90UN0100A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 26 Sep 89 p 2*

[Interview with Valeriy Skurlatov, secretary of the Russian National Front, by Andrey Sorokin: "The Russian National Front: Along Stolypin's Path"]

[Text] On television, the CPSU Central Committee's resolution on the Moscow nature park "Moose Island" was being read. For a long time, that park had been at the center of public debate in the capital.

"Here we go at last." Valeriy Skurlatov, Secretary of the Russian National Front (RNF), heaved a sigh of relief. "We have campaigned to protect the Moose Island for six months. We were not the only ones, of course. But you must agree that it is a pleasure to know that you are part in the general success."

Leaflets bearing the flag of St. Andrew began to appear in Moscow last spring, if I am not mistaken. They announced rallies of a new unofficial movement, the RNF. Earlier, we reported about this group's existence; we now offer a closer look at them.

There was nothing extraordinary about the founding of the RNF; just like the Moscow National Front (MNF) and similar groups in other cities, it was started last year, before the 19th party conference.

"Of course, the influence of the Baltic was strong," admitted V. Skurlatov. "We were encouraged by the success of those movements in the Baltic. The name they took, the one which even before the war was the motto of democratic forces united to fight totalitarianism, suited us, as well. I admit that we followed in the Baltic movements' footsteps and tried to apply their experience—i.e., their methods and basic democratic statutes—in the conditions of the Russian Federation."

There is an interesting twist in the history of the RNF. Its founders were those who during Khrushchev's thaw—in 1963-65, to be exact—were associated with the liberal democratic Young Marxist University (UMM). Skurlatov recalled that among the founders were Yuriy Afanasyev and Yuriy Karyakin, and that Len Kartsinskiy also helped a great deal. The Children of the Sixties from the UMM grew up with the idea of creating a democratic state with different forms of property; when the RNF was created, they were already mature individuals with fully formed views. In this respect, the RNF is

different from many other groups, where the period of ideological disagreements tends to last a little too long.

**"Opponents call us followers of Stolypin; they mean it in a derogatory sense. But we are not offended, on the contrary. Indeed, our goal is to carry to the end Stolypin's interrupted reforms. This means liberalizing the economy and freeing individual initiative. In the end, this should result in the emergence of a powerful class of proprietors who will provide for themselves economically and not depend on administrators materially. We feel that our program will reflect the aspirations of the best-trained and able workers, especially progressive representatives of the working class, and of those who want to work for themselves, be they farmers ("Arkhangelsk peasants") on the countryside or cooperators (entrepreneurs) in town."**

The RNF believes that Stolypin's reforms can be easily adapted to the contemporary Soviet Union. Moreover, according to Skurlatov, "this path, as the short-lived Russian experience and the experience of practically all other developed countries has shown, is the only true way to create a normal economy."

**"Of course, it is difficult to count on the modern peasant, since for many decades everything was being done to alienate him from his land and to keep him from working normally. But we believe in our people: the miners' strikes have shown that the people still has some strength left. Thus, we hope that new, enterprising and hard-working masters will return to the soil. The main task is to keep out of their way. The example of the Baltic once again shows that it is feasible."**

And now it is time for a sensitive topic. An outsider could easily confuse the RNF with pro-Pamyat Russian nationalists. In general, Pamyat's torrid activity has given us yet another ideological cliché: whenever one hears of Russia and the Russian people, one automatically expects extreme nationalism and anti-Soviet statements.

**"On this issue we are confused,"** smiled Skurlatov. "The left (for instance the MNF), calls us anti-Semites, while the right, Pamyat, accuses us of Zionism. Yet, our position is no secret and it is not very original: all ethnic groups—great or small, indigenous or not—are equal. Our Front's members include Russians, Jews, Tatars, Ukrainians and representatives of many other nationalities living in Russia. It is their land, too, and they should be its legitimate masters."

V. Skurlatov frequently used the terms "left" and "right" during the conversation, stressing that "the RNF holds a centrist position".

**"There is much confusion in this issue, and for the sake of clarity let us use the traditional interpretation. On the left we see those who advocate equalization and social equality. On the right there are those who preach special privileges for a social group, a nation, etc. Using these traditional benchmarks, we call ourselves centrists. Our view is that the rights of the individual, or human rights,**

are above the interests of any group, be it a party, a state, a nation or a nationality. Our center is the hope of seeing every individual to be able to provide for himself and be economically sovereign. This in turn is the basis of political and spiritual freedom."

The RNF's program (or at least its goals) make a good impression: they are well thought-out, logical and convincing. Yet, the only measure of any program's effectiveness is its practical implementation.

**"We are trying to work with the masses, with the population. We talk about our position and try to attract attention. At rallies, we also admit new members to the RNF. However, we do not chase after membership numbers. It would be enough if only a few people in a thousand-strong audience join; the most important thing is that they actively support our program and be willing to assist the Front."**

The RNF hopes that the country will develop in an evolutionary manner, since "our people have seen enough social turmoil". One of the main preconditions for this is, according to the RNF, the broadening of the powers of local soviets—although they are not original in this idea. The motto the RNF will use in the impending elections is "Two Yeses and Two Nos": The yeses go to the primacy of soviets over party organizations and direct competitive elections of soviet chairmen at all levels, including the President of Russia. The nos go to district election meetings and nomination of candidates by enterprises and organizations.

These, however, are global issues, whereas true respect is earned in small deeds.

**"Currently we are doing something in Moscow's Zhelezno-dorozhnyy Rayon,"** said Skurlatov. "We are planning to restore the abandoned church of St. Sergius of Radonezh and to turn it into a center for church music. As far as financing is concerned, we are counting on the support of enterprises and cooperatives in the district and on voluntary contributions from residents. If we are successful, they will get another cultural center. What is most important, people will once again feel as proprietors and will acquire the sense of responsibility for their little corner of the world. This is the start of true patriotism. On our part, our hope to increase the number of RNF supporters."

It is definitely a positive aspect of the RNF that it does not shun such grunt work but, on the contrary, stresses it. This may be the reason why the RNF is not yet as well-known in the city as the MNF. But who knows, diligence may yet pay off and we may hear more about the RNF.

Our conversation ended just before midnight. Early next morning, Skurlatov was off to the Izmaylovo Park, where a rally was to take place in defense of the Serebryanka, a small stream.

**Conference Discusses Separate Baltic Currencies**  
18200476 Moscow *LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST* 7  
Nov 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Will There Be a New Currency?"]

[Text] Recently banking specialists from the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs held a conference to discuss the creation of separate republic financial systems and the organization of banking activity. Participants at the conference sent a memorandum to the governments of the three republics. The document establishes the necessity to introduce republic currencies and to determine the principles for an exchange rate between them and with other Soviet and foreign currencies. In this regard, they propose the adoption of republic laws "On the Financial System" and "On Banking," as well as the implementation of a program for printing currency notes and for coins and the creation of a mechanism for protecting the internal market and republic financial systems.

**Estonian Scholar Discusses History of Nationalities Question**

18300847 Tallinn *KOMMUNIST ESTONII* in Russian  
No 7, Jul 89 pp 32-41

[Article by Kh. Vaynu, candidate of historical sciences: "Where Did the Different Interpretation of the Nationality Question Come From?"]

[Text] Discussions concerning the country's economic and sociopolitical development, especially with respect to nationality relationships, conclusively reveal a nationality differentiation. It is a diverse and multifaceted picture, although in a very general way, two approaches may be distinguished in it: the approaches of the Russians and the indigenous peoples of nationality formations (republics, oblasts, okrugs). The "Russian" conception is the common one, naturally, since the way of thinking peculiar to Russian persons has also been absorbed by the majority of non-Russians who live outside the borders of their national territories.

The differentiation is conditional, of course. Being part of one social group or another influences opinions. Moreover, the increase in nationality consciousness varies in intensity in different regions, and in some places it is manifested even in clashes between the minority groups themselves (the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and the Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts). It is apparent that the divergence of views between Russians and minority peoples appears most distinctly in the Baltic region. Major social movements and informal associations (the people's fronts and the intermovements, as well as the United Council of Labor Collectives and the Union of Labor Collectives in Estonia) were formed mainly on the basis of nationality. Judging by the charters of these

movements, they have a great deal in common, and the problems of nationality relationships are the crucial factor.

Both the People's Front and the Intermovement in Estonia frequently base their sharply divergent positions on the decisions of the 19th Party Conference and statements by M. S. Gorbachev, making use of the theses from them that are the most suitable at a given moment and interpreting them in their own way. This is demonstrated in both the verbal and printed squabbles in which stock phrases are continually heard: nationalism, separatism, colonialism, imperialism, and so forth. But labels are unlikely to help clarify the problem and get to the deep roots of the phenomenon. Unbiased analysis is the only path here.

The classics of Marxism and Lenin spoke on a strategical plane as advocates of centralized control, which made it possible to direct socialist reforms into a single channel. Nevertheless, Lenin, especially in his final years, categorically advocated a federative system and decentralization of power in accordance with the nationality principle. The center was to retain mainly the defense and foreign policy functions, and everything else was transferred for decision by the republics, which were equal in status. The positions of representatives of national republics, which in Lenin's conception would alternately head the sessions of central union organs, were provided for in the union narkomaty [people's commissariats]. This was the same kind of radical turning-point as the NEP [New Economic Policy] was in the economic area, that is, a substantial correction in the concept of socialism.

The question arises: what did Lenin have in mind? He criticized the chauvinistic displays by party members time and again and relentlessly struggled against them. Lenin had serious grounds for apprehension that without decisive decentralization of power and without the union republics' sovereignty, some variety of the tsarist national-state system, which was aptly called the prison of the peoples, might be formed. In short, Lenin sought ways to decisively eradicate the national dissension and alienation inherited from tsarism and to change the negative attitude toward the Great Russians, in whose hands the power was concentrated. In Lenin's conception, the voluntary cooperation and friendship of the country's peoples would thereby become stronger in the course of solving the major problems of socialist construction. Lenin considered the dispersal of power owing to decentralization and federalization and the coordination of various interests, though troublesome, to be less of an obstacle than the danger of a revival of the characteristic signs of the tsarist autocracy's national-state system.

Stalin took the Leninist legacy into consideration only formally; he essentially implemented his own plan for "autonomization." Moreover, the USSR was actually turned into a Great Russian unitary state. The capital of the Russian Federation remained the capital of the

USSR at the same time, and the central departments which wielded great-power authority were concentrated there as in tsarist times. The role of the republics in shaping the union's policy was reduced to practically nothing and their representatives were not permitted to take part in the central organs' work. Although individual "natsmeny" [representatives of national minorities] have also been part of the country's leadership, as in the administration of tsarist Russia, they have spoken there not as defenders of the interests of union republics, but as conductors of great-power policy. The republics have had neither the rights nor the means to control the center's implementation of the functions of authority that were delegated to it or simply appropriated by it, and the central organs have been in command of everyone, disregarding the principle of federalism that had been proclaimed. The Soviet of Nationalities has served in the power structure only as a screen, just as the sovereignty of union republics was consolidated in the Constitution of the USSR. Under the pretext of interethnic intercourse, the Russian language has actually been turned into the state language. The Great Russians have found essentially the same special position in the state as in tsarist times. The conceptions of the center and what is Great Russian have become identical to a large extent. For this reason, there are also grounds now to equate the positions of the center and those of the Russians in the nationality question. Incidentally, as far as the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on the nationality question is concerned, its provisions differ substantially from the original ones which were worked out mainly in Moscow and presented to the conference. The resolution reflects the very severe criticism at the conference of the nationality policy conducted previously and represents a distinctive compromise between the positions of the center and the union republics.

In reading the works on the nationalities question from the periods of Stalin's rule and the stagnation, the numerous quotations from the classics arrest our attention, just as in works on the general theory of socialism, incidentally. A considerable amount of dogmatism was displayed in this, but we cannot deny the fact that they were trying to build the theoretical concepts and the practice of nationality relationships at that time on the instructions of the classics, all the same. The gradual blending of the peoples as a part of social progress, subordination of nationality interests to class interests, and the dialectics of the prosperity and rapprochement of the peoples—all this is really in the classics. After all, Marxist teaching sees the path to a bright future for mankind through the disappearance of classes and to a certain extent, it shifts the dialectics of social development to the area of nationality relationships, especially as the trend of internationalization being traced in socioeconomic life corroborates the concept of "rapprochement and blending."

On this strategic plane, the Marxist teaching on the blending of nations is perfectly compatible with the national consciousness of the majority peoples. The

gradual assimilation of minority peoples is considered a positive occurrence, at any rate. Apparently, this is the reason why Soviet specialists in nationality relationships and their American colleagues find a common language with respect to many problems.

However, this similarity is only apparent. In speaking about the blending of peoples, Marxism invariably stresses the necessity of pulling the peoples who are economically and culturally backward up to the level of those who are prosperous. In this sense, the practice during the times of Stalin's rule and the stagnation really was in keeping with the spirit of Marxism. Capital investments in non-Russian regions, chiefly in Central Asia, the Far East and the Far North, were noteworthy and actually were made partly at Russia's expense. This is a substantial distinction from the tsarist autocracy's nationality policy. But this was paraded not as a natural phenomenon for socialism, but as the disinterested assistance of "an older brother"—the Russian people, who thereby were put in a special position not only in deed, but at the propaganda level. And when difficulties arose in Soviet Russia itself, stereotyped thinking was shaped in the everyday consciousness of the Russian people: we are living poorly because of our own generosity—we are helping others. And no one even attempted to thoroughly examine the actual socioeconomic effectiveness of this assistance.

The propaganda on the blending of peoples—within the framework of the administrative-command system—has disregarded Marxism's tenets on the nationality question, which are democratic in nature, and has not troubled itself with a specific analysis of a specific situation. Being guided by some common cliches, the central government decided the paths by which the backward regions would be taken to a bright tomorrow. The center found that since economics, in accordance with the theory of Marxism, serves as the basis for social development and that heavy industry is its nucleus, and that Russia's inclusion among the developed states began with the development of heavy industry, this means that this should also become the wonder-working remedy for all the republics.

However, this prescription did not "blend" in the backward regions in any way and the peoples did not accept it. Especially as within the framework of the blending of peoples they began restricting schooling in the native language and higher education in indigenous languages did not become a reality at all. A substantial part of the indigenous population of nationality groupings refused to study a strange technology in a foreign language. This resulted in disproportions in the social and nationality structure of these regions. The indigenous peoples devote themselves primarily to the traditional industries—agriculture and handicrafts, while a working class consisting of immigrants, mainly Russians, predominates in heavy industry. Once again this can reinforce the illusion of assistance from "an older brother," but it has little in common with bringing the indigenous peoples up to the modern level and with breaking down the

feudal social structures and customs in Central Asia, for example. At the same time, hardly no progress has been made in the traditional production activities of the indigenous peoples. When cotton-growing remains the basic sector of production for the indigenous population and an Uzbek schoolboy spends one-third of his educational time in a cotton field, why should we be surprised if the knowledge he has acquired, and in a foreign languageat that, remains superficial. And everyone is dissatisfied: the indigenous residents are dissatisfied with the low prices for cotton and a living standard that is below average for the country, and the center and the Russians are dissatisfied with the unending subsidies to the Central Asian republics. Wouldn't it be more appropriate to supply these republics with decent cotton-picking combines first of all? Even against the background of the generally low quality of our agricultural equipment, the cotton-picking equipment looks especially bad.

The concept of development that has rested on Marxism that has been sooversimplified and deformed has been applied not only to the regions that lag culturally and economically behind Russia, but to the regions that are ahead of it. In Estonia and Latvia, there has been no shortage of technically skilled personnel, but they have not found the manpower here for the major enterprises of union subordination that have been vigorously developed, partly because of the low population growth, and partly because the local working class and engineering and technical personnel have preferred to work in the enterprises of local industry and the small union-republic plants, where by force of an old habit more attention has been devoted to quality and the commercial appearance of goods. Rapid migration and the consistent exclusion of the local language from business correspondence have created uneasiness among the indigenous population, which is concerned about its preservation as a people. In addition, the enterprises of union subordination are the main sources of environmental pollution and disruption of ecological equilibrium, while their contribution to the economic development of the republic is practically tantamount to zero. And again, help from the "older brother" turns out to be ineffective, leading only to serious dissatisfaction. The notion that the growth rates of industry that is being developed extensively serve as a measurement of progress is groundless. The population of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR have not begun to live 2,780 times better than under the tsar, and Estonians' living standard has not risen by 60 times as much as in the last year of the bourgeois republic, although the official statistics maintain that industrial production has increased by precisely this much in these republics.

Manipulation of the concept of "internationalism" was a favorite technique of the Stalinists. In reality, the Stalinist nationality policy shamelessly obstructed the formation of genuine internationalism and intensified the differences between peoples and the different interpretation of nationality processes. The Russians were

impressed by the "older brother" role, which was reinforced by real capital investments in the union republics and their participation in the development of large-scale industry. In other words, they judged nationality relationships by the goals that were proclaimed, the preferential status for the Russian language was convenient for them, including within national territories, and for this reason they responded to the concept of the blending of peoples as well.

With the actual rejection of the Leninist federative principle and the concentration of power in a central apparatus made up of Russians, the prerequisites took shape for serious defects in the development of national territories, as well as for their subjective perception by the indigenous population as merely "Russian errors." In assuming all the responsibility for the union republics' development—with the elimination of federalism—the center took all the responsibility for the successes being propagandized and the actual deformations as well. Including for the Stalinist terror, whose victims included all the country's peoples, including the Russians. Inasmuch as the central government was essentially Russian, violations of the law were interpreted in the national republics as crimes of the Russian government. Moreover, the Stalinist terror bore the signs of genocide. As long ago as the 1930's, the cultural autonomy of the national minorities scattered over the country was abolished, and entire peoples were evicted from their indigenous lands during the years of the Great Patriotic War. For this reason, it is not surprising that non-Russians sometimes respond to the Russians' argument that they suffered no less than others from Stalin's rule just the way the Poles respond to the Germans' assertion that "Hitler was the same disaster for the German people as he was for the Poles" with the words: "But Hitler came to us from Germany, after all."

Stalinism took the democratic principles of Marxism out of the state-nation relationships and combined with Jesuitical adroitness his strategic policy on the nationality question with great-power chauvinism. The Russians proved to be the most susceptible to this symbiosis.

Only after the events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland did they begin quoting the words of F. Engels from the foreword to the Polish edition of "The Communist Party Manifesto": "Sincere cooperation among the European peoples is possible only if each of these nations is in charge in its own home." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 22, p 290). But these words were quoted only as applied to other socialist countries. Lenin's teaching on the right of nations to self-determination now is considered applicable only to the world capitalist system. Lenin's precepts on the nationality question and his letter "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'" have not been published at all for a long time. But even after their publication they were not guided by them anyway. The same thing happened with the resolution of the party's 12th congress on the nationality question, which was worked out in a Leninist spirit.

The monolithic unity of the Soviet state was declared to be axiomatic and needed no proof, a sacred object for whose defense any means were permitted, and any doubt about it, even the most timid request that real Leninist federalism be restored, was viewed as bourgeois nationalism. Many grounds have been cited. Complete unity stands to reason, they say, since a great deal has already been achieved on the path toward communism, which in the area of nationality relationships is considered primarily the blending of peoples; since the nationality question has been resolved once and for all in the USSR, there is no reason to speak about the right of nations to self-determination. Doubt concerning the advisability of a unitary USSR has been equated with doubt about social progress. Unity, they say, is extremely necessary as the only stronghold in a capitalist encirclement, and even when it becomes part of the world socialist system, since centrifugal forces are operating in it, unfortunately. And so on and so forth. These arguments met with a response primarily among the Russian population.

But if things are now removed from Marxist phraseology, the picture in the eyes of non-Russian indigenous peoples appears surprisingly similar to the autocratic concept of "a single and indivisible Russia" and the Russification policy carried out within its framework. And the national minorities have reacted to this accordingly: even in spite of the preferential development of personnel and the intelligentsia among them, this has not resulted in gratitude toward "the older brother"; it has produced the opposite effect. After all, the intelligentsia, and the creative intelligentsia first of all, always display a low threshold for pain when imperfections in the life of society are mentioned.

There can be only one way out under the conditions of a democratic law-governed state, whose establishment was proclaimed as one of the goals of perestroyka—stop seeing nationalism in the rise of the non-Russian peoples' consciousness and struggling against this phenomenon in accordance with the "prohibit and not allow" principle, and stop shaking your finger and treating nationality processes incorrectly in the press. After all, according to Lenin's conception, it was assumed that a situation would be established in which all peoples living in our country would really want to live as part of the USSR, since this is appealing and advantageous. So let the peoples judge the attractiveness and advantage for themselves; do not impose pseudo-Marxist concepts on them that are remote from life, such as extensive development of large-scale industry, unilateral bilingualism in the national republics, and so forth. The situation needs to be relieved without delay, since patience is already coming to an end in some places. And not as the result of plots by Western centers of subversion, but by force of the objective conditions created by the Stalinist nationality policy.

There is also another way, of course—in accordance with the "might makes right" principle. But this principle is not a principle of the law-governed state. Especially as it can only bring temporary success. The end result can be

tragic both for the non-Russian and the Russian peoples, for the country, and for socialism. Presenting Stalinist ideology in a Marxist wrapping has seriously discredited Marxism in the eyes of the peoples of the USSR.

The Russian people have also suffered a great deal from the Stalinist nationality policy. It has corrupted people ethically, although its clever camouflage does not always make it possible to realize this. Hence the notion that the Stalinist nationality policy is a continuation of the Marxist-Leninist line, only with certain deformations. At the same time, the fact that many more anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist elements are traced in the nationality relationships established under Stalin is most often glossed over. Hence the irritated and even outraged reaction by certain forces that are very influential politically to the rise in national consciousness among non-Russian peoples.

The tickling of the Russians' national feelings by Stalinist ideology under the veil of Marxist phraseology is making it difficult to set nationality relationships free of this ideology more than in other areas of the life of society. Thus, by helping conservative circles to knock together forces that are quite significant, Stalinist ideology in the area of nationality relationships represents a serious danger to perestroyka.

Under the influence of the Stalinist nationality policy, the Russian people have begun placing an equal sign more and more often between themselves and the Soviet people. As a result, the Russians' national consciousness has been deformed to a considerable extent. They do not feel responsible for the failures in their own territory. The neglect of agriculture and the neglect in the countryside on the land that has been Russian for ages, including in one of the cradles of the Russian state—the Novgorod region, often is not perceived as a tragedy of the Russian people which is in its vital interest to bring to an end. They are trying to bring manpower in from the southern regions, from completely different climates, which cannot be justified even from a purely biological point of view. As a result of the automatic mixing of nations with the Russian people, the sense of a small homeland is beginning to be lost, with all the negative consequences which ensue from this. A new type of person without roots has emerged (formed not only of Russians)—homo sovieticus, roaming the country in search of the best deal. Migration, which is a positive phenomenon up to certain limits, acquires a negative character in its hypertrophied form, both economically and ethically, and it does not strengthen the friendship among peoples; on the contrary, it harms it. Russian degenerates and becomes cluttered up among the other languages.

Out in the open with the chauvinist ideology, the rise in national consciousness taking place in the Russian environment during the years of perestroyka is assuming distorted forms. An organization such as "Pamyat" has emerged with the rising wave of consciousness; it is by no means being guided by the new ideas brought into world

culture in the 19th century by the humanist internationalist traditions of democratic Russian culture, but by intolerable isolationism and chauvinism, this trend in Russian culture, or more accurately, lack of culture, about which Lenin expressed a sharply negative view in the article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" and which was secretly stimulated by Stalinism.

We can only express admiration for the Russian people for the fact that after all the Stalinist manipulations to obscure their consciousness and after the nearly complete annihilation of the Russian intelligentsia, they have been able to retain, as perestroika demonstrates, so many persons who have not been poisoned by chauvinism.

Very likely criticism of the Stalinist nationality policy is being expressed most clearly and pointedly in the Baltic republics. There are reasons for this rooted deeply in history. The fact that the Baltic peoples, primarily the Estonians and Latvians, were formed into a nation in an area of German culture has unquestionably played a role. For this reason, becoming accustomed to the way of thinking in the Russian Empire was difficult for them. The fact that, unlike other Soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent bourgeois national states for 20 years, until 1940, and that this was the first form of independent statehood for Estonia and Latvia, is also of no small importance. That period, which even with its mistakes and shortcomings was a period of national independence, is difficult to compare with the years of Stalinist leveling, and in the last years we were directly threatened with the loss of our national identity. Comparisons are not in Stalinism's favor in other important areas of society's life, either—politics, the economy, and the social sphere. The Estonian republic, especially in the initial years of its existence, also experienced terror—against the communist and workers movement, then the so-called "period of silence" with its autocratic form of rule. But the terror, mass repressions, and lawlessness of the Stalinist times were something a little more terrible. On the eve of World War II, Estonia, Latvia, and to some extent, Lithuania were roughly on a par with Finland in their economic and social development. In spite of the assertions by official statistics that our increase in industrial output in the postwar years was four times as much as that of Finland, everyone knows that Estonia lags far behind its northern neighbor in prosperity and the abundance of food products and consumer goods. Owing to a boom in intensive technology, Finland is now called the Japan of Europe, while Estonia is marking time on the extensive path, its goods have lost their competitiveness on the world market, and all this is accompanied by intensified demographic and ecological problems.

Compared with regions of the Soviet Union populated by Slavic peoples, the Great Patriotic War had less of a uniting effect on the people in the Baltic, since Hitler carried out a more flexible occupation policy here. After the forcible propagation of Stalinist terrorist measures, it led to the point that men in the Baltic republics went into

the German Army more willingly than into the Soviet Army. At the end of the war about one-tenth of Estonia's population fled to the West, fearing a return of the Stalinist methods.

When Soviet authority was established in the national territories, actions by the Red Army, together with local bolsheviks and other democratic forces, played an unduly large role. The inclusion of the Baltic states in the USSR in the summer of 1940 under Stalin's overall leadership and under the waves of the conductors' batons of his closest aides, Zhdanov, Vyshinskiy and Dekanozov, cannot be considered a display of the three countries' free will by any means. This took place as the result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded in August 1939; along with other motives, we see the leadership of the USSR at that time striving to restore the borders of the Russian Empire which existed before the Brest peace. What kind of nation that has the least bit of self-respect can like the role of a pawn that has been palmed off and beaten in a game between big powers? Especially as the results provide little joy.

And one more feature of the Baltic region. The three indigenous nations live compactly on their own territories. There are no other indigenous national groups or autonomous republics and okrugs here. The Poles in Lithuania are an exception, and the Latgals have basically been absorbed by the Latvians. For this reason, the growth of national consciousness in the Baltic region has not been overshadowed by interethnic strife as in the Transcaucasus. Dissatisfaction with the fate of their nation during the years of Stalin's rule and the stagnation has been turned unequivocally against the central departments and their representatives locally. In the course of our "revolution in song" no odes to those who settled here recently have been heard, either. We have counted on support from the highest political authority for our national aspirations. A central place among them is occupied by the concept of a cost accounting republic—the IME [expansion unknown], also adopted by the other Baltic republics. In order to raise itself economically and technically to the world level, the people are prepared to tighten their belts for a time. Implementation of the IME presupposes a sufficiently high level of political independence for the republic, of course. This means the priority of the indigenous people on the land of their fathers, without infringement by the interests of residents of other nationalities, of course. We see our development and future as part of the USSR. One of the leaders of the People's Front stated in the summer last year: "Why jump off a train that is moving in the direction we need?"

Criticism of the misinterpretation of nationality relationships during the period of Stalin's rule and the stagnation is unquestionably necessary, but its excesses cannot be avoided, unfortunately. Everything is portrayed in black. Labels such as "colonialism," "imperialism," and so forth have been put in motion. And it is not important that they do not conform to the conceptions that have taken shape. Have they been bringing in

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raw material and a cheap labor force from the mother country to a colony anywhere? The most important thing is that it be scathing! In the complex structure of post-Leninist nationality policy, as in all of public life, attention has been concentrated only on the negative aspects. Objective analysis has been replaced by a purely Stalinist black-and-white view. Only the signs have been changed—plus to minus. It stands to reason that this does not improve mutual understanding with the Russians, especially as persons also have gone too far in portraying life in the bourgeois republic in exceptionally rosy shades.

In such a situation, the people who have come to the republic to live in recent decades, primarily the Russians, have begun showing concern: the positions of the indigenous population have not coincided with their previous notions and with what the center has been saying. The actions taken by indigenous residents (restriction of migration, the law on language, the draft law on republic citizenship, the revival of national symbolism) are incomprehensible to them and threaten to change their entire way of life. Uncertainty about the future has been shifted from the indigenous residents to the newcomers. The latter have decided to organize themselves politically and have become more active.

In order to retain the Stalinist criteria in nationality relationships, different arguments—both new and old—have been started, particularly appeals for internationalism in the Stalinist sense. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of the newcomers are workers, they have begun urging them to rescue the proletarian state “from the aborigines that have been confused by the intelligentsia.” Some people have cleverly played on the fact that the indigenous peoples, in expressing dissatisfaction with the Stalin and Brezhnev orders, have idealized the bourgeois period of national statehood and have identified the central government with the Russians. This has given cause to come out with the slogan of civil rights which is now in vogue. They began fabricating for the lack of trump cards, and rumors have been spread throughout the country on the persecution and beating of Russians, and even their murder, in the Baltic region. On the whole, efforts have been undertaken to win the sympathy and national solidarity of the Russians from Russia, which voluntarily or not would keep nationality relationships in the Baltic from being put in good order on Leninist principles (which would remove the tension, eliminate the causes of national extremism, and narrow its social base). And it must be said that certain success has been achieved on this path: sympathy is being expressed and they have not disappeared, but suspiciousness and extremism have even intensified in the Baltic region. As a result, there is once again a propitious opportunity to raise the bugaboo of nationalism.

In November 1988, matters in the Baltic region went as far as a dispute with the center. In the tendencies toward the reinforcement of centralism expressed in the draft of amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, the indigenous peoples of the Baltic region saw a threat to their

aspiration to resolve their own affairs and to shift to republic cost accounting. In order to remove the assumed threat, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR adopted a Declaration on Sovereignty and its amendments to the republic's constitution on 16 November. The central organs in turn saw these documents as an encroachment on the unity of the USSR and declared our constitutional amendments partially invalid. The dispute was suppressed with difficulty by the recognition in principle of republic cost accounting. The specific limits were to be defined later.

However, the causes of the dispute were actually aggravated. In June 1987, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum proclaimed a radical economic reform. This inspired those who worked out the concept of cost accounting for Estonia—the concept rang in unison with the overall spirit of the plenum's decisions. But after that their implementation was delayed for a number of reasons, and this was reflected in the union draft law on regional self-government and cost accounting published in March this year. A dispute arose that was not simply a constitutional-juridical dispute, but one that is much more profound. The models for development of the economy could become different, with all the consequences that ensue from this. The Estonian-speaking population has demanded full implementation of the IME concept, and another section of the people saw this as the isolation of Estonia, a departure from a unified All-Union national economic complex. Union departments and part of the Russian-speaking population in the republic have disapproved of the IME, adhering to the All-Union plan for cost accounting. All this has aggravated the internal political situation.

As the result of local society's polarization and the obstacles piled up on the path toward the IME, the idea of gradual secession from the Soviet Union has begun to spread among the indigenous population.

This idea lost ground in connection with the adoption of the decisions of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on 16 November last year. The people displayed unity with their deputies in maintaining that relations with the central authorities have to be built on the foundation of a contract with the union. The center gave a hostile reception to this intention. And the idea of secession, for which juridical arguments had been found both in the Constitution of the USSR and in international law, once again began to be propagated. The events in Tbilisi, which were interpreted in different ways in the center and the Baltic region, played the role of an accelerator. Both there and here they expressed sorrow because of the tragic events, but on the other hand, deep-seated differences came to light in interpretation of the nationality policy. While the center saw these events as an attempt to restrain the extremists who had raised their hands against the unity of the union, people in the Baltic region were surprised and indignant that the troops had so barbarously treated the people who had turned their constitutional right into a political slogan.

The party in the Baltic has turned out to be between the hammer and the anvil. It must give appropriate attention to the effort to strengthen its influence, but at the same time, it is impossible not to see the scope of the objective difficulties in its path.

In the period following the 19th Party Conference, the various interpretations of the nationality policy after Lenin have gradually been drawing closer together. However, in the course of resolving complex practical problems, evidently, it is necessary to make quite a few more efforts to work out common theoretical principles. Under the conditions of a democratic law-governed state, only the Leninist principle of self-determination of peoples and the sovereignty of national republics can serve as such a foundation. Although the unity of the working people is our goal as well, it can only be based on free will. In order to achieve and maintain unity we must take the trouble. Lenin taught that the principal objective is mutual trust, but the forms of cooperation depend on the specific historical situation. Let us realize that Stalinism left us a deplorable legacy. We also have to make a considerable effort in order to overcome the mutual suspiciousness. The result will be favorable if we are guided by the simple rule for relationships between people: friendship cannot develop from criticism of a partner, from the relations of a suppliant and an alms-giver; it comes with a partnership that attracts interest and is based on equal rights.

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#### Estonian Plenum, Informal Groups' Demands Viewed

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[Article by special correspondents S. Volkov and V. Proskura: "Reflections After the Plenum"]

[Text] Tallinn—As already reported, a plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee has examined the question of stabilizing the political situation in the republic.

What has caused the instability? In his report, V. Valas, First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, said that one cause is that the "great optimism that has seized the republic's indigenous nation and the dominance of nationality problems have partly left the non-Estonian population aloof from the incipient social revolution. The sense of alienation has been further intensified by the uncoordinated actions of information channels serving different language groups, and by the situation in which the Estonian-language press has forged farther and farther ahead while the Russian-language press has lagged behind, and parts of it have made no attempt to adequately cover and analyze what is taking place in the republic... And so a feeling of uncertainty has begun to take hold among the Russian-speaking population, and there is no clear understanding

of what is going on, of what objectives are being pursued, and of how to understand this."

And just what is taking place, just what are the aims of the various opposing groups? What is happening is more or less clear: Certain forces are seeking to win the adoption of the most radical political decisions, up to and including Estonia's secession from the USSR. Many of the almost two dozen informal public movements hold these positions. Needless to say, the separatist sentiment, which is rather steeped in nationalism, manifests itself more graphically in some areas, while it is muted in others. Nevertheless, such propaganda is eliciting a response in the hearts of the Estonian-speaking population.

Especially zealous are the so-called fundamentalists of extreme views—the Estonian National Independence Party, the Christian Union, and the leadership of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments of Old. And although the ENIP is not registered, since it disputes the legitimacy of the existing state order, its influence on people's minds and hearts is very significant. For the program of the ENIP and other allied organizations is accessible even to children: The separatists' banner carries the following message, in bold print: Estonia's future can be decided only by citizens of the Estonian Republic and their descendants; members of the nonindigenous population will be given the right only to express their views, not vote. Needless to say, this path looks like a blind alley to many groups of Estonia's population, nor has it won international support.

The other fundamentalist extreme is expressed by many representatives of Intermovement and the strike committees, which do not recognize the Estonian SSR as a full-fledged subject of the Soviet federation and essentially question its right to resolve the republic's problems by itself. Herein lie the reasons, it seems, for the highly negative attitude toward their activities on the part of Estonians. Statements, speeches, and demands, which are often of an ultimatumlike character, charge the republic leadership with nationalism and separatism and with discrimination against Russian-speaking residents. This bloc also has its supporters. Their appearance is a consequence of both objective and subjective factors. But the chief factor is the social uncertainty of non-Estonians as to their future. There is but one way to overcome that uncertainty—namely, through dialogue based on mutual understanding.

What role will the just-concluded plenum play in this? Here are is the view of M. Lysenko, an assistant shop head at the Elektrotehnika [Electrical Equipment] Research and Production Association and chairman of the republic strike council:

"Not all the hopes that Estonian SSR Communists had pinned on that plenum were borne out. Many of its participants characterized in too streamlined a fashion the extremists' openly nationalist displays, including the position of the mass media under the control of the

Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. But the republic's working class is not giving up hope. Albeit with variable success, talks continue between the strikers' representatives and an ESSR government commission."

And here is what we heard from K. Ots, an employee of the Standard Research and Production Association and chairman of the Union of Estonian Labor Collectives in Kalininskiy Rayon, Tallinn:

"The most important thing, in my view, is to go to work. Our rayon branch of the Union of Estonian Labor Collectives pursues a uniform social policy regardless of the nationalities of its members; it strives to improve working people's lives everywhere and to bring improvements and amenities to workplaces and residential areas. For it is rightly said: 'Patience and work overcome all.' I think this applies as well to the purely political polemics being waged in the republic."

And here are the comments of P. Panfilov, secretary of the Tallinn City Party Committee:

"I think that the just-over plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee represents a certain step forward in comparison with the last plenum, held in May. The speeches exhibited more thoughtfulness, more pain, if you will, over the crisis situation in the republic party organization and the clear threat of a split along essentially ethnic lines. I am confident that everyone (or almost everyone) wants consolidation, but the burden of mutual distrust that has accumulated over the past year is still great."

The republic is reflecting on its situation.

### Estonian Strikes Supported By Leningrad Enterprises

18001613B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 19 Aug 89 p 3

[Letters From Leningrad Enterprise Labor Collective Councils: "We Express Solidarity"]

[Text] It is with great alarm that the many-thousands-strong collectives united under the Leningrad Association of State Enterprises are following events in Estonia. At the direction of their workers, the labor collective councils are appealing via LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, the editors of the newspapers SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA and RAHVA HAAL, the ESSR Union of Labor Collectives, and the coordinating councils of the republic People's Front and Intermovement.

Dear comrades! Back in March of this year, representatives of Leningrad's working people, in an appeal, called for an even-handed approach to resolving nationality differences and for political wisdom in the process of enacting laws, in order to avoid discrimination against

the Russian-speaking segment of the population. Unfortunately, our appeal fell on deaf ears: The development of the political situation in the republic has led to massive strikes that, for the time being, have only been suspended, not called off.

An analysis of the causes of the existing situation was presented at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of Aug. 16. By decree of the Presidium, certain provisions of the ESSR laws "On the Addition of Changes to and Amendments To the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Estonian SSR" and "On Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Estonian SSR" were declared incompatible with the USSR Constitution and with our country's international legal obligations.

Amid this situation, we express our solidarity with the strikers, and we are prepared to provide moral and material support to them. We would like to inform you that the collective of the Svetlana Leningrad Electronics Industry Association has adopted a decision to donate to the republic strike committee 50,000 rubles from its wage fund and material-incentive fund, and that the collectives of the Leningrad Admiralty Association and the Almaz Production Association have each decided to donate 10,000 rubles to the committee.

We call on the republic's leadership and public to make a sober assessment of the situation and to search for a way out of it through political dialogue.

[Signed] The Labor Collective Councils of the Kalinin Plant, Signal, Almaz and Kirov Plant Production Associations, the Svetlana Leningrad Electronics Industry Association, the V. I. Lenin Leningrad Optical Mechanics Association, the Leningrad Admiralty Association, and the Avangard and Leninets Research and Production Associations.

The Labor Collective Council of the Housing Construction Combine No 2 Association, on behalf of its 8,000 construction workers, expresses its concern over the situation in Estonia.

We are in solidarity with the labor collectives taking part in the strikes in Estonia, just as we would be in solidarity with workers of any nationality in any of the country's republics who were struggling for their inalienable rights granted by the Constitution.

We have decided to provide material support to the strikers and have donated 50,000 rubles to them on behalf of the association collective. We call on Leningrad labor collectives, and above all on our comrades in labor—other construction workers, to assist in whatever way they can the workers who are standing up for their rights, dignity, and honor.

[Signed] The Labor Collective Council of the Leningrad Construction Committee's Housing Construction Combine No 2 Association.

**Russian Writers' Criticism of Estonian Situation  
Rebutted**

18150103 *Tallinn RAHVA HAAL* in Estonian  
27 Aug 89 p 1

[Letter from the Estonian Writers' Union: "To the  
Writers of Russia"]

[Text] It was with a measure of incomprehension and bitterness that the Estonian writers, along with the greater majority of the republic's inhabitants, read the proclamation issued by the secretariat of the Russian SFSR Writers' Union, and distributed through TASS communication channels, that was addressed to all citizens of Estonia, workers and intelligentsia of the Soviet Union.

It is hard for us to believe that this document originates from an organization of writers. To a professional eye it is obvious that this is not written with the pen of a writer. For one, it is hard to imagine any one of the Writers' Union officials stooping so low as to separate workers from the intelligentsia, since our whole organization is based on the idea that intelligentsia has a working role in it, instead of living off the workers, as was at one time propounded by some obsolete leftist theories.

What is it that your secretariat wants to impart to the public? It is still the same line of assertions, repeated to the point of tedium, about restrictions applied to the non-indigenous population of Estonia, that has been served up by the Intermovement, and dished out by some of the central media. For example, there is talk for the umpteenth time about what an undemocratic step it would be to introduce a residency requirement in the election law for local soviets. In this context, reference is made to the fact that such a requirement is not known in many foreign states, while conscious suppression leaves out the fact that voting rights in these states are held exclusively by people who have obtained the citizenship of that country. Also unmentioned goes the fact that citizenship is not conferred upon new arrivals without any further ado, and that granting of citizenships is, as a rule, restricted by much higher and more specialized quotas. This is needed for one single purpose: to prevent incompetence within the legislative organs of power.

Consider the following fact. Available data shows that during the post-war years more than seven million transients have traveled in and out of Estonia, which has a permanent population of a million and a half. This is why, if we don't want to turn over the republic to some power just passing through, if we want to preserve it as a secure, common home for all the people who have tied their fate permanently with Estonia, regardless of nationality, and not letting it be transformed into some wayside stop, then viewing this goal as an expression of nationalism is cynical, to say the least.

By the same token, there is no need to look for forbidden heresies in some of the new legislative measures being introduced that are in conflict with the current USSR

constitution dating back to the stagnation period, and known to be incompatible with the spirit of perestroika for some time now.

The other hobby-horse of those opposing our reforms is the language law that is said to restrict the rights of national minorities. But, our distinguished Russian colleagues, would it be possible to conceive of a person working successfully, at whatever location in Russia, in whatever profession calling for human interaction—not to mention leadership positions—without speaking any Russian at all? What would be the special reasons for making such a thing possible in every other national republic? Such inconsiderate attitudes date back to the alleged friendship of people enforced by command during the Stalinist era, that presuppose the self-evident superiority of the "elder brother." These inconsiderate attitudes stem from a vision that still depicts USSR as the homogeneous and indivisible Russia with its ethnic borderlands, and not a federation of sovereign national republics.

It seems to us that the message of your secretariat is not intended primarily for its designated recipients. For it shows too much concern for the demands and aspirations of our recent political strikers and vents, much too directly, their indignation about the lack of support received from above to all possible Union-level agencies starting from the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet Presidium and ending with the inter-regional group of deputies. There is not only the same well-known nostalgia for a "firm hand" that would put the house in order in a republic that has been misbehaving by the imperialist standards, but also a direct appeal to apply that power. It seems as if some circles outside the field of writing have prepared this material to be signed by the politically carefree secretariat which, without further ado, released it with a bang.

If, however, this message indeed originated in the circles of the secretariat itself, as we hope it didn't, and no matter how saddening that would be, we have no choice but say the following. History abounds in warning examples from tragedies that have been caused by groundless appeals to come to the aid of one's fellow believers supposedly crushed by some enemy. It would be high time to learn something from these. If we don't, not much good can be expected. And one more thought. We have recently found out more details about how the writers' organization of Russia, acting on directives and instigation from above have, over the past few decades, practiced ostracism and repressions against dissenting Russian literati. Is that shame not enough? Is it really befitting writers who consider themselves humanists to appeal to the powers-that-be for collective sanctions, maybe even repressions, to block the road for the society's advance to democracy? By the way, let's be reminded here that, through all of the complicated times in Estonia, there hasn't been one single burst of violence sparked by nationalism, and this is why scaring us with intensifying the national opposition seems more like a deliberate provocation to us.

No, it is hard for us to believe that what we heard in this inconsiderate and insincere message was the voice of our respected writers of Russia.

[Signed] *The Board of the Estonian Writers' Union*

**Estonian Independence As  
'Ultimate Objective' Argued**

18150090 Tallinn *NOORTE HAAL* in Estonian  
3 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Arvo Eek: "About Restoring Estonian Statehood"]

[Text] The Estonian people would not be a nation, but a mass of humanity consigned to subjugation and assimilation, if they did not dream of independence and of restoring their statehood. It should be clear to all, if only on personal experience alone, that the Baltic republics annexed to the Soviet Union by force, are not sovereign states in their present status as member republics of the Soviet Union. The occupation of the Estonian state and its unlawful annexation to the USSR are not supported by the contemporary provisions of international law, which do not recognize the disappearance of a state through occupation and annexation. However, according to Aleksander Warma (LOOMING No 11, 1988): "International law does indeed provide for certain circumstances under which even unlawful annexation is accepted under a so-called 'grandfather clause' and acquiescence on the part of the people so subjugated who are neither planning to, nor doing anything about it." Have the subjugated people of Estonia accepted their situation? No, they have not. They are about to overcome their long-lasting fear and subservience. One indication of that is the collecting of signatures for the People's Front petition to invalidate the declaration of 22 July 1940, made by the unlawfully-elected State Council, about Estonia joining the USSR. And something that takes even more determination because of the vigorous counter-propaganda—signing up for the Citizens' Committees. The national struggle for freedom goes on.

It is encouraging to note that the problems of restoring Estonia's statehood have worked their way into the leadership agenda of the most effective of movements—the People's Front. Sulev Valner, a member of the People's Front Advisory Council, has summarized in VABA MAA (No.11) the positions of at least some of the functionaries in the PF, according to which the PF should "immediately and explicitly spell out that the ideal and the highest goal for both the Estonian people and the People's Front is an independent State of Estonia, outside of any empires." Specifically—outside of any empires. The political pitfalls of V. Kingisepp, J. Anvelt, and others should serve as warning examples. Or would anyone really believe that over the last 50 years, total brainwashing has been administered, with success, to the entire population? Yes, they managed to destroy much, even the honor of the working man, but the dream

of our own state could not be destroyed. The quest for more autonomy as one of the republics within the Union is conceivable, but that only as an interim goal, not the ultimate objective. In the present situation of internal politics, with the Communist Party still wielding full power, the Estonian CP should make more effective use of that power for purposes of restoring statehood, if indeed it wants to serve its people. A different question is, of course, if the Estonian CP, because of its heterogeneous membership, is capable of serving the interests of the Estonian people at all.

Apparently, it is not clear to anyone yet how and when it would be possible to attain independent statehood. Our declaration of independence could be accelerated by an escalation of crisis and general chaos in the Soviet Union. But need for rapid action could also be precipitated by a wave of terror released against Estonians, stemming from a build-up of imperialist propaganda now being spread with increasing intensity by the leadership of the Intermovement (terrorizing of students at Kohtla-Järve has already begun). This is why it is somewhat awkward to see some inarticulate civil defense worker trying to teach us how to defend ourselves against some nameless external enemy, instead of teaching people self-defense against real dangers emanating from the army or civilian terrorists. The Estonian people are left defenseless. The only activity left is peaceful, parliamentary activity. I fully agree with the position of Rein Taagepera (VABA MAA, No. 11), stating that "as long as evolutionary development is possible, it should be used, more moderately by some, more radically by others. However, should the police-welfare structure start to crumble, we have to get ready, without hesitation, for a big leap, doing our best to land on the other side of the abyss. When this happens will not be known far ahead of time ..."

The seriousness of the situation calls for the cooperation of different factions, and their speedy acceptance of a unified preliminary plan for both slow and gradual (evolutionary) development, and also for possible sudden changes. It might be beneficial to consider calling a joint conference for all different factions. While the excessively nervous and one-sidedly pragmatic approach to the independence issue offered by Edgar Savisaar may not be appropriate for the time being (EDASI, 6-7 July), a much more sensible alternative seems to be Mart Laar's call to cooperation between idealists and pragmatists (EDASI, 12 July). Also perplexing is the shiftiness of Indrek Koolmeister, a legal professional who has shown occasional merit for his legislative efforts, every time talk turns to the controversy of citizens' committees, now condemned by the Estonian CP. (EDASI, 12 July). Even Tartu jurist Jüri Pold's treatment of the change of power in Estonia seems one-sided (EDASI, 13-15 July): a thorough search has been made of archive documents and memoirs (absolutely necessary work), but what has been overlooked in the process is the fact that "from the moment foreign power dictated the composition of the Baltic governments, the independence of these states was

already gone" (LOOMING, No 11, 1988), and it no longer matters which documents the president signed or did not sign, as it no longer matters which of the procedures specified in the law of the Estonian Republic were or were not followed, because as of 17 June 1940, Estonia stopped its *de facto* functioning as an independent republic. Jüri Pold, however, is right in saying that the solution to the problem calls for several keys. Since the Baltic question is not just an internal issue of the Soviet Union, but also an international one, our activity must proceed along two parallel lines—we have to maintain dialogue not only with Moscow, but also with the Western countries. A study of recent journalistic endeavors leads one to think that those aspiring to politics have sufficient ability to perceive realities (at least in their own estimation); what they lack is the ability to synthesize.

Who should be the one to declare Estonian independence, how should it be done and when could it be done? All these questions should be given a preliminary, in-principle, answer even now. An inter-faction conference for that purpose would be a necessity. Also, we should put an end to the demagogic criticism of citizens' committees and the unwarranted attempts at viewing them as a source of dual power. The road to independence could be traveled only in CONSECUTIVE steps and the citizens' committees will have a place on it. It was through the activities of a power organ of the Russian Empire—the Land Council, that Estonian independence got its start. Even though historical parallels can be interesting, I am not going to dwell on them. This reference to the precedent of using a foreign power organ is, in the present context, offered to elucidate such a possibility to those who deem it impossible to take the first steps toward restoring Estonian independence through the activity of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Obviously, the legal path is the only possible way. It would be perfectly natural for the Estonian SSR Supreme Council to invalidate and void the Estonian State Council's unlawful declaration, passed 22 July 1940, about Estonia joining the Soviet Union. A proposal to that effect has been submitted to the Supreme Soviet on 8 July, based on the PF Advisory Council's resolution passed in Põlva. As the next step, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet could start negotiations with Moscow, maybe even forming a special commission to have the USSR Supreme Soviet invalidate the act of incorporating Estonia into the Soviet Union passed on 6 August 1940 in a stage production directed by Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov. Will the current Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet take that road? Even though this is not quite certain, the outcome of the 16 November session was encouraging. If a positive outcome cannot be achieved with the present session, we will simply have to wait until the new one convenes. By performing these elementary tasks, as mentioned, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet would redeem its guilt before the Estonian state and the Estonian people. As a logical result of these steps, the organ of the occupation power itself will be abolished. As its last act, the Estonian SSR Supreme

Soviet would announce the elections of the Re-Founding Council, at the convening of which the Supreme Soviet will abnegate its authority. To be elected into the Re-Founding Council, or to participate in the voting, the persons must have been citizens of the Estonian Republic before its occupation, or their descendants. And this is where the preparatory work done by the citizens' committees will come in handy. It will be only after the citizenship law is passed by the new parliament that voting rights will be given to other categories of inhabitants. Naturally, this time-consuming groundwork should not preclude the present parliament's activity in passing vital legislation for reorganizing life in Estonia (first to be discussed should be the immigration and the land laws). Parallel to these, negotiations should also be started (in both the East and the West) regarding demilitarization of Estonia.

Indeed, there is no point hiding our heads in the sand, because the re-founding of the Estonian state is our duty.

#### Estonian Peace March Participants Demand Demilitarization

18150093A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian  
8 Aug 89 p 1

[“Declaration of Peace March Estonia '89”]

[Text] We, the participants of the peace march “Estonia '89” from the Estonian SSR, the Latvian SSR, the Russian SFSR, the Kingdom of Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, traveled through five regions of the Estonian SSR over a period of 14 days. On our travels we experienced the pain of the country and its people that stems from the continued militarization of Estonia.

We demand:

- Immediate disclosure of the structure and personnel totals of all military units stationed in the Estonian SSR, along with a breakdown of such totals for different types of forces.
- A nuclear-free Northland that would include Estonia.
- The demilitarization of Estonia by June 17, 1990.
- Putting an immediate stop to the pollution of earth, waters and air, and getting reimbursed by the USSR Ministry of Defense for damages caused over the decades.
- That all political and economic conflicts be resolved in a peaceful manner, without violence.

*Adopted by the participants of the peace march.  
August 6, 1989*

## NATIONALITY ISSUES

JPRS-UPA-89-062  
1 December 1989**Estonian Peace March Participants Support  
Election, Language Laws***18150093B Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian  
8 Aug 89 p 1*

[“Appeal of Peace March Estonia '89 to the Estonian  
SSR Supreme Soviet”]

[Text] We, the participants of peace march “Estonia '89,” hope that the Estonian deputies will stay firm in expressing the will of their people and vote for an equitable election law. The local residency requirement should be upheld for both the voters and candidates for deputy, and so should the requirement for the deputies to master the state language. You should see to it that

both the local and Supreme Soviet elections be held simultaneously and fairly soon, without the participation of the army.

We have, during our 14-day march, traveled through five regions, talking to a great number of people, and that is why we can say that in our appeal, we express their wishes also.

We, the participants of the peace march, will part today, but we part in faith that you, who hold the future of Estonia in your hands, will not betray our hopes.

*(131 signatures)*

*Registered in the office of the Estonian SSR Supreme  
Soviet Presidium on August 6, 1989.*

### Organized Crime Groups Maintain Interregional Links

18001592 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 45-47

[Article by Lt Col of the Militia Yu.Lushchyay, chief of Main Directorate, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Department for Combating Theft of Socialist Property: "Organized Crime: Different Levels of Organization"]

[Text] Today, in writings on public affairs, the term "organized crime" is often used. One modifier added to an old word meaning crime has made the new term very topical, sometimes allowing for a very broad interpretation. It is frequently used to describe both well-organized criminal entities and small groups connected by illegal ties. Both the protection racket and the mysterious mafia are also covered by it. Yet, it would seem that a new term should describe a new phenomenon; otherwise there would be no need to introduce it and, of course, nothing to debate.

In the U.S., for instance, organized crime first appeared in the 1920s. At first, criminals specialized in illicit commerce in alcoholic beverages, which brought fabulous profits during Prohibition. Such criminal groups formed a network of narrowly specialized groups: suppliers of raw materials, producers, wholesalers and retailers. Stiff competition compelled such groups to hire professional killers, who were also used to eliminate those who were in the way. Later, corruption became an integral part of organized crime, providing protection to the groups. Later still, such criminal associations branched out into other illegal activities.

In our country, specialists studying this problem identify a new form of illegal association, one with a clear structure and hierarchy. They stress that the aim of these associations is systematic criminal activity, with their protracted activity ensured by political protection.

Other people claim that crime in this country does not exhibit objective characteristics of organized crime as such. Seemingly correctly, they suggest that the meaning of the term "organized crime" inherently entails broad interregional organization of large group, a single and stable center supervising the simultaneous activity of a network of criminal groups and strict hierarchical ties between them. They stress that no such examples have been found in our criminal practice.

My 20 years of experience in the Department for Combating Theft of Socialist Property (BKhSS), half of them on the staff of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs BKhSS, and my work in developing and coordinating operations to break up dangerous interregional associations of thieves, bribe-takers and speculators, permit me to assess the importance of this problem in practice.

Studying organized crime, one encounters several theoretical and practical problems. On one hand, research is

held back by the inability of so solid an organization as the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' Main Information Center and its numerous republic and oblast affiliates to provide sufficient data on the structure of crime and criminal associations. On the other hand, the inadequacy of existing laws makes it impossible to assess or identify criminal associations which do not fit into existing descriptions of an organized criminal group. (Article 39, Part 2, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.) The law does not address conspiracy among groups. Groups that are interconnected but act independently are handled separately for the purpose of classifying the crime. Only joint perpetration or collusion by individuals belonging to interconnected groups is recognized.

In the real world, groups without a common leadership center can often act in smooth coordination. This is based in part on the principle of market self-regulation, where demand creates supply and spontaneously emerging connections become stable and permanent. Actions by partners stem not from common leadership or a formal association but from their common interests.

Coordinated activity by several independent groups which are not connected hierarchically but nonetheless form a stable association (or a single system) can be seen using several practical examples. For instance, in the LaSSR a motor vehicle was stopped containing 15,000 privately manufactured women's blouses valued at over R400,000. They were purchased in a neighboring republic by three residents of the MoSSR who intended to sell them wholesale in Moscow and in several cities in Belorussia, the Ukraine and the Central Asian republics at speculative prices. The suppliers, however, were only one of several interconnected criminal groups. At the source of the illegal chain were those who stole wool and bought stolen goods. Acting on their own, they hired local residents to make blouses, thus establishing something like an underground factory. The output was sold in large consignments to outside speculators coming into town. The goods were then delivered to other regions and sold wholesale to the next layer of speculator groups and distributed among pushers. At every level of black market activity, the seller was paid in full, preventing interference into the area of activity of others. Nevertheless, ties among those groups were permanent and this association turned out to be firm and stable. The loss of a single link in this criminal chain would have destroyed the entire system. The proof of the stability of the organization is the length of its criminal activity and the well-developed principles of protecting the extensive criminal network.

On many occasions, in Belorussia and in other republics, large shipments of blouses had been seized and suppliers arrested and indicted. Nevertheless, the organization continued to function. Law enforcement agencies could not get to the bottom of criminal activity and the fight against it was, in effect, illusory. Actually, the growing number of serious crimes reported by internal affairs agencies is the sign of growing power of organized crime.

People tend to blame failures and miscalculations in police and investigative work on the impact on corruption, which takes the form of exerting pressure outside the usual legal channels and threatening to divulge information. While not denying the impact of this factor on the effectiveness of law enforcement, we should mention other, equally important circumstances.

In the above-mentioned example, the organization had no reliable protection. Here is the example of professional inability of the law enforcement system to combat new types of criminal associations, i.e., interregional conspiracy of criminal groups. The ability of such groups to survive for so long was first of all the result of the fact that they did not have a single center and, secondly, due to their modus operandi: the quick turnover, the unpredictable nature of contacts among groups, the high level of secrecy and the willingness to sacrifice a part (individual operatives and property) in order to preserve the whole.

In Moscow, on two occasions, refrigerator trucks were stopped which along with legitimate cargo contained a load of carnations valued at R200,000, shipped there from the AzSSR. However, the owners never turned up and could not be found. Similar instances occurred in Azerbaijan as well. Expensive consignments of flowers, vegetables and fruit found during unannounced trade rules enforcement raids at kolkhoz markets routinely go unclaimed. The loss of large shipments of goods does not worry speculators since abandoning them prevents them being incriminated.

Such criminal associations monopolize trade at kolkhoz markets. Usually, speculators induce those who bring competing goods to markets to sell at low wholesale prices or expel them from markets by any available means. They hire paid bodyguards, who can also eliminate those who cross their path. They establish illegal contacts with market administrators and have tried repeatedly to enter into similar arrangements with law enforcement authorities. In addition to importing goods from other regions, they have set up networks for the purpose of buying up similar goods in the vicinity of their markets, at warehouses, stores and hothouses.

In short, we have here a new form of organized crime that has not been classified in legal terms. Its main feature is the division of functions among groups for the purpose of earning illicit profits. Joint activity run by a single coordinating center (i.e., a criminal syndicate) is only the highest form of organized crime; we should not neglect other, lower stages of its development. I think it is a mistake to think, as many now do, that the main feature of organized crime is the existence of corrupt ties between criminal groups on one hand and party, soviet or law enforcement authorities on the other. First of all, this point of view adds nothing new to the previously existing description of criminal organizations and corruption and, secondly, the term "organized" is interpreted not in its actual meaning but as the threat of corruption it presents.

The corrupt top usually can not act as the organizing center of criminal activity. Usually, those people are not kept informed about individual criminal acts, know nothing about the circumstances in which such acts are committed and do not share criminal intent with actual perpetrators. Their role is generally limited to checking attempts by law enforcement agencies to investigate the activities of a criminal entity. As a rule, however, we can not speak here of aiding and abetting criminal activities or a conspiracy. Graft associated with corruption usually buys putative support and not actual, previously agreed-upon services. Bribing for the future may also be done for the purpose of eliminating rivals. In such cases, actions by those who provide protection, while not covered by criminal laws specifying punishment for masterminding crimes, have socially a more harmful impact than actions by organizers. Corruption and protection which assumes the form of armed protection for pay are features which inevitably accompany the growth of organized crime.

To conclude, I propose to amend our criminal code with an article defining the responsibility for **participating in a criminal organization**:

"Participation in a criminal association comprised of a number of groups by providing protection such as in any form impeding law enforcement and other state agencies and public organizations in executing laws, creating favorable conditions for the association to carry out its activities and providing bodyguard services to the organizer, or protecting his accomplices, property, locations and sites used for criminal activities, will be punished by—.

"Similar activities in unconnected criminal groups, as well as assistance in laundering of money and safe-keeping illegally earned funds, investment into illegal activities and utilization for criminal purposes of any means and forms of oversight functions over law enforcement agencies, experts, witnesses or victims of crime, will be punished by—.

"**Note.** Members of a criminal organization or an organized group who voluntarily inform authorities of its existence or help authorities to identify its members—provided also that they have fully or in a major part restituted the losses they have caused—may be sentenced by the court to a probationary term of up to two years, or in cases when such individuals participated in activities entailing grave consequences, they may have their sentences reduced by at least one third of their term.

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#### Burlatskiy on Court Reform

90UN0318 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 46, 15 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by F. Burlatskiy: "Judicial Reform"]

[Text] The concept of "reform" still has not found extensive support in our country. We are more inclined toward the concept of "revolution," assuming that precisely it characterizes the most radical transformation. However, this is not always so. There are revolutions that bring down more than they create. There are reforms that transform the very bases of the existing order of things.

These thoughts are entirely related to the long anticipated and so necessary judicial reform. It is called upon to create true guarantees against a recurrence of mass repression, against bureaucratism, and again against massive violations of human rights.

All USSR people's deputies are right now clashing with one and the same phenomenon: Hundreds of thousands of complaints, tearful entreaties, resentment, and ruined human destinies. I myself receive no fewer than 50-100 letters of this sort per week. My heart bleeds when I read them. But what can I do? How can I help? How can I differentiate a valid request or demand from an invalid one? No fewer than 5-6 million complaints per year arrive at the central organs of power and management alone. And certainly still more [come] to republic and local agencies. This means that dissatisfaction with some actions of bureaucrats encompass no fewer than 40-50 million families. How can that be?

Only the court can help in this matter. That is why the deputies were so concerned and why they so ardently discussed the draft Fundamental Legislation on the Court System on Monday, insisting on the inclusion in it of major problems which our society has already been struggling to solve for more than four centuries.

First—Trial by jury. I recall that judicial reform in old Russia began with this in 1864. This type of trial has been introduced in practically every country in the world. It is a symbol of democratic legal proceedings. We are not saying that all cases should be decided by such juries. Let it be applied only in those instances when a person is threatened with the death penalty or a prolonged period of confinement. But such a trial ennobles all legal proceedings and forms a climate of citizen trust in the entire judicial system. I first proposed introduction of jury trials in 1957 in an article published in KOMMUNIST Magazine. Many experts have now joined the movement for this reform.

Some people say that this is not related to legal proceedings but it must be included in the Law on Legal Proceedings. Throughout the world, jury trials are related to the basic principles of the structure of the judicial system.

The positions of those jurists who are against jury trials in principle are more understandable though also unacceptable. But they refer to foreign experience in vain. Jury trials have not only not been rejected, on the contrary, they have been extended since World War II to all countries where a parliamentary system has been established. For this is an organic part of the separation

of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial, and it is a guarantee of the true independence of the courts.

Second—Specialized courts. A tradition has taken shape in our country to include in the judicial system only those courts which the USSR Ministry of Justice supervises. But this is a mistake. And this is undemocratic. It is not by chance that many deputies have spoken of the need for juvenile, family, administrative, and other specialized courts which would be formed by other means and would include other judges who have special knowledge and special spiritual qualities.

Administrative courts merit special attention. For example, you can imagine (and this experience exists in a number of countries) the existence of an interdepartmental court which examines citizen complaints regarding violations of the law by officials of the militia, security agencies, procurator's office investigators, etc. In those very instances when crimes are admitted, the cases would go to ordinary courts.

Third—Expansion of the judicial system. We have, according to approximate calculations, five to six times fewer judges per capita than in the countries of the West. If we want to assign new and quite broad responsibilities to the court, we need to make the physical capabilities of judicial workers commensurate [with these responsibilities].

Fourth—Guarantee the independence of the courts. Everyone knows that this is still a sore issue for us. But there can be only one solution—elective positions. However, experience has shown that elections of peoples judges, for example, did not nearly guarantee the level of qualification nor independence from government agencies or party organs.

International experience provides an entire palette of possibilities. Election for life or appointment of the highest judicial workers. A competitive election system. A set of statutory requirements for filling positions of judges and others. We probably need to use different forms on different rungs of the judicial ladder.

Fifth—On allowing the lawyer access at the earliest possible stage of the investigation of the case. This issue is so important that it is included in many international documents on human rights and in the constitutions of a whole series of countries.

These and other important ideas attracted a great deal of the deputies' attention during discussion of the draft Fundamental Legislation on Legal Proceedings. Special votes were even required on the most important amendments. And the result was marvelous. The new law must become a gradual transformation in our democratization. We are now feverishly searching for ways and means of satisfying the interests of man and improving the quality of life. Judicial reform, without special financial expenditures, can provide an enormous social result. The result is justice and elimination of sources of irritation, resentment, and heartache.

**Draft Youth Law Reworked**

90UN0317 Moscow 'KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by F. Sizy; "In the Light! A Draft Law Devoted to Youth Problems Is Ready for Discussion at the Session"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Commission discussed a draft law at its current session which has been known from the beginning as the Law On Youth. The package of new proposals presented by the interim creative collective of NITs [Scientific Research Center] VKSh [Higher Cooperative School] under the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee caused heated debate. The authors of the draft law changed the very approach to forming the law devoted to youth.

Commission members, by a majority vote, also came out in favor of a new title for the law—"On the General Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR." The new title is based on the new content. Fewer political declarations remain in it and the articles are more strongly formulated from the juridical point of view.

For example, the draft law proposes that the USSR Council of Ministers establish social services on youth affairs whose tasks would include issues of rendering aid to young citizens who find themselves in particularly difficult conditions—to difficult teen-agers, children's home residents, families of servicemen, persons who have served their sentences, and many others.

The young scholars and deputies renounced excessive detail and attempted to built a draft law on the basis of an integrated concept of state youth policy. And solutions of specific youth problems are proposed in a separate USSR Supreme Soviet draft resolution.

And yet another important draft document was prepared in the commission. Since a portion of the people's deputies had strong doubts on the advisability of a special youth law, the authors of the draft law strengthened their arguments by summarizing the world experience of state youth policy since the beginning of the century...

The USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Commission will make an attempt to hand down the draft legislation, as it is envisioned by the agenda, for discussion at the current session.

**MVD Official on Curfew, Emergency Measures**

90UN0035A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Sep 89 p 3

[Interview with Major General A.I. Kirilyuk, first deputy chief of USSR MVD Internal Forces Political Administration, by G. Karapetyan: "Curfew: Until Recently This Concept Was Considered to be an Anachronism, but Today?"]

[Text] We are talking with Major General A.I. Kirilyuk, first deputy chief of USSR MVD Internal Forces Political Administration.

"Curfew—An emergency measure which prohibits residents of a given populated area from being on the streets at an established time of day without special permission. Curfew is only permitted in the USSR during a wartime situation. It is introduced for the purpose of maintaining order and preventing possible sabotage, reconnaissance, or other hostile activities against forces, military or civilian authorities, and also facilities which have military or industrial significance. Special military subunits are deployed to maintain order during a curfew. In capitalist countries, a curfew is established by military or civilian authorities not only in wartime but in peacetime as well in cases of outbreaks of political or economic unrest in a country and is frequently accompanied by arbitrary rule and lawlessness by police. (BOLSHAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIA [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Vol. 12, Moscow, 1973, p. 498)."

[Karapetyan] Anatoliy Ivanovich! Judging by everything, the quote from the encyclopedia is clearly obsolete and it is hard to understand the basis for the specific legal procedures upon which the mechanism for proclaiming and rescinding a curfew operates.

[Kirilyuk] It is paradoxical but it is a fact: There is only one normative act in union law on wartime and emergency situations which was adopted almost a half century ago—The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 "On the Wartime Situation"—and naturally it expresses the missions and spirit of the appropriate epoch. Likewise not one legal document has yet solidified the content of the recently instituted (December 1, 1988) Article 119 of the Constitution of the USSR on "Emergency Situations" and "Special Forms of Control." And as yet there is no precise regulation of the procedure for introducing a curfew. Today we frequently clash with reality when, during an extreme need, we are compelled to act with a certain degree, let us say, of legal improvisation when we provide a guarantee of social security and stability.

[Karapetyan] For example, acute and massive violations of social order have occurred in some location. Introduction of a curfew could become a sort of life preserver in the opinion of the residents of that region. How effectively will USSR MVD internal forces subunits begin fulfilling their obligations?

[Kirilyuk] Many confuse and others simply do not know the existing procedure for adopting emergency measures. I recall that, in accordance with existing law, a curfew is proclaimed after declaration of a special situation. Insofar as it means special legal procedures which significantly limit the force of a whole series of constitutional norms, the competence to declare it in accordance with the Constitution of 1977 belonged to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In accordance with the demands of society in a number of union republics after

the introduction of amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the USSR on December 1, 1988, this right remains within the competence of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR but with the difference that this issue must be examined with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the appropriate union republic (paragraph 14, article 119).

After compliance with the requirements of these constitutional norms, officials of the highest government bodies of the union republic must take all steps for immediate promulgation of the appropriate decrees in the republic press and on radio and television.

The next stage, appointment of a commandant of the special region, is quite complicated and controversial. If we are guided by the well-known Decree of 1941, in the event a curfew is declared the functions of government bodies to provide public order and state security are transferred into the hands of the military soviet of the appropriate territory's military district.

The Soviet Army must be freed from internal functions—that is our position today. In my view, the republic minister of internal affairs or the oblast UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] chief as a plenipotentiary of local soviets can appoint a commandant of a special region. And there is one more suggestion: The population must learn the motives for and the time periods of this emergency measure from the Decree on Introduction of a Curfew.

[Karapetyan] Please describe the range of emergency measures associated with introducing a curfew.

[Kirilyuk] I must point out that they may be partially or totally employed depending on the specific conditions. This is special regulation of order and operating times of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also termination of mass cultural measures: limitations on citizens' entry and departure, vehicular movement and their inspection at access control points; implementation of resettlement of citizens from areas which are dangerous to live in with the mandatory provision of temporary living quarters to them; enlistment of citizens and the resources of enterprises, organizations, and institutions to eliminate the consequences of emergency circumstances; transfer of workers and employees to work which is not the result of a labor contract during the period of the emergency situation; introduction of a quarantine and mandatory treatment and prevention measures; a prohibition on conducting gatherings, meetings, and street processions and demonstrations, and also appearance on the street at dusk and during the night; increased protection of vitally important national economic facilities and also those associated with life support to the population; removal of fire arms, knives, and ammunition from citizens in accordance with a special decision as well as a ban on taking photographs, the use of radio transmitting and loudspeaker devices and equipment, printing presses and duplicating equipment; implementation of passport control procedures in

citizens' apartments, in public places, and on transportation; detention, for a period of up to 30 days under administrative procedures, of individuals who provoke a violation of public order, who spread provocative rumors, or who incite inter-ethnic strife or actively impede citizens or officials from exercising their legal rights or obligations.

[Karapetyan] From this exhaustive list, I understand: In the end, a curfew's limitations are introduced for the sake of providing a guarantee of citizens rights. However, there may also be unforeseen circumstances—access to "first aid" at night, access to an airport or train station in the early morning hours, etc.?

[Kirilyuk] Passes with the signature and stamp of the military commandant are issued to all life support services of the given area (they are normally affixed to the windshield of the special vehicle) and also to passengers of various types of inter-city transportation upon presentation of a ticket. We have not had any problems in this regard.

[Karapetyan] Paragraph five of the Decree on USSR MVD internal forces responsibilities and rights states: "...special measures are used to suppress massive disorders, group violations of public order, and other anti-social activities in exclusive cases. The list of special measures and rules for their application are determined by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs by agreement with the USSR Ministry of Justice." Are both the list of special measures and the rules for their application so thoroughly secret?

[Kirilyuk] It seems to me that it makes sense to simultaneously promulgate both our departmental instructions and the local authorities' decree in the area where a curfew is being introduced. Glasnost and the legal education of the population are native concepts and are on a par with each other. I admit that for some reason people have formed an erroneous opinion about the mission of internal forces...

[Karapetyan] The reply is eloquent and characteristic—as far as I know, people in many regions appeal to your representatives with urgent requests to not withdraw internal forces until final normalization of the situation. It is true that frequently accusations are also simultaneously addressed to you because of the delay in rushing military subunits to disaster areas....

[Kirilyuk] The reality of the situation is such that a guarantee of stability in a number of the nation's regions will require the presence of internal troops. They are already required. But taking into account the size [of our country], we have few such troops. Of 36,000 personnel, only half can be away from their deployment areas. We need to immediately establish troops similar to those in any civilized democratic state. For example, France, Italy, England, and the U.S. have long had special highly professional units which are used during massive disorders.

[Karapetyan] Just who determines how long a curfew will be in force?

[Kirilyuk] The final decision is made by the local authorities. It sometimes happens that a curfew will encompass a whole oblast or republic, although this emergency measure, so to speak, serves only one region. It sometimes happens that local authorities even transfer resolution of urgent economic problems (searches for and distribution of shortage goods, gathering the harvest) to the shoulders of the military commandant. Therefore, in our view, it is quite necessary to legally define the relationship between the increasing sovereignty of the union republics and the current complete lack of responsibility of their governments for the local state of law and order.

[Karapetyan] And the final question: If doubts have arisen to introduce or not to introduce a curfew, what would you personally vote for?

[Kirilyuk] I have an extremely negative attitude toward emergency measures which very frequently and quite legitimately result in complicating the lives of the local population. You agree that it is impossible to expose the heads of our soldiers when party and government bodies keep themselves aloof from solutions to accumulated inter-ethnic, socio-economic, and ideological problems. Until the Soviets take real power, variants for stabilizing democratic processes in society will be delayed for an indefinite period of time. This means that we are giving an "advantage" to those who are intent on subverting perestroika and on suppressing the democratic foundations in society. My opinion has only one meaning: Internal forces alone cannot do anything. We can overcome the wave of violations of public security in various regions of our country and reach a turning point only by relying on the people.

#### Reader Query on Gdlyan, Ivanov Commission

18001716A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 39, 30 Sep 89 p 8

[Response to a query by readers from Minsk on the commission created to review the activities of an investigative group of the USSR Procurator's office under the directorship of T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov, by V. Severin]

[Text] We often hear fragmentary reports on the "Gdlyan and Ivanov Case." We would like more detailed information about the commission created by the Congress to resolve the issue and about how and where it is working.—A group of readers, Minsk

On September 26 a regular session took place of the Commission for Reviewing the Activities of the Investigative Group of the USSR Procurator's Office under the Directorship of T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov. The first to be allowed into the session were representatives of the news media, including reporters from "AIF" ["Arguments and Facts"].

A USSR KGB colonel—Investigator A. Dukhanin—was to testify on the manner in which a preliminary investigation of Smirnov, the former second secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, was conducted.

The hearing began in crowded, unsuitable quarters. From the beginning this created difficulty and discomfort because of the large number of people present. These included members of the "defense committees" and people from Gdlyan and Ivanov's investigative group, who were not invited to the session.

At the beginning of the commission's work a statement was read on behalf of the group of investigators that was working under the directorship of T. Gdlyan until it was disbanded in May of this year. Yu. Luchinskiy, an investigator of the Petrodvortsov ROVD [Rayon Department of Internal Affairs] in Leningrad, read the text. It said in essence that those responsible for the statement were expressing their distrust of Deputy R. Medvedev as the chairman of the commission and spoke out about the impropriety of Dukhanin giving testimony in the presence of journalists, a measure that placed the two sides on unequal footing. However, the commission, having discussed this issue, expressed its confidence in the chairman. It was decided that they would continue.

Further on Dukhanin spoke before the commission, but he was interrupted at the very beginning by Deputy Bisher. Alluding to the poor working conditions in the small and stuffy quarters, he announced that under these circumstances he could not take on the responsibility of making a decision in such an important case.

Deputy Golik suggested continuing the hearing. Deputy Yarin supported him with the argument that in adjourning the hearing, the commission would be making a concession to Gdlyan and Ivanov's supporters, in whose name the announcement was read at the beginning of the session. Deputy Lubchenko agreed with him.

By way of a compromise, and so that Colonel Dukhanin's report could be heard, it was suggested that only the members of the commission remain in the room, thus creating reasonable working conditions.

Deputy Lubchenko did not agree to this proposal, announcing that without representatives from the press, he refused to hear anyone's testimony to the commission. Deputy Adylov supported him.

At the end of the debates on this question Deputy Bichkauskas spoke. He asked the journalists to take account of the fact that adjourning the hearing on that day was in no way tied to the statement read at the beginning of the proceedings.

As a result, it was decided by a vote of seven to five that the hearing would adjourn because of poor working conditions. But the members of the committee continued the session on drawing up a plan and report before the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies.

In conclusion, only one point remains to be made: that the case to which the attention of millions was riveted today is so far being tried under conditions which clearly do not correspond to the status of the deputy commission.

In the meantime the chairman of the union soviet, E. Primakov, has assured the members of the commission that in the near future they will be assigned a new place of work.

**RSFSR Prosecutor Aide on Crime,  
Humanism in Law**

*90UN0123A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA  
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 18 Oct 89 p 3*

Interview with I.M. Kostoyev, deputy chief of the Main Investigative Administration of the RSFSR Procurator's Office by Yu. Belanov and E. Elyashev: "Are Good Souls Conducting the Investigation?"

[Text] The issue of strengthening socialist legality and an uncompromising fight against crime has been sharply raised at the Congress of People's Deputies and in party documents of recent years. And at the same time we are hearing appeals for the humanization of society and the number of not guilty verdicts in the nation's judicial institutions is growing. Let us look into this, are there not contradictions here?

We posed this question to Issa Magometovich Kostoyev, deputy chief of the Main Investigative Administration of the RSFSR Procurator's Office.

[Kostoyev] In my view, democratization, glasnost, and humanization are not only not interference but a primary support in consolidating legitimacy in a truly law-governed state. It is good that even in our draft codes and in many other documents we primarily talk about compliance with the Leninist Principle: Not one innocent person may have legal action taken against him. But there is really another no less important principle of justice: No criminal must avoid being charged [with a crime]. It seems to me that under the influence of exposing the Stalinists and the illegalities of the years of stagnation that our legal science and practice, too, while emphasizing the first principle are leaving the second principle in the background.

In our investigators persistent attempt to expose bribe takers, embezzlers, and Soviet "Mafiosi," some zealous champions of humane treatment definitely seek an excess of power and lawlessness. Hundreds of criminals received not guilty verdicts only because both the investigator and the court did not manifest proper persistence, fearing that they would be accused of harsh treatment, a fashionable label in current times. It is no wonder that the latest resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet obliges investigative organs and courts not to permit any leniency whatsoever for dangerous criminals, leaders and active participants of organized groups, or recidivists.

[Reporter] But it is no secret that often a man who ends up in the investigation machinery does not have protection....

[Kostoyev] Actually, a lot of what you run into in the legal system today is far from perfect. Yes, the issue of admitting lawyers at an earlier stage of the investigation is being sharply debated. I and my like-minded colleagues are for this. But not under currently existing legislation. Nowhere else in the world does there exist a more calloused or more conservative criminal process than the one we use today. I have in mind our Criminal Judicial Procedure Code in which there are many very important articles which do not work in practice.

Imagine that an American policeman caught a pickpocket red-handed and, having completed the appropriate report at the police station, had him brought to court. Here in the presence of a lawyer, the victim and the witnesses for the accused are questioned, the degree of guilt is established, punishment is determined, and the matter is ended. We take six months in the same situation while some pickpocket is incarcerated somewhere. It is not surprising that investigations of thefts of particularly major proportions often last for years. We constantly complain about the lack of personnel while maintaining our silence about the fact that the our major trouble is paper—shuffling, in the frightfully unwieldy and clumsy machine of the preliminary investigation and trial.

Criminals skillfully use all of this for their own purposes. Take, for example, the sensational case on charges of particularly major thefts against workers of the Moscow Social Services Administration. The investigation was concluded and the case was sent to the court one and a half years ago. Knowing that the set period for keeping him in custody was coming to an end, one of the accused beat us with one of our own rules. He reads a maximum of about 20 pages a day of the guilty finding and a volume per week. And there are actually 500 of them! Familiarization with the investigation material was consciously prolonged in order to crawl through a loophole that it seemed our laws had purposely left for clever fellows. I have in mind Article 201 of the UPK [Code of Criminal Procedure] that also includes time during the investigation period for the accused to familiarize himself with case materials. This is obvious nonsense! I have completed the investigation and let the accused take as long as he wants to acquaint himself with the material. But this time should not be part of the investigation. Just due to imperfections in our "democratic" instructions, we were compelled to release a blatant female bribe-taker and thief from custody and later had to ask the USSR Supreme Soviet for nine more months which the accused also "consumed." Why? Well because the criminal knows that we shall be forced to release him after the investigation time period has expired despite indisputable proof of guilt.

Those of our workers who conduct investigations of major economic crimes are confined within particularly

harsh limits. Well, let us say an inspection revealed millions in thefts. A bookkeeping committee is experts is appointed to verify or refute the inspection's findings. An expert sometimes works for a year to year and a half and all of this is part of the investigation time period. Moreover, we still have to find a qualified expert. And we knock on the doors of various higher headquarters and departments for which takes months and years. And afterward people are upset: The investigation was prolonged unjustifiably and people were illegally confined. And no one ever thinks to make an apportionment: How much time was the investigator engaged solely in his own duties and how much time was spent going back and forth to higher headquarters. Nowhere else in the world is an investigator so securely tied by bureaucratic shackles as in our country.

[Reporter] And what do you say about the contentious nature of our judicial process? It seems to us that an unenviable role has fallen to the lawyer. He tracks compliance with professional norms but the process flows into the channel of a guilty verdict, the brainchild of the investigator.

[Kostoyev] Well, that is a hyperbole. Although I agree that ours has no true contentious nature. The contentious nature is when both the prosecution and the defense present their evidence and the court determines the soundness of it. This principle is formally complied with in our country. It just does not work in practice. In many ways because not only do individual articles not work but whole sections of the Criminal Code do not work.

Here is the most important of them "Crimes Against Justice." There are more than ten articles here but not one of them is alive. For example, this is "Charging an Obviously Innocent Person." The article states that the investigator or the procurator will be punished by incarceration for up to three years, and in particularly serious cases, for up to ten years, I cannot recall one instance of this during my many years of experience.

I have a resolution about the cessation of a case lying in my safe, the attack on the Molodezhnyy department store which is well known throughout Moscow. Suspects were detained about three years ago including former militia employees and a serviceman. When we found the weapon with which the cashiers were shot, it was discovered that the pistol had been stolen from a militia employee who had been murdered earlier. Four people were convicted of murdering the militiaman, one of whom received the highest degree of punishment. But, thank God, he had still not been shot. They asked him: Why did you plead guilty to a crime that you did not commit? The answer is not hard to guess: The investigator both in the direct and in the figurative sense of the word beat an admission of [guilt] out of innocent people. And what do you think happened? I brought a criminal case against my colleagues—responsible officials of legal bodies, but nothing came of it. Although the investigation lasted more than a year. Why? Well, because court,

do you not see, had to prove it from the appearance of the innocuous word "obviously." They say the [KGB] operations agent threatened and beat innocent persons only because he obviously new: They did not have an alibi. And he had noble motives—to carry out justice at all costs. We managed to find the suspect's ticket at a railroad ticket office; he was on a train far from Moscow at the time the militiaman was murdered. And then this [KGB] agent told us: If I would have had the ticket, it would have been another matter. And thus I was forced to arrive at [the conclusion] that this person is not entirely innocent of a crime.

Obviously it is impossible for people's courts to believe such investigators. But we are not only talking about the moral unscrupulousness of individual workers of ours, the article from the Criminal Code which I previously mentioned is not working and that has forced some people to outright illegal activities.

And let us take the article on charging someone with a crime for presenting false testimony—it is really a direct scourge of our justice [system]. Really, as a minimum three-fourths of all evidence which an investigator gathers is testimony of living people who are witnesses to some crime. But ask any employee of a legal body if he has ever charged anyone with false testimony in accordance with this article? I personally cannot recall any such precedents during decades of work. And why?

As we all know, a witness signs the report still during the investigation stage that he had been warned prior to the interrogation about being charged if he falsely testifies. But this is a game with rules that were determined earlier: Both the investigator and the witness and even the accused well know that this is purely a formality. You can lie as much as you want during an investigation and nothing will happen to you for it. In many ways in my opinion this is because there is nothing upon which to base the opinion (in any case, it is not reflected in the law) that only a court can charge a man for giving false testimony. The law is a very specific mechanism that cannot work if we throw away just one of its thousands of screws. And we have already thrown away not one but many dozen. Although everyone understands: It is impossible to get to the whole truth if the witness says one thing during an investigation and another thing in court. If deception is permitted to occur unpunished during an investigation, then why not also lie in court?!

Yes, the court is obliged to use every possible means at its disposal to protect an innocent man. But justice must also come to the defense of an investigator to the same degree when they publicly fling mud at him. Alas, I do not recall an instance when a man convicted of giving false testimony (and there are a host of examples of that!!) has been immediately charged by a judge with giving false testimony during the proceeding.

The Law has only one humanism—truth, truth and only truth. We can build a truly law-governed state only when a man can know that there will be retribution for each

[incident of] false testimony, either during an investigation or in court. In my view, once this important article of the Law is put into operation and we can end false

testimony, avoid secret meetings, and bribing witnesses—all of this at times intense investigation work will come to nothing.

**Bovin on Career in Journalism, CPSU Relationship**

90A10064 Moscow *ZHURNALIST* in Russian  
No 10, Oct 89 pp 52-55

[Interview of journalist Aleksandr Bovin by Nikolay Sivach: "The Bull-Headed Bovin, or The Art of Being Oneself"]

[Text] **We love Bovin. Readers, and television viewers, and those who attend the public meetings with journalists that have become fashionable. And now the weekly ARGUMENTY i FAKTY, by publishing a popularity index of political observers, has provided a numerical basis for this love: A. Bovin is the absolute leader—39.4 percent of those surveyed came out in favor of him. The next closest to him, V. Zorin, collected 16.6 percent of the votes.**

What is the reason for the persistent sympathy for this man? Certainly, it lies primarily in the fact that we believe him. And we have believed him even when many of his international commentator colleagues have been denied such trust.

And here are the qualities that the participants in the cited survey see in Bovin, and these speak to this trust of theirs: high principle, independence of judgement, honesty, boldness, decisiveness, correctness (which as some note, borders on being a straight-arrow), and even (something which is entirely unexpected in a "abstract" journalist) valor. The colorful appearance of this man is familiar to each of us—his open shirt collar, the obstinately bristling tips of his moustaches, the impassive and sharp eyes of a professional fighter who has stepped down from the ring, but has not been knocked-out... I think that the phenomenon of Aleksandr Bovin is to be explained specifically in the minutiae and details of his 58-year life.

[Bovin] I was born in 1930 in Pushkin, which then was called Detskiy Sad. At that time, my father was studying in Leningrad, at the PKKA Electrotechnical Academy, and my mother was a kindergarten teacher. We rented a room from what must have been a former lady-in-waiting. I remember this because it was then forbidden to celebrate the New Year with a tree: our landlady, however, ignored this directive and put up a New Year's tree.

In 1935, my father finished the academy and received his first assignment to Dnepropetrovsk. And then, already in 1936, they transferred him to serve in the Far East, where we lived for eleven years.

[ZHURNALIST] And where did 1937 find you?

[Bovin] In Voroshilov-Ussuriyskiy. I do not want, at a later date, to change my perceptions of that time. A child is a child. I remember the "pictures." When my father finished the academy, like all graduates, he was given a souvenir album. At the beginning of it there were pages of portraits of all the Army commanders of that time, then pages with the leadership of the academy, and then,

afterwards, a confusion of scenes from their studies and photographs of all the graduates. And gradually, with black India ink—and father was a pedantic man, a great one for accuracy—we painted out these portraits and the signatures that went with them. I was then 7 or 8 years old, but I remember this album well, with its black, yawning eye-sockets, of which there became more and more...

[ZHURNALIST] But later, when you were a teenager and began to understand the words "enemy of the people"...

[Bovin] How should it say it... This is how I understood it: An enemy is an enemy. Military personnel, nevertheless, were distinguished from all others in terms of their discipline and greater loyalty. And until the 1970's, I lived in military cities. There were no such free intellectual discussions as, possibly, there were in the civilian world. So that I, like a majority of my contemporaries as well, "simply" went to school. This boy was restless. They even somehow expelled him from school.

[ZHURNALIST] What for?

[Bovin] I got into a fight. Almost pushed someone into a well, and other things... Afterwards, the war... We had our own style of dress: boots beaten down into accordions which, for some reason, were called "Jimmys," the cloth cap of an eighth-grader, a sailor's striped shirt, a gold tooth cap. This was the get-up.

[ZHURNALIST] And you didn't kick around a little thing made out of fur stuffed with lead shot?

[Bovin] What do you mean "kick around?" I was practically the champion in my courtyard, and we called this little thing a "zoska." We also played "bura," but that's another story...

But it was also interesting for me in school, I studied well, and read a lot. Once, this was in the eighth grade, I somewhere found a tattered volume by Solovyev—I remember that it was about the Time of Troubles, the False Dmitriy, and not at all like in a school textbook. This took hold of me, and the street somehow began to become boring, to fade.

There was also another book, thanks to which I began my theoretical studies. The first collection of Stalin's works came out. There was an article there, entitled "Anarchism or Socialism," or so it seems. I surrounded myself with dictionaries, wrote out the words I didn't know, began to chip away at the granite of science.

At the time, this was accepted as science. They subjugated clarity and precision in the expression of ideas...

[ZHURNALIST] You know, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, in my time I also "fell into" the same thing. Lenin however seemed more complex, more weighty...

[Bovin] Lenin, in fact, often requires considerably greater intellectual effort in order to comprehend him.

Lenin was a creator, a thinker, and Stalin was a systematizer, a classifier. He transformed Marxism into a herbarium, and a herbarium is more elementary than living nature. And, therefore, what Stalin wrote was primitive, but was also much easier to grasp.

Stalin understood the psychology of the masses and he turned to them and not to the intelligentsia. He spoke as if he were driving nails. Take, for example, his famous address of 1931: "Russia has always been beaten for its backwardness, beaten by the Mongolian khans, beaten by the Swedish feudal lords, beaten by the German knights, beaten by the Polish landlords..." And then the remarkable phrase: "We have fallen behind the leading countries by 50-100 years and we must cover this distance in 10 years; otherwise they will doubt us." And exactly 10 years later the war began...

An amusing detail. When I finished the first class, for all-round excellence, I received a bust of Stalin, brown, made out of plaster of Paris. I was proud of it. So that I do not list myself among those Wunderkinder—and there are more and more of them—who "discovered" the cult of Stalin while still in kindergarten.

[ZHURNALIST] And when did you discover it?

[Bovin] Much later. At the university. I became a candidate member of the party in 1951. This was at the postwar height of Stalinism. Front-line soldiers recommended me. There were many of them in our course. And one of them, Aleksandr Tikhonovich Guzhin, came up to me: "I need to talk to you." And we went to the quai on the Don and sat down on a bench. And then—then he told me everything that, after five years, Khrushchev had reported to the 20th Party Congress: about the cult, about the massive repressions, about the fact that the party was sick. "I am making the recommendation; I trust you and want you to know everything." And this is the way it happened...

In general, I was prepared for the 20th Congress. Although it is precisely from the congress that my own perestroyka, my biography as a communist, as a citizen and as an individual begins.

[ZHURNALIST] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, we have already taken the biographical route; let's return it. What happened after school?

[Bovin] When I finished school I was already in Gorkiy. And I, a person who had grown up in the provinces wanted to become—what do you think?—a diplomat. I set out straight for Moscow to enter the ... Diplomatic Academy. The guard at the entrance, having seen me and, with even greater surprise, my school record, poured cold water on me: They only accept people who have a higher education into the academy.

[ZHURNALIST] And what kind of education is most appropriate?

[Bovin] Most preferably, juridical.

And I set out for the juridical faculty at Moscow State University. As a gold prize winner, I did not need to pass examinations, only a personal interview. Everything apparently went favorably. To the question of whether I needed a dormitory, I answered that I did. "In such a case, we have to disappoint you, because you can study in your own city." And, in fact, there was a juridical faculty in Rostov-on-the-Don, where my father had been transferred by that time. Thus, I ended up as a student in the juridical faculty at Rostov State University.

[ZHURNALIST] Nevertheless, you did not become a diplomat, but a journalist. How was this?

[Bovin] Exclusively at the will of the leadership. But it is necessary to begin with the fact that, during my work in court and later in party organs, I suddenly developed an attraction to abstractions and, in 1956, I entered post-graduate studies in the philosophy faculty at Moscow State University. After finishing these graduate studies I intended to work in the propaganda and agitation department of the city party committee in a certain Ukrainian closed city. Everything was agreed upon, but they suddenly summoned me to the journal KOMMUNIST and proposed that I become a scientific consultant to the philosophy editors. And I agreed. Since that time I have been a Moscovite.

I worked at KOMMUNIST from 1959 to 1963. Journalism is unique there. It is often necessary to put unintelligible theoretical studies by well-known authors into everyday language. But I was also published there myself.

[ZHURNALIST] Without difficulties?

[Bovin] What to say? Yes—in general. But it was precisely there that, for the first time, there was an occasion when they wanted to remove me from work. An article of mine came out, called "Science and World Outlook." In it, in particular, I said that there are material bearers of heredity, and that it is necessary to study these. Several days later, a column appeared in SELSKAYA ZHIZN, which was not only the Lysenko's court publication but also the newspaper of the Central Committee, in which, in one part of it, a "people's academician" thoroughly lambasted "Comrade Bovin". A scandal. The clouds thickened. But the thunder did not roar. Academicians saved me. A group of physicists and chemists wrote a letter to the party Central Committee in my defense, and this deflected the wrath of the leadership from me.

A little later, already in 1961, I was published for the first time in IZVESTIYA. The article was called "Truth in Justice." It criticized Vyshinskiy's "theory of evidence" and also the jurists who continued to support it. Everything was going smoothly but suddenly there was a summons to the Central Committee. The instructor to whom I went—and they were important then: well really a Karl Marx or at least a Friedrich Engels, only he had less hair—looked at me with surprise. I was, excuse me, thirty-one years old at that time and was wearing a checked cowboy shirt with an open collar. The

instructor, continuing in his astonishment, handed me a letter: "Read it!" It was signed by scholars rather well-known at the time and it said that "this Bovin" had at one time served as an assistant to Vyshinskiy and had written speeches for him, and that he was now casting aspersions on his former chief. The astonishment of the instructor was understandable: When the "theory of evidence" was created, I was ... 5 years old. Not quite enough, even for a Wunderkind.

In the summer of 1963, they invited me to the CPSU Central Committee, to the Department for Relations with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries. At the time the inertia of the 20th Congress was continuing and Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, who headed the department, was gathering experienced people about himself.

During my first conversation with Andropov, one other curious episode occurred. Our relations with the Chinese had only started to go bad at the time. And polemics were being conducted in veiled form. For example, KOMMUNIST published a series of editorials which discussed whether the second half of the 20th century was an era of revolution and storm or an era of peaceful coexistence and whether a peaceful transition to socialism is possible or not possible.

Andropov asked:

"Have you read these articles?"

"Of course."

"How do you find them?"

And inasmuch as I didn't "find" them any way, I began to talk about the absence of logic, the weak argumentation, and the loose composition of these articles. My comrade, sitting next to me, stepped on my foot. And I fell silent.

It turns out that I had organized criticism of speeches by Suslov, Ponomarev, and Andropov himself that had been recast for the paper. Nevertheless, they took me on to work in the Central Committee and I worked there for nine years.

[ZHURNALIST] All sorts of talk is going around about how you parted with the Central Committee...

[Bovin] It is going around. And it already bores me. And the matter was as follows. In the beginning of 1972, I took a creative leave—I tried to write my doctoral dissertation. And when, after two months, not having finished it, I went back to work, I felt that there was something going on around me. As if electricity was building up in the air before a thunderstorm. I phoned Yu. V. Andropov by force of habit. He was then in the KGB. So, I said, and so, what strange feelings. "Don't pay any attention, do your work," he replied, though it seemed to me, without much confidence. And so, several days later, in the beginning of April, a courier dropped by with a packet. I signed for it, opened the packet, and

in it there was a single sheet: "Comrade Bovin, A.E. is appointed a political observer for the newspaper IZVESTIYA." And the signature: M. Suslov, secretary CPSU Central Committee.

[ZHURNALIST] Of course Bovin has tried to explain the reasons for his release from his job. But nobody who could know anything definite said anything plainly. And, incidentally, have not said anything up to now.

Such were the times then. They did not, in fact, send people to the camps, they sent them inside themselves. Many souls were generally infected from this internal barbed wire. But not all. And although a large segment of Bovin's life passed specifically during the years of stagnation, and although, after several years, the top leadership "forgave" him, Bovin, happily, escaped this terrible sepsis.

Do you view what happened as a failure: your unexpected removal from the party Central Committee and your transfer to work in a newspaper?

[Bovin] Well, a failure—this is too strong a word. At the same time, as became clear later, it was specifically thanks to leaving the Central Committee that I found myself in journalism. But, in the first period, it was difficult.

[ZHURNALIST] Didn't get an inferiority complex at that time? Nevertheless, you had at once to work on equal terms with professionals of high rank. Indeed, it is also necessary to conform to out-of-favor duties.

[Bovin] Well, no, you know, I didn't have any kind of complex. The matter is that, in the Central Committee, I was in a job which demanded from me a knowledge of the international situation, its analysis, evaluation. In general, the same things that journalists are occupied with. Earlier I simply wrote for other readers and in a different genre.

In the Central Committee, it was necessary to write the facts. And I took this with me to the newspaper. And my first journalistic difficulties started here at once. My first article in IZVESTIYA was called "On the Threshold of the Visit" and was devoted to the arrival of Iosip Tito in Moscow. I also wrote about the fact that we had very complicated relations with Yugoslavia, that there were certain problems, and that these even then remained. That is, I tried to write about how everything actually was. When the material was taken to the first deputy editor of IZVESTIYA, Polyanov, he became very angry.

[ZHURNALIST] But you saw how the others were writing. You understood that you could not do this.

[Bovin] I didn't want to understand this! I came from a different school. And when the noise started at IZVESTIYA, I called a secretary at the Central Committee, K.F. Katushev, and asked him to read my article. He agreed. An hour later they returned the material with the ten crossed-out lines. After this, my material was no longer edited.

And from here on it went as follows. Suddenly the phone rang: "This is Adzhubey." (I wasn't acquainted with him earlier.) "I would like to see you. Let's have lunch together. I will come by for you." I recall that I went out to the corner of Pushkin Street. Adzhubey drove up in his old Moskvich and we set off for the Central House of Artistic Workers [TsDRI]. This is what he told me. "I have read your article and I think that they will soon fire you from your job. You can't write this way here, really don't you know this?" "Excuse me," I answered, "but, in the first place, they still haven't fired me. And, in the second, I can't write in any other way."

And so, they haven't fired me up to now.

[ZHURNALIST] You know, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, it's a strange thing—for a long time, there was a mysterious aura surrounding your name: Once Bovin permits himself more than the other journalists—this is not without reason. It means he has been allowed to do so. At one time, they even began to say that you were Brezhnev's first and favorite assistant or that you in general were practically related to him. Nonsense, of course, the cost of a distorted, stagnant psychology. But, whatever the case, you in fact had contacts with him and, we must assume, also with all of our subsequent leaders. Therefore, could you not now demonstrate the sharpness of your journalistic eye and give us close-up political portraits of these people?

[Bovin] With regard to a demonstration of anything at all, then spare me this. As regards the leaders, then I actually have had occasion to associate with them.

To follow the genre of a "blitz," I can perhaps say the following. Brezhnev, to use bureaucratic language, did not correspond to the position he occupied. He lacked the internal reserves necessary to become a great political figure. He thirsted for stability, and led the country to stagnation.

Chernenko—He was a mediocre apparatus worker. This is what he amounted to!

Andropov had all the qualities necessary to become a political leader on a world scale. He clearly "sat too long" in the KGB. And illness got in his way.

I have not had occasion to meet with Gorbachev since his election as General Secretary.

[ZHURNALIST] This is indeed a blitz. But could you expand on your characterizations just a little bit?

[Bovin] If you please. Brezhnev, in my view, should not be portrayed only in negative tones. Certain steps he took at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's were correct. Take for example the enormous funds which they began to invest in agriculture—in essence, this was the first attempt of any kind in the history of our country to repay the countryside for what they had expropriated from it. Or the extremely important agreements with Nixon on arms limitation, and the signing of the Helsinki documents.

If we look at internal policy, then, in my opinion, Brezhnev fell apart under the burden of the events in Czechoslovakia. It is necessary to say that measures were then being planned for the democratization of society; there was even talk about a plenum of the Central Committee concerning this question. The Czech events cancelled all this. The flirtation with reforms came to an end. Conservative tendencies grew stronger. The departure from the course of the 20th-22nd congresses became more rapid. In all this can also be seen his sympathies for Stalin, Brezhnev's internal weakness, his intellectual shortcomings, his lack of culture. He actually believed in his own greatness. Plus—his illness. At the end of the 1970's, it was already difficult to talk, much less argue, with him.

On the day-to-day level, Brezhnev was, it seemed to me, in general, a not unkindly and a hospitable person. He loved hunting and adored playing dominoes and "animal" films. He read little, saying that, for him, meetings and talks with people took the place of book learning. He was steadfast in his attachments. Fond of children. A typical case of shortcomings which are a continuation of virtues. He seated relatives, fellow coworkers, and his acquaintances around himself, focusing on their personal loyalty.

Next, not in terms of chronology but on the basis of internal essence, comes Chernenko. By skillfully making use of Brezhnev's weaknesses, he literally wiggled his way into the Politburo. A total mediocrity.

Now, about Andropov. This is the only person from the post-Stalin leadership who did not have a higher education. And, at the same time, he was in a real sense educated. I once visited him for some reason in the hospital and a copy of Plato's "Dialogues" was lying on his bedside table. I said: "Why do you have this, Yuriy Vladimirovich?" "So that I can argue with my consultants." Arguments and, sometimes, loud discussions in his office were not the exception but the norm.

He wrote poetry. And philosophical lyrics, and political satire. I recall, for example, his "Letter from a Volga Boatman to Chairman Mao" (incidentally, Andropov himself was a boatman in his youth).

I am far from any thought of idealizing Andropov. He led a very complicated life. The price of Hungary alone! The crowd lynching communists—he never was able to forget this. He also saw the events in Czechoslovakia through an Hungarian prism. And 17 years of work in the KGB? They made Yuriy Vladimirovich very suspicious, even mistrustful. Indeed the world is perceived from a very specific point of view there.

And nevertheless Andropov felt and understood the necessity of sharp and serious changes. Although, I am afraid, he would act even more cautiously than the present leadership. By the way, Andropov had the very best relations with Gorbachev. As far as I recall, he actively supported him and considered him his political successor.

## MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

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[ZHURNALIST] You said that you have not run into Gorbachev in his present capacity. And, nevertheless, what do you think about him?

[Bovin] A wise, bold man who has taken upon himself extremely heavy responsibility for the fate of the party and the country, for the fate of world socialism.

I remember all the complexity of his position. And nevertheless I am convinced that Gorbachev must move things along more decisively, that he must go out to the masses (and what I have in mind is not "meetings" in the streets). Must lean on their support. And he should pay even more attention to perestroyka within the party itself, within its apparatus. So far, very little has been done here. And the authority of the party continues to fall. This is dangerous.

I would hope that Gorbachev will have sufficient will and courage not to surrender his positions under the pressure to which he is being subjected from various sides.

[ZHURNALIST] I am not indifferent to your journalistic creativity, and therefore, I hope it is permissible for me to express the following observation of mine. You are a professional newspaperman, but you shine much more brightly on the television screen than in the newspaper column. What is the matter here?

[Bovin] I am pained by your judgement. I like the paper more and strive to do my best work in the columns of IZVESTIYA.

It is possible that secondary circumstances play a role here. A newspaper—this is paper and letters. But television—this is theater. Everything is included here: both mimicry, and intonation, and live speech, with its special characteristics. The "brightness" comes from this.

And here is something else. IZVESTIYA is a stern paper, the "government paper," as they call it. And certain liberties that are completely natural on television or even in other publications, and that sometimes give the effect of brightness, are inappropriate in our paper.

[ZHURNALIST] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, despite your sense of humor, you yourself seldom smile. It is interesting, does this happen when you are not in front of people? And in general: What in this life makes you happy?

[Bovin] As regards smiling, I don't know, I have not given much thought to this. In my opinion, I smile fairly often. And what makes me happy? I am happy when I feel that my work has been successful. I am happy when I look at my grandson, Makar Sergeyevich. I like to sit with friends and talk "about life." I like to receive letters from which it is clear that they understand you, that they believe you.

It is very necessary that people believe you... There was one occasion in my childhood... Somehow some money came to be missing at home. Rather a lot for those

modest times. And it turned out that, besides me, nobody could have taken it. But I didn't take it! It was all the more awful that my parents, I felt this, did not believe me. And I decided to shoot myself. We had a gun from the war in the house and, having waited until everyone went off to work, I opened the drawer in my father's desk where this "Colt" was lying.

I remember that I was crying. And me, a boy! Weighing the pistol in my hand, I stood in front of a mirror to strike heroic poses, and suddenly there was a deafening shot. In the wall—it was like a crater, the whole room was mortar and brick dust. The remainder of my energy went to restoring order.

Much has happened in my life. Much has been forgotten. But this awful feeling, this kind of inconsolability, because I wasn't believed, this I remember to this day...

### Problems of Film Industry Self-Financing Analyzed

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[Article by I. A. Kallistov, senior instructor, Moscow Film Institute, candidate in economic sciences, A. F. Laykov, instructor in All-Union State Institute of Cinematography, candidate in economic sciences: "Film Production and Cost Accounting"]

[Text] The year 1989 marks the beginning of extensive dissemination of the principles of full cost-accounting and self-financing in the social and cultural sphere. Among the enterprises and organizations that will be utilizing the new management conditions are those of the film making industry.

When the new economic principles are applied, the Soviet film maker will encounter certain difficulties, arising from a number of circumstances. Some of these are common to all enterprises in our economy, the others are a reflection of specific circumstances in the film industry. The latter category includes: inadequate coordination among the systems for making, promoting, and showing films; the confused and inefficient structure of the financial relationships between film making as a whole and the state; the merely nominal existence of elements of cost-accounting at the stages of film production and sale; the unsolved problem of finding the optimal combination of box office appeal and ideological and artistic content in the film industry, an issue which has given rise to endless disputes.

The stable decline in audience interest in Soviet films dictates the need for a radical improvement in the state of Soviet film making. According to published data, in 1980, 26 Soviet films were seen by an audience of 20 million; in 1983 there were 14 such films; while there were 8 each in the 2 subsequent years. During this same period, two thirds of the box office receipts from films came from foreign films, which represented one third of the total number of showings. From 1970 to 1987, while

there was relatively stable number of movie theaters and an increase in the number of films produced, the size of the audience decreased steadily (cf. Table).

Years	Number of film	Production of	Number of visits
	facilities charging	full-length	to films, million
	admission, thous.	and short films	
1970	157.0	1,392	4,652
1980	152.6	1,644	4,259
1985	152.2	1,769	4,100
1987	153	1,804	3,775

Of course, each of the functional components of the film industry has its own particular internal problems requiring improvement of administration and management, however the source of all the difficulties, in our opinion, is the lack of development of the form of cost accounting used and the absence of a well-thought out system of material incentives and sanctions in the area of film production. This is why the goal of increasing workers' material interest in the quality of the final products produced by the divisions of the film studios is of such importance.

At present the artistic/creative, technical, and financial/management aspects of the work of film studios are, in effect, isolated from each other. The artistic concepts of the creative personnel are not always compatible with the facilities, equipment and film production manpower available and at times are developed without regard for the actual financial capacities of the film studios. This does a great deal to makes additional problems in implementation of the artistic and output plans of the studio inevitable. This situation, on the one hand disrupts the rhythm of the production schedule, making it even less smooth than it already is and increases delays, and, on the other hand, compels changes in the artistic aspects of films due to cost overruns on other expenditure estimates (mainly, wages, overhead, and payment for services of other organizations). Taken together, all this has a negative effect on the quality of the films produced.

The current system of incentives is only weakly related to achievement of high economic indicators by the film studio, and is focused not on final, but on intermediate results. Incentive payments to studio employees are awarded mainly for meeting plan targets involving volume (gross) production indicators. The quality of the films produced is treated very idiosyncratically. Its criterion is not success with the audience, but rather is based on the decisions of evaluation commissions at various levels, frequently consisting of studio personnel. Success with distribution and at the box office is hardly reflected at all in the indicators of film studios' performance.

The absence of true cost accounting in the system for producing films is the reason for the continual increase in unjustified (from the standpoint of the final result)

expenditures on film production. Many of these expenditures are related to expensive shooting of scenes abroad, or to staging of large-scale panoramic scenes requiring not only large outlays to alter the existing landscape, but also the associated payment of substantial fines and compensatory payments for causing material and ecological damage. Increased expenses also result from the continual increase in the cost the technical film making equipment and of the services of other organizations. However, while in many other sectors of the economy the magnitude of expenditures on production does not depend directly on factors related to the work of the enterprises, increases of expenditures on film production are predominantly dependent on factors internal to the work of the film makers, especially lack of personnel incentives to use resources economically and to increase audience appeal.

It must be noted that the major expenditures on film production are associated with remuneration for the work of the artistic production and auxiliary personnel. Thus, saving money on wages is one of the important ways to attain good results from the standpoint of cost accounting.

Today, the employment by film studios of personnel who do not participate directly in production of film significantly increases the amount of overhead, to which these employees' salaries are charged. There are cases where overhead expenses exceed the direct costs of the film, but this is not reflected in the income of the workers.

Aside from basic and supplementary wages, plans call for including payments to the creative personnel (clearly performance awards) in the prime cost of film production. But if this is done, it is difficult to see the sense of including unconditional incentive bonuses in the plan estimates of expenses for producing films. Are not such payments unmerited advances, guaranteeing benefits to a certain circle of film studio employees? After all, the way things are currently structured, these payments will in effect be awarded regardless of the quality of work, since the sums are already stipulated in the plan. Cases where such bonuses are not awarded because films are judged to be low in quality are extremely rare.

One would think that, from the point of view of economic expediency, bonuses for producing films should be paid through the incentive fund only if there is a profit. Then the creative workers would have a real material interest in the financial aspects of film production. At present, this interest manifests itself in an extremely one-sided way: through demands for increasing expenses in order to realize some artistic conception.

Indifference to the financial aspects of film making, which is observed first and foremost in the directorial personnel, is, to a great extent, made inevitable by the

lack of a mechanism ensuring financial accountability. For example, for failing to meet deadlines for completing cartoons and certain other kinds of films, the director loses from 5 to 20

of his production bonus, but he still retains his whole basic salary. Thus the current system of sanctions for failing to meet plan targets in the filming period is not very efficient and engenders indifference on the part of the heads and members of creative groups to issues of meeting plans and, to some degree, actually makes it financially beneficial to them to prolong the time taken to make a film. It is not difficult to see that depriving the guilty parties of their bonus money is not commensurate with the amount of money lost due to billeting charges for service shops and their own regular wages.

Articles by film critics and film experts justify ignoring financial results due to concentration on creative experimentation. These writers would insulate this "high form of art" from box office considerations. The creation of this, clearly artificial, antagonism between the goals of increasing the ideological and esthetic level of film production and of increasing gross receipts from distribution of Soviet films belies a poor knowledge of the economic principles of film production and a superficial approach to the true nature of the issue, which has little in common with a deep scientific analysis. On the whole, film production is capable of providing the economic conditions for production of all types of film, including experimental films.

#### In Western film industries, up to 60

of the resources expended on film making is used for advertising and a significant portion of the remainder goes to pay film stars with "box office appeal." In other words, everything possible is done to attract an audience, or to be more accurate, their money. In this way the final evaluation of a film is made by the consumer, the market. We have no basis for arguing that the ideological and esthetic level of foreign films is lower than ours. The costs of the free film market are comparable to what is lost due to state control over film making, when the ideological content and the artistic value are determined and paid for not by the audience but by the government.

We are not suggesting blind imitation of western techniques for attracting an audience, but we think that we must try to attain a situation where complete cost accounting and self-financing induce our studios, like western film companies, to attempt to get the maximum receipts for each film they make. Psychologically complex art films, not capable of attracting a mass audience and producing sufficient box office receipts, must be paid for out of the appropriate financial reserve funds or earmarked resources of film studios, or from special funds of the USSR Film Makers' Union.

Archaic financial procedures, particularly the one governing distribution of profits, act as a significant impediment to the adoption of principles of full cost accounting in the film production system. Introduced in

the early 1930s and revised and improved many times in other sectors of the economy, this procedure has remained in effect in film studios virtually unchanged, as if symbolizing that here the financial results of work are of no importance. According to the rules currently in effect, film studios must relinquish almost all the profit stipulated by the plan except for small deductions for their own needs. If they earn more profit than the plan stipulated, they may put up to 30

in the enterprise fund, but this sum cannot exceed 5.5 of the wage fund. The film studios can use an additional 30

of such profit for construction of housing and other consumer facilities. However, for obvious reasons, this is a right that in the majority of cases exists only on paper [i.e., is not exercised because no such profit is made].

Thus, under the conditions existing today, film studios have no effective incentives for economizing on resources and obtaining additional profits. The overwhelming majority of film studio work collectives are not awarded bonuses for saving resources through decreasing expenses for shooting and producing films, other than symbolic prizes for saving silver containing materials, electricity, etc.

Given the financial and economic situation in which even relatively profitable film studios have found themselves up to the present, it would not be possible to switch to the standard distribution of profit as stipulated in the Model statute in force today. For this to occur, the basic conditions determining the financial results of film production must first be revised.

Today when estimates are made for producing a film, the wholesale cost is determined by computation of the 5

level of profitability. For full-length fictional films the profit is fixed at an absolute sum of 20,000 rubles, which corresponds to 5

of a standard estimate of costs for producing such a film. This makes it clear that the work of film studios is planned to be low-profit. Thus given this approach, the likelihood that self-financing can be achieved, even with regard to covering operating expense, not to even mention capital investments, is dubious. On the other hand, raising the profit level for films that is stipulated by the plan raises complex problems of price setting. Solving them at the audience's expense, ultimately increasing the cost of admission, would entail violating the major principle of the price reforms that are being developed, i.e., that they must not lead to a decrease in the real income of the population. It would also be short-sighted to increase subsidies to the film distribution concerns, since this would prevent dissemination of full cost accounting throughout the film industry.

It would seem that one solution to this dilemma would be to seek a way to offer the film studios benefits for payments to the budget. According to our calculations,

the majority of film studios would currently not make enough profit to pay into the budget the top priority payments—payments for production capital (minimal rate 2

) and for labor resources. For example, in 1987 "Soyuzmultfilm" made 154,000 rubles of actual profit, while the mean number of employees on the roll was 540. Given the standard distribution of profit, this would mean that the film studio should pay 162,000 rubles into the budget for labor resources, which exceeds by 8,000 rubles its total profit for the year. Furthermore, the studio, having at its disposal fixed assets at an initial cost of 2,262,000 rubles and working capital of 390,000 thousand rubles, would have had to come up with a minimum of 53,000 rubles in addition to pay for production capital (computed at 2

of the standard.) Other studios are in an analogous position.

Aside from the low profitability and complete absence of their own savings, the position of the film studios on the eve of the transition to self-financing is marked by a high degree of physical wear and obsolescence of production equipment. By the beginning of 1988, almost 50

of the fixed assets of the film studio "Azerbaijan" were worn out or obsolete. The comparable figure was 78

for "Filmeksport", 75

for "Tsentrnauchfilm", and over 82

for "Soyuzmultfilm". An item by item analysis of wear and obsolescence of equipment at the "Filmeksport" studio revealed fixed capital the amortized cost of which exceeded their initial cost by more than a factor of three.

Because of the extreme shortage of new equipment and the predominance of imported models, replacement of worn out or obsolete equipment has occurred primarily through the central office and associations of USSR Goskino. Frequently the amortization costs for the studios have been computed centrally, while centrally controlled supply of new equipment was far from equivalent in amount to the resources withdrawn. Thus, on the eve of the transition to new conditions of economic management, many film studios have been deprived of the major source of replenishment of fixed capital. The latter, as was already noted, requires immediate replacement. Payment into the budget for fixed productive

capital is computed on the basis of cost, without taking wear into account and thus ignores productivity and return.

All this speaks in favor of freeing the film studios from making payments for capital. It would seem that the same would be true for payment for labor resources. Incentives for the film studios to increase the quality of the final results of their work by using fewer workers would be vastly more successful if remuneration for labor was increased as a function of the specific contribution of each participant to the making of a film. This would increase the financial benefit to workers of performing several specialized jobs and of increasing the amount of work performed by each member of the collective, and would lead to the elimination of numerous vacancies in the service shops and to a decrease in the number of creative employees, due to reductions in force. Important aspects of the solution of this problem would include the mass adoption of intrastudio cost accounting and the utilization of contractual relationships. It should be emphasized especially that payment for labor resources by film studios loses its value as an incentive when there are substantial shortages of workers in unique and difficult specialties (for example, cartoonists, cutters of subtitle blocks, etc.).

The relations between film studios and the budget must, in our opinion, be based on principles of income tax assessment with a broad range of deductions. This would make it possible to add a profit of 10-15

to the wholesale cost of the films not by increasing prices, but through decreasing expenditures alone. Virtually all film studios have the resources to make such decreases. It need only be guaranteed that the majority of the profit will be retained by the workers of the studio.

In setting the income tax rate for film studios, it must not be forgotten that many of them, unlike enterprises of other sectors, do not have existing incentive funds, and thus are without sufficient resources for solving problems of independent productive and social development. For this reason, when the procedures and rate of taxation of profits of film studios are established, they must be based not on existing conditions, as was done initially after adoption of the new economic principles, but on the scientifically justified needs of the film industry to have a savings fund of its own.

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**Party Historian Writes on Khrushchev Ouster,  
Brezhnev Stagnation**

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[Article by P.A. Rodionov: "How Did the Stagnation Begin?"]

[Text] I met Brezhnev on a few occasions. I was in a sense his "grandson" even: when, at the end of 1963, the decision was made to nominate me for the position of second secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, I had been received by him twice. The first interview had been lengthy, and I had formed an entirely favorable impression of Brezhnev. I was to meet with him subsequently, but I have a particular memory of the meeting which took place at the end of my time in Georgia.

But first let me recount what preceded it. An absolutely intolerable situation had taken shape in Georgia: corruption and the demoralization of the cadres had reached its apogee here. It was to be considerably later that Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia and its neighbor republics also would take over the dubious "lead" from Georgia. The word "corruption" was not being voiced at that time, it was true, this term was not in vogue, nor was, come to that, the word "mafia". Therefore when, at a theoretical seminar for the republic party aktiv in September 1969, I said that graft, in the guise of costly "gifts" included, was pervasive among senior officials and that in political language this was called corruption, the speech literally caused a storm.

I was showered with complaints, and this was understandable for there were among the participants in the seminar many for whom "the cap fit," as they say. They were attacking, incidentally, not only me but also the interior minister at that time, E.A. Shevardnadze, who, as distinct from his union boss Shchelokov, was fighting corruption not in words but in deeds.

Subsequently becoming first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, E.A. Shevardnadze did much to improve the moral and psychological and ethical climate in the republic. Corruption was not cut out entirely, it is true, but the bribe-takers were not now in a position to operate as openly and brazenly. At the time about which I am speaking they were not fastidious either as to the methods of extortion or the ways of combating those who were in their way. Everything was put to use: slander, threats (as far as assassination), attempts to "buy silence". Shots were fired at the car of a Central Committee secretary, and the gunman, incidentally, was not identified, it being put about, on the other hand, that this was a "child's prank"....

The fight against corrupt elements was complicated considerably by the fact that the crooks and bribe-takers always had powerful protectors, and not only within the republic itself. The government line (high frequency) telephone once rang in my office. The subscriber introduced himself: "Yakov Ilich Brezhnev speaking." Having introduced himself, he began to intercede for a most inveterate

crook who had been arrested. I answered: "Excuse me, but I have no right to intervene and put pressure on the investigating authorities," and I heard in reply: "You can do what you like, you have great authority." I told the caller most categorically that I was not about to take any steps in this connection. I conveyed the content of our conversation to V.P. Mzhavanadze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, who said merely: "This does not surprise me. Next time refer him to me."

Prior to this phone call even rumors had reached me that certain Georgian operators had found a way to Ya.I. Brezhnev, but I had attached no significance to this talk. I had heard that he was a great disciple of Bacchus and, coming across him at various receptions in Moscow, I myself also, incidentally, had seen that he would reach vigorously for the wine glass. It was only later, after Georgia, that I learned that he was a chronic drunkard, that he had a position at the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy on paper only, sometimes absenting himself for 2-3 weeks at a time and that the ministry executives were often unable to say anything in response to L.I. Brezhnev's question: "Where's Yakov?" (Much about Yakov Ilich's escapades, incidentally, was known to the drivers of the CPSU Central Committee garage, whose job it was to chauffeur him to various addresses even after the death of his crowned brother. There was much and continues to this day to be much talk about the ostentatious dacha built for Ya.I. Brezhnev in the Barvikhi area. Do we not have here the "several participation" of the operators whose kindly guardian he was?)

Protectionism and "telephone law" took on mass and open proportions in Georgia. A trade was carried on in a number of party organizations in... party cards, and big bribes were given for the admittance to the CPSU of a variety of crooks, who were subsequently promoted to higher office. Having received warnings about such shameful facts and having persuaded ourselves that they were correct, we assembled the Central Committee Bureau in Mzhavanadze's absence and strictly punished the culprits, expelling some people from the party. The decision was made, it has to be admitted, with considerable trepidation because some members of the Bureau were reluctant to "wash dirty linen in public". Mzhavanadze's favorite, Chanukvadze, who zealously defended his protege—at that time first secretary of the Sukhumi Gorkom who was ultimately strictly censured, this being entered on his record, for abuses perpetrated at the time of admissions to the CPSU—put up particular resistance.

Mzhavanadze changed favorites several times in my memory, but this latter exerted the greatest influence on his patron. Insidious and resourceful and flattering, he would frequently operate via Mzhavanadze's family also, particularly via his wife, literally tying his "boss" hands and feet. When, however, Mzhavanadze was finally relieved of office, the first to renounce him was none other than his powerful favorite Chanukvadze, who by that time had big connections in Moscow. He was dismissed as Central Committee secretary and sharply criticized (having emphatically rejected Chanukvadze's nomination

at the Georgian CP congress, delegates to the Abkhaz party conference, for example, spoke frankly about his abuses), nonetheless, he enjoyed ministerial office for a further 10 years.

I would add to all this that my successor in Georgia, Churkin, was one of the heroes of the diaries of S.N. Khrushchev ("Union Pensioner," OGONEK Nos 40-44, 1988) who in the journal's photograph stands alongside Medunov, seeing off N.S. Khrushchev from Sochi—a protege of that same all-powerful favorite. There was talk about Churkin as a "great operator" from the time even when he was Sochi Gorispolkom chairman, and suddenly, having worked for some time as Krasnodar Kraykom second secretary, this disciple and associate of Medunov arrived in Georgia.

"I do not know Comrade Churkin personally," Mzhavanadze introduced him at a Central Committee plenum, "but Shota Chanukvadze knows him well. Let us go along with his recommendation." The majority of Central Committee members knew the value of such a recommendation full well, but they voted "for". And? The republic's law enforcement authorities soon caught Churkin taking large bribes. Among the material evidence was a necktie of solid gold, which had been presented to Churkin by the former director of the Pharmacology Technical School, Todua, who, when searched, was found to have R765,000 in securities. Although expelled from the party, Churkin immediately found a good job in Kalinin.

I am often asked: was there a real basis to the rumors concerning the involvement of Mzhavanadze and his wife in corruption? I once received information on this score from completely trustworthy sources and shared it with leading comrades from the CPSU Central Committee, but inasmuch as proceedings were not instituted I cannot resort to any categorical assertions, remembering, in addition, the presumption of innocence. But I will say this. Shortly after my move to Georgia, my wife and I were invited to the home of the Mzhavanadze's. Our hosts lived modestly and dressed likewise. However, time went by, and all changed—the first secretary's wife and daughters began to wear expensive outfits and accessories, and sumptuous festivities began to be the fashion on the birthday of Mzhavanadze's wife—"Queen Victoria," as she was called—with the invitation of a large number of guests and the handing over of expensive gifts. And the Mzhavanadze's now no longer occupied an apartment in such a modest private dwelling as before—it stood out noticeably by its facade, layout and finish. It was, it was true, a private dwelling for several families, including that of the last favorite, but Mzhavanadze's vast apartment was reminiscent more of a high-class antique store than a residence. Such a metamorphosis in just a few years! I would add to this that the "first" wife began to intervene high-handedly and, it has to be assumed, by no means disinterestedly in the assignment of cadres in the republic, specifying for prestige positions and "cosy numbers" people from her "personal list".

Seeing that my information concerning the state of affairs in Georgia was not meeting with the due response in the CPSU Central Committee machinery, I appealed directly to L.I. Brezhnev and sought an interview. He listened to my story attentively, encouraging me to even greater candor, but it was only later that I understood that the facts which I had communicated were not of interest to him in themselves but were needed as arguments for the removal of the last of the "Moors" who had done their work: Mzhavanadze had in the past helped Brezhnev remove Khrushchev, about which I will speak later....

I also had an opportunity to meet L.I. Brezhnev in a different situation, when he was on a visit to Georgia. He was affable and approachable, liked a joke and knew himself how to joke, particularly at table. He could suddenly open up. As regards, for example, how difficult it was for him to wear "Monomakh's hat" and how there would turn over at night in the head beneath this hat all that had had to be thought about during the day. "And oh how much thinking has to be done about so much!" If Brezhnev's posturing is disregarded, he made a very good impression on many people who came in contact with him.

Granted all this, Brezhnev belonged in the category of people about whom folk aptly say: "He makes a soft bed and sleeps soundly". I once came across in the press words to the effect that Brezhnev's sentimentality resided next door to ruthlessness and that the velvet gloves merely concealed fists of steel. I fully agree with this: Brezhnev unhesitatingly removed all dissidents, sugarizing the pill here. Nor did he spare those who were close to him, but who had suddenly taken an injudicious, rash step which made the boss unhappy. This was how F.D. Kulakov, at that time member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, who was in charge of agriculture (it was he, incidentally, who had sponsored Chanukvadze), found himself out of favor, and S.M. Tsvigun, who, thanks to proximity to Brezhnev, had become first deputy chairman of the KGB, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and who, among very few people, enjoyed his particular trust, fell into disfavor. Brezhnev's changeability so shook Tsvigun that he committed suicide. His sponsor and "benefactor" did not even append his signature to the obituary notice....

Here is your "absence of clearly expressed ambition and love of power," as one publication said about Brezhnev. Here is, finally, your "empty rubber vessel," as Fedor Burlatskiy colorfully termed Brezhnev. Such descriptions, in my view, are at variance with the truth.

As far as the absence of "clearly expressed ambition" and "love of power" is concerned, numerous facts confound such a conclusion. Some things are in need of clarification, in my opinion, in respect of the "empty rubber vessel" also. If one refers to intellect, erudition and sharpness of mind, then, yes, such an image is, perhaps, successful. Brezhnev was in this sense truly a mediocrity. And it was by no means fortuitous that he surrounded himself, as a rule, with insipid people in order to stand out against this

background. He removed those who were cleverer and more capable, displaying exceptional shrewdness and uncommon resourcefulness and dexterity here. Making adroit use of the manifest weakness of democratic traditions in the party and in society as a whole, he strengthened his position in the upper echelon of power step by step. For many years Brezhnev accumulated experience of political survival and maneuvering in the struggle for power, which he displayed particularly strikingly in the rivalry with F.R. Kozlov and N.V. Podgornyy, his chief opponents. He learned a great deal, a very great deal also from N.S. Khrushchev, who in conversation with the French statesman Guy Mollet had called Brezhnev one of his successors. By that time F.R. Kozlov had already "scratched," and Khrushchev was seeking a person to take his place who would be devoted to him personally. The well-known Western Sovietologist Paul Murphy wrote not without reason in his book "Brezhnev—Soviet Politician" that there was hardly a person in the party more devoted to Khrushchev than Brezhnev, lacking which, of course, the latter would never have moved up. However, Brezhnev began to dissatisfy Khrushchev with his behavior and would display a certain independence in his judgments and in his actions even at times, which, of course, forced Khrushchev to look for a counterweight to him from the ranks of the Presidium members of that time. He turned first of all to the Ukrainian cadres. He ruled out Kirilenko's candidacy right away since the latter was too close to Brezhnev and rested his choice on Podgornyy inasmuch as politically the latter was more dependent and, it should be said, unlike Brezhnev, less ambitious. Brezhnev took this step of Khrushchev's very hard, which subsequently prompted him to struggle for the removal of Khrushchev. With high authority in the Central Committee Secretariat and relying on his own cadres (Dnepropetrovskian and Moldavian primarily), whom, while Khrushchev was not looking, he had placed in most important areas of work, in the leadership of the armed forces and the KGB included, Brezhnev gradually accrued power. As of a particular moment he was supported by Podgornyy and Suslov, and it was this trio which headed the conspiracy against Khrushchev, and not Shelepin, as has been wrongly written by the authors of certain articles on how Khrushchev was removed, although Shelepin also played an essential part, of course.

By the will of circumstance I found myself in the past initiated into many details connected with the preparation and realization of the 1964 October Plenum, at which N.S. Khrushchev was removed from office. I consider it necessary to recall this now for the events of that year throw light also on the biography of Brezhnev himself, who replaced Khrushchev as head of the party.

A number of publications has appeared recently whose authors justifiably testify that the preparations for the plenum were of the nature of a conspiracy. Among such publications I would like to highlight primarily the diaries of Khrushchev's son—Sergey Nikitich—"Union Pensioner".

I would like to begin not with the essence of the OGONEK publication but with an exposition of my opinion of V.I. Galyakov, one of the principal heroes of the events of those years, who 25 years ago named the participants in the compact, more precisely, conspiracy against the leader of the party and the country. Of course, to be objective, he did a good, politically important thing and ran a tremendous risk for the sake of this. Nonetheless, I believe with complete conviction that he should not be made out to be a hero. I shall attempt to explain why I think this. Your author was acquainted with him at one time. He sticks in my memory with his appearance of a typical veteran of the old school, a military man. Instead of "yes," he would invariably answer to questions: "Precisely." He would openly display devotion to his "boss"—N.G. Ignatov—whom I had known quite well from joint work in the Orel region. The metamorphosis which occurred with him subsequently seems to me astounding and hard to explain. Something extraordinary affecting Galyakov personally must have happened for him to have ventured to strike at his revered chief a surprise blow. The reason was, I am sure, very serious. The information which he communicated in the past about the conspiracy being prepared against N.S. Khrushchev was undoubtedly correct. The testimony of Ignatov himself also serves, aside from all else, as grounds for so categorical an assertion.

As second secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, I called Ignatov on one of my trips to Moscow (approximately a year after the Central Committee October Plenum) in order to pay my respects, as they say. I heard in reply: "You have begun to give yourself airs somewhat, my friend. You are in Moscow and do not call on me, do not even ring me." I laughed it off: "I do not wish to take up the precious time of the president of the Russian Federation." We agreed to meet. And there I was on Delegatskaya, where the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the government were housed at that time. The conversation took place in a recreation room over a cup of tea. Following an exchange of several meaningless phrases, Ignatov, as a complete surprise to me, started literally abusing Brezhnev. "We fools," he said in his nervous fit of temper, "brought this cunning (patrikeyevna) fox to power. Look how he is appointing cadres! He is gambling on people who are dim, but convenient, and keeping those who are somewhat cleverer and stronger at a distance. You'll have to wait a long time for anything sensible from him."

Speaking of "stronger" and "cleverer" people, my hospitable host was surely referring to himself. The grievance was literally seething in him: he had done so much for the preparation of the "palace coup," and the result—black ingratitude! In the midst of the tirade he suddenly said: "Nikita (precisely "Nikita," and not "The Bug") was himself to blame. He had received a warning about the intrigues being hatched against him! Not long before his departure for Pitsunda, at a meeting at which only members of the Central Committee Presidium remained, do you know what he said? 'You, my friends, are plotting something against me. Take care, in the event of anything, I will scatter you all like whelps.'" According to Ignatov

and many of those present, this plunged people into a state of semi-shock. Getting a grip of themselves, the "friends" began to vow in chorus virtually that none of them was thinking or could have thought anything of the sort. Nonetheless, addressing Mikoyan, Khrushchev said: "Let us, Anastas Ivanovich, deal with this business and try to ascertain what kind of petty intrigues we have here."

"Mikoyan," Ignatov continued, "displayed no particular liveliness in unwinding this business.... Of course, Khrushchev was severely let down by his self-assurance. He was undoubtedly a very brainy fellow, but he came unstuck here. Otherwise Brezhnev and his lot would have failed."

The most striking and incomprehensible thing in this conversation, which is eternally etched in my memory, was the fact that Ignatov spoke about what had happened as if from the sidelines, as if having completely forgotten that he himself had been one of the principal characters in this drama.

The fate of Ignatov himself is to a large extent dramatic and instructive. He was an original, exceptional personality. Formerly a participant in the civil war and a Chekist who found himself by the will of fate in Leningrad, Ignatov, despite the fact that he had only basic education (he himself would say that he graduated from the PS, that is, the parish school), quickly showed himself to be a born leader and was promoted to executive party work. At first he worked as a party organizer of the All-Russia CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee at the "Goznak" Factory and then as first secretary of a Leningrad raykom. In 1937 he was sent as second secretary to the Kuybyshev Obkom, this being shortly after Pavel Petrovich Postyshev, already in the "glasshouse" by this time, had been appointed or elected (which in those times made no difference) first secretary of the same obkom. A short time later Postyshev was executed, and Ignatov became obkom first secretary. In this high office he developed to the utmost. Aware of his weak points when it came to agriculture, Ignatov sat down at his books. He would often seek the advice of specialists, as if sensing that it would be on account of agriculture that he would lose his high office. And this was the case. It had been too rainy a summer, and the harvest of cereals, which had been cultivated with such difficulty, was clearly in danger. Being by nature a bold, decisive and enterprising person, Ignatov took the sole step possible under those conditions: he ordered one-third of the harvest to be given out to the participants in the harvesting, and this measure helped—the harvest was saved. However, what was done did not fit within the canons and framework of that time and angered Stalin, who immediately dispatched A.I. Mikoyan to the oblast with instructions to investigate the "extraordinary situation". There was, strictly speaking, nothing to investigate, Ignatov's "fault" was obvious, and he was noisily dismissed. At the 18th party conference, which was held shortly after, he was expelled from the All-Russia CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee. His career, seemingly, which had begun so successfully, had ended ingloriously, but Ignatov was not one to be let down in such cases and submissively reconcile himself to the blows of fate. He was offered the position of oblispolkom deputy

chairman, but he begged to be allowed to stay in party work and to be given any position at all. He obviously believed that he would in this way, given a favorable confluence of circumstances, once again be able to rise. So, in fact, he did. In the Orel region, he had traveled quickly in 1940 from head of a sectoral department to obkom first secretary. He then became first secretary of the Krasnodar Kraykom and, following the 19th party congress, a member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Subsequently, second secretary of the Leningrad Obkom and simultaneously first secretary of the gorkom, first secretary of the Voronezh and Gorkiy obkoms....

In June 1957, when certain members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, among whom were Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Bulganin, were attempting to remove N.S. Khrushchev from the position of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and seize the leadership in the party and the country, it was Ignatov (and not KGB Chairman Serov, as the historian Roy Medvedev mistakenly claimed in the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY) who headed the so-called "twenty," a group of Central Committee members which included the leaders of a number of the country's most important party organizations and certain well-known statesmen and military figures. This group demanded the urgent convening of a Central Committee plenum to put a stop to the attempts of Stalin's followers to bury the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, knock the party from its chosen course and at the same time escape responsibility for Stalin's crimes, which had been perpetrated with their active assistance. The "twenty" had to overcome the most stubborn resistance of the factionalists. When the members of the "twenty" entered the building in which the Central Committee Presidium was in session, they demanded to be let into the meeting room. They conveyed this demand via N.A. Romanov, the now prospering former head of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee General Department. As he testified, his communication concerning the demand of the Central Committee members that they be admitted to the Presidium session was greeted by crude language by N.A. Bulganin, then chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who literally kicked Romanov out the door. And it was only on the third call that the members of the antiparty group agreed to begin negotiations with the "twenty," in which a considerable, decisive part, it may be said, was played by Khrushchev's statement to the effect that otherwise he would attend a meeting with the Central Committee members alone.

Following the June Plenum (1957), Ignatov, who prior to this had been working in Gorkiy, was to become a member of the Presidium and secretary of the Central Committee. However, some time later it was ascertained that he, as, incidentally, another member of the Presidium and secretary of the Central Committee, Ye.A. Furtseva, who also had actively supported N.S. Khrushchev in June 1957, was not wanted, as they say; they were expelled from the Central Committee Presidium and demoted. In November 1966, while in Chile at the head of a parliamentary

delegation, Ignatov fell ill and, upon his return to Moscow, passed away. Thus ended his turbulent life, full of collisions and rises and falls. Albeit belatedly, the then leadership of the party and the country, incidentally, paid tribute to the deceased, burying him at the Kremlin Wall, which was not vouchsafed N.S. Khrushchev even.

Having acted assertively in defense of the course of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1957, in defense of Khrushchev, 7 years after this Ignatov displayed the same, if not more, assertiveness in the conspiracy against him. He was guided not, of course, by considerations of a fundamental nature but by a grievance against Khrushchev, who had deprived him of real power, the more so in that, in his opinion, some people in the leadership were wrongfully occupying a higher position. When, however, he had convinced himself that the longed-for piece of the pie of power, on which he was so much counting, would not be coming his way and that he would have, as before, to content himself with a ceremonial position on the scale even of the biggest republic (it is, after all, only now that the situation is radically changing, but right up until the 19th party conference even the office of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was chiefly ceremonial or nominal), the grievance against Brezhnev began to torment him....

Such metamorphoses occurred not only with Ignatov, however. V.P. Mzhavanadze, then first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, obliged for his promotion, membership of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and also the conferment on him of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor precisely to Khrushchev, which he himself acknowledged, participated readily and zealously in the intrigues against him, and his motives were personal also. In a brusque, even threatening form Khrushchev had once ticked off Mzhavanadze for an incident in Tbilisi, when a concert by a famous foreign singer who had performed in broken Russian the celebrated "Katyusha" was almost ruined—Mzhavanadze had not forgotten this. Subsequently he and Khrushchev had more serious rifts, as a result of which he began to fear for the stability of his position as "leader of the Georgian people"....

In a speech at the CPSU Central Committee March (1965) Plenum Mzhavanadze, speaking about the reasons for the removal of N.S. Khrushchev, imputed to him the blame for the division of party and soviet bodies into industrial and rural. "The Central Committee members with whom I met," he declared, "expression indignation in this connection and told Khrushchev that the division would complicate matters and that it should not be done, but he was unwilling to listen to anyone." And there followed an angry tirade: "Everything was tolerated, but the members of the Central Committee did not tolerate encroachments on the party, ran out of patience and acted entirely correctly." One involuntarily wonders here: why did these "indignant" members of the Central Committee, including Mzhavanadze himself, obviously aware that the reorganization which was being undertaken would be harmful and that an "encroachment on the party" was being made, not speak about this 3 years earlier at the Central Committee

November (1962) Plenum, which discussed and decided the said issue? They did speak, but something directly opposite. "We," the same Mzhavanadze declared at the plenum, "wholly share the propositions expressed by N.S. Khrushchev to the effect that the old organizational forms are now in a sense an impediment in leadership of the party and the government. We wholly share and support N.S. Khrushchev's proposals concerning a new structure of the party authorities." Other Central Committee members expressed themselves in roughly the same spirit also, although prior to the plenum some of them really had had objections on this question.

An active participant in the conspiracy against Khrushchev was A.N. Shelepin. In the memorable days of June 1957 he, as first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, joined the above-mentioned "twenty" and was subsequently a subject of Khrushchev's constant attention. But Shelepin, obviously believing that the positions which he held (he was a CPSU Central Committee secretary and simultaneously deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Party-State Control Committee) were far beneath his possibilities, was longing for more power, the highest even. Following the October Plenum, he submitted a program whose letter and spirit were largely reminiscent of the times of Stalin's personality cult. People who knew Shelepin will unanimously maintain that, in contrast to Brezhnev, he was always a representative of the so-called hard wing. Disagreements, which in time assumed a more serious and almost open nature, began between him and the then general secretary right after the October Plenum. The rumors which spread at one time about Brezhnev's ill health were inspired, if not by Shelepin himself, then by his associates and were to have served as a means facilitating a new "changing of the guard". His associates overdid it, which accelerated Shelepin's fall.

To return to Shelepin's program, one involuntarily wonders: which Shelepin to believe? The one who delivered a speech at the 22d party congress, in which he, then KGB chairman, adduced instances of the deaths from repression of prominent party, state and military figures and totally innocent people which shocked everyone and spoke about the part in this bloody violence of certain members of the antiparty group even; to us listening to Shelepin it seemed that the speaker was speaking sincerely and convincingly. Or the Shelepin who was the author of the said program, whose Stalinist thrust was obvious.

Shelepin, as far as I am able to judge, was one of the few figures in the leadership of the country at that time who was distinguished by both intellect and great organizing capabilities and a creative bent. But oh this damned thirst for power! How many people, gifted people included, has it corrupted and destroyed, what damage it has done to the party and society! It destroyed Shelepin also, I believe.

And, finally, concerning the most experienced and, perhaps, most keen-witted of the conspirators—M.A. Suslov. It is significant that at each sharp turn of history he would suddenly come out "the winner". While largely sharing the

views of Molotov and his allies, he was in no hurry to take their part, evidently fearing that he could lose his position in the upper echelon of power. When, however, he "learned" that the "twenty" were categorically demanding the convening of a plenum and that this demand, following brief, but turbulent negotiations with a group of detailed representatives of the Central Committee Presidium (Voroshilov, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev), had been met, Suslov's position was clearly defined, and it was he who was entrusted with delivering the report "The Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich Anti-Party Group" at the Central Committee plenum convened on 22 June in the Kremlin's Sverdlov Room.

Subsequently he did much to reduce to nothing the line of the 20th CPSU Congress, prompting N.S. Khrushchev to actions manifestly contrary to this line.

It is significant that the idea of a conspiracy against Khrushchev united the most diverse people, including those who disliked one another. There were very strained relations between Shelepin and Mzhavanadze, particularly following the 22d congress. On Khrushchev's initiative Mzhavanadze was to have spoken at the congress and demanded the removal of Stalin's ashes from the mausoleum. Such an assignment was not in the least to his liking, and he "urgently took sick," as is usually said in such cases. G.D. Dzhavakhishvili, chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers, had to speak on behalf of the republic party organization. Shelepin sent the Central Committee Presidium a special memorandum in which he questioned the illness of the leader of the Georgian CP. It is easy to imagine Mzhavanadze's reaction, but in the course of the preparation for the October Plenum they drew closer together, and among friends Mzhavanadze would call Shelepin nothing other than "Sasha".

Such things have happened quite frequently in the struggle for power, incidentally. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, who treated one another with clear dislike, became allies in June 1957 in the factional group, the common goal uniting them, as they say.

Some people are now maintaining that the October Plenum was prepared in due form, in accordance with the rules and that there was no conspiracy. It is permissible to ask: why, then, were many Central Committee members worked around in advance? Why in the course of preparation for the plenum was it necessary to employ the KGB, and not the mechanism of intra-party democracy? O.I. Ivashchenko (and not Nasriddinov, as M. Sturua mistakenly indicated in NEDELYA), secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee at that time, attempted to reach N.S. Khrushchev by telephone in Pitsunda to warn him about the compact, but these attempts were blocked. The conjecture that the conspiracy succeeded because Khrushchev's opponents, deriving experience from the past, had operated skillfully has shown up in the press. This was, perhaps, the case (at least, compared with 1957), although it was not without a serious flaw which could have cost the conspirators very dear: Khrushchev knew about it!

According to V.Ye. Semichastnyy, then chairman of the KGB, some members of the top leadership were nurturing the idea of arresting N.S. Khrushchev. Even so!

The assertion of N.G. Yegorychev, former first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, contained in his interview with a special correspondent of OGONEK (Nov 6, 1989) that "it was by no means a question of a 'conspiracy' against Khrushchev but of the fact that he himself had brought matters to the point of his dismissal and that the Central Committee elected at the 22d party congress had found within itself the strength to relieve its first secretary of his duties, preventing his mistakes from spreading," is incomplete, to put it mildly, the more so in that he goes on to make the reservation: "The plenum had to be prepared, and this is a complex business, dangerous to a certain extent."

Of course, every Central Committee plenum, one at which the question of the leadership is to be decided all the more, must be carefully prepared. But prepared not secretly but on a democratic basis. In fact the preparation for this plenum was (and I believe that Yegorychev is no less and, perhaps, more aware of this than many others) of a conspiratorial or, if you will, backstage nature. This is in fact confirmed, albeit obliquely, by Yegorychev himself, who points to the danger of such a preparation, which was so real that, according to him, having learned that "Khrushchev has some information" as regards the "democratic" preparation for the coup, Brezhnev became so frightened that he was even "wholly reluctant to return from the GDR, where he was heading a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation." I believe that Yegorychev knows also that the roles had been allocated in advance among the organizers of and participants in the "preparation" and that each had the assignment of "talking" with particular Central Committee members. Yegorychev himself chatted with a group of Muscovite Central Committee members, which he himself acknowledges. Incidentally, a conversation with four or five Central Committee members cannot serve as grounds for the assertion that "the majority of Central Committee members was inwardly prepared for such a discussion" (that is, discussion of the question of the replacement of Khrushchev as first secretary of the Central Committee).

In informing OGONEK's readers about how Khrushchev was removed Yegorychev departs from the truth. When, however, he says that initially "quite good relations" took shape between himself and Brezhnev, here he is being objective. As far as Yegorychev's speech at the 23d CPSU Congress is concerned, it was, perhaps, one of the most (if not the most) apologetic in respect of Brezhnev.

Of course, the events of those days cannot be reduced merely to the conspiratorial methods of preparation of the October Plenum. It should be a question also of the objective need for changes which had become urgent at that time. Although, I repeat, however much one might wish it, there is no escaping the question of how the plenum was prepared and staged.

Let us now ask the following question. Why in so long a time of preparation for the "coup" was a comprehensive, substantive report not compiled containing not only a criticism of Khrushchev's mistakes but also a set of measures to rectify these mistakes and a more or less specific action program?

I must testify here: the report delivered at the plenum by M.A. Suslov (and it was titled as follows: "The Abnormal Situation Which Has Taken Shape in the Central Committee Presidium in Connection With Khrushchev's Incorrect Actions") did not contain an in-depth analysis of the state of affairs in the party and in society, even less a specific action program. Too much was said about "certain" persons who were close to the party leader and who had allegedly been a bad influence on him. Khrushchev's son in law, A.I. Adzhubey, came in for it particularly on account of his overseas trips. The hall erupted in the course of the report with shouts of "Shame!" and it was those who considered themselves offended by Khrushchev who were doing the shouting.

Suslov specially emphasized in his speech two points. First, the fact that he had been entrusted with setting forth the unanimous opinion of the Presidium members and candidates and also secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. True, there had been some variant readings initially. A.I. Mikoyan, for example, had proposed that Khrushchev retain the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers, but encountering the emphatic objections of the majority of members of the Presidium, he immediately withdrew his proposal. The second point was the statement that Khrushchev, recognizing the soundness of the criticism of him, had sought the Presidium's permission not to appear at the plenum. This requires clarification. The point being that, as Suslov himself acknowledged, Khrushchev had in the course of the Presidium session incorrectly heckled and had in fact rejected the criticism of him, but the pressure on the part of many members of the Presidium was so strong that Khrushchev was forced to go on the defensive and then cease his resistance.

At the end of his report Suslov declared: Khrushchev has admitted that his state of health prevents him performing the duties entrusted to him and therefore asks to be relieved of his positions. The speaker hereupon read out a written statement by N.S. Khrushchev addressed to the Central Committee plenum (instead of a speech, which he was in fact prohibited from making). The "preference" was for no debate.

All this testifies that the organizers of the conspiracy did not have complete confidence in the success of what had been planned. Having returned to Tbilisi from Moscow, Mzhavanadze, for example, was describing his travel experiences at a meeting with members of the Georgian CP Central Committee Bureau when, having purchased newspapers at one of the large stations, he failed to see in them reports of the plenum. This seemed to him a bad omen, and he had made up his mind that something unforeseen had happened even. When, however, according to him, he heard on the radio the animated voice of the announcer:

"We will broadcast the information bulletin on the CPSU Central Committee plenum," only then did he recover himself. He even, in his words, downed a glass in celebration....

Let us return, however, to the plenum itself. The decision which it adopted was in keeping with the spirit of the report. While criticizing the mistakes and shortcomings of N.S. Khrushchev, nothing was said about what to do next and how, and it was only later, at the March and September plenums (1965) and then at the 23d party congress, that measures aimed at the development of the economy and social sphere and a strengthening of the country's defense capability were mapped out.

The October Plenum has undoubtedly taken its place in history. There was truly an urgent need for changes, and it was of an objective nature, there was much that had been complicated by the displays of Khrushchevite subjectivism and voluntarism. We would note in this context that several months prior to the October Plenum there had been one further plenum—the July Plenum—which was not reported in the press, however oddly. The question of the release of L.I. Brezhnev from his duties as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was discussed (the plenum had nominated A.I. Mikoyan for this office), after which a big speech was made, surprisingly for the members of the Central Committee Presidium, by N.S. Khrushchev, who made it understood that the Central Committee plenum scheduled for November would tackle questions connected with the reorganization of agriculture and reform in the science field.

None of this could have aroused enthusiasm, people were fed up to the teeth with reorganizations, and they were perceived as another manifestation of Khrushchev's subjectivism.

While having done much for the surmounting of Stalin's personality cult, in time Khrushchev himself found himself in the grip of this most dangerous disease, perceiving as his due the streams of glorification addressed to him which poured forth from the newspapers and platforms. As chief editor of the CPSU Central Committee journal AGITATOR, I summoned up courage, as they say, at the start of the 1960's and addressed a letter to N.S. Khrushchev, the burden of which, if one overlooks the diplomatic subterfuges, amounted to the fact that Nikita Sergeyevich himself should apply the brakes to the glorification which had begun to engulf the party and the country. The letter adduced specific instances of this and wrote that people singing the praises of the leader of the party and the country were frequently doing so far from disinterestedly, that they were hereby doing the party leader a well-intentioned, but bad turn and that relapses into a personality cult could do both the party and society great harm....

There was no reaction to the letter, although, before sending it, I had dialed Shuyskiy, N.S. Khrushchev's assistant, who had promised not only to read the letter but, if necessary, report it to Nikita Sergeyevich. As can be seen, it was not "necessary". I must confess that at that time I went through a good deal inasmuch as my appeal to

N.S. Khrushchev could have taken a most unpleasant turn for me, he was an unpredictable man, after all.

Some people are today attempting to dispute the fact that N.S. Khrushchev sincerely endeavored to make changes in the outmoded political and economic mechanism and that he wished to improve people's life, the life, particularly, of those who had for years and decades huddled together in basements and wooden huts. A great deal was done for the solution of these and other questions, but inconsistently, unfortunately. The reforms which were undertaken at that time were not backed by profound democratic transformations, which reduced to nothing the progressive initiatives and reforms. The big hopes born of the new party policy and the ideas of the 20th CPSU Congress were gradually replaced by skepticism and unconcealed, bitter disenchantment even. Gennadiy Ivanovich Voronov, who at that time was a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, writes in the journal DRUZHBA NARODOV (No 1, 1989) how hopes for profound transformations reminiscent of the present perestroika "were glimpsed fleetingly and disappeared". And he honestly admits: "Responsibility for the fact that the possibility of a fundamental change in the life of the country remained unrealized is borne before the party and the people by us leaders of that time. It is far more difficult acknowledging such a mistake than any other, but this is essential and all the more essential today, when the repetition of such a mistake would be, in the full sense, fatal."

Nonetheless, one thing seems to me absolutely indisputable: whatever Khrushchev's opponents and ill-wishers then and now maintain and however contradictory his personality, history will pay tribute to him for many things. Khrushchev was able to remove Beriya from the leadership; had the latter come to be at the helm of power—and such a danger was entirely real—our society would have experienced many grim disasters and tragedies. After this, Khrushchev did away with the concentration camps and released and rehabilitated half a million innocent victims of the Stalin-Beriya terror. Finally, the extremely courageous exposure of Stalin's personality cult, which abruptly changed Soviet society and initiated its renovation—all this contributed also to the transition from the cold war to peaceful coexistence with the West.

Even Suslov, addressing the Central Committee October (1964) Plenum, was forced to declare that the general line formulated at the 20th, 21st and 22d congresses, to whose elaboration N.S. Khrushchev had made a certain (?) contribution, was correct and inviolable and that mention should be made of his positive role in the exposure of Stalin's personality cult, the pursuit of Lenin's policy of states' peaceful coexistence and the struggle for peace and friendship between peoples and that it would be wrong to forget these contributions of Khrushchev. This acknowledgment is all the more important inasmuch as we now know under what circumstances it was made.

There is no doubt that the time had come for N.S. Khrushchev to step down from the top positions in the party and the state, if only from age considerations.

However, "our Nikita Sergeyevich" (a film which was being shown extensively at that time referred to him precisely thus) lacked the resolve to tender his resignation. True, as certain authors, including his own son, Sergey Nikitich, testify, Khrushchev intended doing this at the next party congress. But the congress was still far off. This is still unprecedented in our Soviet history, incidentally (if we do not count K.U. Chernenko's deliberations on the possibility of his resignation not long before his death, about which we learned from A.A. Gromyko's memoirs "Things Remembered"). Yet this should essentially be a customary phenomenon. It is very important to quit executive work, in the upper echelons included, in good time, for a leader, all the more. This is not only in the interests of the party and all of society but also in the interests of those who are retiring to their deserved rest.

I recall that in the mid-1970's the Western press forecast that Brezhnev would retire at the 25th congress in 1976, when he would be 70 years of age. Alas, this occurred neither in 1976 nor later. Brezhnev gave no thought to retirement, and, as party documents subsequently emphasized, the growing discrepancy between the high principles of socialism and the daily reality had become utterly intolerable. Of course, the Brezhnev regime was the main source of the stagnation, I am entirely in agreement here with the authors of the publications on that period of our history. However, I do not wish to oversimplify—the roots of the stagnation lay not only in the personality of Brezhnev but primarily in the imperfection of our political institutions, including the party itself, which, of course, by no means precludes the personal political responsibility of the persons who in the stagnation years constituted the country's party and state leadership. Why did many of them reconcile themselves to the situation? Why was that same Brezhnev not told plainly and honestly that it was time for him to leave his post since this was demanded by the interests of the party and the people? In the event of Brezhnev's unwillingness to retire, this question could have been resolved within the framework of democratic rules and structures, out in the open, as is the case in certain Western communist parties. Tengiz Georgiyevich Avaliani, a Kemerovo communist and director of the Kiselevsk Footwear Factory, found within himself the courage on the threshold of the 26th CPSU Congress to write a letter to Brezhnev in which he essentially urged the addressee to retire. The author wrote that "delay in a revision of the fundamentals of the methods of leadership" of Soviet society and the people, a delay for a further 5 years, even more, "could prove costly," that the situation in the country was very serious, that "we cannot be reconciled to it and... become bogged down in it" and that for this reason "it should be discussed seriously and without delay in the Politburo also," that "this question should be the main one on the congress' agenda" and that "the congress and the preparations for it cannot be allowed to once again develop into one big laudatory, theatricalized performance." The letter said candidly and forthrightly that the Politburo and the government had failed to cope with the duties entrusted to them.

As was to have been expected, the letter was seen as seditious and as an "attack on the foundations". The contents of the letter were reported to K.U. Chernenko, who instructed that a call to be made to the Kemerovo Obkom and the author "investigated". Avaliani was dismissed as factory director, and it is not known what shape his life would have taken had perestroika not begun in the country. The publication of the letter was important also.

I have not addressed myself to Avaliani's letter fortuitously. The substantiated nature of the demands it made concerning the need for decisive changes in the party and society were well understood by those in the top echelon of power also. It would be wrong to think that there were no people in the leadership of the party and the country counteracting the inordinate elevation of Brezhnev and the policy which he pursued.

Melor Sturua, for example, writes in NEDELYA (24-30 October 1988) about how in the years of Brezhnev's rule "Kirilenko, who had become carried away," was removed, about the "taming of the refractory Shelest" and about the punishment of "the mutinous Yegorychev". Another commentator, Fedor Burlatskiy, adduces in his article "Brezhnev and the End of the Thaw" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 September 1988) a fact from the life of N.G. Yegorychev, at that time first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, who in conversation with a leader said: "Leonid Ilich is a good man, of course, but is he suitable as leader of such a country?" "These words," the author goes on, "cost him dear, as did, incidentally, his unconcealed criticism at a Central Committee plenum of military policy."

It should be said that the authors at times make an exaggerated and not always accurate evaluation of such facts. In respect of "Kirilenko, who had become carried away," for example, there is altogether some misunderstanding here. There is, it is true, information indicating that his relations with Brezhnev in 1978-1979 had cooled and that this had entailed a certain decline in Kirilenko's influence in the top party hierarchy, in which he had found himself solely thanks to Brezhnev. But may this serve as grounds for assertions concerning some confrontation between him and Brezhnev?

As far as the "refractory Shelest" is concerned, without disputing such a character trait of his as refractoriness, I would nonetheless say that no one "tamed" him and that he was sent, as someone wittily remarked, "without fuss and bustle" [play on the Russian "shelest"] into retirement (which he himself recently publicly acknowledged). This had been easily accomplished inasmuch as he enjoyed no particular popularity and had the reputation of being a person with strong nationalist ways and a supporter of a hard line.

Now specially about N.G. Yegorychev. Nor do I believe that there are grounds for calling his speech at the June (1967) Plenum "mutinous". As a participant in the plenum, which proved unlucky for Yegorychev, I can attest that the part of his speech in which he criticized shortcomings in the organization of air defense afforded no grounds

for the organizational conclusions which followed. It was merely a certain "stirring of the air," but it stuck in the minds of the listeners merely for the fact that such "stirrings" were at that time extremely rare. I am profoundly convinced that the speaker was looking in delivering the criticism for the support of Brezhnev himself since he was guided merely by good intentions, and his speech in this respect was in addition of the nature of self-criticism inasmuch as Yegorychev himself was a member of the Moscow Air Defense District Military Council. But what Yegorychev had not learned was that he was intruding into a closed zone whose curator, together with D.F. Ustinov, was the general secretary himself. This is why matters took, surprisingly for the majority of participants in the plenum, an abrupt turn. A break was announced early, and after the break, the speakers (including Mzhavanadze) began their speeches, which had been prepared in advance, with a slating of Yegorychev, in virtually identical words, what is more. Brezhnev devoted his wordy concluding remarks almost entirely to Yegorychev, showing that the Central Committee was concerning itself much and consistently with the country's defenses, air defense in particular. It was clear: Yegorychev's fate was predetermined. Yet the day before I had learned from reliable sources, as they say, that it had been contemplated electing Yegorychev secretary of the Central Committee at this plenum. He had before this been together with Brezhnev in Georgia, and we had heard this news at that time even, and I was honestly happy for Yegorychev inasmuch as I knew him quite well and had always had (and still have!) sincere respect for him.

When, however, fate played an unexpectedly dirty trick on him, I was very unhappy for him, as, incidentally, for our "superdemocratic" practices also.

As far as the words let out by Yegorychev in conversation "with a leader" are concerned, had they been known to Brezhnev, Nikolay Grigoryevich's fate would have been far more dramatic, and the question of his promotion would not have arisen.

Nonetheless, there were people who truly put up serious opposition to Brezhnev. Aside from Shelepin and Podgornyy, whom with the aid of his assistants Brezhnev literally forced out of the Politburo and, simultaneously, from their high office, fearing that he would lose sole authority, there was A.N. Kosygin also. His disagreements with Brezhnev were fundamental. Kosygin championed economic priorities in domestic policy, believing that it was on this basis that it was necessary to raise the working people's material well-being. In foreign policy he advocated detente and trade with the West. It was Kosygin who initiated the 1965 economic reform. He considered the most important condition of its accomplishment freedom of action in management of the economy, which was to have been exercised by the government. And to this day arguments appear in the press to the effect that this reform was foiled on account of the opposition of government officials, in the localities in particular. All this is at least naive. The reform was undoubtedly killed "upstairs," and not least owing to Brezhnev's begrudging attitude toward Kosygin.

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin enjoyed deserved authority both in our country and abroad and was an experienced, competent statesman. I would note, incidentally, that when a paragraph appeared in the press to the effect that Kosygin's assistants had been virtual Cerberuses protecting their boss from the people, I was beside myself at the manifest injustice of such an assertion—Kosygin was a democratic individual, and a trait of his character was a strongly developed sense of justice.

From petty deviations and incompetent interference Brezhnev, setting himself the goal of weakening the positions of A.N. Kosygin and the government which he headed, moved on to more tangible actions. I recall the CPSU Central Committee December (1969) Plenum devoted to questions of the economy. It was unusual inasmuch as it was for the first time in many years, perhaps, that the government was so sharply criticized. The scenario was typical, it was true: speakers rose one after the other and, while directing their barbs chiefly in the direction of the Gosplan, they were in fact aiming at the government and Kosygin, who headed it. Some speeches, particularly that of Georgiyev, at that time first secretary of the Altay Kraykom, who did not even speak but literally shouted, as if at a large meeting, were distinguished by manifest bias, inordinate peremptoriness and, what is most important, a lack of arguments and scandalous indelicacy.

Seated at the presidium table, Kosygin listened patiently and, it seemed to me, very closely to the speakers. However, one could not fail to notice that he was nervous, although he was by nature a man of enormous forbearance. Many of us were expecting Kosygin to speak, but the speaker was not he but Gosplan Chairman N.K. Baybakov. While acknowledging the justice of a number of critical observations, he calmly, but very convincingly showed on the basis of facts the true state of affairs in the economy, in agriculture particularly. Having set forth the objective and subjective causes of this situation, he thereby showed the utter groundlessness of the crude attacks on the Gosplan (read: the government). The same Georgiyev, for example, had complained that their (sic) region was not being allocated sufficient resources for the development of agriculture, but Baybakov adduced figures which made it clear that the Altay people had failed to assimilate even the resources which had been allocated....

In 1976 Kosygin became seriously ill. Some people deliberately set in motion and exaggerated rumors to the effect that, after he was released from hospital, he would be unable to perform his duties as USSR Council of Ministers chairman. N.A. Tikhonov, a friend and fellow countryman of L.I. Brezhnev, was appointed to the position of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in order that in the near future he could be made head of the government. Of course, this promotee could not hold a candle to Kosygin, and his popularity was on the zero mark. But what did this matter to those who were backing him and who valued personal devotion higher than professional attributes and who put personal interests higher than the interests of the state....

I shall speak separately about Tikhonov's predecessor, Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov. I had an opportunity to meet him when he was first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. He made a very pleasing impression. His authority in the republic was strong and entirely deserved. Having become first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, K.T. Mazurov proved a good support for the head of the government and put his best foot forward. But he was evidently not much to Brezhnev's liking since he was considered, first, a person who had been promoted by Kosygin and, second, he never attempted to please the "leader". Understandably, his premature departure from active work "owing to the state of his health" surprised no one. I would note in passing that Mazurov's return to public activity could not have failed to have gratified all who had known him earlier. In the "stagnation" times Mazurov's fate was decided conclusively, as he himself recently recounted, by his clash with the general secretary on a relatively delicate matter, this concerning the indecorous behavior of Brezhnev's daughter—Galina Leonidovna—who got away with all her "tricks". In addition, I would note in passing that the members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat of that time deemed it possible even to confer on this child... the order of the Labor Red Banner in connection with her 50th birthday, which was celebrated in very sumptuous fashion....

And, finally, about one further "dissident"—the above-mentioned Gennadiy Ivanovich Voronov. I was not personally acquainted with him and judge him from speeches at plenums and Central Committee Secretariat meetings and from how in the past he conducted meetings of the CPSU Central Committee Bureau on the RSFSR. Voronov impressed me as a particularly businesslike and very scrupulous executive. As he himself has acknowledged, Brezhnev's assumption of office was for him a surprise, which he greeted, to judge by everything, negatively. While holding the position of head of the RSFSR Government and then chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee and as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Voronov always had the courage to express and defend his own viewpoint on such questions as, specifically, the building of the Kama Truck Plant and the Cheboksary GES and the appointment of that same Shchelokov as interior minister. I know that he took a negative view of the decision to commit our troops to Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which I judge from the fact of his speech in Novosibirsk to members of the obkom bureau, in which he plainly and unambiguously evaluated this step of the leadership as profoundly mistaken, making it understood that he had expressed this viewpoint in the Politburo also. Such a position under those conditions could only have been adopted by a person of great personal courage, and it was not fortuitous that he ultimately became unwelcome to Brezhnev....

I repeat: I touch on the problem merely from the viewpoint of the political responsibility of the leadership of the country at that time for the adoption of decisions like the commitment of troops to Czechoslovakia, and there is plenty of room for discussion here. First, this decision was

not made by the full Politburo. The most active part was played by Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Andropov, Kosygin (he also, unfortunately!), Shelest and some other Politburo members. Second, may such fundamental issues be the prerogative merely of the Central Committee Politburo? Neither a Central Committee plenum or a USSR Supreme Soviet session were convened. Of course, given the practices and traditions which existed at that time, they would most likely have "rubber-stamped" the Politburo decision, as was usually the case, but Brezhnev and his associates did not even attempt to create even a semblance of a democratic approach. Not to mention the fact that nothing was said either before the events or after about either the true events in Czechoslovakia or the reason why troops were committed. In addition, our central newspapers frequently published unobjective material which Czechoslovak satirical journals would reprint without any comment or correction because their content was patently to our disadvantage.

The journalists who witnessed the "Prague Spring" of 1968 described in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (No 35, 28 August 1988) the difficulties with which their work in Czechoslovakia had been attended. Events in the fraternal country were growing by the day, and the journalists, of course, felt an understandable and burning need to describe them to Soviet people, but nothing got into print. And then Brezhnev flew to Prague. Availing themselves of a suitable moment, Aleksandr Didusenko (then correspondent of TRUD) and Vasiliy Zhuravskiy (correspondent of PRAVDA) turned to him for help: "What are we supposed to do, what should we write?" and heard in reply: "Write the truth." Then Brezhnev bethought himself and added: "In a single copy." He thought some more and concluded, poking his finger at his assistant: "Addressed to him." A whole 20 years were to elapse before the journalists could tell the truth not just in one but in a multitude of copies, and they expressed here a very important idea concerning lessons of the past. One of these lessons is this: the political problems of another country and another nation cannot be solved by military force, this is all a dangerous illusion, and history does not forgive such steps. Situations wherein one country arrogates to itself the right to decide something for the other must not arise in relations between socialist countries. Respect for this principle is the surest guarantee of a nonrepetition of the 1968 events. Policy must not be unscrupulous, such a policy is disastrous for those who adopt it and attempt to interfere from outside in internal processes occurring in other countries for the purpose of altering them after their own fashion.

I recall how, following the 1968 Czechoslovak events, a small group of Soviet communists went to France at the invitation of the French CP Central Committee. Wherever you looked, anti-Soviet slogans abounded, nor did the French communists themselves conceal their negative attitude toward the commitment of Soviet forces and those of the Warsaw Pact to Czechoslovakia. I recall the anger with which we were told this at meetings in various parts of the country. A Brezhnev speech, on the other hand, attempted to justify the legitimacy of the commitment of troops to Czechoslovakia, which served as the pretext for talk about

the "Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the socialist countries" and undermined the authority of the CPSU and the country....

Brezhnev's assumption of leadership of the party and the country did not yet afford him the actual sole authority which he acquired somewhat later. There were people in the leadership, as was shortly revealed, capable of challenging him. It was for this reason that official documents of that time persistently emphasized the need for strict compliance with the principle of the collective nature of the party leadership and that Brezhnev's name was specified only in rare instances. But this did not last long. Brezhnev was a sharp tactician and made skillful use of the most diverse levers to achieve his ends. He actively supported officials who were personally devoted to him and distributed offices to his friends and schoolfellows, who got away with every conceivable transgression. Changes soon occurred in the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, as a result of which Brezhnev's power was consolidated, and by the mid-1970's it was essentially undivided.

Brezhnev skillfully latched onto the lessons of history, one of which he knew by heart: since Stalin's times a decisive weapon for consolidating power had been the establishment of a dominating position in the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat and also in the central machinery. The example of Malenkov, this most experienced, double-dealed apparatchik, whom people were able—and how!—to fool, proved this once again. It is known that after the death of Stalin the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers was offered to Malenkov. There naturally arose the question: but what will his position in the Central Committee be? As I was told by people in the know, it was declared with N.S. Khrushchev's prompting: there was something similar with Lenin, let Malenkov chair sessions of the Politburo, although he is not a Central Committee secretary. The dodge worked, as they say, and Malenkov did preside for some time at sessions of the Politburo, but at one of them the question was reasonably raised: why, in fact, does G.M. Malenkov occupy a leading position in the party's leading authority? Malenkov said in confusion: was it not you yourselves decided it this way, you who cited the practice under Lenin? He was told in reply: how can you make the comparison, Lenin was the leader of the party recognized by everyone....

The first thing Brezhnev did was to consolidate his positions in the executive boards of the Central Committee and his staff and only then did he lay his hands on the highest state authority also. K.T. Mazurov was undoubtedly right when he said in a recent interview that Brezhnev was a good pupil of the Stalin administrative-command system. Adroitly employing the "method" of this system, he gradually created a secretariat which was obedient to him and with whose help he could carry his policy and decisions through the Politburo, transferring the latter into a second echelon, as it were (it was no accident that Politburo sessions often lasted just 15-20 minutes). In time this enabled him to concentrate in his hands all the most important levers of party and state power. However, I am

not in agreement in all things with Mazurov, who now, while paying tribute to Khrushchev for the good that he did, believes that the reason for the abrupt decline in his popularity in the party and among the people and the ferment and excitement among the intelligentsia were Nikita Sergeyevich's mistakes, for which he was ousted. But there then arises the logical question: had not Brezhnev's popularity sunk by the mid-1970's to zero? Was there not then also "excitement" and unconcealed discontent with all that was happening, including the leader's incompetence and the selection and appointment of cadres from the ranks of fellow countrymen and friends? Had Brezhnev not in fact buried the principle of the collective nature of leadership? In that case, why was he not removed from the leadership, as Khrushchev had been removed in October 1964? Mazurov claims today that he, like many other participants in the October Plenum, was guided primarily by a desire "to restore the good name" of our ideological and party-political work. But why, in that case, did the same desire not arise in the Brezhnev era?

K.T. Mazurov expresses the thought that all policy must not be concentrated in the hands just of the leader of the party inasmuch as if it is incorrect, the blame for all shortcomings and failures lies on the party, and this is harmful for society. But it was precisely this which occurred under Brezhnev! And? Where was the Politburo? K.T. Mazurov himself correctly defines its role as the organ of political leadership whose job is not only the formulation and implementation of party policy but also the prevention of deformations and a departure from the Leninist rules and principles of party leadership. It was this role, as he himself admits, which the Politburo failed to perform, and even the members of the Politburo (Mazurov himself included) who disapproved of Brezhnev's behavior and actions and who were pained by the intolerable situation which had been created did nothing in any way effective and efficient. But why? Mazurov honestly confesses that "It was not in my interests to enter into some confrontation with the leader, even if I disagreed with him." And he hereupon explains why: "I was held back by the constant squabbling in our party and foreigners' opinion. I personally heard many reproaches from foreign communists: 'When will it end with you? You exposed Stalin, you ousted (!) Khrushchev, you are unhappy with Brezhnev.... No stability.'" Concerning the causes of the cult syndrome, Mazurov cites together with the need for a "good master" and the lack of culture "concern for party unity and the fear of weakening it."

Leaving aside the subject of the "good master" and the lack of culture and also the reproaches of foreign communists, which, incidentally, were far from unequivocal, let us touch on such a highly fundamental issue as the understanding of party unity and concern for its authority. The above-mentioned position reminds me very much of other, Stalin, times, when certain important and meritorious figures of our party and representatives of the Lenin Guard (including Bukharin, Rykov and others) consciously for the sake of misunderstood unity made a deal with their conscience and in fact waived party interests. When, however, subsequently they attempted to oppose Stalin,

who had flouted Lenin's standards of party life, it was too late. After all, Lenin never detached unity from intra-party democracy and believed that they should constitute an organic, interconnected and interdependent whole, without which the normal development of the party is impossible. And when, now, we encounter the assertion that even under Lenin with his immense authority pluralism and democracy did not sit all that comfortably with unity, we cannot, I profoundly believe, agree with this.

Returning to the Brezhnev era, I would say that the bitter and repeated lessons of history were forgotten at that time, for which we once again paid too high a price. Those who did not close their eyes operated locally and in scattered fashion and were for this reason, not having attained their ends, jettisoned.

An instrument of which Brezhnev made maximum use, as K.T. Mazurov acknowledged, was the servility of his closest associates. And he again finds an excuse for this. "Yes, we would sometimes (?) utter quotations from Brezhnev since these were references not to the thoughts of Brezhnev but to the party's purpose expressed through his mouth. Yes, we would sometimes have some kind words to say, but this is customary among people. It cannot be considered from just this that we were creating a cult." But the point of his subsequent arguments amounts to the fact that most to blame were the journalists, who were too florid in their portrayal of Brezhnev's merits. But was this the case? As if realizing his error, K.T. Mazurov expresses the thought that "we need to understand who started it, perhaps it was the repository of the cult himself."

The "repository" did not sit on his hands, of course, but his associates also did a tolerable amount of "work" on him, creating the Brezhnev personality cult, which it is more accurate to call the cult of office. Shortly after the October Plenum, the glorification mechanism was triggered with might and main. Impetus of considerable importance for this was the transformation undertaken by the 23d CPSU Congress of the Central Committee Presidium into the Politburo and the restoration of the office of general secretary. It is interesting to note in this context that this situation had persisted up to the 17th party congress, after which the Central Committee plenum no longer elected the general secretary, and Stalin's name in the listing of the Secretariat was mentioned merely in alphabetical order, what is more. There were reasons for this, which we will not go into here. Let us say merely that for Stalin, who held the said office from April 1922 through February 1934, the prefix "general" was of a purely formal nature inasmuch as by that time he was in fact already the undisputed leader of the party and its executive boards, although, for example, L.B. Kamenev, A.P. Smirnov and N.B. Eysmont believed that he was unsuitable for this role.

It was said in justification of the expediency of the restitution of the office of general secretary at the 23d congress that this office had been introduced following the 11th congress on Lenin's initiative. And although the proposal for the restitution of the office of general secretary was

made at the congress by N.G. Yegorychev, at that time secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, it was obvious to all that it had been inspired by the upper strata, more precisely, Brezhnev himself. The argument for the proposal concerning the renaming of the Central Committee Presidium of the Politburo was once again the fact that it had been instituted thus in Lenin's time even.

The name of Lenin would continue to be used repeatedly as a cover in those years. An exchange of party cards began in 1973, and the media informed the whole world that the hand of L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had signed party card #00000001 in the name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin; it was reported literally the next day that party card #00000002 had been presented to Leonid Ilich himself. Those who had inspired these "procedures" were not even embarrassed by the fact that V.I. Lenin's biography (1960 edition) contained a photograph of Lenin's party card #114482, which he had been issued in 1922 and which was signed by the secretary of the Zamoskvoretskiy Raykom (raykom, not Central Committee!). The party card issued to Lenin in 1917 and signed by I.V. Chugurin, a member of the Vyborgskiy Raykom and a student of Ilich's at the Lonzhyumo Party School, had the number 600. As far as party card #1 is concerned, it was issued to St Petersburg worker G.F. Fedorov, an active participant in the October Revolution, in whose house Lenin hid prior to his departure for Razliv. People may read about this splendid Bolshevik on page 565 of volume 50 of V.I. Lenin's "Complete Works".

The popularity of the new party leader was falling catastrophically. The country's new leadership had attempted with the "dodge" involving the writing out of party card #1 in the name of V.I. Lenin and party card #2 in the name of Brezhnev to artificially prove the "continuity" of Leninist policy ("From Ilich to Ilich!"). Brezhnev's closest associates did everything to support their "boss," and it was none other than the "gray cardinal" Suslov, as he was called, who proposed the implementation of a number of measures to shore up L.I. Brezhnev's authority, linking this with the latter's approaching 70th birthday. It was planned, *inter alia*, preparing for publication the book "Leonid Ilich Brezhnev. Concise Biographical Outline". This merits a special mention, the more so in that the will of fate decreed that I head this work, performing the Central Committee assignment. I will describe it if only for the sake of repentance.

Once, when the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism was on leave and I, as first deputy, was acting director, I was suddenly summoned to Mikhail Vasilyevich Zimyanin, at that time secretary of the Central Committee, who was in charge of ideology matters. Right at the start of the interview I was told: "There is an assignment for the prompt preparation and publication of a concise biographical outline of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev. Size, of the order of 8-10 sheets. Deadline, 6 months." When the talk got around to the content of the work, the occupant of the office suddenly threw out the words: "Just as long as it is not all sniveling and wailing!" I will say honestly that these words both surprised and gladdened me. None of this tied

in with the general tone of our propaganda of that time and the unchecked glorification which was flourishing then. I was very much against our institute participating in a campaign to create a new cult. I shared my thoughts with Mikhail Vasilyevich. He smiled archly and, after a certain pause, said that on all questions connected with the preparation and publication of the MS I should address him or Suslov directly.

Without going into details, I will say merely that we ran into big difficulties in performing the assignment we had been given inasmuch as there was insufficient material of a purely biographical nature—as distinct from in the West, it had not been customary publishing such information. Lest we made fools of ourselves, we asked CPSU Central Committee comrades to send us the registration form of CPSU member L.I. Brezhnev, which contained merely the barest biographical information. The rest had to be scrupulously unearthed, as was done, for example, by the assistants of Ye.M. Tyazhelnikov, at that time first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, who ultimately discovered an issue of the house organ of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Foundry and in there a paragraph containing praise of party group organizer Leonid Brezhnev. Not, seemingly, much of a find, but when Tyazhelnikov mentioned it in his speech at the party congress, this had the "necessary" effect.... The unfortunately celebrated "auto-biographical" Brezhnev trilogy, written by the spirited pens of those who were also "on assignment," was to appear subsequently....

But, to be honest, there was not particularly that much searching and time spent because what was connected with Brezhnev's biography took up little space. We tried to speak more about the activity of the party and its Central Committee. We were not overzealous when it came to glorification, although there had to be some for we were pushed into this by the very genre and nature of the book. I will say further that, on account of the deadline and the specifics, this MS required tremendous effort.... In working on it and publishing it we by no means laid claim to any laurels and did not advertise it since the work was anonymous. Although some people made transparent hints as regards "proper entry," to be completely candid, this publication added to the institute no laurels. I recall how the head of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Secretariat once brought me this booklet and explained that it had been sent in by a reader with his comments, which were inside. Free from urgent business, I began to leaf through our unfortunate work that had been sent us by a reader, and it transpired that almost every page of the book had been scored through crosswise in colored pencil and that inscriptions had been made on many pages: "Why omitted?" "nonsense," "dog's mess," "it is high time Brezhnev quit. Where is he heading and leading the country?" "Why, for what contributions this 'shower of gold'?" "Was the outcome of the war really decided on the Little Land?" "The Order of Victory is given only to generals. What the hell kind of general is Brezhnev? All this has been done by lickspittles and toadies from Brezhnev's entourage. Shame and disgrace on them!" And all in the same spirit, and in parts somewhat more trenchant even.

Reading this was not, of course, pleasant but there was, after all, no reason to object, the less so in that by the endeavors of vassals a golden shower of stars and every conceivable award and honor was truly coming down in a Niagaran cascade on Brezhnev at that time. Speeches were heard from a variety of platforms, the very highest included, which were more and more reminiscent of celebratory toasts. I would note, incidentally, that at the Central Committee October (1964) Plenum Suslov had with righteous indignation branded Khrushchev for the fact that the latter had impudently promoted the exaltation and eulogizing of his personality and that obsequious persons had done everything to ensure that his photographs and terribly long speeches were published in virtually every newspaper issue. Following this tirade, the hall rang with applause, and no one suspected, of course, that time would pass and that new obsequious persons, among whom would be Suslov himself, creating a Brezhnev cult, would be operating far more actively and purposively. The same Khrushchev had attempted from the congress platform, if only to restore order, to take a hand in the unduly ardent eulogizers; this did not even occur to Brezhnev. The eulogizers were not in the least embarrassed by the fact that glorification of a leader diminishes the role of the party's collective authorities and that, like a poison, it slowly, but surely takes its destructive course.

One of those who actively contributed to the glorification of the "leader" was K.U. Chernenko, who was commended with the highest awards and honors, including the conferment, in private, it is true, of the Lenin Prize for participation in... the modernization of a Kremlin building.

Since we are talking of Chernenko, I will say that I knew him quite well from joint work in a sector (he was in charge of it at that time) of the Central Committee Ideology Department. By nature reserved and taciturn, he did not open up very easily. It is usually said of such people: "he keeps his own counsel," which generally corresponded to the nature of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. Conscientious, efficient and a red tape-monger to the core of his being, he always endeavored and knew how to please the authorities: to say something or other apropos and to maintain, in good time, a portentous silence if other circumstances had taken shape. Being no expert when it came to writing reports, he made skillful use of the possibilities of others, squeezing out of officials subordinate to him the maximum possible, in matters also, what is more, which were not even a part of their immediate duties. He possessed an utterly amazing flair in respect of the acceptability or unacceptability of this document or the other which was being prepared in the sector, subtly and almost impeccably divining circumstances and the demands of the moment.

Chernenko's cherished dream was the position of deputy head of the department since he had a very good relationship with L.F. Illichev, head of the department at that time. The dream was close to being realized, had not L.I. Brezhnev, who, putting together his staff, first off summoned K.U. Chernenko to offer him the post of chief of the chairman's staff, become chairman of the USSR

Supreme Soviet Presidium. He was given only a day to think about it, and it was on that very day that Chernenko was to have given Brezhnev an answer that I called on him on some urgent business. And what did I see? My boss was sitting there, head in both hands, in a black mood, on the point of crying. Pushing aside quite off-handedly the report which I had brought, he suddenly told me, after a long and agonizing pause, about the offer which Brezhnev had made him. Such an attack of candor occurred with him only in the most exceptional circumstances. "If only you knew how I do not want to do this!" he told me. "But what can I do? Refusing would mean ruining relations with Brezhnev, and this could cost me dear."

He gave his consent to Brezhnev, although the new position was for him essentially a demotion. Considerably later Chernenko became chief of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat, and his status was thereby noticeably enhanced. Our ways parted with his departure from the Central Committee. To be honest, I believed that he would now become a fixture in his new field, the more so in that he was entirely suited to the said office. And, of course, I could not imagine what an unexpected turn events would take just 3 or 4 years later and what changes would take place in Chernenko's life.

When Brezhnev became leader of the party and the country, it could with a great deal of probability have been assumed that he would have transferred Chernenko to the Central Committee and, most likely, to the office of head of the General Department, and for this reason the appointment of the latter to the said office did not surprise me, nor could it have. I had the passing thought, I recall, at that time: "He has now reached his ceiling." Many of those who knew of Chernenko's possibilities thought the same way, probably. And when the latter was elected a secretary of the Central Committee, remaining at the same time head of the General Department—even this could still have been explained by some things and understood, although even this was greatly overdoing it. His subsequent takeoff was, as they say, fantastic, particularly if one refers to his election as general secretary. Even considering our "practices" of those times, this simply cannot be taken in.

The qualities of Chernenko which I mentioned above enabled him to become a middling (and that for his time) deputy head of department and even the head of, say, the General Department, in which he was able, I repeat, to display his inherent qualities and proclivities. For the role, however, of chief ideologist of the party, of general secretary even, he was utterly unsuited, lacking for this the intelligence and erudition, the political imagination, overall breeding and organizer's capabilities. I recall in this connection 1983, the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum, Yu.V. Andropov's speech and K.U. Chernenko's report. Both the speech and the report had been prepared by teams of apparatchiks with the participation of scholars. However, listening to Andropov, it was clear to all that he had done additional work on the prepared material and inserted in it much that was his own which had been comprehended in depth and experienced over

the years. The report made no such impression, not to mention the fact that the "chief ideologist of the party" (and Chernenko ranked as such at that time) frequently stumbled and mispronounced many words. In the lobbies it was said openly: what have we come to? What was it like, however, subsequently, when Chernenko became leader of the party and the country!

It should be said that Chernenko laid claim to the office of general secretary of the Central Committee immediately following the death of Brezhnev.

The choice of candidates for this office, in accordance with the conditions of that time, was very limited—either Chernenko or Andropov, and it objectively resulted in a real struggle developing around them. Precisely struggle, for not all was as simple as is sometimes depicted by our press, oversimplifying a most complex situation: "a special CPSU Central Committee plenum was held the day after the country had learned of the death of the leader," "there was just one item on the agenda—the election of a new general secretary," "the day before this very question had been discussed at an emergency session of the Politburo, which had instructed Konstantin Chernenko to propose to the participants in the plenum the candidacy of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee"—all, I repeat, simple, but in reality much was far from being so.

Although Chernenko's ambitions were absolutely without foundation, he had support in the Politburo on the part of those who were perfectly suited by the atmosphere of lack of supervision, license and permissiveness which had come about in the country and who had no desire for and feared changes in the life of the party and society—Kunayev, Tikhonov, Romanov....

Whatever, victory was nonetheless on the side of Yu.V. Andropov, and it was only then that the Politburo did indeed instruct Chernenko to speak at the Central Committee plenum held on 12 November 1982. His speech was, in the main, devoted to the departed leader, about whom he spoke as having been a gifted continuer of Lenin's cause and great and indomitable fighter for the ideals of peace, a man who lived the interests of society and the people and an outstanding leader who had bequeathed the party and the people a precious legacy and about the fact that the rules of our life under Brezhnev had become exactingness toward and respect for the cadres, inviolable discipline and support for bold useful initiatives, intolerance of all manifestations of bureaucratism and constant concern for the development of ties to the masses and about the genuine democratism of Soviet society. All this was said, of course, perfectly seriously and even with a sincere belief, possibly, in the justice and reality of what was said.

As far as the nomination of Yu.V. Andropov for the position of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was concerned, it was very laconic. Having for form's sake called Yuriy Vladimirovich a very close associate of Leonid Ilich, who valued him highly, Chernenko declared that all members of the Politburo believed that

Yuriy Vladimirovich had a good grasp of "Brezhnev's style of leadership," "Brezhnev's concern for the interests of the people" and "Brezhnev's attitude toward the cadres".

Having become general secretary, Yu.V. Andropov, who had "a good grasp of Brezhnev's style," operated in defiance of this "style". Forced to reconcile himself to what had happened, Chernenko did not, as could be seen, abandon hopes of becoming general secretary, given the appropriate confluence of circumstances. After Andropov, he was considered the second man in the leadership, but considered, precisely. Here is a highly typical episode of that time. Being in the Central Committee on one occasion, I met one of his aides in the corridor. He asked me to pay him a visit since we had met near his office. Seeing that he was out of sorts, I asked him: "Is something bothering you?" and heard in reply that, yes, he was bothered, but even more bothered was his "boss," who had returned from vacation several days early to take part in an important meeting, and Andropov, upon greeting him, declared: you still have some leave so why don't you go off and make the most of what's left of it, we'll hold the meeting without you. When, however, Chernenko observed that he had interrupted his leave and hastened to Moscow on account of this meeting, Andropov threw out: very well, we'll think it over. Telling me this, the aide added: after all, Andropov is a very sick man, why did he aspire to this office, he should have retired. I realized, of course, that these were not his words but those of his boss. I thought to myself that neither could Chernenko boast of his health, and as far as his personal qualities were concerned, he could not, of course, contend with Andropov.... I would add that the above-mentioned meeting (I was present at it) was opened by brief introductory remarks not from Chernenko but M.S. Gorbachev.

It is the right time to speak about Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov. He undoubtedly stood in terms of his attributes incomparably higher than Brezhnev, and it was by no means fortuitous that, following the October Plenum, it was he, as the press reported, and none other who proposed a most capacious, precise action program. This program was more consistent than had been the case under Khrushchev and was based on the line of the 20th party congress. It incorporated such points as economic reform, transition to modern scientific management, the development of democracy and self-management, the party's concentration on political leadership, an end to the arms race, which had become pointless, and, finally, the USSR's movement onto the world market for the purpose of familiarization with the new technology.

Unfortunately, these measures, which were urgent and dictated by the country's social development, met with no understanding either by Brezhnev or Kosygin or other influential members of the Politburo at that time. The result of the step taken by Andropov was his own transfer to the position of KGB chairman, which suited both Suslov, who suspected Andropov of having his eyes on his position, and at the same time Brezhnev, who aspired to have at the head of the KGB a dependable person in order to secure himself against the "trick" which had been

played on Khrushchev. For greater surety he kept under Andropov as first deputies and spies his own trusty people—his fellow countryman Tsinev and the above-mentioned Tsvigun.

Despite his severe illness, Yu.V. Andropov, having become general secretary, made a substantial contribution to the work of the party Central Committee on surmounting the difficulties which the country had encountered. Our people pay tribute to him for all the good that he did in the interests of the party and the state, for his ability to think broadly and on a large scale and for his high scrupulousness, exactingness and personal decency. But Lenin taught us to see in this figure or the other both his merits and his shortcomings and weaknesses, both the pluses and minuses. As far as Yu.V. Andropov is concerned, the political responsibility not only for the stagnation phenomena in the country in the "Brezhnev era" but also for the serious shortcomings, blunders and breakdowns even in the work of the KGB, which he headed for many years, cannot, I profoundly believe, be removed from him. Yes, in this office Yu.V. Andropov did much to improve the activity of the KGB, but at the same time, most regrettably, it is also true that it was at that time that the "witchhunt" in the country began, the enemy image was persistently created and incredibly harsh methods of combating the dissident intelligentsia were employed. There was in those years in many instances an unwarranted "brain drain" overseas. In the struggle against dissidence the KGB, together with other departments, employed at times methods which were absolutely savage in nature and form. What was the point of the destruction of an exhibition of nonconformist artists in 1974 in Moscow, when bulldozers were employed? Incidentally, as PRAVDA reported, the organizer of this exhibition of sad memory, A. Glezer, ending up in the West, created in Paris and New York two museums of Russian contemporary art and now, profoundly in sympathy with the transformations which have begun in his compulsorily abandoned motherland, has announced the formation of an International Association of Intellectuals in Support of Perestroika and promises to transfer 300 paintings, of which 50 belong to him personally, to a future museum of contemporary art in Moscow....

Nor is there any escaping the deplorable fact that the end of the 1960's, all of the 1970's and the start of the 1980's were marked in our country by a wide-ranging campaign pertaining to the struggle against so-called dissidents or "prisoners of conscience," whose statements were declared slander of the Soviet social system. Things were not confined, however, to trials, imprisonment and exile. Psychiatric hospitals, to which absolutely healthy people were sent, were used to tame the dissidents. Such was the case, for example, with the now deceased Gen Petr Grigoryevich Grigorenko, a hero of the Great Patriotic War, and the well-known biologist Zhores Medvedev, who now lives in England and who has published several books which have evoked the great interest of readers overseas. Incidentally, the currently popular historian Roy Medvedev, brother of Zhores, who has long been widely known in the West for his works published there, "moved"

for many years among the parasites and dissidents. An interesting fact: as secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu.V. Andropov not only did not condemn, as R.A. Medvedev himself reported in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI of 12 February 1989, his work on the book "Let History Judge" but advised him to continue it even. However, having shortly after become KGB chairman, Andropov conveyed to Medvedev his desire that he continue the research that he had begun, but not publish the MS abroad for otherwise steps would be taken against the latter, and he, Andropov, would not be able to help him. Medvedev did not heed the advice, and his first important work, devoted to Stalin and the Stalin times, was published in the United States, after which he was expelled from the party for slander of "the Soviet social system". Grishin declared in the gorkom bureau at that time: "We have a different attitude toward Stalin now." Following the death of Yu.V. Andropov, three KGB officers kept watch on Medvedev's apartment for a whole 18 months and checked out everyone who entered.

I would note also that Roy Medvedev, not even himself suspecting it, possibly, was the person who was to blame for the suffering in 1982 of Sochi inhabitant A.P. Churkin, who was sentenced by the Krasnodar Kray Collegiate Court to 6 years imprisonment; among the most "dreadful" charges was the following: "For the purpose of undermining and weakening Soviet power, having become good friends with Moscow inhabitant Roy Medvedev, he received from him printed works published abroad...."

An unprecedented measure of struggle against dissidence in the post-Stalin period was banishment without trial and investigation. In this way was the "chief dissident," Academician Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, sent to Gorkiy, which was simultaneously accompanied by a campaign of slander against him, when a variety of "protests" by writers, composers and workers was published. A "denunciatory" letter entitled "When Honor and Conscience Are Lost" (PRAVDA, 29 August 1973) and signed by 40 academicians who displayed pusillanimity and who did not venture, as did, for example, Academician V. Goldanskii, to come to Sakharov's defense, was also composed, among others, in the quiet of offices. Matters did not end with the letter. Persistent attempts were made to have Sakharov expelled from the USSR Academy of Sciences, but, to the credit of the majority of members and the displeasure of the organizers of the persecution, this attempt was foiled. It remains only to be regretted that the Academy was unable to protect the outstanding scientist and honest individual against the oppression, humiliation and outrages against his name; the book "The CIA Against the USSR," whose author, N. Yakovlev, heaped dirt on the scientist known worldwide, cannot, in my view, be called anything other than an outrage.

The scale of the repression of those years cannot, of course, in any way be compared with the Stalin years. But merely the fact that this occurred after the 20th and 22d party congresses cannot fail to shock. There is no justifying the fact that cold winds began to blow after the "thaw". To blame here, of course, are not only officers of the KGB and

its leaders, although their contribution was undoubtedly considerable. And I have to agree here with A.D. Sakharov, who writes that on the one hand the KGB authorities, thanks to their elite character, were almost the sole force not touched by corruption and which were for this reason opposed to the mafia and, on the other, embarked on the ruthless persecution of dissidents. This contradiction and duality were undoubtedly reflected, in Sakharov's opinion, both in the personal fate and the positions of Yu.V. Andropov, leader of the KGB. In fact, had not Andropov formerly lent powerful impetus to the exposure of corruption and the organized crime of our home-grown mafiosi, there might have been no notorious "Uzbek," "Krasnodar" and "Moscow" affairs. As the investigators for particularly important cases of the USSR Procuracy themselves acknowledge, the participation of the KGB in the course of the investigation performed a decisive role in, for example, the case of the not-known Tregubov, who, enjoying Grishin's protection, perpetrated the most serious crimes for many years.

But, on the other hand, and A. Golovkov writes about this perfectly correctly in OGONEK (No 4, 1989), it was KGB officers in the Brezhnev era who literally cooked up the "cases" of certain true patriots, pursued them through courts "merely obeying the law" and dispatched them to excruciating torments in strict-regime colonies and exile. There the same "servants of the law" mocked the prisoners in every possible way and created new "cases" on contrived pretexts, which entailed for the prisoners new sentences and new torments. Bringing people to the point of total despair, they forced them to "repent" of their sins and crimes, which they had not committed: these characters were shown on Central Television, and articles about their "seeing the light" were published in the papers. The "method" smacked, as we can see, very much of that employed by Stalin's secret police. True, speaking of a Ukrainian investigator, KGB Major Zinchenko, the author observes that he was a polite and quite intelligent person and unlike the former sadists from the NKVD. But this "polite" and "quite intelligent" person fabricated a case against a totally innocent individual—high school teacher V.I. Belikov—who had compared Brezhnev's regime with a missile which was out of control. He was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and 5 years exile by the Kiev Collegiate Court. The same fate befell the "particularly dangerous criminals" F.F. Anadenko, major of the reserve, and Lt Col V.S. Volkov, whose entire guilt consisted of their having sent the PRAVDA editorial office an article in which they asked for an answer to the question concerning the origins of the cult of Stalin's personality, calling attention here to the "slowness of the return to Leninist principles." And it was only by a ruling of a Supreme Court plenum of 27 September 1988 that they were both fully rehabilitated, the sentence of the Kiev Municipal Court and all subsequent findings in respect of them rescinded and "proceedings" suspended for the absence in their actions of elements constituting a crime....

All these contradictory facts pertain once again to the period when the head of the KGB was none other than Yu.V. Andropov. When one links all this with his name,

one involuntarily wonders: how could this person with his high principles and who rightly believed that it was essential to pursue the course of the 20th party congress more consistently suddenly himself act the part of persecutor of those who had dared raise the most urgent problems of political, religious and national life and freedom of creativity. The most convincing explanation, in my view, is that he was under strong pressure from above, particularly on the part of such figures as Suslov, although, I repeat, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Andropov himself.

It is particularly painful for me to write about all this since I sincerely respected Yu.V. Andropov. I would note, incidentally, that your author expressed his attitude toward him in the article "A Life Given to the People," which was published in PRAVDA on 15 June 1984 in connection with Yu.V. Andropov's 70th birthday, although at the head of the party and the country at that time was a person who, putting it delicately, was not at all fond of the latter. But facts are facts, and they cannot be ignored.

Since we have been dealing with the state security authorities, I would like to touch on a number of points connected with the present time. I emphatically disagree with those who believe that the facts which have been made public (and even more of them will certainly be made public in the future) of the monstrous Stalin lawlessness and mass repression and the extermination of millions of innocent people stain not only all Cheka personnel of that time but also the present body of KGB officers, regardless of when they joined the authorities and how they have proved themselves. All generalizations are harmful and therefore impermissible. That Soviet people have a right to demand of KGB workers—both senior officers and the rank and file—active participation in analysis of what was connected with the scandalous tyranny, the flouting of socialist legality and the mass repression and of the fact that the state security authorities were out of control and were placed above the party and the state is another matter. Only then will we be able to learn the necessary lessons from the past and formulate and create firm guarantees precluding arbitrariness and lawlessness.

Unfortunately, the KGB officers have been a long time silent. Their articles in the press have begun to appear only in most recent times. And have not always been sufficiently self-critical, what is more, but have frequently contained a whiff of the old approaches and stereotypes. Why, for example, has the criticism of us on the part of the West, when it has been a question of compliance with the Helsinki agreements on humanitarian problems, been seen until most recently as interference in our internal affairs? A remarkable, profoundly analytical article by KGB employee V. Rubanov entitled "From the Cult of Secrecy to the Information Culture" was published in the journal KOMMUNIST (No 13, 1988). The sole thing it was lacking, in my view, was this self-critical approach: it was, after all, the KGB authorities which performed the decisive role in the fact that together with prudent and justified

measures pertaining to the protection of official and military secrets what are not secrets and cannot be such was classified at the same time also, and this did considerable damage to society.

As far as the Stalin times are concerned, a most painful and tragic manifestation of which was the ferocious, frequently butcher-like and utterly uncontrolled activity of the state security authorities, this is mentioned, as a rule, in general form, and an inaccurate characterization of both the events of past years and the sinister role of the KGB in these events is frequently made. The newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (No 52, 1988) published material in the column "The USSR KGB Reports and Comments" on a party conference of the KGB which said that the conference dealt also with "the mistakes and costs of the past." What kind of "mistakes" and what kind of "costs," if the authors of the publication themselves go on to talk about the mass repression of the period of the cult of personality (without naming Stalin for some reason or other) "which carried away hundreds of thousands of lives of totally innocent people, Chekists included."

It is true, of course, that among those subjected to repression there were Chekists also. Some 20,000, as the press reports, among whom were highly professional officers, outstanding intelligence officials and communists selflessly devoted to the party. Also true is the fact that both among the Chekists who died and among those who survived there were also those who, risking not only their office and position but their life itself even, did the maximum possible to alleviate the lot of the innocent people and at times even saved them from certain death. We thus learned that it was a Chekist who prevented the arrest of Mikhail Sholokhov and thereby saved his life. I still recall the following fact: in December 1969 the PRAVDA editorial office had prepared a private survey of the responses to an article devoted to the 90th birthday of I.V. Stalin, among which mention was made of the letter of Volgograd inhabitant K.I. Flug, who wrote: "I am one of those who was an innocent victim of the bloody Dzhugashvili.... I spent 22 years in prisons, camps and exile right up to my rehabilitation in 1955.... And had it not been for the real communists who were encountered among those working in the Gulag, my death, like that of hundreds of my comrades in misfortune, would have been inevitable."

All this is so, and this discussion could go on for a long time. However, there was among the Chekists a great, great multitude of large and small Yezhov's, Yagoda's, Yevdokimov's, Merkulov's, Khvat's and Kabulov's, real executioners and sadists; many of them, like, for example, former NKVD investigator and now "man of learning" Boyarskiy or that same notorious Khvat are tranquilly living out their days in official houses, in receipt of a pension....

"We have no idea what the people working in the vast KGB buildings are doing in the field of domestic policy," the scholar L. Batkin protests in OGONEK (No 50, 1988). "I have heard nothing about a cutback in this apparatus. It is working! On what? What are its assignments within the

country? Democratization and glasnost mean, in my view, that the extent of such assignments is narrowing sharply and that, consequently, there should be a reduction in the apparatus. Is it foreseen?"

"My imagination is struck also by the magnificent new building on Lubyanka. The architect has created an architectural image of great impressive power," an OGONEK reader shares his opinion (No 39, 1988). This was about the new KGB building, but somewhat earlier, after all, the same organization had built for itself just as, if not more, impressive a building. Its erection began simultaneously with the construction of the Ministry of Defense building in Arbat Square. One had the impression that these two departments were competing with one another, as it were, in the scale of the construction. The KGB came out the winner; it subsequently left its kindred department altogether far behind, having quickly built that same palace about which OGONEK wrote. I would note that literally opposite this "palace" is the building of the celebrated Polytechnical Museum, a kind of Moscow relic, which has long been in need of major renovation. As the press writes, the museum has no special repositories and has for decades been "running" the current exhibitions, although it possesses the richest archives and collections of rare books, which are as yet inaccessible, on account of the overcrowding, for extensive use and study. The Great Hall of the Polytechnical Museum, where V.I. Lenin, A.V. Lunacharskiy, I.M. Sechenov, K.A. Timiryazev, N.Ye. Zhukovskiy, S.I. Vavilov, V.V. Mayakovskiy and S.A. Yesenin spoke and which was known to the whole country, has been lost on account of the dangerous condition of the roof. A special decree of the USSR Council of Ministers officially declared the Polytechnical Museum the head museum of the history of the science and technology of the USSR, but, given its present condition, it cannot perform the functions with which it has been entrusted. Why should the KGB not help the museum, conveying to its neighbor "an architectural image of great impressive power"? This would be not simply a handsome but, what is most important, needed and warranted gesture, the more so in that the KGB, to judge by the new buildings which have been erected, does not have to complain about overcrowding, and this is primarily a political question, what is more. Why even in Stalin's times did the KGB "make do" with the old building on Lubyanka, but now, in the era of democratization, has suddenly found it cramped and necessary to expand so appreciably? Not to mention the most serious nature which has been assumed in Moscow by the housing problem and how difficult it is for our museums—not only the Polytechnical but also the V.I. Lenin Museum, the Tretyakov Gallery, the History of Moscow Museum, the V.I. Lenin Library—to get by.... Incidentally, under Khrushchev the construction of a building for the RSFSR government and the Supreme Soviet and certain other facilities was set aside—the resources were transferred to the construction of housing and Moscow's urgent needs. Is the seriousness of this problem less now?

In their public protests—written and verbal—people of the most diverse professions are reasonably noting that the

KGB lives in some way a self-sufficient, completely independent life, that there is an absence of a social institution monitoring its activity and that there is absolutely no actual accountability to society. In fact, this department remains even today the sole closed or virtually closed zone, perhaps. Yet this is contrary to Leninist traditions. As is known, shortly after the formation of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee deemed it expedient to create a special commission under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin to formulate measures pertaining to the increased supervision by the party and the Soviet Government of the activity of the Cheka and the strengthening of revolutionary legality. The arrests of people on false information were the reason for this decision. The Cheka was required to strictly punish, as far as execution, false informing. Later V.I. Lenin raised the question of the need "to propose the firm slogan of the exercise of greater revolutionary legality" and in this connection "to reform the Cheka, define its functions and authority and confine its work to political assignments...." This proposition was of fundamental importance and formed the basis of the decision of the Ninth Congress of Soviets, which deemed it essential to narrow the range of activity of the Cheka and its bodies, and also the All-Russia Central Executive Committee decree of 6 February 1922 on the abolition of the Cheka. The mission of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Main Political Administration (GPU), which was formed on the basis of the latter, no longer included judicial-investigation functions. The People's Commissariat of Finance, which was headed by the revolutionary and Leninist G.Ya. Sokolnikov, had cut the appropriations for the security authorities, and this approach was the rule. Once in conversation with F.E. Dzerzhinsky, saying that it was necessary to spend the people's money economically, he expressed the very interesting consideration: "Supply gives rise to demand. The more money your officers receive, the more inflated cases there will be. Such is a specific feature of your highly important and dangerous institution." Officers of the authorities subsequently exacted "vengeance" on Sokolnikov: he was done away with in the ranks of other of V.I. Lenin's associates....

Today, however, when the process of the democratization of society is broadening and intensifying, safeguards against a repetition of the mistakes of the past are more important than ever. There is the question of constant supervision of the activity of the KGB—party, state and public. In their official speeches and publications senior KGB officials invariably repeat that they work under the leadership of the party and its Central Committee. True, of course, but it is, after all, not only the party but also the state and society which should know, with regard for the specific features of the KGB, of course, what the state security authorities are doing and how and in what way they are tackling their assignments. Yet until most recently in the republics, for example, the KGB would go to the councils of ministers, if at all, only on economic issues, although in the not-too-distant past the very institution was called "Committee of State Security at the Council of

Ministers of the USSR" (or of the corresponding republic). There was no question of supervision of the KGB on the part of the Supreme Soviet since the highest organ of state power had practically nothing to do with the activity of the state security authorities.

Let us specify for the sake of clarity the question of party leadership of the work of the KGB. Not in the know as regards the way in which the Central Committee and its boards and machinery direct and supervise the committee's work, I can only observe that at party congresses the work of the state security authorities is dealt with only in the most general form and positively, as a rule, if, of course, the 20th and 22d congresses are excluded. This is not heard about at Central Committee plenums at all. As far as the local party authorities are concerned, as a person who has been the first secretary of a raykom and gorkom and second secretary of a union republic CP Central Committee, I will say one thing: the leaders of the state security authorities notified of their activity chiefly the first secretaries of the corresponding party committees, and frequently in accordance with the principle of nothing in writing, just between the two of us, what is more.... To a certain extent the committee's officers also had links with the secretaries in charge of the administrative organs department, but after L.I. Brezhnev took personal charge of this department, many first secretaries of local party committees followed his example. Questions which were the prerogative of the KGB authorities were discussed neither in the bureaus nor, even less, at party plenums, as a rule. What kind of supervision was this?

In Khrushchev's time the chairman of the KGB was not a member of the Central Committee Politburo. Under Brezhnev this practice was rejected, and KGB leader Yu.V. Andropov soon became a candidate and then member of the Central Committee Politburo, although defense ministers, say, have in recent decades far from always been accorded this honor. In addition, aside from the KGB chairman, the CPSU Central Committee has included (and continues to include) several of his deputies, which was never previously the case, even under Stalin.

I have been told by people in the know that the question of regulation of the situation concerning personal protection of the central leadership was raised in Khrushchev's time, but that Suslov and certain others emphatically opposed this. Of course, no one questions the need for the protection of leading persons, for the leader of the party and the country even more. In all other instances it is necessary, it would seem to me, to maintain a sense of proportion, and, of course, the protection of leaders of the republic party authorities should hardly be reintroduced.

Of course, much depends on the leader himself. I was once holidaying in a sanatorium near Moscow at the same time that A.N. Kosygin and a secretary of the Central Committee, who had only just been elected and who prior to this had been one of Brezhnev's numerous aides, were there for treatment. And? Intoxicated with his own greatness, the secretary would stroll around the grounds of the sanatorium (private, essentially) with a sullen expression

on his face accompanied by two bodyguards, while the head of the government would meanwhile be strolling about with ministers and officials with whom he was acquainted, conducting a lively, relaxed conversation, which was interspersed with jokes and laughter. I observed a similar picture many years ago in the Kislovodsk "Krasnye kamni" Sanatorium also. A.N. Kosygin and A.N. Shelepin (both members of the Politburo) would mix without ceremony and readily with the vacationers, but P.Ye. Shelest, who arrived after them and who was at that time first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, it not being enough that he had ensconced himself at an official dacha neighboring the sanatorium (this was not in fact surprising at that time), he had brought with him a sizable retinue also. He would even walk about the sanatorium grounds accompanied by a guard and would conduct himself like a lord.

And does the protection of the houses and entrances in which members of the central leadership, and, once again, not leading persons, live not seem an anachronism in our time? Plain-clothes officers mooch about around the clock, even when the "wards" are not at home, receiving for this substantial wages, what is more. And one is even more puzzled when one learns that even former members of the leadership and their families are being served....

The work of the KGB needs updating, but this could largely remain a pious wish if there is no state security act which clearly delineates the framework of this organization's activity. Only a law, only the strictest supervision, glasnost and democratization will safeguard both the Chekists and all of us against relapses into the tragic phenomena of the distant and recent past.

Having made this digression, I shall return to the question for the sake of which I embarked on these observations—the political responsibility of those who were among Brezhnev's closest associates—and I will highlight particularly a period when the Brezhnev era was on the wane and the question of a successor to the leader, who, true, was now a purely formal, symbolic leader, had inevitably arisen....

In the issue for 12 October 1988 the newspaper IZVESTIYA published what was, in my view, an interesting letter from reader M. Sandler from Yoshkar-Ola, which said: there are many publications in the newspaper about Stalin, but it is too timid in illustrating history closer to us. How could it have happened, the reader asks, that the terminally sick Chernenko became general secretary, and we were there and then rushing with all our might to find the frontier post at which he served? "It is difficult," he continued, "to write about this, but necessary if we wish to believe in glasnost completely."

To believe in glasnost completely much needs to be addressed.

The fact, for example, that in the "Brezhnev" era it had become the practice to put up busts of senior officials who had twice been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, not in the "hero's native parts," as stipulated by the

Conferment Edict, but chiefly in republic, kray and oblast centers or, if the worst came to the worst, in a city very close to the place of birth. It would sometimes come to be a question of embarrassments of a political tinge. A graphic example is the story concerning the installation of a bust of M.S. Solomentsev, who, incidentally, once worked in Kazakhstan as second secretary of the Central Committee, but, following one piquant story, was forced to beat a hasty retreat from the republic. But he was taken care of, and none other than Brezhnev helped him move to the position of first secretary of the Rostov Obkom, whence the latter ultimately made his way to Moscow.

Now about the bust "in the hero's native parts". M.S. Solomentsev had been born in a village located a certain distance from the ancient Yelets, which is now a part of Lipetsk Oblast. It was in Yelets in a small square which had been laid out specially and well maintained that a bust of him, which had been made by L.Ye. Kerbel, the creator, incidentally, of monuments to Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, was erected.... The choice of site, the layout of the square and the installation of the bust had been directed by a Solomentsev aide, who visited the place often. It was not fortuitous that all was done to the highest standard. True, one "trifle" had been overlooked—the fact that Lenin Square, which neighbored the small square, and the sculpture of the leader installed therein were in the most deplorable condition. Angry letters were addressed to various authorities, central included, from the townspeople, following which urgent steps had to be taken: a new sculpture of Lenin to be ordered, and the square to be given a fair appearance, although even today it is still manifestly inferior to that in which the bust of Solomentsev stands. Even traffic had been banned until recently on the territory adjoining the square....

I will never forget the repulsive political show staged at the time when Chernenko already had one foot in the grave. During the campaign for elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet television transmitted from a suburban hospital—the whole country was shown K.U. Chernenko, who was dropping his vote in the ballot box, receiving a few days later provisional certification of his election as member of the Supreme Soviet and reading a speech of thanks, which he had been forced to read, and it could be seen what all this was costing him. The organizer of these most absurd acts had been V.V. Grishin, former first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, who was laying claim to the office of general secretary. It was he, and not Chernenko, who needed this show, which shamed and disgraced us before the whole world and engendered scorn and malicious anecdotes. Forcing a terminal patient to pose before the television cameras—what could be more absurd and blasphemous! But what is not done for the sake of one's career, for the sake of the beguiling prospect of being the first in the party and the country!

Recalling and analyzing all these facts and thinking over my experience of life, I frequently wonder: what must be done to ensure that the past is not repeated? Of course, it is extremely important to have done with the old braking mechanism, have done with the accumulated backwaters

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of immorality, falsehood and hypocrisy and revive the Leninist ideas and rules of party and state life, which were forgotten and at times deliberately cast aside in the times of the Stalin and Brezhnev business. A most important lesson and guarantee of the irreversibility of the salutary processes of perestroyka, in my view, would be to completely preclude, with the aid of democratic mechanisms and structures, a situation whereby the fate of the party and the people is determined, as was the case in the recent past, by all kinds of chance and the egotistic interests of

conservative forces in the party's leading nucleus, which are far from the interests of society and in howling contradiction to Lenin's principles of party and state life.

But this topic requires a separate discussion.

**Footnote**

\* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 44, pp 328-329.

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**Literary Critic on Nostalgia for Authoritarian Rule**

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[Article by Natalya Ivanova: "The 'Iron Hand' Syndrome"]

[Text] The euphoria we all felt thanks to the heady possibilities of glasnost is over and has been replaced by a different feeling, that of growing alarm. Weariness has set in, caused, among other things, by the sense that everything has been said. Democratization has become complicated by another, parallel process of social destabilization, with interethnic strife and strikes and work stoppages by workers shaking up the country. This new social climate first emerged back in December 1986 in Kazakhstan, and has become especially evident after the Congress. Political scientist A.Migranyan, in an article published in NOVYY MIR (No.7), paradoxically called for the strengthening of authoritarian rule and in an interview with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, he and I.Klyamkin further elaborated on their idea that in the present situation, for a totalitarian system to move to a democratic one, we need an authoritarian regime. "Yes, at this point I am for a dictatorship, or a dictator," said A.Migranyan, and I.Klyamkin called for "greater power to a reforming leader." Even a victory by conservative forces plunging life back into stagnation seems less dangerous to A.Migranyan than the rule of uncontrolled passions. I share I.Klyamkin's and A.Migranyan's concern. To me, however, the panacea against destabilization lies not in strengthened authoritarian rule (let us be frank, we have not moved away from it very far yet), but in overcoming the indecisiveness, incompleteness and obvious delays of political decision making. As to the "iron hand", many people now long for it for one reason or another. In my opinion, if these dreams of dictatorship came to pass, it would not but a transition to but an end of democratization. Potential results of a new dictatorship arising from the depths of destabilization are described in Aleksandr Kabakov's anti-utopian futurist novel "Defector" published in the June issue of the magazine ISKUSSTVO KINO.

The action takes place in the year 1992, in Moscow, in the winter after the coup. "From the direction of Maslovka Street come the sound of a large-caliber machine gun firing." In the Kremlin, the First Extraordinary Constituent Assembly of Russian Democratic Parties begins its work. The guests of Russian political parties include many visitors from abroad: Christian Democrats from Trans-Caucasus, Social Fundamentalists from Turkestan, Radical Catholics from the Baltic Federation and Left Communists from Siberia. The president of the organizing committee is a general who enters the Kremlin if not astride a white horse, at least in a white tank.

The country is stricken by famine. Moscow is under martial law. Armed gangs terrorizing the city include militant nationalists, the so-called "Black Undershirts." Citizens never leave home at night without their AK assault rifles. Our own times, when only luxuries where in

short supply and vodka was hard to find, are remembered almost as a golden age. It is different now. "Ahead, somewhere by the Strastnaya Square, boomed an explosion I jerked my assault rifle off its shoulder strap and fixed the bayonet with a twisting motion..." Bullets fan from the gateway across the street. Commission for National Security conducts rough searches. The country is in a midst of an economic depression. Blackened ruins are everywhere; blood has become routine. Everything is rationed. Hatred is widespread: "You did not like Stalin. You did not like Brezhnev. You liked Gorbachev instead. Give me your coupons and get out of here; otherwise I kill you, Moscow intellectual!"

Troops guard "prestigious" homes. Another redistribution is carried out by force. Residents wearing shearling coats and expensive hats are executed ("The Law of Your Redundancy") as "Enemies of Radical Equality" People walk around with trench picks. Accidents and disasters kill tens of thousands. The homeless and the hungry sleep in human piles in metro stations. The good intentions of April 1985 have collapsed. "We started the cure; it was a long, complex therapy. In 1992 we had a metastasis: His Excellency General Panayev."

"Defector" is a warning what may happen to us if our intended changes and reforms fail: a military coup, a dictatorship and a complete destabilization of society. Of course, destabilization will cause a new wave of degradation and a decline of political culture. I want also to note that A.Kabakov's novel, which was written in June 1988, is not, in my opinion, a great work of literature; it is rather a kitschy pastiche of different political trends. But the writer's gift of clairvoyance is evident: in the 12 months that elapsed since its writing so much of it has come true, unfortunately! Incidentally, the author of "Abysmal Heights", A.Zinov'yev, also warns us against the possibility of re-stalinization. He calls today's situation a "process of transition from the conformist Brezhnev regime to a voluntarist Stalinist one." (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No.33, 1989) He thinks this process is unavoidable ("it is an objective necessity and not the question of subjective desires.") My hope, however, is that it is only a possibility. But the proof that this possibility exists is, in a way, Kabakov's gloomy anti-utopian novel.

We have recently marked the 100th anniversary of Anna Akhmatova's birth. An important part of the celebration was the renaming of Vokzalnaya Street in Pushkino (formerly Tsarskoye Selo) after Akhmatova. The event coincided to the disappearance of Zhdanov's name from signs all over the country. Nevertheless, Zhdanov was mentioned time and again during the festivities. As Bulgakov's character Iyeshua told Pontius Pilate: "From now on, we are tied together. Whenever people think of me, they will think of you, too."

Every respectable publication marked the date, each one in its own way. NEVA published the first volume of Lidiya Chukovskaya's famous "Sketches about Anna Akhmatova", which first appeared abroad; ZNAMYA published Vyacheslav Ivanov's memoirs; VOPROSY LITERATURY E.Gershteyn's; OGONEK N.Roskina's; and

DRUZHBA NARODOV printed new research by R. Timenichik. LITERATURNOYE OBOZRENIYE and ZVEZDA dedicated special issues to Akhmatova, and NOVYY MIR has been publishing articles on Akhmatova since the start of the year. Only two thick literary journals ignored Akhmatova: MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and NASH SOVREMENNICK.

In June, during the celebrations, the sixth issue of IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS came out, where next to extremely interesting historical materials there were also items of the new, perestroika period. These included the Resolution of the Central Committee Secretariat "On Covering the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Central Press". After reading that resolution and the Note of the State and Legal Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the Ideology Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy which the resolution approved, I could not believe my eyes and went back to check the date: 29 April 1989. What was the subject of these documents? I quote: "works undermining the authority of the Armed Forces, the prestige of military service and the links between the army and the people." My fellow-critics Lyudmila Spaskina and Andrey Nuykin were declared villains for asking questions about the state of the military that "were subversive in their essence." Their revelations in the magazine DVADTSATYY VEK I MIR—which are truly alarming—were rejected at the outset with the help of the usual cliches and stereotypes, by describing the army as "the school of tempering by life," stating that "thousands of servicemen have been elected people's deputies" and claiming that today the army "participates in solving complex and difficult problems, such as harvesting." Did you catch the tragicomic meaning of the last sentence? I do not claim that everything L. Spaskina or A. Nuykin wrote about the army should be accepted reverentially, as gospel truth. But debates should be waged with arguments and facts. And let us do something at last, for facts mentioned by officers and soldiers in many letters cry out for changes, as do the harsh living conditions of our officer corps and the low morale in units. But no. Instead, the Note harshly condemns the critics for overstepping the limit and calls for fighting "pacifist tendencies", especially in unofficial movements. In order to "raise the level of articles on the subject of defense of the socialist Fatherland," editors are advised to bolster their staffs with "qualified military journalists serving in the Soviet Army and Navy." (Based on the principle that only a fireman can write about other firemen since he has a better vantage point.)

The army has always been a part of our society. This is why the situation in the latter was naturally reflected in the former, and our entire history is linked to the army: not only through the war against Hitler's Germany and the Great Victory, but also in the events of September 1939, 1956, 1968 and 1979-89. Our current reality is reflected in the army in the form of the harsh life of military personnel and their families, the distorted relations among servicemen in life, the outbreaks of despotism and violence and the widespread alcohol and drug abuse. These are the "charming glimpses" of army life that the apparatus is

trying to keep hidden from glasnost. But once the dam opened and the flood started, writers and journalists were the first to speak up about the problems, norms of conduct and habitual, alas, emergencies which are unacceptable in a democratic society and in our army; they did so with an understandable concern. Army brass, on the other hand, as Vasil Bykov noted in his review of S. Kaledin's novel "Construction Battalion", concerned as they are with the honor of the uniform, remain reluctant to admit what has in essence become an open secret, displaying instead the usual intolerance for all criticism from the outside. (ZNAMYA, No.8) Who needs this criticism, anyway? What criticism? Who dares criticize? The Note betrays clear irritation against disobedient civilians. The solution would be to give the job to their own, trusted people, especially if they could be kept on a short leash.

This is the reality behind our literary celebrations. Pasternak's anniversary is just ahead. What will you do to us on that anniversary, comrades?

Replying to the question "What is culture?" B. Pasternak said: "Culture is creative existence. This is a sufficient definition. Let man change creatively for centuries, and cities, states, gods and the arts will emerge all by themselves, like fruits maturing on trees." (DVADTSATYY VEK I MIR, No.5) Culture is the true measure of our freedom. The decline of culture, the disappearance of culture, savagery, loss of human face, substitution of culture for a technical civilization and distortion of culture under the guise of mass culture are phenomena of unfreedom. The breakthrough to culture which occurred in recent years by the joint efforts of philosophers, writers, artists, publishers and restorers is difficult to overestimate. I am not going to list here works which shook up popular consciousness: they are on everyone's lips in any case. We are now awaiting the return to the motherland of books by A. Solzhenitsyn, who proved with his life and art the Russian proverb with which he concluded his Nobel Prize acceptance speech: "One word of truth will overcome the whole world". While Pasternak in his definition of culture stressed its resemblance to nature and the fruitfulness of its development, Solzhenitsyn in his Nobel speech spoke of the victory of art over lies and violence. This is why despotism has always tried either to destroy culture or break, co-opt and pervert it. Today, the entry under culture in the "Encyclopedia of Philosophy" (1983), with its solemn warning against the "exploiters' culture," can only be read sarcastically, as a testimony of its times. Return to culture in its full national and human form, however difficult, can not be accomplished with new vetoes, national isolation, class barriers and the revival of unfreedom. If culture is the measure of freedom, then freedom is also the true measure of culture. However, the word culture is used today for various purposes, including ones which have nothing to do with the word's true meaning.

We often think today of the role of "the righteous man, without whom, as the saying goes, not even a village could stand. Nor a town. Nor this planet of ours."

After quoting these words from the finale of Solzhenitsyn's "Matrena's Yard", V.Izvekov, the author of the article "Opposition" in the Kaluga Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA, goes on to state: "It is a rather rare figure in history and this is why... I propose to bestow the title honorary citizen on S.Yu.Kunyayev, a great modern poet who sings his and our own native land, Kaluga, in his talented and honest poems." I think that the people of Kaluga will decide themselves about awarding the title, but I want to note that, despite all his merits, to call Kunyayev a righteous man without whom this planet of ours could not stand is risky, to say the least.

The role of such people as Tukhachevskiy, Kirov and Fedor Raskolnikov who in the 1930s voiced openly and honestly his opposition to Stalin's crimes is open to different interpretations. However, Kunyayev chose the most original comparison, in my opinion. The victims of the Great Terror are likened to rats. "What to do," elegizes Kunyayev, "if such things often happen in history? In biology, it can be compared to epidemics which occur, for instance, among rats. In the Middle Ages, whenever the number of rats grew enough to upset the ecological balance and man could not combat them, a plague would suddenly break out among the beasts as though brought about by divine will." (DON, No.5, 1989)

The righteous man S.Kunyayev passes his verdict with a speed that even the notorious troyka tribunals, the OSO, would envy. Of late, he has applied himself at the long-suffering area of our native history, where his rampant dilettantism, with flashy, superficial comparisons supplanting objective judgment, could at least be explained by the neophyte's eagerness to be the first to express an opinion. But Kunyayev the professional writer displays inexcusable ignorance of contemporary Russian and Soviet literature. For instance, he regrets the fact that N.Ya.Mandelshtam's "Memoirs" have only been published in the West, whereas for two years the book has been serialized in YUNOST. Having condescendingly patted O.Mandelshtam on the shoulder, Kunyayev is nonetheless unable to rid himself entirely of the invented notion that a writer of non-Russian blood writing in Russian is in some ways deficient. With his love of phrase, Kunyayev writes: "Museum preservation of the allegedly dead culture seemed at the time (in the 1920s, N.I.) the only possible solution to many different people, from Gershenson to Khodasevich. With a feeling akin to that of the discoverers of the Pyramids, they wandered in the 19th century from one name to another and reverentially cataloged their observations. Later, Khodasevich even published a book on Russian literature, under the title of 'Necropolis', i.e., the City of the Dead."

I refer the readers to the author's introduction to "Necropolis": "The memoirs about several writers of the recent past collected in this volume are based only on what I myself have witnessed." The book is comprised not of museum observations about the Russian literature of the 19th century but pieces and sketches on Gorkiy, Yesenin, A.Belyy, Sologub and Gumilev. The word necropolis in this context means a beloved cemetery where ghosts of

those who were once dear to the author, of people who departed but who still live in his memory, rest in peace.

At the end of the article which I have been quoting ("Times and Legends: Ideology and Poetry of Totalitarianism", DON, No.5, 1989), Kunyayev concludes: "In general, with all his talent, Khodasevich often overestimated his own value to Russian poetry:

'I have grafted the classical rose/onto the Soviet wild rosebush.'"

Kunyayev is being sarcastic: how could Khodasevich have neglected the fact that "the branches of that 'wild rosebush' included by then Blok, Mayakovskiy, Yesenin, Akhmatova, Klyuyev and Zabolotskiy." Had he read Khodasevich, however, Kunyayev would have learned that Khodasevich, writing in the fall of 1918, did not have these poets in mind, but was writing about those *workers'* poets who, having not yet mastered poetic culture, "praised each other's mediocre and outright poor poems with a very humorous reverence." (Khodasevich's article "Proletkult, Etc." was recently reprinted in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.)

Khodasevich, who was deeply shaken by the destruction of an entire branch of Russian culture in his native land, saw the destructiveness of these processes and the danger of regression that they presented. But despite his pessimism, he could not imagine that one day one such Soviet wild rosebush would pass a verdict on his book without bothering to read it.

In 1918, Khodasevich noted that "a wonderful quality of Russian workers' audience is its intellectual honesty." Unfortunately, in our age of widespread "semi-education" (in literary circles as well), this quality has been lost by many people, probably hopelessly.

Last February, VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL began publishing an extensive opus by K.Rash entitled :The Army and Culture". Journalist M.Antonov called Rash's previous work "the most notable literary event in the 70 years of Soviet power". Not "Master and Margarita", "Chevengur" or at least "Quiet Flows the Don", but a book of essays by Rash. I was shocked by M.Antonov's words. I am a professional critic but, embarrassingly, I have never read anything by Rash. Another expert, A.Likhanov, seconded M.Antonov's opinion, writing about the book "Invitation to Battle": "K.Rash's work is a concentrate of thought, a clearly marked path which we must follow in order to educate young people and a brilliant encyclical by an educator who knows what needs to be done." It turns out that the Academic Board of the General Staff Military Academy "supported K.B.Rash's candidacy for full membership in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences." Rounding out the high praise, the editors noted that Rash's books "are full of fresh ideas, unusual comparisons and mature... judgements." On that occasion, K.Rash appeared in the journal in the genre of "military admonitions in the field of morality." (Boldface here and below is by N.I.)

You must agree that one begins to read something that comes so highly recommended with inner trepidation, expecting nothing short of revelation. And indeed, much is revealed. The following for example: "the actions of those who do nothing but defend the foundations become revolutionary." Other claims made by Rash are equally original. It turns out that in Afghanistan our troops "re-established anew our ancient military tradition of heroism, deciding the issue of their spiritual superiority;" "there, in the mountains, Pushkin's light of friendship, clarity and lyricism first began to shine. They felt that they were carrying out a task whose meaning was not yet clear to their contemporaries and that they surpassed spiritually men their own age and saw the new horizons."

That undeclared war, lasting twice as long as the Great Patriotic War, caused much suffering both in Afghanistan and in this country, but for K.Rash the ideologist this suffering and the soldiers' obedience to their oath are but a cause for another fresh thought: "We who bring forth such soldiers remain today, as always, the **richest and the most cultured country in the world.**" We will say a little later what exactly the word culture means to K.Rash. I would like to ask a different question now: can one call a country where millions live below the official poverty level, a country of chronic shortages and a country in the midst of an economic and environmental crisis the richest and the most cultured? Do we not use superlatives too often in relation to ourselves? Do we not have to pay too high a price for this superiority complex? In the rich collection of the National Gallery of Scotland in Edinburgh I was struck by one modest object: a precious Afghan rug on which the traditional design intertwined with images of our tanks and fighter planes. Is this the symbiosis of the army and culture?

The term culture takes up half of K.Rash's title, which is why one is justified in wanting to see the author himself display his culture, all the more so since he is a teacher. But his passages on dissidents—or rather those who think less freshly than K.Rash—make one doubt the choice of this word in this context. For instance, writing about a famous scientist whose conduct, moral rectitude and sense of responsibility have earned him respect everywhere in the civilized world, K.Rash makes the following statement: "A Nobel laureate can split the atom but be a total lout (sic!) in life and politics, which are indivisible." In general, K.Rash blames professors for everything. Assessing disdainfully Freud's work in psychoanalysis, Cobusier's ideas about architecture and C. Levi-Stauss' research in linguistics, K.Rash concludes: "And this hogwash (sic!) is published in millions of copies for many decades." It turns out that by using these insults K.Rash is trying "to restore the original meaning to the word culture." As George Orwell once said, "Love Is Hatred".

And cultured people, all those art critics, music critics and linguists, they better stop worrying. The problem has been solved. Goebbel's words come to mind at this point: "Whenever I hear the word culture I reach for my gun." However, it is much more convenient to identify culture with the gun.

According to Rash, "at all pivotal junctures of history, the army was the main, real hope of our people and it often had to carry out unusual tasks." What are these tasks that the army is being saddled with? The ones tested on Rustaveli Square?

Nostalgia for the iron hand defines the moral pathos of K.Rash's work. This nostalgia is associated with the wish to bring back military methods, prop up the siege mentality which distorted the minds of many generations but has recently been shaken and help forge not a thinking consciousness but one that rules (i.e., issues orders) and obeys (those orders). We agree that in the army discipline is indeed an organizing force. But K.Rash uses military methods when discussing culture, consciousness and spirituality. Moreover, he notes: "Perestroyka is a regrouping action before an advance." In light of the above-mentioned ideas, not only his nostalgia for command methods becomes evident, but also the *active idea of an advance*. According to K.Rash, our troubles began "in the mid-1950s, during Khrushchev's thaw" since which time "we have been like a boat without a system or services for seaworthiness." Worse still, it turns out that in the past 30 years we "have been carrying out the fascists' Hitlerite program."

Nostalgia for the time when the vanguard nation (as K.Rash calls Russians) was treated as cruelly as all others, while mockingly being called the leading nation (Stalin's terminology), defines also the pathos of the new letter of Nina Andreyeva, published in MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, No.7: "The flood of angry denunciations against Stalin and a number of other leaders of our party and state" serves, according to Andreyeva, as a "disguising screen" for attacks on our history. She contrasts the "wholesale denigration" of the past few years with the three "glorious" decades of Stalin's rule. To be sure, another letter, which follows this one in the journal, uses statistics to show how much those so-called victories cost us, and how many millions perished in the civil war, the campaign against kulaks and the Great Terror. "In the 1918-39 period," writes V.Pereverzev in his letter, "the Soviet people suffered huge demographic losses amounting to over 20.1 million. This sacrifice was made, in the final analysis, in the name of the lofty ideals of a bright communist future. But can these ideals justify the destruction of so many millions, most of whom were totally innocent? And if so, can we still consider these ideals truly bright and humane?"

Even though the new letter of N.Andreyeva is called "Glasnost Obliges", it is directed against glasnost. "Glasnost without end or limit may become an impediment to social progress," claims Andreyeva. Why, for instance, so many obkom secretaries failed to win seats in the elections to the Supreme Soviet? N.Andreyeva is ready with the answer: because their victorious rivals "adopted the 'parliamentary methods' of bourgeois democracy." The letter is full of various political labels, from "antisocialist forces" to "revisionist element". Behind all these labels is an attempt to resurrect the image of the enemy: "There is ample reason to believe that the antisocialist forces, which

have been active in our country with the help of the revisionist element, have begun in the guise of perestroyka a process similar to events in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968." Hungary has reburied Imre Nagy's remains and events related to the violent suppression of the Prague Spring are being officially reassessed; yet, N.Andreyeva continues to scare us with her image of the enemy.

True, the economy is spinning its wheels, shortages are becoming more acute and inflation is accelerating. These processes play into the hands of those who look back happily on the times of stalinist order and discipline, "when the shelves were full", even though that order was based on peasants' self-like condition, workers' lack of rights and the intelligentsia's conformism. The purpose of the letter is to call for the return of the iron hand.

Interethnic conflicts shaking the country from one end to the other like a chain reaction confirm in the minds of many the appealingly simple, aggressive idea of the firm hand, i.e., of the return to authoritarian rule. The problems can be solved very easily, by suppression and jailings. In this task, the army, with its instinct for obedience which K.Rash lauds, could prove very useful. The argument about freedom is not being waged only on the pages of periodicals, but in Fergana and Sukhumi as well. And it may be decided not by intellectual arguments but by tanks and by force. It may be decided by the military which, according to K.Rash's expert opinion, is in fact culture: "In all the best periods in Russia, the most thoughtful and noble element of the nation gathered around the army"; moreover, "nowhere should a soldier's presence be more natural and appropriate than in Moscow. Naturally, foreigners do not like it. This means that it is good for us." As the saying goes, what is good for the Russian will be the death of the Frenchman. Let Us Turn Moscow into the Model Military Camp!

Much is now coming out of the archives. Previously unaccessible documents are published—so many of them that it is difficult to follow every discovery. IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS in its July issue published previously unknown letters by Gorkiy, including a letter to Stalin dated 8 January 1930. By accident or design, it appeared in the journal next to a memorandum by the famous economist N.Kondratyev to V.Molotov, who in October 1927 became the head of the Politburo commission in charge of drafting the theses on the countryside for the 15th party congress. After thoroughly analyzing the situation in agriculture, N.Kondratyev concludes: "It is clear from the above that for the foreseeable future the issue of the development of agriculture will be, as it has always been, primarily that of the development of peasants' individual holdings (from the point of view of their share in the total), even though they would be organized into cooperatives for the purpose of selling and processing agricultural products and being supplied with means of production and tools." Kondratyev's memorandum is dated 8 October 1927. In 1930, when the process of destroying the peasant was well underway, Kondratyev was purged in the so-called Peasants' Labor Party case. At the same time, M.Gorkiy wrote

a joyful letter to the leader: "this change is of a near-geological magnitude... immeasurably greater and more profound than anything previously accomplished by the party... The way of life that has persisted for thousands of years is being destroyed; it is the destruction of the centuries-old, deep foundation of their life. And this is why... people fight doggedly, very frequently hiding behind this phrase the vengeful feeling of the primitive man whose end is nearing." This is how the great humanist writer welcomed the iron fist which was implementing a great change, the destruction of the peasant. And this is how another intellectual, an economist, tried to save the peasant and was himself killed instead.

This small incident in our recent history comes to mind when one reads articles by I.Shafarevich "Russophobia" (NASH SOVREMENNIK, No.6) and "Two Paths to the Same Abyss" (NOVYY MIR, No.7). The author, who is a correspondent member of the Academy of Sciences and a Lenin Prize laureate, is very much concerned with the fate of the peasant and his culture. But searching for the causes of the tragedy he nevertheless embarks on the same road as the Leningrad teacher: he seeks the hidden "enemy" who is deeply dug in and continues his sabotage activities. According to N.Andreyeva, all our troubles come from revisionists and pluralists; according to I.Shafarevich they are due to the "small nation" causing harm to the Russian people: "The evil shadow of the 'Small Nation' once again silhouettes on our horizon... Knowing the role played by the 'Small Nation' in history (which according to I.Shafarevich was invariably a destructive one, N.I.), one can very well imagine the consequences of its present appearance... The total destruction of the national and religious foundations of life." What is this mysterious nation? I.Shafarevich leaves no doubts about its identity: "the Jewish influence", "under the strong influence of Jewish national feelings", "the Jewish core", etc. The issue of "national self-preservation for the Russians" is to create a "spiritual antidote against it."

Let us imagine for a moment that similar statements about "Small Nations" were made in other regions: in LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA about the "Small Nation" of Abkhazians, in LITERATURNAYA ARMENIYA about Azers, in LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN about Armenians and in LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN about Germans. Could it be tolerated?

As to the decisive role of the "Small Nation" in the destruction of our culture, I hope that an careful reading of the documents cited above would cool off somewhat the rhetorical passion of the Academician's thought.

In his second article, which followed "Russophobia" (take a note of the word: structurally, it is very close to the word cosmopolitanism; it is a pity that our neo-slavophiles cannot avoid Western word roots), I.Shafarevich comes down hard on Western liberals, who in his opinion were "sympathetic to Stalin's command system" and started to criticize it more harshly only after the 20th congress. However, the list of Western liberals which I.Shafarevich provides consists only of those who suit his purposes. But

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

even those about whom Shafarevich writes did not welcome Stalin's command system. Some of them thought that the purges were "grave errors of the regime", others did not trust the testimony of their own, Western side and others still looked at Russia hoping that it would build a new society, free of contortions and excesses of their own world. Also, those mentioned by I.Shafarevich, including Leon Feichtwanger, Herbert Wells, Bernard Shaw and Karel Capek, could easily be contrasted by another group: those whose works have been until recently under a strict veto in this country. I will mention only Andre Gide, Arthur Koestler and George Orwell. To claim that the entire liberal West "was deaf" to what was going on here would be unjust, as would be to use as an example of indifference to our sufferings the U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace, who was tricked by the NKVD: they showed him corpulent guards dressed up in prison uniforms instead of real labor camp inmates.

No, there were honest people in the West as well: writers, liberals and public figures—including sovietologists and kremlinologists—who voiced protest against totalitarianism in all its forms, both Hitler's fascism and Stalin's regime. The wholesale violation of human rights played an important role in this. Today, I.Shafarevich uses this term in parentheses: violations of "human rights" in the USSR.

I.Shafarevich mirrors the logic of the brezhnevite foreign policy stratagem. In the West, where rumors of camps, psychiatric prisons and persecution of dissidents reached, people screamed about violations of human rights; in reply, we said that they themselves had Indians living in reservations, unemployment and nature given up to capitalist bosses. Our correspondent member and laureate revives basically the very same techniques of brezhnevite propaganda: "Plainly speaking," he concludes, "the U.S. lives at the expense of others: at ours and our descendants', whose very existence they threaten." And what about us? Do we not exploit, spill and poison everything in the same exact way, and do we not threaten anyone's existence? Let us recall the news about Chernobyl, for instance, which we got from Stockholm faster than from Kiev.

Comparing Stalin's command system and the Western progress model, I.Shafarevich concludes that they are identical in their Utopian vision and technocratic goals. However, what Shafarevich so uniformly calls the "Western progress model" (also in parentheses), has many individual forms and incarnations: the U.S. and Switzerland, Denmark and France, Great Britain and Sweden are not so identical. The attempt to find the historical culprit in Western progress (i.e., in the subjugation of Russia to the standards of Western civilization) is thwarted by the history of Russia proper: it would be embarrassing to remind a correspondent member of the abolition of serfdom (it was a Western path to freedom, after all), the success of Russia's industry by 1913 and Stolypin's farming plan which meant to allow peasant proprietors to prosper and thereby deal a deathblow to the patriarchal community. (I.Selyunin, in his article "Sources" in NOVYY MIR, No.6, 1988, analyzed the community's deficiencies very precisely and thoroughly.)

All of the above could be discussed and pondered for a long time, since our concern and love are the same—or one would like to think so at least—i.e., our country, its culture and the condition of its people. We could argue about different development paths and about the special historical traits of our character. We are tired of the boring games of perennially immature adults who say two fifths of what they want to say and are silent about the remaining three fifths. But we are extremely ungrateful. We have just begun to straighten out but our spines already want to bend: our spines hurt since they are clearly used to staying bent. Disputes degenerate into rhetoric, whereby it is less important to get at the truth than to throw something at the opponent, no matter what, the closer it is to dirt the better—making use, incidentally, of broader freedoms which the opponents obtained.

Or, better still, to complain to superiors. (Something which in the 19th century used to be called to appeal to the policeman.) For instance, no sooner did OKTYABR publish excerpts from Abram Terts' "Promenades with Pushkin" and V.Grossman's long-suffering novel "All Flows By", the first work in our literature describing the aftermath of collectivization and the horrible famine in the Ukraine, than eager defenders of Russian culture wrote a letter to the RSFSR Writers' Union Board of Secretaries signed by M.Antonov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, sculptor V.Klykov and the very same I.Shafarevich

The outraged trio upheld the best traditions of the recent past: "A Russian journal takes the lead in trying to prove the inferiority of the Russian people and of Russian geniuses... it is guilty of Russophobia. Evil signs of this ugly phenomenon... We ask you to show this letter to the secretaries..." Uncharacteristically, the RSFSR Writers' Union reacted promptly: the review date has already been set to discuss a letter which takes words and sentences out of context. This is a case without precedent, especially since the degree of literary dilettantism of the letter's authors is glaring. For them, a literary work is not something to contemplate or to discuss but an exhibit at a trial. Clearly, for the authors of that document laws of literature have no meaning. They appeal to authorities, not to the truth. As to Abram Terts' book, I could select admiring, loving passages about Pushkin from it, as well. The choice of quotations, however, is not at issue here, nor are concepts, ideas and observations—the three enraged patriots do not even try to argue with them and do not even notice that this is the essence of the book, which, incidentally, is written from the point of view of a narrator, which is an accepted literary technique. A.Sinyavskiy himself has repeatedly talked about it. Abram Terts is a literary character and to get excited about his statements would be pointless, if not ludicrous. It is tantamount to holding one Ivan Belkin or Kozma Prutkov morally responsible.

As to statements on our native land, one can find the following in our native classical literature: "Farewell, unwashed Russia,/The land of slaves and masters,/and you, the blue uniforms,/and you, the people obedient to them."

These lines were written by Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov.

And now about another author of the "Letter of Three". NASH SOVREMENNICK, No.2, published M.Antonov's article stating the following: 1. the good life not enlightened by a "higher idea" "is not for us", "not for a great nation" (maybe this is why we would be better off with an idea instead of bread?); 2. the greatest danger now is in attempts by N.Shmelev, A.Aganbegyan, T.Zaslavskaya, A.Strelany and others "who voice the interests of our rich" to restore the market economy; and 3. even though N.Kondratyev has been rehabilitated, M.Antonov still harbors suspicion "that party members at the time had reason to consider him... anti-Soviet and an enemy of socialism who at a difficult for communists time tried to raise doubts as to the possibility of building a new, just society." M.Antonov declares efforts to put our economy on a firm economic footing nothing but attempts to force "the tradesman's ideology" upon us; he also sees as profoundly erroneous the assertion that the growth of the living standard of the population is the ultimate measure of economic policy's success.

But M.Antonov's main idea is that "at this junction, the people needs leaders who are organically linked to it." The people "must realized this vital need" and then "such leaders will arise".

This is the purpose of all those words about democracy.

Dostoyevskiy was thousand times right when he warned us: "There is no concern more pressing and more painful for a man who has just become free than to seek urgently someone before whom to kneel."

The path to democracy will not be an easy or simple one. Going back to the views of I.Klyamkin and A.Migranyan, I agree with them that democracy can not be imported. It can only be... The word "suffered for" comes to mind. Had it not been so overused, it would have been the right word. A sudden transition from totalitarianism to democracy, like coming up from the ocean floor, may be fatal for an organism grown accustomed to living under tremendous pressure. The transition must be gradual and authority must be preserved. But that authority should be based only on one strict dictatorship, that of law. We have paid too dearly for all other varieties of dictatorship.

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#### Single Youth Organization Concept Deemed Historically Obsolete

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[Article by Aleksandr Galagan, candidate of historical sciences: "The Syndrome of Indivisibility"]

[Text] I am totally convinced that the principle of a single organizational structure for the Komsomol, that is the principle of unity at the level of the entire Youth Communist Union, is historically obsolete. This took place long

ago, decades ago, sometime during the change from the 1920's to the 30's according to my calculations.

Any organizational unity goes hand-in-glove with dictatorship and in any case is an extraordinary measure brought about by a specific historical situation. We have dragged this "extraordinary measure," this form of social living that is of benefit to all dictatorships, into the 80's and now, on the eve of the 21st Century, persistently continue to sanctify it as the supreme expediency, one granted us by the dialectic of social development.

Throughout the decades historical Komsomol science has proclaimed that the idea of youth organizational unity at the country level has been a total blessing. But what if this idea dawned on the Bolshevik Party long before October and was continuously reinforced and sold, first in the decisions of the 6th RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress (June to August 1917) and then during preparations for the 1st RKSM [Russian Communist Party of Young People] Congress and so forth. But was this how it was?

Nowhere during the 6th RSDRP(b) Congress, neither in the resolution on "A Union of Young People," nor in speeches by the 14 delegates who spoke on this subject, is there even a hint about the need for a single union of young people. On the contrary, there was talk everywhere about organizations and unions for young people. Does this not prove that during those years the Bolshevik party conceived the development of the youth revolutionary movement on precisely a pluralistic foundation?

And there was no talk about a single youth union after October. Hundreds of youth associations and unions with socialist trends were created, operated, ceased to exist and then were reborn in many cities and no one felt that their external differences were detrimental.

Moreover, the idea of a united, centralized union of young people was also not seem as a mission on the eve of the 1st RKSM Congress (October-November 1918).

We get some insight from the stenographic report on the 1st RKSM Congress in VOZZVANIYE which the Orgburo (organizational bureau) used to appeal to unions of young people at the convocation of the Congress. In historical Komsomol literature VOZZVANIYE is categorically treated as a clear-cut demand for the creation of a single youth organization. But this is clearly a strained interpretation! VOZZVANIYE only calls for combining efforts "in general solidarity," coordinating actions at the all-Russian scale and so forth. There was nothing during the congress about merging the various organizations into one union or about joint, centralized work by the various youth organizations. Yet there was good reason for the fact that the congress came together, opened and went down in history as the First Congress of Unions of Working and Peasant Young People.

Delegations from several unions, especially those from Petrograd and Moscow, arrived at the 1st Congress with firm intentions to combine all youth organizations into one union. And as soon as the second day of the Congress

the leader of the Petrograd element, Oskar Rykin, recommended that they "create a single powerful Communist Union of Young People."

The idea of a centralized union met no objections (judging by the congress's verbatim report) and this is totally understandable. Beginning with the summer of 1918 the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat had developed as a one-party system: the Civil War had broken out and, as any war, had made it necessary to create a centralized structure. And in closing the congress, Lazar Shatskin (one of the founders of the Komsomol, its historian and theorist) amid thunderous applause from delegates proclaimed it to be the 1st Congress of the United Russian Communist Union of Young People.

There is one fact that serves as the foundation for the belief that the idea of a single communist union of young people covering the entire country began not there, but during the 1st RKSM Congress. This is the fact that the Orgburo for the congressional convocation did not get involved in developing such basic documents as the Program and Regulations for the congress. The congress developed and adopted only the basic theses for the documents, but the documents themselves were worked out after the congress.

I am totally convinced that the creation of the RKSM as a single union was more the fruit of spontaneous revolutionary creativity than a planned result. By the way, this is precisely how the creation of the Komsomol is described in publications from the first half of the 1920's. This is when, beginning in the late 1920's, during the period when Stalin's dictatorship was consolidated, the first hallelujahs to a centralized structure were heard. And it gets worse. Of course the Komsomol did not stand idle during this process.

As a rule, historical myths or historical lies are started by directives, by "social orders" given by the ruling regimes. A lie that is hammered into the conscientiousness of millions and is in total conformity with Marx becomes a material force and begins to serve as the truth. Historical myths are easy to create and very difficult to refute because they are corroborated by propaganda means and must be overthrown by scientific means—with a mass of regulated facts and well-grounded arguments. But here is the problem: where do you get these arguments and facts if, as before, the archives are sealed?

However, the following is very apparent from available documented fragments: from its beginning up to the mid-1930's the Komsomol was not a united youth organization in the USSR. Literally in very recent years we have learned, thanks to Anatolii Zhigulin's story "The Black Stones" and stories in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and other publications, that it was not even a single element in the 40's and 50's. I specifically have in mind the heroic Communist Party of Young People (KPM) organization in Voronezh.

But let's return to the 1920's. According to information from researchers, there were more than 30 youth associations and unions of very different persuasions operating at

that time. There were the RSDRP Menshevik Union of Young People (1920-1923), the Young Marxists Union in Georgia, the Union of Young Trotskyites in Armenia and the Young Trotskyites in Sverdlovsk. There were actually several dozen nationalistic youth associations such as "Yugend-Poaley-Tsion," "Shommerov" and "Makkaba," religious youth unions and cultural-instructive unions, those of deviant behavior such as the women's "Down with Virginity" Union, the young people's "Union of Lovers of Hard Liquor" (SLON), and others. We all know that a youth movement that clearly expressed the chauvinistic trends of the "Pamyat" variety and was called RKSM (please do not confuse it with the Komsomol which even then was known as the VLKSM), the Russian Communist Union of Young People, existed in Moscow in 1926.

In Komsomol communiques all of these associations came under the heading "non-communist unions" and later "anti-Soviet unions."

We also know that as early as the 1920's attempts to create a Peasant Youth Union and a Student Union and to transform meetings of working youth delegations into a permanent agency were steadily torpedoed. All of these attempts were even then assessed as nothing other than harmful intrigues by youth class enemies. And the phenomenon of youth organizations that were deliberately friendly to the Komsomol caused the followers of the totalitarian system to be especially embittered. The very idea of a pluralistic social-political structure was seen as one of the very serious crimes against the people.

Writings on social-scientific composition were dedicated to the charms of a monolithic structure for social-political systems. And only during the years of perestroyka have we heard about its damaging properties. One would think that it is finally time, if only on a scientific plane, to ask the question, "What is good and what is bad about the principle of a single structure for the Komsomol?"

My own analysis of the problems led me to these conclusions. This principle is good in the initial stage of a youth movement, but its effectiveness is short-lived and cannot be permanent. It is always good from the point of view of the ruling elements in the Komsomol and is always bad from the point of view of those being governed. It is good in extreme conditions (shock work, war and so forth; there was reason for the fact that Stalin improvised and kept Soviet society under the extraordinary conditions of increasing "class struggle" for thirty years) and ineffective under normal living conditions in society. It is always the antithesis of the principle of democracy and therefore the concept of the "principle of democratic centralism" is in and of itself devoid of any positive aspects since in practice it always interprets in favor of centralism.

Having proclaimed itself to be a united organization of young people, the Komsomol generally considered itself the country's single youth organization and "dealt with" parallel structures in a very severe and often cruel manner. The entire history of its further development (from the point of view of the fundamental—until now—

organizational principle) followed thusly: the united [union]—the sole [union]—the uniform [union]—the monotonous [union].

The youth movement was somehow crammed into the framework of the Komsomol and the words "Komsomol" and "youth" began to be and are considered synonymous (just as are "Pioneers" and "schoolboys").

What can be done? The Komsomol is now facing the question of *perestroika*, a question that exists at every critical stage. The answer to this question is simple and complicated. The simple version is very short: we have to re-build and not play at rebuilding. According to Dal, *perestroika* means reconstructing by building or forming in a different way. In a different way!

Lenin wrote about the unavoidable tendency toward over-monopolizing to the point of decay. We have been eagerly looking abroad for the effects of this law for long time. But what about the Komsomol? It is a very real over-monopolization! Having recognized this, we should not be surprised at its current state and must correct this deformation before it is too late. How? The Komsomol has groaned, but has nonetheless recognized the right of parallel structures to exist in the youth movement. It has even more than once already stated its solidarity with many of them. In other words, it has repudiated its former pretension of singularity. But that is not enough.

The Komsomol has already done a lot to overcome its uniformity and is working with difficulty, but has already been noticeably successful in ridding itself of its own stereotypical activities. And this inspires optimism.

But, and pay attention to this, the Komsomol stubbornly refuses to part with its primary, basic trait. It remains united and indivisible. I am totally convinced that by preserving its former "united-indivisibility" the Komsomol will never be able to part with its own monopolistic privileges. By maintaining itself within the shell of a gigantic and awkward monster, the Komsomol of the future will be able under the best of circumstances only to record processes in the youth culture, without being successful in influencing them, never mind managing them.

The famous Soviet economist and songster of agricultural cooperation A. V. Chayanov cited the law of differential optimums which says, "It is advisable to develop any social structure only to certain limits; after that it begins to devour itself and stops producing the assigned functions, producing only an administrative apparatus." The example of gigantic sovkhozes and kolkhozes has convincingly demonstrated the vitality of this general sociological law. We have learned to produce agricultural officials, but have still not learned to produce bread and sausage. And if one examines the activity of the Komsomol under the prism of this law, will we really see any other results?

I think that the conclusion is obvious. The Komsomol must resolutely break up and cast aside the existing model of its organizational structure. It must break itself up into

a number of optimal structures based on a number of groups organized according to the interests and needs and young people.

As they develop a healthy competition among themselves, the new unions of young people (economic, musical, technical, sport and creative) will be combined into a federation under a common name—Komsomol.

V. I. Lenin taught us that "An organization increases strength ten-fold." We always discuss this aphorism in a one-side and distorted manner, interpreting "organization" as an "association" and as a "union" and thus as a social structure. What V. I. Lenin primarily had in mind was "construction." Then what you get is "The correct construction increases strength ten-fold!"

The recommendation to reconstruct the Komsomol into federations was sharply criticized in February 1989 at the 4th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum. But as I understand it, the congress rostrum used the term "federation," when in fact it is called a confederation, and these are not one and the same.

A federation is a union of structures that are managed by a single center while a confederation is a contractually-based association of structures, all having autonomous management. And we must not forget that since its very beginning the Komsomol has and continues to be a federation of national Komsomol from the union republics.

There are no two federations alike. As far back as the 20's many people in the Komsomol objected to a federation along national lines, saying that a structure based on this principle could cause young people to establishing boundaries along "national lines." Alas! It is only now that we have come to recognize their correctness.

I support the idea of a federation association of unions structured along the interests of young people, unions that operate autonomously and are coordinated by a single center. Such unions (for example, ecological) will not recognize national boundaries and will be the ones able to express the international aspect of our social order and carry it out in practice.

There were a number of counter-arguments against this idea at the 4th Plenum. Among them was the fact that young people are dynamic and have changing interests and, for all we know, will begin to change unions as they would change their neckties. Well, what is strange or unnatural about that? Let them change and let them be in two or three unions at the same time.

The plenum discussed the fact that it is very difficult to manage a decentralized structure. What they had in mind was that it is difficult to manage such a structure from the top. But one of the principles of *perestroika* is self-management and therefore is it worth making a management (read: apparatus) problem into an impassable obstacle? That which is uncomfortable to "those on top" does not always bother "those down below." Dialectics work this way and we have to take that into account.

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### Repression of Ukrainian Uniates Described

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[Article by OGONEK special correspondent Georgiy Rozhnov: "It Is Us, Our Lord"]

[Text] All of those who passed through the Arbat at least once this spring, this summer, or this fall must have seen them. The rank of people standing close to the bookstore "Ukrainian Books" for hours cannot be overlooked; one cannot pass them by. There are young people and those already aged, some wearing monastic cassocks, some wearing fashionable suits. They have tired faces; there is virtue, sorrow, and regret in their eyes. They hold icons, rosaries, and banners.

I read them: "To this day, the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UKTs) has not been rehabilitated; its right to legal activities has not been recognized. Services and other rites are equated with unauthorized meetings by the authorities." Another one: "The 1946 Lvov Synod is a falsification, the handiwork of Stalin's satraps." A third banner: "We demand that the mass media speak the truth about the UKTs!"

I agree: The newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV have not said a word about this hunger strike and the reasons for it. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has been the exception but where can one read it?

This is why the participants in the hunger strike talk quietly, in a discreet and at times naive manner to everyone who approaches them and finds out for the first time in his life about both the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Lvov Synod in the years long gone—one more "blank spot" in the history of the Ukrainian people. It is obvious that you do not get to hear scientific treatises here. They talk more about what pains them, their woes and suffering to which no end is in sight yet. Others listen to them and cannot understand: Why at present, given our democratization and more than just tolerant attitude towards religion hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian Greek Catholics have been driven into the underground? Why is Article 52 of the Constitution which guarantees to everyone the right to profess any religion is being violated openly and shamelessly? Why do the people arriving at the Arbat from Lvov, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankovsk tell virtually every day stories of services dispersed by the militia, administrative arrest and fines imposed by the courts on the priests and laymen, persecution of them in the pages of the republic and oblast Ukrainian newspapers?

Requests, appeals, and petitions to religious and lay authorities go unanswered. Tens of thousands of signatures in support of them are left unnoticed.

#### Is there a ban?

All of this is not that simple. Catholicism has appeared in the Ukrainian lands many times as an aggressor. Reread

Taras Shevchenko—it is in his works that you find the sternest accusations leveled at the papal Rome and the policy which was pursued on behalf of the Catholic hierarchy. Look how many uprisings there were against Catholicism and how cruelly they were suppressed! However, the uprisings were not against the faith as such. The people cursed those who brought to the Ukrainian Catholic Church the banners of Hitlerite toadies and their armies aiming to enslave the Ukraine. However, along with the politicos and traitors, there also were believers, after all. As far as the traitors go, they are alien to all—to the Orthodox, to the Moslems, and to the Catholics. We now condemn Stalinist repressions against the peoples who were declared "criminal." There are no criminal peoples and there is no criminal Christianity; it is important for me to stress this principled position at the very beginning.

#### Shots at the Church-Porch

Let us go back in our memory to the year 1948, stop at 20 September, and approach the Church of Transfiguration in Lvov. The service is already over, but the believers are not leaving. They are waiting for the Dean High Presbyter Gavril Kostelnik. He enters magnificently, slowly, and lifts his hand in order to bless the flock with the sign of cross but at this point several pistol shots crackle. The dean falls, dead on the spot, and the young guy who shot him lifts the gun again and presses the barrel to his own temple.

The official version still remains that Father Gavril was shot by Vasiliy Pankiv, a Bandera man, at the instigation of the Vatican.

It was clear to everybody why he did. High Presbyter Kostelnik was exactly the one who as early as the beginning of 1945 headed the Central Action Group for the Unification of the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox Church. This very group convened the Lvov Synod and held it between 8 and 10 March 1946. The decision of the Synod aroused the entire world: It revoked the provisions of the Union of Brest which in 1596 united the Orthodox Church of the Ukraine and Belorussia with the Roman Catholic Church. In other words, the Uniate, or Greek Catholic, Church which emerged in the course of very complicated state and national processes was eliminated in the course of these two days in March, and all of its parishioners sort of became Orthodox all of a sudden. The official organs of these years assured us that an overwhelming majority of the priests and monks joined the ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church in similar unison. Cathedrals, churches, and monasteries came to be under the new members of church hierarchy. The hierarchies of both churches argue to this day whether the Union of Brest was good or bad, and both of them have their own arguments, their own reasons. However, politics is politics, and faith remains faith. At present, I am not inclined toward historical debate and even less so toward theological debate. Certainly, the church is used by this or that ruler but, after all, there are believers. May I be forgiven by Their Eminences the cardinals and the Right Reverend bishops but I will lend my ear to the Ukrainian woman from the Arbat who put in place her scarf fitted village fashion and stretched to me her hands of a peasant: "Good people, why, for what

sins of ours did they take away from us our faith, our church, our saints? Count how many generations of our people have adhered to the Greek-Catholic rite under Poland, under Austria, and under the Soviets. We are the only ones who have not had our temple; we pray, go to confession, wed, and have funeral services for our loved ones in hiding. Good people, what is this punishment for?"

Undoubtedly, someone will reproach me on account of this monologue for simplifying a problem which is complex for the entire Christian world, for forgetting the lessons of history, and generally for playing up to the primitive attitudes of the crowd.

Such attitudes have existed and continue to exist. However, at present our historical experience is sufficient in order not only to avoid new mistakes but also to rectify the old ones. After all, in our desire to punish the criminals or fanatics in Sumgait and Fergana we might take it as far as banning the Moslem religion because cutthroats may be encountered among the Moslems. However, we are trying the murderers publicly, and we are correct in doing that because they do not determine the morality, faith, and traditions of the people. This is why a conversation which at times boils down to general, superficial phrases is inadmissible at present...

At present, in the 4th year of perestroyka which we have suffered for, when new thinking, the abandonment of many stereotypes, and the policy of democratization and religious tolerance have been proclaimed, what arguments are there in order to justify the ban on the UKTs and driving it into the underground?

The first word belongs to the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich Filaret, the Exarch of the Ukraine. The Very Reverend has touched on this painful topic in many of his articles and interviews in the recent 2 to 3 months.

"The Greek Catholic Eastern rite (or Uniate) Church in the Ukraine has not existed for 40 years now. Its self-liquidation began in March 1946 at the Church Synod in the city of Lvov when its bishops, priests, and representatives of the laity announced the nullification of the union foisted on the believers in Brest in 1596. The decision of the Lvov Synod was supported by a majority of the Greek Catholics, and almost all parishes of this region joined the Russian Orthodox Church. What were the reasons for this act? Certainly, not the Stalinist repressions which all of us condemn but the Uniate Church which was artificially created in the territory of occupied Ukrainian and Belorussian lands having outlived itself. The hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church had completely compromised themselves before the rank-and-file believers and the clergy during the years of World War II due to its collaboration with the fascist occupation regime and the nationalist gangs of Bandera. God save us from the legalization of the UKTs."

Here is what First Secretary of the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party I. Postoronto says: "Recently, comprehensive alarm has been caused by the activation of Uniate representatives, their

efforts to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church which has compromised itself before the Ukrainian people. In conjunction with this, oral statements and publications of newspapers reveal the reactionary essence of the Uniate Church, its alliance with nationalism, and explain that the so-called Uniate Church issue is merely a cover for nationalism."

As we can see, the views of the member of religious hierarchy and the ranking party functionary differ little, and what difference there is boils down to the former proclaiming that only the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church has been compromised while the latter levels this accusation at the entire UKTs.

The point of view of the Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the UkrSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers S. Kolesnik is even more specific and unambiguous: "There is no Greek Catholic Church of any kind in our republic. It was liquidated by the Lvov Synod as long ago as 1946."

It is easy to notice that persistent references to the decision of the Lvov Synod on the self-liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are the main and, perhaps, the weightiest argument of the opponents of legalizing it at present. These very decisions are contested with equal vigor by the other side—they refer to the Synod as first of all non-canon and, consequently, illegal from both the theological and lay points of view. This is why we will now move on to thoroughly research not only the documents of the Synod, and not nearly as much the documents as we will the entire mechanism of preparing and holding it. Let us not forget in the process that the reference is to the year 1946 when the units of the Red Army and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] were carrying out extensive combat operations against the armed formations of the so-called Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—commandos of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera's people. Pacification was far away, and violence bred violence.

#### Things Unknown About What Is Known

A lot has been written about the Lvov Synod. As long ago as 1946, soon after the synod came to a close, the quite voluminous book "Deeds of the Greek Catholic Church Synod on 8 Through 10 March" was published in Lvov. One may learn from the book that as early as 28 May 1945 the Central Action Group for the Unification of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches was formed in Lvov. It was headed by Father Gavriil Kostelnik, already known to us. General Vicar of the then existing Drogobych Oblast Mikhail Melnik and the Dean of Gusyatin Antoniy Pelvetskiy became members. Each of them represented just one out of three Greek Catholic Church dioceses in the western oblasts of the Ukraine—Lvov, Stanislav, and Drogobych. It is nowhere said who and when empowered these members of the clergy to speak not only for their dioceses but the entire Greek Catholic Church which, as the Metropolitan Filaret has confirmed above, operated in the entire territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia.

The first action of the group set up by Father Kostelnik was to appeal to the UkrSSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars]:

"...Now that the entire Ukrainian people has united in a single mechanism of state its Church should also unite to form a single Church independent from the foreign helm, into the Orthodox Church which is the Church of our fathers."

Be that as it may, as early as 18 June 1945 the Commissioner for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs at the UkrSSR Sovnarkom P. Khodchenko sent to Lvov a circular letter which even the Holy See would not have ventured to send: "As instructed by the UkrSSR Sovnarkom, I communicate to you in response to your declarative proclamation of 28 May 1945 that 1) The Action Group for the Unification of the Greek Catholic and Russian Orthodox Church consisting of you is authorized to be the joint temporary Church-administrative organ which is given the right to fully manage the existing Greek Catholic parishes in the western oblasts of the Ukraine and carry out unification with the Russian Orthodox Church. 2) The Action Group has a right to coordinate in the future all legal issues in the matter of leading the Greek Catholic parishes and unifying them with the Russian Orthodox Church with the UkrSSR Sovnarkom commissioner for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church at the UkrSSR Sovnarkom and, correspondingly, with local commissioners in the field. 3) In the course of conducting a poll of the deans of parishes and monasteries of the Greek Catholic Church the Action Group should send to the commissioner for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church lists of all deans, priests, and monastery father superiors who refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the Action Group." (Emphasis mine—Georgiy Rozhnov).

I hope it is understandable why I bring this final point to the attention of the reader: What is this if not run-of-the-mill spying and stukachestvo reporting which Comrade P. Khodchenko was calling on the action group fathers to commit? What kind of arguments will now those people resort to who maintain to this day that the synod was prepared by the church rather than state authorities? Should we prove that there is a difference between the episcopate and the Sovnarkom?

However, let us follow the subsequent turn of events. It became obvious, and the Action Group acknowledged it, that the synod could not be held without the participation in it of the bishops of the Greek Catholic Church—what canon compliance by it could there be otherwise? Let us not forget in all of this that the Catholic Church doomed to elimination had at this time its own metropolitan and seven bishops. What about them—did they turn this down? Somewhat later, the member of the Action Group Antoniy Pelvetskiy referred to this matter as follows: "Our metropolitan and bishops did not grasp their mission, as can be seen from the communique of the UkrSSR Prosecutor's Office, and did not justify the confidence." Neither this mysterious communique of the Prosecutor's Office nor the specific expression of the lack of conscientiousness

among the entire Greek Catholic Episcopate have ever been made public, either at the time or later. However, one may infer from the Lvov newspapers of this time that the members of the hierarchy of the local church "could not grasp their mission" since as early as April 1945 because they were staying in the cells of the NKVD prison on Lontski Street.

Yes, there were traitors among them who stooped to collaborating with the hitlerites, and their punishment was deserved. However, there also were traitors among the Orthodox and Moslem clergy who served in the same Hitler's legion. The flock should not be held responsible for the deeds of criminal members of the hierarchy. However, the synod meeting appealed exactly to the mass of believers. The greatest difficulty is with them; members of the hierarchy will always be found. On that occasion, they were also found.

As soon as 24 and 25 February 1946, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksiy scheduled the installation of the action group members themselves, Fathers Antoniy Pelvetskiy and Mikhail Melnik, as bishops. The two Greek Catholic priests converted to Orthodoxy in short order and only after that were elevated to bishops in order to avoid unnecessary idle talk. It is this fact that made it possible, and still makes it possible, to maintain that the requirements of religious canons were observed and two bishops participated in the holding of the synod. However, in the process it is somehow forgotten that Bishops Antoniy and Mikhail became the Orthodox bishops of the flock which still adhered to the Greek Catholic rite, and for this reason simply could not represent the church which they had voluntarily renounced and which they proposed to eliminate for the reason of being unnecessary. When I recently shared the doubts which I began having with the Metropolitan of Lvov and Drogobych Nikodim the bishop even got angry:

"Look who is talking! What if I say that the Brest Synod as well did not comply with the canons?"

However, be that as it may, on 8 March 1946 the synod was held at the Main Cathedral of St. Yur; it lasted 3 days. Two hundred and sixteen delegate-priests and 19 laymen came to it from the four western oblasts of the Ukraine. The conference of the clergy immediately assumed strictly political overtones and felt no compunction about expressing its loyalist feelings to the authorities. At the end of the synod, telegrams of greetings were sent to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Grechukha. Those assembled considered it possible to end the telegram to the last of the three in his capacity as the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine by the biblical pronouncement: "Marvelous are Thy deeds, O Lord, and no praise does justice to the Miracles Thou worketh!"

Indeed so!

The Lvov Synod was crowned, as was to be expected, by a unanimous decision to annul the dependence on Rome and return to the Russian Orthodox Church.

The doctrine of faith which millions of people had professed for 3.5 centuries was banned in the strictest manner.

#### Operation "Cathedral"

I hope that the reader has already understood how complicated and, more frequently, explosive the social and political situation was in which the preparations to convening this unusual synod and holding it proceeded. Even if its initiators and participants acted in keeping with their beliefs, gathering the faithful in just one village was no simple matter, and most frequently it was altogether impossible: At night, unshaven guys with tridents on their semi-military service caps and travelling caps could be in control there whereas in the morning and during the day fine fellows from the NKGB [People's Commissariat of State Security] policed narrow streets and houses. There were daily funerals in the rural and city cemeteries of this sad time. Some died at the hands of "forest people" of the UPA or the OUN, others in the course of punitive actions of the state security forces.

However, no matter how long I have been digging through the archives of Lvov, no matter how much I have been leafing through the files of newspapers of this bitter time I have not been able to find even a hint to the effect that the NKGB organs took part in providing security for the participants in the synod, to say nothing of preparing the synod.

Suddenly, during my last visit to Kiev I had a chance encounter with the interlocutor I had long been waiting for. He has been in the service in the Ukraine all his life, and has been to its western oblasts as a professional and experienced intelligence officer. I believe that the readers will understand that the time has not yet come to reveal his real name. I believe that even the most zealous proponents of glasnost will agree to this omission. Suffice it to say that my interlocutor serving in the competent organs also was a competent man with extensive and versatile education, intellectual and charming. He is slightly over 60, and he retired at the rank of state security colonel. Being frank with me did not come easy to him, and his every word was considered and weighed. The cassette of my tape recorder registered his long pauses and frequent corrections of what he was saying.

The recording follows:

"The attitude of the organs of state security toward the Uniate, or the Greek Catholic, Church during these war and post-war years was determined by the following factors: 1) For 3.5 centuries, the Uniate, or the Greek Catholic, Church has facilitated the expansion of the Vatican to the East. 2) Members of the hierarchy of this church did not only bless the fascists beginning with the first days of occupation but were also both the organizers and providers of religious blessings for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the SS Galichina Division, and the Bandera underground. 3) As early as the summer of 1944, immediately after the liberation of Lvov representatives of the Red Army, NKGB, and Soviet power asked the head of the Uniate Church to appeal to the leaders of the UPA and

OUN to put down their weapons on generous and honorable terms. He categorically refused to do this. In view of these circumstances, UkSSR People's Commissar of State Security General Sergey Romanovich Savchenko reported his considerations to First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev. Several days later—this was in February 1945—Khrushchev communicated to General Savchenko that Stalin had personally made the decision to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as soon as possible."

Being clearly aware of the novelty of this message in principle and even its somewhat sensational character, I am prepared to name to UkSSR KGB representatives the code name of the file with documents stored in their archives which are thus far not accessible for me in the event of possible objections and denials. There will be plenty to confirm every word of the colonel.

The well-known Soviet writer, winner of USSR and UkSSR State Prizes, the author of the famous trilogy "The Old Fortress" Vladimir Petrovich Belyayev became yet another interlocutor of mine on this sensitive issue. He lived in Lvov from 1944 on and was able to witness all the details of preparation for and holding of the synod. Vladimir Pavlovich has surprising memory. I quote from the record:

"The selection of delegates to the synod, their delivery to Lvov, and registration were the responsibility of State Security Colonel Bogdanov who stayed with his officers at the hotel 'Zhorzh' which was later renamed 'Inturist' in the very center of Lvov. I do not remember ever having my documents checked as thoroughly as when entering the hotel and particularly the room where Bogdanov stayed. Of course, delegates of the synod delivered to the city were also subjected to the same procedure. I remember that Bogdanov personally issued the credentials of delegates to the priests and the laymen after which High Presbyter Gavril Kostelnik signed them and affixed to them the seal of the Action Group set up by him in the adjacent room. I also recall that each delegate received from Bogdanov meal tickets and vouchers for 200 grams of vodka—this was post-war time, the time of hunger. On the eve of the inauguration of the synod, I found in Bogdanov's room Deputy Chief of the oblast NKGB Administration Colonel Kozlov. They were both nervous, something did not quite work out. However, eventually the synod opened with surprising quiet; the gunfire which was customary at the time was not heard in the streets. The square in front of the cathedral was tightly cordoned off and was literally blue with the service caps of state security soldiers and officers. Ovsyannikov, an energetic young officer with the rank of either junior lieutenant or lieutenant was in charge of the pass system. I had the impression that he knew the faces of all delegates.

The delegates spoke laboriously and stumbled upon the hard-to-pronounce cliches from the political vocabulary of the time. As far as I know, the texts of their speeches were prepared by Nikita Pavlosyuk, the secretary of the synod.

**Struggle**

What was the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church left with after the massacre of 1946? Only with the faith which its parishioners had not renounced, and are not going to renounce. Everything else—temples, monasteries, their ritual effects, and church libraries—became the property of the Orthodox Church. Sad as it is, it was this respectable robbery that equated the Orthodox hierarchy with the state power sponsoring them in the perception of dispossessed believers. In all of this, it is important to understand that the protest maturing over 4 decades drove the proponents of the Greek Catholic doctrine to fight for their rights which have been infringed on rather than the dogmas of the doctrine.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church made its presence known openly for the first time last year when Christians of the entire world solemnly marked the millennium of the baptism of Russia. Hundreds and thousands of signatures of believers accompanied the petitions sent to the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Moscow Patriarchate. There was, and still is, no response. Similar petitions were received in the equally high echelons of the Ukraine—silence followed. Are we not good at sweeping things under the rug and sowing the seeds of tomorrow's dissatisfaction today?

The issue of restoring the rights of the UKTs arose during the nomination of candidate people's deputies of the USSR. As soon as the 3d day of operation of the Congress Rostislav Bratun, Roman Fedoriv, Yuriy Sorochik, and Ivan Vakarchuk elected from the Ukraine submitted a deputy inquiry to the presidium fulfilling the instructions of their voters. In the inquiry, they noted not only the infringement on the rights of millions of believers but also demanded that a special commission be created to study this sensitive issue. There has been no response.

In view of that, it is hardly surprising that the UKTs activists among whom all kinds of people can be encountered are sending petitions to the Vatican, to the U.S. Congress, to the participants in the Vienna conference, and to the UN secretary general, and secure meetings in Moscow with Ronald Reagan and the Vatican Secretary Augustino Casarolli. It is noteworthy that every foreign addressee has responded immediately to such appeals even if only with the warm and polite words of support. As for us, it looks like we are trying to stoke up the passions by keeping silent...

Articles and letters supporting the UKTs have filled the pages of numerous newspapers and magazines of the Ukrainian "samizdat"; not only the forces sympathizing with perestroika attempt to profit—and do profit—by the situation; words in support of the UKTs are said at virtually every mass meeting.

For the first time in more than 4 decades of the total ban, the religious activities of the church are coming out of the underground. It has turned out that the persecuted and sort of non-existent church has retained not only a flock of

many thousands but also its priests and hierarchy. In Lvov, one may see Archbishop Vladimir Sternyuk and Bishop Filimon Kurchaba, in Ivano-Frankovsk—Bishops Sofron Dmiterko and Pavel Vasilik, in Transcarpathia—Bishops Ivan Semeliy, Iosif Golovach, and Ivan Margitich. The UKTs has three theological seminaries and several monasteries which operate in keeping with all the rules of underground activities. What kind of "Roman times" are those in our time? What kind of informal propaganda in favor of the church is it?

Let us duly praise those of the UKTs priests and their lay assistants who initially strove for dialogue and cooperation with the Orthodox rather than confrontation. Here is just one case. In December of last year, the Charitable Society of Virgin Mary approached the Orthodox priests of the St. Nicholas Church with a request to hold a joint service with the Greek Catholics in the memory of those who died in the Armenian earthquake. They were turned down: One cannot pray together with the adherents of a faith which does not exist.

However, the most dramatic events unfolded a month later when a week of ecumenical services was held in our country on the suggestion of the Russian Orthodox Church. This means that between 17 and 25 January it was possible to hold joint services regardless of the religion of those praying. In early January, an appeal was circulated on behalf of the same Charitable Society of Virgin Mary to the Orthodox and Greek Catholic priests of Lvov with a suggestion to hold an ecumenical church service for the people of the Ukraine on Sunday 22 January at the Main Cathedral of St. Yur. In addition, a similar request was addressed on 11 January to the Metropolitan of Lvov and Drogobych Nikodim. A summons for the activists of the society to appear before the commissioner of the Council for Religious Affairs of the UkrSSR Yu. Reshetilo was the response. It turned out that an angry letter with information on the forthcoming church service and a request to put the unregistered society and the believers of the non-existent church in their place had already appeared there from the chambers of the metropolitan. Those invited were warned that a service by Greek Catholics on the grounds of the currently Orthodox cathedral will be equated with an unauthorized meeting with all the ensuing consequences.

Still, the service was held as scheduled. About 10,000 Greek Catholic believers came to it with their priests. I saw a videotape of this service, and listened attentively to the words which activists of the committee in defense of the UKTs and other organizations which have emerged due to the abnormality of the situation addressed to the crowd. Were they political in nature as representatives of the authorities in Kiev and Lvov assured me? If calls for the restoration of the UKTs or toasts to the honor of the Ukrainian people are to be considered such, I would agree that they were. If we recall that the Sunday 22 January selected for the service coincided with the unification of the Ukrainian lands proclaimed as far back as 1919 then merely a step remains before the service is called a meeting

and an appeal for help from the authorities is issued. Can you imagine, they indeed appealed. I read this:

"To Prosecutor of the City of Lvov S.D. Kriklivets, Chairman of the City Executive Committee B.D. Kotik:

"I am informing you that on 22 January 1989, at 11.40 hours, a group of people assembled in the yard of the Cathedral of St. Yur close to its central entrance which, as became known later, was headed by the leaders of the Helsinki Union, the UKTs Defense Committee, and the Charitable Society of Virgin Mary. These people held a meeting and a service dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the independent Cathedral Ukraine without a permit by the local organs of power and without my consent. The service was conducted by the unregistered uniate priest V. Voloshin.

"By their illegal actions they violated not only the state laws but also the canon law of the church. Specifically, they held their political church service, chanted slogans in honor of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Catholic Church, created among the people a mood hostile to me and the believers of the Russian Orthodox Church using technical means in the process (a loudspeaker, tape recorder, cameras).

"I ask that charges be filed against them in keeping with the legislation of our state in effect.

"Metropolitan of Lvov and Drogobych Nikodim."

Equally angry statements were sent to the prosecutor's office by the Orthodox priests of the cathedral P. Kochkodan, Archpriest B. Shtim, and Chairman of the Church Committee M. Voytovich.

One can imagine what the reaction of the Greek Catholic priests, their flock, and numerous social organizations of the city was to this step by the members of Orthodox hierarchy. The echo of the emerging discord swept the entire Ukraine and, as the broadcasts of foreign radio stations showed, transcended its frontiers. Whether due to these unexpected reverberations or to the disapproving attitude in Moscow and Kiev toward the Lvov metropolitan who was angered beyond measure he soon retracted his petition to the prosecutor's office: "May God judge them for all their deeds!"

Alas, the judicial machine had already been set in motion. On 10 March, the judge of Zaliznichnyy Rayon of the city of Lvov S. Dikunskaya considered materials on administrative penalties to be imposed on those guilty. The judge came to the conclusion that on 22 January "a meeting was organized and held in the yard of the Cathedral of St. Yur without a permit from the local organs of power in which I.O. Kalinets took an active part together with other 'advocates of rights.'" Proceeding from this, the judge resolved to detain Irina Onufriyevna Kalinets for 10 days.

On 26 February, an ecumenical requiem for Taras Shevchenko was performed in the yard of the Church of Holy Assumption. About 25,000 of Greek Catholic faithful took part in the church service. The Orthodox priest from

the village of Staraya Sol in Gorodokskiy Rayon Father Nizkoguz prayed with UKTs priests Fathers Voloshin and Lesiv for the first time. At the end of the service, the priests performed the kiss of peace. On 16 April, there was an outdoor service next to the former monastery of Barefoot Carmelites. About 20,000 believers performed a requiem for the victims of Chernobyl.

However, I would not like to give the reader the impression that the Ukrainian Catholic Church has conquered the souls of all faithful Christians of Western Ukraine without exception. The Roman Catholics and the Orthodox have been living side by side with them for many hundreds of years now. Also, I do not want to assure you that all former uniates to a man have rejected the decisions of the Lvov Synod; there were quite a few sincere allies of the Orthodoxy among them. All of this is normal; it is just that we should not boast the abnormalities. Legally existing churches have not had a dearth of attention from the authorities, especially in the last year to a year and a half. As of the beginning of 1988, there were 10 Roman Catholic and 578 Orthodox churches in Lvov Oblast whereas by now Roman Catholics have dedicated another 10 and the the Orthodox about 700 temples. These numbers were quoted to me with pride in Kiev and Lvov on many occasions sort of inviting me to rejoice in the growing religious tolerance of the authorities. During the week I spent in Lvov Orthodox churches were opening virtually every day.

This campaign just as any other has its badly camouflaged motive. Let me try and explain it, all the more so because it is simple. The point is that any temple boarded up in the period of comprehensive persecution of any and all religions attracts like a magnet the Greek Catholics praying in the nearby forests and fields. There have already been cases of unauthorized occupation of vacant churches by them. This is why the authorities are in a hurry to give them to the Orthodox diocese and thus cool the hottest heads among the Greek Catholics who have emerged from the underground.

There are other, no less dangerous forms of protest. In the village of Staraya Sol which I have mentioned above in passing it came to open hostility between the two communities. "The kiss of peace" which the local Orthodox priest Nizkoguz exchanged with Greek Catholic fathers cost him, as they put it in the lay word, a dismissal from work. The injured dean paid them back in kind and publicly renounced Orthodoxy. Thereupon, he began to conduct church services in the same church according to the UKTs rites with the consent of his parishioners. The rights of the residents of the village who continued to profess Orthodoxy were not infringed upon. They could pray in two churches in this village and the neighboring one. Certainly, the Lvov Diocese could not forgive the desertion of Father Nizkoguz, and on the instruction of the metropolitan a concelebrated service was scheduled in the church captured by the apostate. Eleven priests dispatched by the church superior and headed by the Reverend Father Bilyk came to the village. At this point, an embarrassing situation occurred: A crowd of Greek Catholics assembled in

front of the disobedient temple did not let the visitors go anywhere further than the church-porch. This was an open challenge, open disobedience.

The Orthodox deans lost their parishes in the village of Kupichvolya of Nesterovskiy Rayon and in the village of Susolov near Sambor. The dangerous confrontation between UKTs believers, and the authorities and the Orthodoxy has swollen: There is no better background for it than the reluctance to face up to the truth, omissions, and bans.

### Where Is the Road to the Temple?

No matter who I talked to—leaders of the Council for Religious Affairs or party functionaries, members of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or Ukrainian Catholic Church, USSR people's deputies or activists of informal organizations—all of them heard the same question from me: What next? Are we going to continue to stubbornly maintain that the UKTs "self-liquidated" or will we jointly find a road for its adherents a road to the temple which has been taken away from them?

These are the opinions I have happened to hear.

**N. Kolesnik, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs at the UkSSR Council of Ministers:**

"The newly formed church should work out the tenets of its faith, its statute and program, discuss and adopt them at a representative synod prior to raising the issue of registration. This, however, has not happened!"

I do not want to remind the esteemed ranking official that the tenets of the faith, rites, and canons of the church unknown to him have existed for slightly less than 4 centuries now. Let us consider something else: The Ukrainian Catholic Church lives in Poland, Yugoslavia, the FRG, Canada, and Australia. Thousands upon thousands of our fellow countrymen whom the fate has driven to foreign lands profess the doctrine of its faith. Will we always be able to find a common language with the Ukrainian diaspora which is millions strong if we continue to deprive their coreligionists in our native country of their rights in a humiliating manner? Has anyone thought why a state which aspires to become law-governed allows a violation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Articles 18 and 19) and the Vienna accords? Is this not where people's diplomacy ought to have a say?

**V. Grigorenko, head of the Ideological Department of the Lvov Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party:**

"The issue of legalizing or, if you wish, rehabilitating the Ukrainian Catholic Church is complex and painful. However, it needs to be resolved. At present, now, such a moment has arrived that it is no longer possible to keep silent and sweep the issue under the rug. Historically, it has so happened that there are quite a few believers among the population of our oblast—about 40 percent according to the roughest count, out of whom adherents of the UKTs account for one-half. Perhaps, there are even more of them, and it is inadmissible to shrug off their needs. The

position of the party committee of the oblast on this issue is one: We want to draw as many believers to perestroika as possible."

I will admit that no conversation has calmed me as much and has made me as hopeful as this frank conversation with Vladimir Semenovich Grigorenko at the oblast committee of the party. I do not want to prematurely make public his further intentions; I will only say that they are specific, bold, and honorable.

As far as the manifestations of extremism and the undisguised effort of some advocates of the faith to acquire political capital are concerned, that much is, unfortunately, clear. Say, rank-and-file participants in the hunger strike on the Arbat are concerned only about the woes of their persecuted church whereas a Stepan Khmara who has usurped the role of their leader staunchly advocates the position of extreme nationalism in his speeches. He prints obvious fables in the emigre newspapers of Munich and literally breaks down the doors of embassies of certain powers. Do the believers know that, as the people who knew their leader well tell it, he was so unconcerned about religion in the years past that, as they put it, did not cross his forehead once?

As you might have noticed, I have been referring only to the position of lay persons. What is the point of view of the members of the UKTs hierarchy?

**Archbishop Vladimir Sternyuk:**

"All violence has always been alien to our long-suffering church. It runs counter to the gospel. However, we, the spiritual shepherds, cannot guarantee the impeccable conduct of each of our coreligionists just as the state cannot vouch for its every citizen being law-abiding. However, we resolutely condemn any case of illegal behavior, any hostile word regardless of where it is spoken. Let us assume the extreme case: Our believers have forcibly captured an Orthodox temple. What next? After all, not one of our bishops will consecrate it and appoint a priest for it. I tirelessly repeat this everywhere.

"What needs to be done, to my mind, in order to restore and legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church? First of all, decisions of the 1946 Synod need to be canceled. This needs to be done by the authorities which organized it, conducted it, and foisted the illegal decisions on the delegates.

"No matter how difficult the heritage of the arbitrary rule of Stalinism is for us we will not call for avenging the boundless suffering of our believers, our people. Finally, having been convinced with bitterness of the reluctance of the Moscow Patriarchate to heed our entreaties we do not equate its hierarchy with the rank-and-file Orthodox Church members. Any manifestation of violence with regard to our brothers in Christ will be resolutely condemned by us."

I was leaving Lvov on Saturday, on the Day of Christ Savior. Hundreds and thousands of people were coming to the square in front of the former Catholic monastery of

Barefoot Carmelites. Having stood through the service with all of them I kept hearing for a long time after that the chant of many voices repeated many times over:

"Our Most Holy Lord and the Most Pure Virgin Mary, hear us! It is us, O Lord!"

Blessed are the believers: They had no doubt that God would hear them, take heed, and give help.

What about the authorities?

Indeed, they should not aggravate the situation which has been brought to the point of alarm to begin with. Moslems, Baptists, Evangelical Christians, and Krishna followers are acquiring the the right to pray in our country. Infringing upon what belongs to the people by right has never inspired the people. And on the other hand...

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